


3 1761 11552706 1





Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2022 with funding from
University of Toronto

January / February 1978

International Perspectives

Journal of opinion on world affairs

1
9
I56


Tagging the South African press

Waiting the outcome in Lebanon

Negotiating the pipeline route

Experience with women's rights

The testing of Eurocommunism



International Perspectives

Contents

January / February 1978

the press in South Africa / <i>Christopher Young</i>	3
Lebanon, one year after / <i>André Liebich</i>	8
Negotiating the pipeline / <i>Don Peacock</i>	12
Armaments and things nuclear / <i>W. A. Wilson</i>	16
Experience with women's rights / <i>Florence Bird</i>	20
Testing of Eurocommunism / <i>André Donneur and Alexandre Macleod</i>	26
Update on law of the sea / <i>Barry Mawhinney</i>	33
Letter to the Editor	40
Reference Section	43

International Perspectives is issued bimonthly in English and French by the Department of External Affairs, Ottawa. Any material in this publication may be reproduced. Mention of *International Perspectives* as the source would be appreciated.

Published by authority of the
Secretary of State for External Affairs.

Authorized as third-class mail,
Post Office Department, Ottawa.

Subscription rates: Canada, \$4.00 a year;
single copies \$1.00; other countries
\$5.00 a year, single copies \$1.25.
Remittances, payable to the Receiver
General of Canada, should be sent to:
Printing and Publishing,
Supply & Services Canada,
Ottawa, Ontario, K1A 0S9.

Editors:

Alex I. Inglis
Louis Balthazar

International Perspectives is a journal of opinion on Canada's role in the world and on current international questions. Its purpose is to stimulate discussion and interest in international affairs. It is not intended to reflect Canadian Government policy or perceptions. Indeed, the editors often seek to include material that expresses different or contrary views. The Department of External Affairs accepts no responsibility for the views expressed except where it is clearly stated that an article by a departmental officer is a statement of Government policy. All other articles contain a specific disclaimer of departmental responsibility for their contents.

Letters of comment on issues discussed in *International Perspectives* are welcome and will be considered for publication. Please address your correspondence to: International Perspectives, Department of External Affairs, L. B. Pearson Bldg., 125 Sussex Drive, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, K1A 0G1.

The South African press and the coming disaster

Christopher Young

There is no longer much point in arguing the moral issues of South African policy. It is preaching either to the converted or to those who have long since set their minds against conversion. What struck this traveller on a first, brief visit to South Africa was the overwhelming practical argument against the racial policies of the Nationalist Government. What is so appalling is not just that apartheid remains in all its essential aspects, or that political control still rests with the white minority, but that the trends of policy are towards more repression, not less; towards less freedom of expression, not more; towards harsher treatment of those who dare to test the limits of liberty or press the case for reform. It is like watching a busload of people careering out of control down a mountain highway while the driver guns the engine instead of trying to make use of the brakes. South Africa is rushing headlong to disaster. It is a terrifying sight.

Prime Minister Vorster's decision to call an election a year and a half before the end of his term seemed to herald the Nationalist Party's harder line, especially in reaction to the press. The death in prison of the young black "guru" Steve Biko, and the reaction of the Nationalist leaders to it, dramatized for the whole world the human issues involved. James Kruger demonstrated why his chief parliamentary critic, Mrs. Helen Suzman, refuses to refer to him by his official title, Minister of Justice. She calls him Minister of Injustice, Minister of Prisons and Police, or some equally pejorative name. Kruger revealed a callousness that was almost unbelievable when he said Biko's death "leaves me cold". He even tried (unsuccessfully) to raise a laugh about the matter from the platform of a Nationalist Party convention.

Prime Minister Vorster suggested that, if Biko had not been so well known, there would have been little fuss. This was probably true. Biko was the twentieth person to die in detention over a period of a year and a half, some of them barely noticed in the press. It was the fact that Steve Biko had been recognized as an inspirational leader

by South Africa's black youth, and therefore by foreign liberal politicians and journalists as well, that gave his death its impact. Donald Woods, the white liberal editor of the *East London Daily Dispatch*, had written a column in 1976 warning Kruger that there would be serious trouble if anything happened to Biko while he was in detention.

Vorster's comment was revealing in another, unconscious way. It suggested that, if Biko had been an unknown troublemaker, his death in prison would not have mattered much; only his celebrity gave his death significance. This was typical of white South African attitudes, developed by the conditioning of three centuries. Blacks are not really seen as people in the sense that whites are people. Blacks are seen, perhaps unconsciously, as another kind of being, somewhere between human and animal. It is common, even normal, for whites to be kind to blacks as individuals; after all, most people are kind to horses and dogs too. But the death of a black person, even if linked as this one was to police beatings, would not be seen by most whites as a tragedy or an outrage, as the death of a white man would be.

It was noticeable that, when, following the outcry over Biko's death, Government action was taken against both Percy Qoboza, the black editor of *The World*, and Donald Woods, Qoboza was imprisoned but Woods was "banned". Heaven knows, being banned was bad enough. It meant that Woods could not work at his job on his newspaper, or any other newspaper. He could not leave the environs of his town. He could not make public speeches or express opinions in public on any subject. He could not even

*Blacks seen
as another
kind of being*

Mr Young is General Manager of Southam News Services and a former Editor of The Citizen, Ottawa. He has reported from the Soviet Union, China, Japan, India, South Africa and other countries, and has won a Bowater Award for journalism and a Wilderness Award for television documentary. He was in South Africa shortly before Steve Biko's death. The views expressed here are those of Mr Young.

meet more than one person at a time, except members of his family. Still, it was better than being in prison – especially a South African prison.

Events late in 1977 seemed to suggest that South Africa was abandoning one of its very few claims to being a free country, even for the whites. It was abandoning any pretence of freedom of the press. Like so many other extreme opponents of Communism, the Vorster Government had embraced the more repressive methods of Communism and was displaying the paranoiac reactions that have made Communist governments so intolerant of dissent.

Little vigour

The South African press in general had hardly been noted for the vigour of its political criticism. The Afrikaner newspapers tended to be tame, and some of them were out-and-out apologists for the regime. Some of the English-language papers were compendious rather than incisive. The state-owned South African Broadcasting Corporation usually ignored news likely to embarrass the Government. Its single television channel, which broadcasts alternately in Afrikaans and English, has been on the air only since 1975. I was told by a member of the white establishment that television coverage of the Soweto riots in June 1976 had given white viewers for the first time some idea of what black anger was all about. I cannot vouch for this, but normal TV coverage is heavily biased in favour of the Government and the white community.

Content, a Toronto monthly magazine devoted primarily to news and criticism of the Canadian media, published in its issue of last November a comparison of news coverage done in South Africa in a single week of March 1977. The study was done by Michael Hastings, a television journalist who has been a producer for both the CBC and the SABC, as well as a reporter for the *Hamilton Spectator*. He compared hard news coverage (leaving out editorials, sports, business news, fashion features and so forth) in five daily newspapers and on both the Afrikaans and English newscasts of the SABC. The papers studied were the *Rand Daily Mail* (English morning), the *Johannesburg Star* (English afternoon), *Die Transvaler* (Afrikaans morning), *Beeld* (Afrikaans morning), and *Die Vaderland* (Afrikaans afternoon). All these papers are aimed primarily at white readers. Unfortunately, Hastings did not include *The World* in his study.

The most interesting statistics were in a column headed "bad news" – defined here as "news that could be seriously embarrassing to the South African Government –

mostly allegations of criminal violence, police or illegal police meddling with the ministration of justice". The percentage such news appearing in the media survey in the week chosen at random last March were as follows: *Rand Daily Mail*, 6.1 per cent; *Transvaler*, 2.2 per cent; *Beeld*, 1.5 per cent; *Star*, 0.6 per cent; *Vaderland*, 0; South African television (English), 0; SATV (Afrikaans), 0. Assuming the week was reasonably typical, these findings confirm common opinion that, among the big newspapers, the *Rand Daily Mail* is the sharpest thorn in the Government's flesh. They show that the Afrikaans press is not entirely uncritical. They suggest that the *Star* is less than adventurous in its domestic coverage. They confirm that television news in South Africa is what the Government wants the audience to know and little more.

The Hastings article lists half a dozen highly-dramatic news events that occurred during this week picked at random and gave a negative impression of the South African authorities. One was a decision by the Constitutional Court of the Supreme Court. Others were allegations of police brutality sensationalized to any journalistic standard. These were among the news stories ignored by television and by some of the newspapers.

Apart from this kind of suppression there is another way in which press and broadcast coverage affects the outlook and judgment of white South Africans. Hastings put it this way in *Content*:

Both TV and the white-oriented papers provide meagre coverage of events among the non-white population. Admittedly whites' wealth, education, and political power cause them to be the chief newsmakers, but while blacks generally know a good deal about the everyday existence of the whites (because they work with them), extremely few whites have the slightest notion of what is going on among the blacks, who make up the overwhelming majority of the population. Universal is this hermetically-sealed ignorance that most whites never give any thought.

Prodigies of courage

Yet, despite all this, South Africa can boast prodigies of journalistic courage on a level quite unknown in Canada. In this country, as in the other Western democracies, throwing verbal rocks at the Government is so easy that sometimes it takes more brains and guts to offer a word in defence of established authority. In South Africa, defiance of the Government is dangerous and highly unpopular with the white community. It requires conviction, stamina and a willingness

*First idea
of black anger
from coverage
of Soweto
on television*

take financial risks, as well as moral courage. Donald Woods, a small-town editor who declined all offers to move to the big-city press, is an outstanding example. The *Rand Daily Mail* of Johannesburg, edited by Chester Sparks, is another.

And then, of course, there is the special case of Percy Qoboza. In a paper he wrote for a conference in Cape Town last May, Qoboza said that South Africans of all colours must eventually sit down round a conference table to "devise a formula acceptable for future co-existence". He continued:

Our country is full of noble black men who have been silenced under the security laws for advancing just these types of ideas. Many are called Communists simply because they believe in the dignity of man. Many have been labelled agitators simply because they call for a society where merit and not colour is the criterion by which man must be judged.

Indeed, all those with whom the Government should be talking in the black community have been subjected to punitive actions. The danger is that the time

may well come when the authorities are forced to talk to somebody, and there will be nobody to talk to.

Qoboza's newspaper, *The World*, is a subsidiary of the Argus Printing and Publishing Co., a white-owned, English-language press giant. Argus also owns the *Johannesburg Star*, a fat afternoon daily of the North American type designed for English-speaking whites, as well as other papers in South Africa and Rhodesia. *The World*, a tabloid for blacks, used to be concerned mainly with sex, crime and sports. It was designed for the mainly English-speaking black residential townships, especially Soweto, where Qoboza lived. *The World* was a commercial success, with a daily circulation of about 150,000.

After Soweto

As Soweto began to express its rage by means of rioting and various kinds of illegal or extra-legal political action, *The World* and its editor provided a voice for the muzzled masses of their sprawling ghetto. The paper became more and more political.



Qoboza had joined *The World* as a reporter in 1963 and had become editor by 1974. In 1975 he was a Neiman Fellow at Harvard. By 1977 he had become more than an editor – he was an important leader of the black community centred in Soweto. He was one of the Committee of Ten, an unofficial group that organized itself after the 1976 Soweto riots in an attempt to provide some kind of constructive political leadership for the townships. In this role, Qoboza found himself caught between the whites and conservative blacks who thought him a dangerous radical, and the young revolutionaries of Soweto who thought him a sell-out. Bombs were thrown at his home, and the police more than once routed him out in the middle of the night and took him away for questioning. All this was before this actual detention and the closing of *The World* last October.

The death and funeral of Steve Biko in September had given a theatrical focus to the forces that were in play in South Africa – the blind rigidity of white authority, the helplessness of the black masses, the rage of the black activist minority, the bravery and the pathetic impotence of the few white liberals.

Some 15,000 to 20,000 people, many from distant cities, attended Biko's funeral in the village of King William's Town where he had lived. Most of the mourners, of course, were blacks, but there was a sprinkling of whites who felt they had to be there

to express their sympathy for Biko's fate or their revulsion for the manner in which he died. Among the whites present was Helen Suzman, who encountered some hostility before she explained who she was, Donald Woods, as well as the American ambassador (the Canadian Ambassador was on leave).

A kind of miracle

In this emotionally-charged atmosphere, Woods wrote later, "it was a kind of miracle that no white person was harmed and that no racial incidents occurred. He reported

My wife and I were in the middle of a standing crowd and afterwards composed notes about certain moments of apprehension. One came for me when I noticed what appeared to be a hard-bitten tough-guy standing fairly close, looking at me with stony face through slitted eyes. He had a large knife scar on one cheek and appeared in my imagination to be sizing me up for a cutting. One is very conscious of one's whiteness on such occasions.

However, when he became aware that I was looking back at him that rock-hard face broke into a friendly smile and a wave of greeting. I have never been so relieved in my life! . . .

I think what motivated many of the whites who attended, apart from natural motives of condolence, was a sort of

*Biko death
gave focus
to forces
in play*



Wide World

In the wake of Steve Biko's death, white newspaper editor Donald Woods was one of seven whites banned by the Government. On New Year's Eve, Woods managed to escape to asylum in neighbouring Lesotho. He is shown here reunited with his wife and children in Maseru, Lesotho.

faith in the kind of country South Africa could become, with people judged as human beings rather than as members of a race group.

That certainly was a point made in many of the speeches. Admittedly it was a minor theme to the major theme of black activism, yet consistent throughout was the message that the end result envisaged was a non-racial, non-ethnic society. . . .

It was a fittingly sad and solemn occasion, but for my wife and me the greatest sadness after all the tributes and speeches were over was the journey home with the renewed realization that the Steve Biko we will miss most painfully is not the revered leader most of the masses will miss, nor the young philosopher the academic visitors will miss, nor the brilliant conversationalist the overseas journalists will miss, but the lovable friend who always made for the same chair in our house and whose inflexions of voice and gestures in lighting a cigarette and quaffing a beer and greeting a child and slouching for a chat are so vividly remembered.

I think he would say that the reason why there was no racial incident at his funeral is that the people were all known to be there in friendship, that they were intermingled – not standing in separate racial groups – and that just as hostility grows from separateness and isolation, so love grows from closeness and contact.

The total opposite of *apartheid*.

Shortly after that column was published Woods was criticized by radical blacks for being too friendly towards the Government. Qoboza sprang to his defence, denouncing "racism in reverse" in his weekly column in *The World*. He apologized to Woods for the unfair criticism and said:

Evidence that the majority of our people are not part and parcel of racial attitudes was fully demonstrated at Steve's funeral. All those white friends who joined our people in giving Steve a thunderous but solemn farewell were as welcome and safe as anybody.

Alan Paton

In an essay for *Time*, Alan Paton, the father figure of South African white liberalism, said that his country had not a friend left in the world. He made the practical point that the West can no longer afford, for political, economic and moral reasons, to alienate the black countries of the world".

"White South Africa is growing more and more bitter against the West," he said. "I cannot understand that the West does not want to see us involved in a racial war. The greatest beneficiary of such a war could



Wide World Photo

Twenty thousand South African blacks attended Steve Biko's open-air funeral at a King Williams Town stadium last September. As Biko's coffin was carried to the stadium, mourners raised their hands in the clenched-fist salute. At the stadium, a succession of speakers condemned the South African Government and its security police.

only be Russia. Afrikanerdom would be destroyed. Our relatively sophisticated economy would be destroyed too. The only people in South Africa who would welcome such destruction would be the most radical of blacks, who have decided that nothing new can be built until everything old has been destroyed. . . .

"I fear that the Afrikaner Nationalist is resisting Western pressures for change not only because they challenge his sovereignty, but also because he knows he is psychologically impotent to accede to them.

"Meanwhile the black demand for change becomes daily more insistent, more confident. With the fall of Marcello Caetano, the liberation of Angola and Mozambique, the great impending changes in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe and South-West Africa/Namibia, the black people of South Africa

know that the day of their own liberation is near."

When the pressures become too strong to bear, the white leaders of South Africa will have to recognize the truth of what has been said by Paton and Woods and Qoboza, just as the white leaders of Rhodesia, however reluctantly, have been forced to accept

similar truths about their country. But suppression of moderate voices such as those of Woods and Qoboza increases probability that Qoboza's prophecy come true, that, when the time comes the whites want to talk, there will be no one left to talk to. The time for talking will have passed, and the civil war will begin.

Lebanon, one year after

By André Liebich

More than a year after the Riyadh and Shtaura agreements, which ended the fighting in a large section of Lebanese territory, no clear picture of a new Lebanon seems to have emerged. One is certainly struck by the new face, both contradictory and incongruous, the Lebanese capital presents to the world – the animation of some of the residential and working-class districts stands in contrast to the silent ruins of the downtown area and other areas where fighting occurred. The lively and diversified retail trade is gradually picking up, but operates out of makeshift booths that line the major thoroughfares. Squatters, looking somewhat lost in the luxury apartments where they have taken refuge, rub shoulders with neighbours who – though more comfortably off – are obviously ill at ease. In the shadow of the blackened ruins of the Hôtel Saint-Georges, the Yacht Club offers the vision of a world that is still serene. However, from the political point of view, Lebanon has settled down to a provisional existence, motionlessly awaiting the outcome of events that, for the most part, are largely beyond its control.

André Liebich has studied at McGill University, St Anthony's College (Oxford) and Harvard University, where he received an M.A. degree in Soviet studies and a Ph.D. in political science. Since 1973, he has been a professor in the political science department at the University of Quebec in Montreal, where he is also director of the Pan-European Section of the Centre Québécois des Relations Internationales. He has spent a considerable amount of time in Lebanon. His latest stay dates back to August 1977. The views expressed in this article are those of Dr Liebich.

The massive Syrian presence is one of the most pervasive facts of daily life in Lebanon. It is impossible to travel more than a few miles without encountering a Syrian soldier, and in some sectors of Beirut more than a kilometre and in some sectors of Beirut more than several hundred yards, without running into a check-point of the Arab Deterrent Force. Although officially international – it includes contingents from Saudi Arabia, North and South Yemen and the United Arab Emirates – and limited to a maximum of 30,000 men, the Force is overwhelmingly Syrian in composition, and the actual number of troops remains a subject of speculation.

On the political front, Syria's grasp is just as visible. Lebanese politics have a most peculiar three-sided nature. In fact, Lebanese leaders of the various factions exchange views through a Syrian intermediary, and Lebanese politics are thus reduced to pilgrimages to Damascus. Moreover, all the factions involved go along with this mediation – albeit somewhat reluctantly. The few initial opponents have disappeared from the political scene. Kamel Joumlatt, feudal head of the Druzes, leader of the Lebanese left, was assassinated; "Dean" Raymond Eddé, Christian leader of the "national coalition" and main competitor of Elias Sarkis for the presidency, is in exile in Paris, where he exercises moral influence that is, in any case, declining. The potential adversaries of Syrian occupation are kept under strict surveillance and some of them, such as Lieutenant Ahmed Khatib, commander of the short-lived Lebanese Arab Army, are still under guard in Syria.

All the Lebanese combatants in the civil war now acknowledge the inevitable nature of the Syrian military occupation. Some of them even give it credit for having prevented renewed fighting and for ensuring a minimum degree of internal security.

It does, however, raise certain problems for the occupying force itself. Despite the financial contribution of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar, which was established under the Riyadh Agreements at 65 per cent of the costs of the Arab Deterrent Force for the first six months of occupation, Syrian expenditures resulting from the occupation amount to more than \$1 million a day. Politically speaking, Syria's freedom of action with regard to Lebanon is strictly limited by the jealous watch kept as much by the other Arab countries as by Israel and the United States. Tel Aviv's veto on the stationing of Arab Deterrent Force troops in Southern Lebanon represents both a warning to and a serious restriction on Syrian authority in Lebanon. American assent to the Syrian occupation, obtained over Israeli objections, only covers the peacekeeping role of the Syrians. Finally, from an inter-Arab and domestic Syrian point of view, the ambiguity of the Syrian policy during the civil war leaves Syria very vulnerable to attacks from left-wing Arab regimes and even from groups within Syria itself. In fact, as was the case during the final months of the civil war, those who are hoping for an abrupt change in Lebanon set their best hopes on an overthrow of the Assad regime.

Thus the Syrian tutelage in Lebanon, far from being a historical opportunity for realizing the age-old ambition of a "Greater Syria", represents a heavy burden for the Syrian republic, if not a threat to its own stability. While addressing a Lebanese delegation in August, President Assad declared that Lebanon and Syria made up a single nation, a single country, but two states. He did not mention a plan for annexation, but the statement was both bitter and ironic.

***De facto* partition**

The occupation and the influence exerted by Syria on the domestic policy of the country are obvious, and the *de facto* partitioning of Lebanon, while not quite as evident, is nevertheless very real. The "green line" that separated the Christian and Moslem areas during the civil war has remained engraved both on the way of thinking of the Lebanese and on their daily lives. There are very few Moslems or other sympathizers of the "Moslem progressive" camp who would even think of going to live "on the other side", and although, in spite of the exodus of numerous foreign residents, a district in the Moslem eastern area of the capital such as Ras-ayrouth continues to display a fine denominational heterogeneity, it represents an isolated exception. Financial and commercial establishments are making arrangements in recognition of this tacit division,

and it is common practice for a bank, or even a hairdressing salon, to divide its operations according to sector in order to avoid difficulties for its employees or customers and — who knows? — even to provide against a possible renewal of hostilities.

This segregation, which is still incomplete because of communication needs within the capital, is more noticeable when one ventures outside Beirut. It is very evident when one travels from Beirut to the small village of Jounieh, the modern political and economic centre of the Christians, with its new commercial and port facilities, or to Mount Lebanon, the unconditionally Maronite fiefdom. The following incident reflects the present atmosphere. It is said that the key figure in the abortive *coup* of March 11, 1976, the Moslem General Ahdab, having reached the summer resort of Broumana in the Lebanese mountains, was abused, slapped and turned away by youths from the village, one of whom was the son of a prominent Christian deputy. The deputy apologized to General Ahdab and celebrated with him several days later at Broumana, but few incidents of this sort end on such a happy note.

It seems that the first consequence of the Lebanese civil war was to stir up sectarianism and weaken the state. Indeed, there are obvious rifts in the unity of each camp that reveal the social basis of Lebanese sectarianism — the left-wing Christians, through a "patriotic grouping", agitate against the dominant ideology of their fellow Christians, while the sympathy of the Sunnite Moslem middle class with the aims of the Christian Falangist Party is barely concealed. These aims are to ensure order and to remove the Palestinian troublemakers from Lebanon. It is with scepticism, however, that the Lebanese view the few loudly-trumpeted attempts at national reconciliation. Despite the fact that the powerful Christian leader, Camille Chamoun, offered an *iftar*, the traditional banquet of the month of Ramadan, for the former Prime Minister, Takiedinne Solh, and that the supreme head of the Falangists, Pierre Gemayel, anxious to keep up with his allies on the road to reconciliation, followed Chamoun's lead by organizing an *iftar* for Saeb Salam, the strong man of Moslem Beirut, the two camps are no closer to reconciliation. In fact, these initiatives have led to accusations of opportunism from both sides.

The weakening of an already weak state is the first obstacle on the road to any real reconciliation. Since it achieved independence in 1943, Lebanon has been based on the shaky compromise of the "National Pact", which divided the elected positions

Segregation more noticeable outside Beirut

Attempts at national reconciliation viewed with scepticism

along religious lines and directed a denominational quota system in the public service and the national assembly. This arrangement not only reinforces religious affiliation as the first criterion in determining political allegiance but also gives permanence to a distribution of power based on a demographic situation that is no longer representative and favours the Christians at the expense of the Moslems. During the civil war, the break-up of the few remaining national institutions, such as the army, the collapse of essential services and the disintegration of the economy provided the finishing touch to an already existing fragmentation resulting from a constitutional order most citizens considered to be illegitimate.

In the postwar period, the renewed growth of sectarianism and the weakness of the state ultimately reinforced the power of some of the traditional leaders. This was paradoxical, since during the war the power of these same leaders had been eroded as it passed to the leaders of the countless new fighting groups. Thus, although the politicians were unable to end the anarchy of the war, some of them have succeeded in obtaining recognition in peace-time – under the shadow of the Syrian shields. From this point of view, the biggest winner in the civil war is Camille Chamoun; his key role and his intransigence throughout the war assure him today of a personal prestige among Christians in Lebanon exceeding that of Pierre Gemayel, who has a more numerous, better organized and better armed following but is considered a moderate.

On the other hand, Rachid Karamé, who was Prime Minister all through the war, has lost control of his base in Tripoli, while Saeb Salam only regained his control in Beirut by coming to terms with one of his former lieutenants, Ibrahim Kolehlat, who is the new leader of the *Morabitoun* (independent Nasserites).

Whatever the relative power today of the various traditional leaders, it is certain that the political weight of the current President, Elias Sarkis, and of the Prime Minister, Selim Hoss, is minimal. These two technocrats, who are well intentioned and competent but lack any sort of political base, represent only the will of the Syrians and they suffer the humiliation of seeing their protector deal directly with the heads of the traditional factions. Furthermore, there is no indication that time is on the side of the country's constitutional authorities. Even if the traditional leaders are almost all octogenarians, each of them has one or more sons ready to succeed him and followers who are willing to recognize the authority of these sons. No, the state of Lebanon is defi-

nately dead. The question that remains to be answered is what is going to replace it.

Palestinian presence

Concerning the future of Lebanon, it is the Palestinian shadow that dominates any discussion. There is no need to accept the Christian interpretation of the civil war which admits only a conflict between Lebanese and Palestinians, in order to recognize the fact that the war began with an attempt to liquidate the Palestinian resistance. Furthermore, as the war continued, there was an increased preponderance of Palestinians within the Muslim progressive alliance. It is sufficient to recognize what a destabilizing effect the Palestinian presence had on the fragile sectarian balance. It was a catalyst for popular assassinations, a source of tension among the Arab regimes and a means of justifying the brutal Israeli interventions. Since the Six-Day War in 1967, and despite the patching-up in 1974 of the Cairo Agreements, which were supposed to regulate the status of the Palestinian resistance on Lebanese soil, the Palestinian question has been an international political problem in Lebanon.

Since the civil war, the status of the Palestinian resistance can only be evaluated in dichotomic terms. Although the international presence of the resistance has been stronger than ever since Yasir Arafat spoke at the United Nations in 1974, in Lebanon the prestige of the resistance is irreparably compromised. Although the "Rejection Front" has stepped back in Lebanon and rallied behind the policies dictated by Arafat and the majority wing of al-Fatah, the resistance has, on the whole, very little room to manoeuvre.

In fact, those who see the civil war as an imperialist plot against the Palestinians – an oversimplified theory extremely difficult to refute – and who therefore feared the total annihilation of the resistance can be thankful that, largely because of the submission of its leaders, the resistance survived this test. However, in its relationship with Lebanon, the resistance has suffered considerable political and moral loss. On the Christian side, a policy of threats and ultimatums has come to replace the pretence of conciliation that prevailed before the war. The Christian leaders insist that they will be unable to wait for a possible Geneva conference to resolve the Palestinian problem. Consequently, they are demanding the immediate eviction of the Palestinians from Lebanon according to various estimates, number between 200,000 and 400,000. Furthermore, it is significant that even a moderate Christian leader like Raymond Eddé is trying to discredit Camille Chamoun on the occasion

*Disintegration
of economy
provided
finishing touch
to fragmentation*

of the publication of the latter's war memoirs by accusing him of having come to terms with the Palestinians. On the Moslem side, the hardships that the people in the zones controlled by the Palestinians were forced to endure, the inability of the Palestinians to ensure basic services and minimum security in their sector, as well as various flagrant abuses of power, have helped to demobilize the Lebanese Moslems and separate them from their Palestinian allies. In short, the war showed that the stakes were not the same for Lebanese Moslems as they were for the Palestinians. It is the awareness of this fact that caused the isolation of the resistance from its allies.

Explosive factor

The seemingly incessant fighting in Southern Lebanon appears to be the most explosive factor in the entire Lebanese situation. Nothing does more to indicate the precarious nature of the Lebanese truce than the constant murderous fighting, and this is perhaps the key to its meaning. While giving rise to a variety of hypotheses – including that put forward by Pierre Gemayel, according to which Israel is seeking to seize Southern Lebanon and use it as a bargaining counter for the west bank of the Jordan in the event of a general Israeli-Arab settlement –, the fighting in Southern Lebanon aims primarily at maintaining a high degree of pressure on all the parties involved in the Middle East conflict. From this point of view, paradoxically, the continued fighting serves the interests of all the combatants. It allows the Palestinians to maintain that their military strength has remained intact despite the losses suffered during the civil war, and that their will to fight remains strong notwithstanding the diplomatic concessions that were forced from them. It also allows the Lebanese Christians to argue that peace will not return to Lebanon until their principal demand, the expulsion of the Palestinians, has been met. Finally, it allows Israel to emphasize that neither the status quo as it existed before the war in Lebanon nor the presence of Arab armies along the southern Lebanese border will be tolerated. The principal losers in this sad contest are the people of Southern Lebanon. They are primarily impoverished Moslem Shi'ites, who continue to swell the ranks of the refugees heading towards Beirut.

In Beirut, the war in Southern Lebanon seems to be far away, both because of the censorship that limits access to news from the South and, even more important, the lassitude of the people of Beirut as they try to go about their daily tasks in spite of the major economic difficulties. Commercial

and industrial losses amount to \$1.5 billion. The country is experiencing an annual inflation rate of between 30 and 40 per cent, to which must be added an incalculable unemployment rate and a mass exodus of qualified workers. For some Lebanese, particularly those who do not have any exportable skills, peace is perhaps more unbearable than war. During the fighting they at least had the option of enrolling in the combat groups, some of which, moreover, were mainly bands of looters. For those who are able to emigrate – doctors, engineers, skilled workers or contractors – the future in Saudi Arabia, the Persian Gulf states or America is less gloomy. This accounts for the fact that out of a total of 700,000 Lebanese who left the country – almost 25 per cent of the total population – only half have returned. The other half can pride themselves on improving the Lebanese balance of payments through the money they send to their relatives who have remained in the country. Nevertheless, if Lebanon is ever to get back on its feet, it must be able to count on the actual presence of these people.

The reconstruction of Lebanon cannot be achieved overnight. Despite the unveiling of a French plan for rebuilding the downtown area at a cost of \$100 million and the improvements being made to the port of Beirut, the climate of uncertainty is undermining all efforts and dampening all initiatives. After six months of operation, the port reached only half its prewar rate of activity and the level of transit traffic remained at 17 per cent of the volume handled in 1974. At the end of six months of relative peace, there were only six American business firms registered with the American Embassy, compared to 600 before the war. It should come as no surprise that the exodus is continuing and that it includes people who are not even Lebanese. In August, Yasir Arafat called on Arab countries to refuse the requests for visas from 10,000 Palestinians in Lebanon.

The Lebanese crisis is still awaiting the final outcome that will lead to real peace. The causes of this crisis undoubtedly lie in the internal contradictions in the country, but Lebanon will not be able to solve them as long as international circumstances remain unfavourable towards a general settlement in the region. To a large extent, in Lebanon as elsewhere in the Middle East, the most pressing internal questions remain in abeyance until such a settlement can be reached. The main result of the civil war is, therefore, the destruction of the illusion, so difficult to justify even before the war, that Lebanon can remain uninvolved in the conflicts that surround it.

*Reconstruction
cannot
be achieved
overnight*

Deciding on a pipeline route for bringing gas to market

By Don Peacock

The agreement between Canada and the United States for the construction of a pipeline to move natural gas from Alaska south across Western Canada to the lower 48 states was described in the Canadian House of Commons as "historic". The words were delivered by no less a personage than Queen Elizabeth, as she read the Speech from the Throne opening a new session of the Canadian Parliament in Ottawa. She was there as part of her Silver Jubilee visit to Canada. The words she read, in her role as Queen of Canada, were no less significant for having been written by the Government in the ancient British Parliamentary tradition.

Since the broaching late in 1969 of the pipeline idea, its proponents – more multinational than national until the end – have described it as the biggest engineering and construction project ever undertaken by private enterprise. In the autumn of 1977, the Canadian Government was saying pretty much the same thing, though moderately conditioned, as is only to be expected of government. Again through the voice of the Queen, the Government described the pipeline project, which is now expected to cost more than \$10 billion and construction of which is scheduled to begin in 1979, as "one of the largest civil engineering projects in the history of the world".

Its cost, however, is not all that makes the pipeline project historic. From the beginning, this project was unique in having competitors for the right to construct it. Never before had two groups of huge corporations vied, at such cost and with such vigour, for such a prize as government ap-

proval to build this pipeline. In the past, when there were competing interests, such a project, these were brought together one way or another, usually by mutual interest or government pressure or both. The only issue was whether their joint proposal satisfied whatever government regulatory procedures were in effect.

The uniqueness of the competition for this project turned out to be symbolic; precedents were established at several stages in the evolution of the Alaska pipeline project. Never had planners of such a project devoted so much time and money to studying its implications. In particular, there had never been so much attention paid to the potential impact of such a project on the environment and the socio-economic area through which the pipeline would pass.

Unique character

What is unique about the final outcome of the long struggle to build the pipeline from Alaska is the triumph it represents for Canadian enterprise in general and the Canadian pipeline industry in particular. It is important that the outcome shifts a substantial, though still indeterminate, amount of economic power westward to Alberta and British Columbia from Central Canada, a bastion of management and finance, to Ontario. But of at least as much importance is the fact that the final decision about the pipeline shut three of the world's largest multinational oil companies – Exxon, Mobil and Shell – out of any direct ownership or control of the Canadian section of the pipeline.

Two companies from Western Canada had taken on the world's giants of the oil and gas industry for this biggest private-enterprise prize of all to date and beaten them at their own game. As a result, it seemed likely that the Canadian oil and gas industry would ever again be quite as dependent on – or, as more impassioned nationalists might put it, as subservient to – foreign companies. Perhaps, too, multinational companies would never again be quite as powerful – at least, not in Canada. If they could be beaten once, why not again?

Mr Peacock is a press and public-relations consultant in Alberta. He is a former counsellor (press) at the Canadian High Commission in London, and during the 1960s was Special Assistant to the Prime Minister. A veteran journalist, Mr Peacock joined the Parliamentary Press Gallery in 1954 and was later Managing Editor of The Albertan in Calgary. The views expressed in this article are those of Mr Peacock.

As the long and (as already noted) unexampled struggle approached its climax at summer, the two main contenders for final approval by the Canadian and American Governments were Canadian Arctic Gas Pipeline Limited of Toronto and Foothills Pipe Lines Limited of Calgary. Membership in the Arctic Gas group numbered 10, including the Canadian subsidiaries of Exxon (Imperial Oil Limited), Gulf (Gulf Oil Canada Limited) and Shell (Shell Canada Limited). But participation by these multinationals (Shell is, of course, of Anglo-Dutch ownership) and by a half-dozen American pipeline companies in the Arctic Gas group was not the essential difference between it and the competing Foothills group.

The Foothills company had been established by two veteran Western Canadian pipeline companies, Alberta Gas Trunk Line Limited of Calgary and Westcoast Transmission Company Limited of Vancouver. The Foothills group also had American partners. The fundamental difference between the competing proposals was the way they planned to handle ownership of the project. There were fundamental differences, too, in the routes they proposed to follow, but even more fundamental was the difference in their ownership designs.

Ownership of the Arctic Gas pipeline would be shared by any or all of its members who wished to participate, whereas ownership of the Canadian sections of the Foothills pipeline would be limited to the Canadian participants in that proposal, and American sections would be owned by the American partners. This difference in the two projects, more than their route difference or any other, is what had kept the two groups competing instead of co-operating with each other. It meant that, if the Foothills group won (as it did), there would be no chance for equity ownership in the Canadian sections of the line by the multinationals or other non-Canadian participants, though they would be more than welcome to invest in capital bonds and other non-equity financing of the enormous project. From the point of view of the Foothills group, had the Arctic Gas group won the project would have been dominated by American and multinational companies among the group's membership.

Arctic Gas proposal

The proposal by Arctic Gas was for a single pipeline system that would move both Alaskan gas from the slopes overlooking Prudhoe Bay on the Arctic Ocean and Canadian gas from the Mackenzie River Delta in northwestern Canada to markets in southern Canada and the United States. The same route for the pipeline lay across the

North Slope of Alaska and Canada's Yukon Territory, never far from the coast of the Beaufort Sea, which is part of the Arctic Ocean. The line would then have crossed the northern part of the Mackenzie Delta in Canada's Northwest Territories and connected with a line coming down from near Inuvik, on the Delta. From there the line would have run south up the Mackenzie River Valley into Alberta and diagonally across that province to the United States border just inside Saskatchewan and, through a branch pipeline, into the Pacific U.S. from a point in British Columbia.

The Canadian section of the Arctic Gas pipeline would have been about 2,300 miles long, longer than any previously built, including what is currently the longest in the world – the 2,200-mile Trans-Canada pipeline between Alberta and Montreal. It was estimated that it would cost about \$10 billion to bring this project to its full capacity of 4.5 billion cubic feet of gas a day, half from Prudhoe Bay and half from the Mackenzie Delta.

At a point about half-way through the seven-year battle between the two groups, the Foothills proposal began to favour two pipelines – one to bring Alaska gas south to the U.S. and the other to bring Canadian gas south from the Mackenzie Delta. But as finds of gas in the Delta proved disappointingly small, the Foothills emphasis on a separate line up the Mackenzie Valley was dropped and all its attention became focused on a proposal for what has come to be known as the Alaska Highway pipeline.

The Alaska Highway line would be built from Prudhoe Bay south to Fairbanks, Alaska, along the corridor already established for the Alyeska oil-pipeline, which began operating in mid-1977. From Fairbanks it would run southeast along the Alaska Highway route across the Yukon and northeastern British Columbia and into Alberta, and then split to enter the U.S. at the same points in Saskatchewan and British Columbia as the Arctic Gas line proposed.

Both pipelines were planned to be 48 inches in diameter, the largest built to date on this continent, though there are lines of larger diameter in the Soviet Union. Of more crucial concern was the higher pressure under which, it was proposed, the Arctic gas should move in the pipeline. The highest pressure under which gas was currently moving in pipelines in British Columbia and Alberta, where some of the terrain to be crossed is comparable to that to be traversed by the Alaska pipeline, was between 800 and 1,000 pounds a square inch. The Arctic Gas system proposed to move the gas under an unprecedented 1,680 pounds a



As part of her Silver Jubilee visit to Canada, the Queen opened Parliament with the traditional Speech from the Throne. The speech promised the required legislation to turn the negotiated pipeline arrangement into a working reality. At press time, the legislation is before Parliament.

square inch. The most the Foothills system was prepared to attempt was 1,260 pounds a square inch.

There were also complex differences in engineering approaches by the two groups to the major problem of coping with frost heave. But what finally tipped the scales for good in favour of the Foothills project were the environmental and socio-economic issues. These were gradually brought to bear on the projects by a demonstration of "participatory democracy" also unique in Canadian experience – and perhaps any other democratic country.

Never before

Never in Canadian political experience had there been a royal commission quite like the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry headed by Mr. Justice Thomas Berger of the British Columbia Supreme Court. The issues of the environmental impact of a pipeline, of the rights of native peoples in the regions through which it would be built, and of the

effect on the socio-economic climate were neither unknown nor new. The inquiry it was what was new; no such pervasive examination of the issues had ever been made prior to a development project before.

The Berger Inquiry, as it came to be called, spent 302 days listening to evidence from 1,000 witnesses. It travelled by plane, boat, dogsled and canoe to hold hearings in 35 isolated northern communities and territories throughout the Mackenzie region. Sometimes the hearings were convened in tiny meeting-halls – and occasionally in open air beside a river. Total transcripts of testimony were finally estimated at 14 million words. The inquiry, which lasted for 18 months, cost an estimated \$4.5 million, including \$1.5 million to fund native and other public-interest groups to ensure that they could stand up to the pipeline companies. Considering that it concerned the well-being of, in all, no more than 38,000 of Canada's population of 22 million, and adding to the findings all the information gathered by the competing applicants along similar lines

is inquiry ensured that the people of the Mackenzie region were the most thoroughly-analyzed minority group in any population on earth.

In a statement to Canada's National Energy Board, the Arctic Gas group explained why so much painstaking attention had been paid to factors almost always ignored by resource-developers in the past. "Society's growing awareness of the importance of natural resources and of man's capacity to change the environment is one of the unique developments of this decade," the statement said. "In both the political and economic fields, efforts are being made to evaluate environmental factors and to place them in proper priority. . . . Because vast areas of the Northwest Territories and Yukon Territory are still virtually wilderness, there is a unique opportunity to develop an integrated plan for the rational management of northern natural resources."

When the report of the Berger Inquiry was issued in the spring of 1977, however, it totally rejected the proposed route of the Arctic Gas pipeline as environmentally unacceptable. It suggested that the Foothills route along existing corridors was a better choice, and this opinion was supported by the decision of the National Energy Board in July—a decision confirmed by Prime Minister Trudeau and President Carter in Washington on September 8.

In explaining its decision, the National Energy Board said it had never before faced such a complex and difficult choice. "This is not only because of the immensity of the projects themselves and their importance to Canadians," the Board declared, "but also because of the magnitude of the potential socio-economic impact on the peoples of the Arctic environment." Complicating factors were claims to ownership of large areas of land in the regions through which the pipeline would pass by native people's groups, Indian and Inuit (Eskimo). The Berger Report recommended that no pipeline be built in the Mackenzie Valley for ten years, to allow time to settle the land-claims and to enable the native economy to prepare for survival in competition with the capitalist economy represented by the pipeline.

An inquiry similar to that of Mr. Justice Berger, but limited to three months, was conducted into the potential impact of the Alaska Highway pipeline on the environment and socio-economic situation of the Yukon. It recommended a four-year delay in starting the project while native land-claims and other issues were settled. But the final agreement between Canada and the United States provides for a start on the Yukon section of the pipeline in January

1981, seven months earlier than recommended by the Yukon inquiry.

The agreement itself establishes another precedent for resource-development projects of this kind. It provides that Foothills Pipe Lines Ltd must make an advance payment of up to \$200 million to compensate for the social and economic impact of the line. This will be credited against future tax obligations of the line, which are estimated to amount to as much as \$1 billion during the 20 to 25 years of the project's life—a substantial income benefit to the Yukon.

Aside from the environmental, social and economic considerations, however, there was another fundamental reason for rejecting any proposal for a pipeline from the Mackenzie Delta at present. The amount of proved gas reserves, between five and six trillion cubic feet, found in the Delta did not warrant building a pipeline for economic reasons—they were not yet worth the cost.

For Canadian industry as a whole, the final outcome of the long pipeline struggle represented a landmark in the process of maturing. It will be the first major development project in the history of Canada that was planned, managed, built and owned by Canadians, and in particular by Western Canadians. (During the last century, the Canadian Pacific Railway was built largely under British and American management. The Trans-Canada pipeline was built a couple of decades ago under the control of what the project's opponents in Parliament called "Texas buccaneers", though it gradually came under Canadian control once it was built.)

The president of the Foothills company, Robert Blair (who also heads its Calgary parent company, Alberta Gas Trunk Line Co. Ltd), has interpreted the victory of his group as the end of Canada's economic colonialism. In a speech late in 1977, Blair said Canada was no longer a "technical or engineering colony" of any country. Canadian industry now had the leading technology in the world for the development of oil-sands and heavy oils, important potential sources of future energy, and for building large-diameter and high-pressure pipelines in cold weather, as well as for hydrocarbon exploration and development in Arctic regions.

For Canadian businessmen and management, Blair said, now "is a great time for our companies and managements in Canada to be taking charge fully and doing it our way". No project in Canadian history will provide Canadian industry and management with a better opportunity for "doing it our way" than Blair's own Alaska Highway pipeline.

*Landmark
in maturing
of Canadian
industry*

Canada's moralistic policies could use some consistency

By W. A. Wilson

On three related current issues of importance in international affairs Canada holds markedly inconsistent positions. On two of these issues the line taken is a strongly moral one. This ethical stance, almost self-righteous in its expression, is so marred by contradictions and exceptions motivated by self-interest that it opens Canadian policy to the complaint of hypocrisy. Although there are contradictions within these policies, however, the greatest contradiction is that the third issue is totally exempt from this approach.

In principle, but not always in practice, Canadian policy bars the sale of armaments and military supplies to areas of international tension or conflict. This policy has been marked, however, by a major contradiction: the exploitation of open warfare to conduct a lucrative arms trade throughout the American involvement in the Vietnam war. The fact that a particularly controversial conflict was involved did not prove to be a barrier to profits.

The dividing-line for the Canadian arms trade, as a result, appears not to involve ethics but the practical question of whether profits can be secured through the military involvement of a country that in other areas is an active friend and ally. The application of the Canadian policy is hard-headed, not moral.

The Government's policy demands extremely stringent safeguards on the sale of nuclear fuels to its political and economic friends, some of them military allies, safeguards substantially more rigorous than those in current international use. This particular policy is pursued with such determination that, for instance, when the European Community is groping with the difficulties in the way of greater unity, Can-

ada seeks to exploit the national differences by insisting on bilateral negotiations with members of the European Economic Community.

This policy so far appears free from contradictions that mar the first of the three positions. It is followed in the face of arguments that it disregards other Canadian interests in the field of trade relations by building significant resentment in customer countries, that it shows interference to the vital, long-term concerns of fuel-short customer countries such as West Germany and Japan, and that it ignores the reality that diplomacy, like government, is the art of the possible.

The third related policy area is in total contradiction to the previous two. Canadian policy permits the most active efforts, including the use of some dubious methods, to sell nuclear technology and installations not only in secure areas but to countries such as active or potential instability that the signature of safeguard agreements becomes meaningless. These latter are rendered inherently unreliable by the inability of an existing government to commit its successors or even to know what sort of political regime they will impose. In the case of Argentina, strange and still unexplained payments to facilitate the sale of a reactor and the associated technology were made at a time when it was known that the government of that country would soon be overthrown by a military coup but before it was known what would form the new regime or what its standards would be. The certainty of an eventual coup was so great that only the date at which it would occur and the new policies of the victors who would take over remained unknown.

The basic action in this case, the sale of nuclear technology to a part of the world so unstable that the value of signed safeguard agreements was of great doubt, is in complete contradiction to the second of the three policies, the very rigorous standards on fuel supplies demanded from reliable friendly countries. Its quality is much closer to the major, money-making exception to the policy on the export of arms and military supplies.

Mr Wilson is Ottawa Editor of The Montreal Star and contributes a regular column on political affairs to that newspaper. He joined the Star in 1956 and was appointed its Bureau Chief in 1962. The views expressed here are those of the author.

The outcome is great difficulty in finding a coherent policy thread through these related issues, although the level of very moral Canadian statements over the years has been high and the statements at times have verged on self-righteousness.

Where the prospect of profits is not encouraging, the first of these national positions can be applied in extreme ways. The most immediate example involves southern Africa. If, as seems to be the case, the policies of the Rhodesian regime of Prime Minister Ian Smith have changed in favour of some moderation, this is clearly a response to the threat confronting that country from the armed attacks of black guerilla groups rather than to the diplomatic efforts of Britain and the United States. Mr. Smith has withstood many diplomatic approaches over the years.

The personalities and political sympathies of some of the leaders of the guerilla forces cause reservations about them but, historically, it remains true that personal freedom and political liberty have usually been secured by fighting. Countries such as Canada and some other ex-members of the British Empire are favoured exceptions. Even there, the initial, largely peaceful devolution of power within the Empire and its ultimate disintegration without extensive British resistance have in a good many cases been followed by political instability and violence. The road to freedom is generally not smooth and history is full of examples of the rockiness of that course.

Canada applies its policy of not selling arms to areas of unrest rigidly in the case of southern Africa but offers sympathy, moral support and some non-military aid to the guerilla groups. If this were the outcome of a third analysis of the policies of southern Africa, and of specific policy decisions based on that approach, no government would find it difficult to defend the position. It seems to be, however, the application of a general policy without much reference to the specifics of the situation. Apart from whatever moral satisfaction it gives the Government of Canada, the policy has two other results.

One was evident in the autumn meeting in Ottawa of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association. Even moderates from the coloured members of the Commonwealth demonstrated, through their statements, their lack of confidence in the diplomatic efforts to produce a moderate Rhodesian settlement, their views that British and American policy (which Canada follows) was highly hypocritical and that the opponents of Mr. Smith should secure military aid wherever they could find it. Some of the spokesmen were very specific on this latter point, urging that there should be no hesitation in securing assistance from

the Soviet Union, the arms-producing countries of Eastern Europe and China. At present, the U.S.S.R. and China are the most important suppliers of weapons to the guerilla forces.

Policies are rarely applied in a vacuum. The two principal suppliers of arms to the black fighting forces in southern Africa are, on the basis of their past approaches alone, clearly looking to enhanced influence in the future. It is open to great doubt whether it is in the interest of any Western nation to see southern Africa come under heavy Chinese or Russian influence, if not some element of control. *Détente* has come into existence but has not progressed to the point where the extension of the Communist world is a matter of indifference.

One of the major questions to be asked, then, is simply whether we, and our important allies, will feel happy if southern Africa in the end comes substantially within the sphere of the two Communist great powers, even though they are in a state of conflict between themselves. If the answer to that question is negative, a second one follows: should foreign policy decisions be based upon a nation's long-term interest or the pursuit of a sense of moral satisfaction? There is little evidence in Canadian policies that these questions have been seriously asked or answered, even though the purport of the foreign policy review some years ago was that genuine self-interest should be the guiding principle of a nation's external policies.

On the second of the Canadian policy contradictions, part of the inevitable background is that the power of nuclear weapons is terrible, the potential danger from some nuclear wastes great. This has produced certain inevitable reactions that are commonplace in the world. But these tend to obscure two historical realities and a third current one. History has shown us that atomic arsenals are of practical military value only during a period — in fact, very brief — of monopoly. The American arsenal, in the development of which Canada played an early role, was used during that brief period. Since then, no direct military use has ever been made of the huge supply of nuclear weapons that exists in today's world. The greatest single effort has been to maintain a balance between the two biggest arsenals with the mutual aim of keeping them neutralized. Some of the smaller arsenals have been developed either because individual countries, such as France under General de Gaulle, felt that they could not rely upon an offered nuclear umbrella, or because no real umbrella was available, which was China's case. Some steps towards nuclear self-reliance have been taken for complex reasons of na-

*Little evidence
that questions
have been asked
or answered*

tional pride and international uncertainty, such as India's controversial explosion. (India has developed a high level of competence in some "elitist", specialized fields, which is counterbalanced by its difficulty with the techniques of mass production. In addition, most Western governments underestimate the important role that damage to pride and confidence during the imperial period still play in ex-colonial countries.)

While nuclear arsenals have not played a direct military role in the world since the end of the American monopoly, they have played an extremely important diplomatic one. The size of the Chinese arsenal, for instance, has never been considered as at all close to those of the United States or the Soviet Union. But China's position in the world reflects possession of nuclear weapons that cannot be ignored; it does not require great "over-kill" capacity for terrible retaliation to be possible.

If we tend to overlook the fact that far more people in the world have been killed since 1945 by conventional methods of warfare than died at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, we also overlook the extent to which fuel-short countries seeking nuclear supplies consider this search to be vital to their future. As a matter of policy, Canada is ardently opposed to any method of power-production in which plutonium is a large and growing by-product. This accounts for the strong Canadian prejudice against fast-breeder technology. To a country such as West Germany, however, development of precisely this method of power-production represents a possible escape from its dependence upon external energy supplies. The extent to which vital interests of friendly countries are involved has not played a large role in the formation of the Canadian policy on the export of nuclear fuels, except that it is considered to improve this country's bargaining position.

The Canadian approach suffers from the defect that in other countries it is likely to be construed as hard-boiled rather than hard-headed. It risks the creation of resentments that can be felt in many other ways, and it assumes for this country a position of moral superiority over countries with which we have otherwise close ties — West Germany, France and Japan. They would be unlikely to concede that our concern for the future of the world is superior to theirs. Even the Americans have warned us, politely but firmly, that if we, and they, hope to limit the forms of nuclear technology in the energy-deficient countries, reliability of supply is essential. At this point, rather than demonstrating reliability, we have arbitrarily cut off uranium exports in ways calculated to create an impression of unreliability. Why,

then, should the most important trick of countries on the other side be prepared to give way to some of the points Canadian policy seeks to establish?

Article of faith

An underlying article of faith in Canadian nuclear policy is to be found in the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It is put to work, for instance, to justify our own sales of nuclear technology to unstable countries. Because they were prepared to adhere to the treaty, our officials have argued that our sales must be acceptable. This approach to the treaty, however, runs counter to the analysis of its purposes that history is bound to make. It was not intended to reduce the risk of nuclear war; if both Israel and Syria, for example, were equipped with nuclear arsenals, it is no more likely that they would choose to employ them for mutual suicide than it was in the American-Russian case. If only on those countries possessed nuclear weapons, the super-power sponsor of the other would threaten to arm it and the opposite super-power would curb its protégé. The true military risks would probably be considerably less than those that did exist in the most tense period of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, before the Hungarian revolt of 1956 and the Cuban crisis of 1962 demonstrated that there were limits neither country would risk overstepping.

It is predictable that history will view the Non-Proliferation Treaty not as an idealistic instrument intended to reduce the risks of war but as an attempt by the super-powers to freeze an important aspect of the diplomatic status quo. The possession of even a small nuclear arsenal gives a nation a changed diplomatic voice. It leads to the re-emergence of great powers in a world of super-powers on one side and third-class ones on the other. China is the chief example, but the position of France in this context is not insignificant. In the latter case, much is heard of the matter nowadays. That, however, is much more a function of the disappearance of General de Gaulle and his particular policies and of the emergence of more pressing problems than of any change in the underlying realities of diplomacy in the nuclear age.

In assessing the diplomatic and military role of nuclear weaponry, it should be at least as instructive to examine history as to look at the normal human fears for the future. The United States has been more heavily engaged militarily since the Second World War than any other power. It employed nuclear weapons without hesitation or compunction during the period of its monopoly. Subsequently it accepted severe

*Canadian
prejudice
against
fast-breeder
technology*

urses in Korea and a prolonged, fruitless struggle in Vietnam rather than use them again. Clearly, morality was not the issue; commonsense and a lively regard for the possible consequences were the decisive factors. Since the Soviet Union has not been involved in direct military ways to the same extent as the United States during the post-war period, the question of its use or non-use of nuclear weapons has not arisen. It has not hesitated, however, to make diplomatic use of its arsenal, notably through its threats at the time of the Suez crisis, which the British Government may not have believed but could not quite dismiss, and its attempt to change the balance through establishing missiles in Cuba, an action from which it had to back off. Had the missiles remained in Cuba, the military security of the United States would have been neither more nor less threatened than it is by the long-range arsenal of the Soviet Union. The Soviet diplomatic voice, however, would have been heard.

Canada's willingness to accept the effort to establish a status quo through the Non-Proliferation Treaty is in contrast to its scepticism about other attempts to do the same thing. One of our main criticisms of Soviet policy in Eastern Europe is that it rests upon precisely this, an effort to freeze a status quo. Canadian policy-makers have argued freely that this is a mistaken, unworkable approach, that the true Soviet problem, both domestically and in its sphere

of influence, is to learn how change can be accommodated without the collapse of their system. When the writer once argued this point about the treaty with a Canadian External Affairs Minister, he fell back in the end on the statement: "Well, it's better than nothing".

That view is debatable, but in any case it does not make the treaty an impressive umbrella for Canadian nuclear sales in unstable areas. It would be somewhat more convincing if Canadian policy-makers simply argued that it did not matter, that even if future Argentinian or South Korean regimes, for instance, were to make nuclear weapons it would be possible to prevent their use. That argument would, of course, ignore the diplomatic effect of even small nuclear arsenals.

The only common thread running through these important and closely-related areas is the desire for morality, but it has been breached so glaringly for profit that it has become an unconvincing policy-base. We do not have the international power-base from which we can hope to dictate international nuclear standards, and by demonstrating unreliability as a supplier we are in danger of reducing, not enhancing, our ultimate influence. We risk appearing to others as a nation that has difficulty maintaining its position as an economic middle-power, which does not seek an important military status but wishes to be a super-power of morality.

*Common thread
is desire
for morality*

Academics abroad

Four Canadian academics are chair-holders of Canadian studies at foreign universities during the 1977-78 session. All four programs are funded by the Department of External Affairs.

Peter Neary, a historian from the University of Western Ontario, is the third Canadian visiting professor of Canadian studies at the University of Sussex, England. Professor Neary is the author of several books on the history of Newfoundland.

Allan Cairns, a political scientist from the University of British Columbia, is the third incumbent at the Centre of Canadian Studies at the University of Edinburgh.

Eric Ross, head of the Geography Department at Mount Allison University, is the second Canadian in a program involving three universities in Japan: Isukuba University, just outside Tokyo;

Keio University and International Christian University, both in Tokyo.

As part of the commemoration of the U.S. Bicentennial, a visiting Canadian professorship was established at Yale with a grant from the Canadian Government. The second participant in this program, Walter Henson, an entomologist, has been chief of research at the Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources since 1968.

In addition to these four, Ramon Hathorn of the Department of French Studies, University of Guelph, is participating in a program funded by the University of Grenoble III. Professor Hathorn will be teaching for three months starting in February 1978. As of the 1978 fall term, Grenoble will fund a Canadian visiting professor on an annual basis.

National and international experience with women's rights

By Florence Bird

The Canadian Human Rights Commission administers the Canadian Human Rights Act, which prohibits discrimination on grounds of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, age, sex, marital status, conviction for which a pardon has been granted and, in matters related to employment, physical handicap. The appointment of the Commission in September 1977 was the culmination of a series of steps that had been taken by the Federal Government of Canada to provide equal opportunities for women. Although the pressure for reform has come largely from within the country, the example of other nations and the influence of international organizations have always supported the demands of Canadian women for equal rights, privileges and responsibilities. In recent years, the setting-up of machinery leading to steady progress has enabled Canada to provide valuable "feedback" to other countries.

In the distant past, a handful of tough-minded, persistent women spearheaded the women's suffrage movement in Canada. They conducted a quiet, orderly campaign without the demonstrations and martyrdom of the Pankhurst suffragettes, while, at the same time, gaining publicity from the violent activities of the British women. They won the right to vote and hold public office in the Prairie Provinces as early as 1916 and throughout the country as a whole in 1921.

After the acquisition of the franchise, the cause of women's rights floated in the doldrums until after the Second World War, when women who wished to go on working as they had during the fighting years found that, though they had won their political

rights, they did not have economic rights, since they continued to be regarded as members of a pool of cheap, docile labour. Consequently, as the Forties drew to a close, the battle was rejoined.

Annual briefs

In Canada it has long been the custom for the National Council of Women, the Federation of Business and Professional Women's Clubs and the Federation of University Women's Clubs to present briefs to the Federal Government. Their executives go annually to the Parliament Buildings to meet with the Prime Minister and several members of the Cabinet; there is usually lively and informative discussion of the resolutions adopted by the associations.

In the early 1950s, thanks to the remitting pressure from these national women's associations, a Women's Bureau was set up in the Department of Labour. Equal pay legislation was passed by Parliament. The demands of organized women had been encouraged by the example of the United States, which had set up a Women's Bureau in the 1940s, and by the equal pay conventions passed by the International Labour Organization. A continuing stimulating interplay of ideas about the needs of women in a changing society and how to meet them had been provided by conferences of the international associations, of which the Canadian associations belong, and by the attendance of their representatives as NGO (Non-government organization) observers at meetings of the United Nations Commission on the Status of Women. Great inspiration was provided by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, unanimously passed by the UN Assembly in 1948.

As time went on, an increasing number of women in Canada, as in other countries, became indignantly aware that there was still discrimination against women and that prejudice was still very much alive. For example, though there had been a tremendous increase in the number of women, particularly married ones, in the labour force

Suffragette campaign without demonstrations and martyrdom

Mrs Bird was Chairman of the Royal Commission on the Status of Women in Canada. She has since acted as a consultant on the role of women for various governments. She is a journalist, broadcaster and author who usually publishes under the pseudonym Anne Francis. Her autobiography was published in 1974. The views expressed in this article are those of Mrs Bird.

equal-pay legislation had done little or nothing to close the gaps between the salaries of women and men who did work of equal value. Many laws and practices concerning women had not kept up with the technical and scientific developments that had, in half a century, changed Canada from an agricultural country into an urbanized, industrialized one.

Royal Commission

In the Sixties, rumblings of the women's liberation movement began to echo in Canada from the United States and young women at all levels of society began to see eye-to-eye with older middle-class women who had hitherto carried the banner. In 1967, there was a major breakthrough when the Federal Government appointed the Royal Commission on the Status of Women. This was a direct response to repeated strong demands from the Ad Hoc Committee on the Equality of Women, representing 33 associations with a membership of two million. The Commission was instructed "to inquire, to report and to recommend what steps might be taken by the Federal Government to ensure for women equal opportunities with men in all aspects of Canadian society".

Canadian royal commissions are traditionally free from political interference; they are adequately financed and have great power under the Inquiries Act. It was, therefore, possible for the Commissioners – five women and two men (I was chairman) – to make a study in depth as well as in the wide area designated in the terms of reference. We were determined to make recommendations that would provide the government with a blueprint for action for at least a decade. We also decided to make recommendations to the provinces as well, since the Canadian Constitution puts civil and property rights, education and about 80 per cent of labour matters under provincial jurisdiction.

In due course, we assembled a secretariat of brilliant, dedicated women, trained in a number of disciplines. We then called for briefs and received 469 from individuals as well as organizations of physicians, nurses, students, universities, unions, bar associations and governments. After analysing these, we held 37 days of public hearings covering every one of the ten provinces. Another commissioner and I spent an additional fortnight in the Yukon and the Northwest Territories, visiting small settlements along the coast of Hudson Bay. We also commissioned 40 special studies by authorities in civil and criminal law, penology, history, education, sociology and labour. Our secretariat prepared background papers and unearthed for our consideration the research

material already available. We received opinions from 60 consultants, men and women with exceptional experience and expertise.

Help from abroad

We received valuable help from other countries. The 1968 report to the United Nations, *The Status of Women in Sweden*, was a welcome guide and reference book, since its thinking corresponded so closely to our own. In the same year, the UN conference in Tehran on the rights of women gave international support to our philosophy. The Chairman of the U.S. Status of Women Commission, Esther Peterson, came to Canada at our invitation to discuss the American report delivered in 1963. I went to Washington, where I was given useful information and enthusiastic co-operation from the Equal Opportunities Commission and the Department of Labour.

When the Royal Commission was appointed, the Canadian media as a whole greeted it with scorn, jocosity and often downright opposition. A few editorial writers and commentators believed that there might be discrimination against women, but doubted if a commission largely run by women would ever report and, suggested that, even if it succeeded in doing so, its recommendations – presumably emotional, since so many women were involved – would inevitably be pigeonholed by the Government and soon forgotten. Some influential women also publicly expressed doubts that the Commission was needed.

The public hearings, held a year later, had a remarkable impact, leading, in many instances, to a *volte-face* in these points of view. The Canadian Press sent a reporter, and the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation sent a camera crew, supervised by the late Ed Reid, an intelligent, sympathetic young producer and interviewer, who travelled with us across the country, even up to the Arctic. The full day-to-day coverage of the often moving, sometimes shocking, revelations at the hearings made governments, the media and the public aware of the discrimination that still existed and the extent of the harm it was doing not only to women but to society as a whole.

In 1970, the report, with 167 recommendations, of which 122 were for the Federal Government and the rest for the provinces and private side, was tabled in the House of Commons. These recommendations were based on the general assumption that everyone was entitled to the rights and freedoms proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Hard-hitting, unemotional and professional, it was greeted with surprised respect by the media

*Opposition
to Commission
composed
of women*



Vicarious suffragettes

In the opening decades of the twentieth century, Canadian suffragettes were spared much of the element of confrontation that their counterparts elsewhere had to endure. The National Film Board, in search of photographic material on the suffragette movement, had to go abroad to find it. These photos of the women's movement in England are from the NFB collection.



and Parliamentarians and, as was to be expected, elicited a variety of opinions, both agreeing and disagreeing with its philosophy and conclusions. Not surprisingly, most women gave it wholehearted support.

It was not pigeonholed or forgotten; Canadian women made sure that it would not be. Immediately, all over the country, study groups discussed the 488-page volume, which became a best-seller running to four printings. Committees were set up to publicize its findings and to bring pressure on governments to implement its recommendations. For years, hardly a day went by without the media mentioning it in one context or another.

Approximately half the voting population of Canada are women, so that no government can afford to ignore them. In any case, the provinces have already carried out many of the recommendations and the Federal Government has implemented two-thirds of them – more than those of any other royal commission. All but two of the major recommendations have been implemented either wholly or in part.

As we recommended, the budget of the Women's Program in the Department of the Secretary of State has been increased, so that it is possible to give greater financial assistance to women's voluntary associations, provide more speakers and counsellors for women's groups, and to organize conferences.

New machinery

The new machinery we recommended has been set up and is now slowly beginning to take effect. The Office of the Co-ordinator of the Status of Women is the small unit under the Cabinet Minister responsible for women's affairs. The Office of Equal Opportunities for Women in the Public Service has removed sex stereotyping from all Government publications and recruiting literature, done away with "rug-ranking" of secretaries, seen to it that department heads recommend women for managerial training courses, commissioned research studies into the status of women in the Public Service, and made critical, constructive reports that have received considerable publicity.

The Federal Advisory Council on the Status of Women is made up of women and men with wide and varied experience who represent different geographical areas in this country huge in size if not in population. It carries on research and publishes educational material such as a recent series of pamphlets with titles such as *Birth Planning*, *The Family in the New Society*, *Matrimonial Property Rights*, *Fringe Benefits*, *Rape and Sexual Assault* and *Health Hazards at Work*. It advises the minister re-

sponsible for women's affairs. Its annual report, often outspokenly critical of the government, must by law be tabled in the House of Commons.

This new machinery was already in gear when, in September 1974, Canada was host to the UN Interregional Seminar on National Machinery to Accelerate the Integration of Women in Development and to Eliminate Discrimination on Grounds of Sex. As is usual at such gatherings, Canadian delegates learnt much from the other delegates about the needs and attitudes of people in the 29 nations they represented and on all five continents. They also had the satisfaction of being able to provide practical "feedback" about the extent of the machinery that had been set up in Canada.

Similarly, in December 1974, the National Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization's conference "Woman and Human Rights", which was attended by delegates from six Caribbean countries, the United States, Sweden and Canada, enabled the Canadian delegates to give a detailed progress report about the success of the machinery adopted in Canada. For the whole of the Caribbean, this conference was a breakthrough that is now rapidly bringing them rights and opportunities long enjoyed by developed countries. It provided a springboard for the UN conference in Mexico City in July 1975, which dealt with a wide range of topics.

IWY fanfare

In Canada, 1975 – International Women's Year – was celebrated with considerable fanfare. The Federal Government provided \$5 million for a wide variety of projects. Tens of thousands of Canadians travelled all over the country bringing information about the status of women. There were a number of regional conferences. A one-day intensive conference opened by the Prime Minister and addressed by the Honourable Marc Lalonde, then Minister Responsible for Women's Affairs, was attended by 350 chief executives from industry, unions, business, government, academia and the media. The objective was to inform them of the continuing positive action they could take, in their own spheres of influence, to give women equal rights.

Awareness of the aims of the IWY was stimulated by an advertising campaign under the slogan WHY NOT? (Why not more child-care centres? Why not equal pay? Why not more women in management? Why not more women in public life, etc.)

So far as governments in Canada were concerned, the sound of IWY trumpets could



Despite the relative tranquillity of the suffragette movement in Canada, there were notable advocates of the rights of women. Foremost among them was the author Nellie McClung. First in Manitoba and then in Alberta, she was outspoken in her demands for social reform. A recent television production re-enacted Mrs McClung's struggles in Manitoba. Actress Kate Reid is shown here in the lead role.

While more than slightly accelerate a momentum that was already under way. On the other hand, it does seem to have somewhat changed attitudes towards working women. A two-part survey showed that in 1975, 30 per cent of all Canadians had become more convinced than they had been in 1974 that women should have equal job-pay opportunities.

The IWY also stimulated Canada to increase its feedback to other countries: CIDA (the Canadian International Development Agency) is now making a special effort to meet requests from the governments of developing countries that ask for aid in their efforts to improve the status of women. Consequently, when Prime Minister Michael Manley of Jamaica asked the Canadian Government to send me to Kingston as a consultant, CIDA made it possible for me to go there briefly for two years in succession. It was a rewarding personal experience. I was awed by the energy, commonsense, wisdom and strength of the Jamaican women I worked with. They knew what they wanted and needed and were ready to learn from and profit by the Canadian experience.

A chapter in *Politics of Change*, Manley's brilliant manifesto for Jamaican progress, is devoted to explaining the importance of integrating women into the economic and political life of the nation. Many

recommendations of the Women's Bureau, which I worked with, and the new Ministry of Women's Affairs have been carried out with despatch because the Prime Minister, spurred on by his intelligent, determined wife Beverley, believes in what he has written.

In 1976, CIDA enabled me to go to Bridgetown when the Government of Barbados asked me to be sent as a consultant to help set up a National Commission on the Status of Women. As in Jamaica, it was deeply satisfying to work with the dynamic women of the island and the seriously-involved civil servants, who are obviously determined to bring out a strong report that will give Barbadian women the rights they need. Foreign Minister Henry Forde of Barbados, while in opposition, introduced the resolution that led to the National Assembly's voting unanimously to set up the Commission. He is now enthusiastically responsible for the Ministry of Women's Affairs.

Long road ahead

Though new enlightened legislation, new machinery of government and changing attitudes have done a great deal to raise the status of women in Canada, there is still a long, hard road ahead. Women are still often paid less than men when they do

work of equal value and are still largely confined to the traditional low-paid, support jobs. They are still, with a few outstanding exceptions, outside the power structures of business and the public service. Though there are three women in the Federal Cabinet, they are still woefully under-represented in the House of Commons. (Fewer than four per cent of Canada's Members of Parliament are women, compared to 20 per cent in the unicameral Swedish Parliament.) With the exception of Quebec, which has the most enlightened married-women's property law, and Manitoba, which has recently passed improved legislation, the provinces have not yet acknowledged the contribution that a wife makes to the marriage partnership, whether or not she stays at home or goes to work for pay. The rights of Indian women have yet to be recognized. Therapeutic abortion is not easily available and non-therapeutic abortion remains in the Criminal Code. There are not enough day-care centres to look after the children of working mothers.

On the other hand, thanks to recent federal legislation, women have equal citizenship rights with men and equal treatment under the Canada Pension Plan, and can use their unemployment insurance benefits while on maternity leave. The family allowances paid to mothers have been dou-

bled and indexed against inflation, working mothers can deduct child-care expenses from their federal income tax.

The appointment of the Canadian Human Rights Commission, the single most important recommendation of the Royal Commission on the Status of Women, should do a great deal to wipe out existing pockets of discrimination, as well as to stimulate needed change in attitudes towards the rights of women. Such an organization is stronger than the people who administer it. It is, therefore, a hopeful augury for the future that the Chief Commissioner, Gordon Fairweather, a former Attorney-General of New Brunswick and until recently a progressive Conservative Member of Parliament, is a man who has long believed in and fought for human rights. The cause of women will certainly not be ignored. The Deputy Chief Commissioner, Rita Gaudet, has represented Canada on the Commission on the Status of Women. She was Director of the Office of Equal Opportunities of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation.

It seems reasonable to hope that, in the future, Canada will be able to carry on constructive feedback to other nations while at the same time moving ahead to the ultimate goal of giving women equal opportunities with men in every aspect of Canadian society.

Eurocommunism is tested in France, Italy and Spain

By André P. Donneur and Alexandre Macleod

It was when Enrico Berlinguer and Georges Marchais, secretaries-general of the Italian Communist Party and the French Communist Party respectively, met in Rome in November 1975 that Italian journalists began to use the term "Eurocommunism" to suggest a new phase in the development of cer-

tain Western Communist parties. Observers were quick to point out the shortcomings of this expression – it did not apply to all European Communist parties, it excluded the Japanese party, which had been taking a similar route since 1962, and, above all, it was vague. However, the parties concerned, while maintaining some reservations about its meaning, adopted it and even sanctioned its use. Mr. Berlinguer used the term publicly for the first time on June 3, 1976 at a demonstration organized by the French Communist Party in Paris, and did so again at the conference of European Communist parties in East Berlin at the end of the month. The other parties soon followed. For example, though the French Communists were somewhat reluctant to do so.

Dr Macleod and Dr Donneur both teach Political Science at the University of Quebec in Montreal. Dr Macleod is writing a larger work on the French and Italian Communist Parties and the Portuguese revolution. Dr Donneur has already published a number of articles on international socialism. The views expressed in this article are those of the authors.

While a small party like the Communist Party of Great Britain does not hesitate to consider itself "Eurocommunist", the term was from the very beginning applied primarily to three others: the Italian Communist Party (PCI), the French Communist Party (PCF) and the Spanish Communist Party (PCE). All three could claim a share in power through the new strategy they had adopted. The Portuguese Communist Party, the fourth "Latin" party in Western Europe, did not answer the call and through its leader, Alvaro Cunhal, refrained totally from making any reference to Eurocommunism. The aim of this article is, therefore, to determine the reasons for the rise of the Eurocommunist phenomenon in the three other Southern European countries mentioned above.

One reason is clear. In each of these countries there is a large Communist party that can legitimately hope to be part of the government. There are other reasons, however. First, peaceful co-existence has increased the freedom of action of the Western Communist parties, which no longer see themselves entrenched in the "socialist camp" in the Cold War against American imperialism. Secondly, the emergence of new strata of wage-earners has completely undermined the conception of a well-defined working class and, since the early year of 1968, the Communist parties have been forced to review their analyses on this score. Lastly, the political, economic and social crisis that has beset most of the Western European countries since the end of the Sixties has made the idea of Communist participation in government much more plausible. The Eurocommunist phenomenon is, therefore, related to a number of objective factors, and, as we shall see, to a change that is already clearly discernible within the parties under consideration.

What is the meaning of this term that the Eurocommunists themselves criticize as being too vague, though they accept it? First of all, it would be incorrect to interpret it as a new variant of Marxism Leninism or as an attempt to create a third or fourth centre of the international Communist movement. It is much more modest in scope. Simply stated, it represents an attempt to resolve the antinomy between the imposition of a socialist model that has little applicability in Western Europe and the strategic requirements for a socialist transformation of advanced capitalist societies. While the possibility of a new Communist doctrine can be dismissed, one can discern among the Eurocommunists some agreement on a common approach regarding the kind of socialism they hope to establish, on the means to that end, and on the necessity of modifying their

relations with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

In short, the Eurocommunists agree that the democratic liberties already prevailing in most Western countries should be respected; indeed, they hope to extend those liberties and defend them more effectively. This apparently means that the Communists accept the rules of parliamentary democracy and a plurality of parties and therefore recognize the right of the electorate to remove them from power. For the purpose of coming to power, the Eurocommunists are all in favour of enlisting a wider range of forces in the fight for socialism, so as to provide a truly popular base for all the stages involved in changing society. The link they wish to establish between popular support, secured through strategic alliances with other popular movements and parties, and democratic socialism requires that the Soviet-style "dictatorship of the proletariat" be abandoned. Implicit in this new formulation of Eurocommunist strategy and objectives is the rejection of any relations with the Soviet Union that could hinder their search for a national road to socialism.

Spain

As has often been the case in the history of the international Communist movement, it was in returning to a program designed to implement a policy it had previously rejected that the Spanish Communist Party adopted a Eurocommunist platform. Just as Stalin revived Trotsky's industrialization program, which he had just denounced, and as, in 1934, Thorez formed the political alliance with the socialists that was advocated by Doriot but that Thorez himself was in the process of rejecting, so Santiago Carrillo won his party's acceptance of the program of Fernando Claudin's "Italianizing" group, which had been rejected in 1965. Such was the ambiguity of this innovative and yet traditional action.

This program is not particularly original. Without renouncing the distant objective of a socialist system in which hegemony would be held by the workers' party – in other words, the Communist party – it defines an intermediate stage, that of a "political and social democracy set against monopolies and private ownership of large estates". During that stage, power would be exercised through an alliance of "all the antimonopolistic forces, including the petite bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie". The "forces of labour and culture" would assume the leadership of such an alliance, but they would do so in co-operation with various leftist parties and movements and without an official "Marxist-Leninist" ideology. Terms

*Spaniards
set aside
dictatorship
of proletariat*

in this formula call to mind the "people's democracy" programs that followed the Second World War. At that time, too, the Communist parties of Western Europe and Eastern Europe had stated that a road to socialism other than the Soviet-style "dictatorship of the proletariat" should be applied in Europe. Earlier, during the Spanish Civil War, the Communist Party had declared itself to be a republican party and had set aside – as the only "sensible" approach to take, according to its leaders at that time – the idea of dictatorship of the proletariat.

However, as Karl Marx himself once pointed out, we must distinguish between the phraseology, claims or constitutions of parties and their real interests, and between what they think they are and what they really are. In practice, the PCE sought alliances with all groups opposed to Francoism, including ultra right-wing elements such as the monarchist group of Rafael Calvo Serer and the Carlists. In fact, the establishment of a "Democratic Junta" in July 1974, grouping round the Communist Party representatives of the monarchist, Carlist and liberal right as well as some very moderate socialist intellectuals, was reminiscent of the attempt to form a "national union junta" to fight Franco in 1944, inasmuch as both failed to assemble many people around the Communist Party. The Party did not

really come out of isolation until the end of October 1975, when the Platform for a Democratic Coalition, an alliance formed in summer of 1975 by the large Workers' Socialist Party and the Christian Democrats, left with a multitude of small opposition groups, consented to sign an agreement of "democratic co-ordination" in view of the fact that Franco's death was imminent. This new alliance, never formally proclaimed, collapsed in December 1976 when the Socialist Party announced that it would stand alone in the June 1977 elections. Today the Communist Party continues to call for a national union government.

Three texts

However, the PCE has classified its perception of the "democratic road to socialism" and of the "socialism in democracy and liberty" to be achieved once in power. Three texts are particularly significant. The first is a statement issued jointly with the Italian Communist Party on July 11, 1975; it was, in fact, the first "Eurocommunist" document, though it appeared several months before the term was invented. In it, the two parties declared that they were endeavouring to bring about in their respective countries "the broadest and most democratic alliance of all the political forces" opposed to the conservative groups. They also solemnly



Wide World

After a week in jail in December 1976, Santiago Carillo, the party's secretary-general, and seven other Spanish Communist leaders were released. Carillo is being whisked away by car from Madrid's Carabanchel Prison.

ared that their "conception of a democratic advance towards socialism in peace and in liberty" reflected "not a tactical attitude but a strategic conviction". In addition, they said that, for them, socialism was the full development of democracy.

The second text was the joint statement released on March 3, 1977, following the meeting of the secretaries-general of the Communist parties of Spain, Italy and France. In that statement, the three parties expressed their desire to "obtain the widest possible agreement between those political and social forces prepared to contribute to a policy of progress and renewal". Even more interesting is the fact that they elucidate their conception of "socialism in democracy and liberty". While the strategy of the democratic road to socialism offers little in the way of new ideas that was not already included in that of the parliamentary road followed from 1944 to 1947 and recommended again by the international Communist movement at the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in 1956, the statement by the three parties gives a clearer idea of what socialism would accomplish once the parties were in power. They state unequivocally that they wish to "work to build a new society with a plurality of political and social forces by respecting, guaranteeing and developing all collective and individual liberties".

The third text is Santiago Carrillo's book, *Eurocomunismo y Estado*. It is a very important work, chiefly because it presents in a systematic fashion all the ideas that had previously been expressed on the subject at various times, particularly those on the question of the "democratic road to socialism" and the achievement of socialism "in liberty and democracy".

Even expressions of a desire to build socialism by guaranteeing the broadest liberties have not dispelled the mistrust of the leaders of the Spanish Workers Socialist Party—and particularly not that of its secretary-general, Felip Gonzales. There are reasons for this. First, the value of a guarantee of rights on paper is purely relative; the Soviet Constitution of 1936 was on this point the most democratic in the world. Secondly, while it expresses a real desire for democracy in the future government of a state in which it is at present only a minor opposition force, the Communist Party has a completely oligarchical, even monarchical, system of internal operation. Furthermore, Santiago Carrillo has often stated his prediction for "democratic centralism", the mode of operation of Communist parties that prevents all democratic debate and renders powerless any minority opposed to the ideas of the party leadership, which

some observers have derisively but accurately renamed "bureaucratic centralism".

Italy

On his return to Italy in April 1944, the leader of the Italian Communist Party (PCI), Palmiro Togliatti, outlined what he called even then the "via italiana al socialismo". This new era in Italian Communism was predicated upon greater integration into the country's political system and organization of the Party in order to make it a real party of the masses. Despite the exclusion of the PCI from the government in 1947, these two objectives continued to guide the actions of the Italian Communists, who played a much more positive role than did their French counterparts in all the political institutions of which they were members.

In fact, the Italian conception of power can be traced back to the great theoretician of Italian Communism, Antonio Gramsci, who died in a Fascist prison in 1937. According to Gramsci, the conditions under which socialism was established in Czarist Russia were very different from Italian conditions, characterized as they were by the existence of a relatively strong state and a well-rooted civil society that required the working class to engage in protracted, static warfare rather than the rapid mobile warfare of the October Revolution. The long-term objective of the working class should therefore be to replace the hegemony of the classes ruling over Italian society with its own.

In its interpretation of "hegemony", the central notion in Gramsci's thought, the Italian Communist Party has practised what Sydney Tarrow has called the "strategy of presence". This means that, though the Communists are part of the parliamentary opposition in Rome, they make the most of the opportunity granted them under the Constitution to participate in government at the municipal, provincial and regional levels. The concrete result of this policy is that the Communists are found almost everywhere in Italy, and that they already exercise a real hegemony in the "red belt" formed by the regions of Emilia-Romagna and Tuscany.

During the Fifties and Sixties, the PCI periodically demanded a share in power, but this demand was never really taken seriously. During the Sixties the debate over Party strategy took on more urgency. There were two principal, opposing theses: that of Giorgio Amendola, urging a parliamentary approach based on the union of the leftist parties, and that of Pietro Ingrao, advocating united action at the grass-roots level so as to bring together the leftist forces, including left-wing Christian Democrats.

*Communist
hegemony
in regions
of Italy*

In 1972 the new leader of the Party, Enrico Berlinguer, proposed to the Thirteenth Congress of the PCI what could be called a bureaucratic compromise between the two positions, when he declared that a "democratic turn" in Italian politics was necessary. This democratic turn required "co-operation between the popular mainstreams: Communist, Socialist and Catholic". Berlinguer used the *coup d'état* by the Chilean generals that brought down Salvador Allende's government in September 1973 as a pretext for reopening debate and clarifying the meaning of the democratic turn.

The argument of the secretary-general of the PCI was quite simple. As in Chile, it was becoming clear in Italy that the union of the left did not in itself possess the means to undertake the transformation of society, which, because of the crisis being experienced by Italy and all the other Western countries, was so urgently required. Winning 51 per cent of the votes was a necessary but insufficient condition. The base of the popular movement had to be broadened to ensure the success of the transformation process and to prevent the middle classes from taking the same road as they had in Chile. The Communists had to review their analysis of the Christian Democratic movement and recognize that it received strong support from those strata whose objective interests lay in the setting-up of a socialist system. It was incorrect to consider the Christian Democrats as a purely conservative force. By taking action and exerting pressure, the Communists could bring out the genuinely progressive elements in the Christian Democratic movement and thus isolate the conservatives or reactionaries.



AP Photo

Italian Communist Party leader
Enrico Berlinguer

To refuse this "historic compromise" between the political forces of the people to accept the possibility of a vertical split in a country that was already deeply divided and play into the hands of those who wanted a rightist or Fascist authoritarian solution to Italy's enormous problems.

The proposed new alliance does not exclude the socialists or the other parties in the so-called "constitutional arch" (the coalition that helped to draft the existing constitution), but still stresses special links between the two parties that together represent more than 70 per cent of the electorate. The Italian Constitution of 1948 remains an entirely valid starting-point for the changes that will be proposed, because it provides, in the opinion of the Italian Communists who helped to draft it, the foundations of a genuine "advanced democracy" and all that is required is its correct application. Defence of the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution and respect for the prevailing democratic framework therefore become essential components of the Italian road to socialism. As we shall see later, this road also involves a categorical rejection of any *rapprochement* with the Soviet model.

French Eurocommunism can be traced back to the Berlinguer-Marchais statement of November 15, 1975, in which the two parties undertook to respect the pluralism of parties, the right of opposition parties to exist and the alternation between temporary roles as majority and minority. Their meeting and resultant statement followed a scathing campaign begun in October 1974 by the Communist Party against the Socialist Party after the latter had tended its influence in the presidential elections. The Communist Party had challenged the loyalty of the Socialist Party to the Common Program of the Left signed in July 1972, and had accused it of preparing to destroy the alliance after reducing the Communist Party to an auxiliary force. The controversy had also concerned the support given by the French Socialist Party to its Portuguese counterpart, as well as its Soviet stance.

Did the Twenty-Second Congress of the French Communist Party in February 1976 at which the Party's desire to respect democracy was expressed, really mark the adoption of a charter of French Eurocommunism? The distinguishing feature of this Congress was the abandonment of reference to the dictatorship of the proletariat in the Party program. Is this really significant, however? In 1974 the Portuguese Communist Party had also abandoned any such reference. A short time later, however, it began, slowly but surely, to put pressure on the new democratic



CP Photo

**French Communist Party leader
Georges Marchais**

Portuguese Government and sought to reduce the influence of the socialists and other democratic groups by obstructing trade-union democracy and promoting the seizure of the main socialist newspaper by left-wing trotskyists. Before the French presidential elections in 1974, the French Communist Party had already tried to show that it had changed by implementing Operation "Open-Door", a symbolic gesture that enabled André Harris and Alain Sédouy to gather the material needed to publish *Voyage à l'intérieur du parti communiste*. This stage of openness did not, as we have seen, prevent a new stage of violent attacks on the Socialist Party and of support for the Portuguese Communist Party.

In any case, abandonment of any reference to the dictatorship of the proletariat and the effect of promoting an alliance of the left for the 1976 cantonal elections, and particularly for the 1977 municipal elections. The Common Program did not in itself provide for such alliances. Through them the Communist Party was able to take root in a number of municipalities where previously the socialists had governed with centrists. Hardly were the municipal elections over when the Communist Party embarked on another vigorous polemic against the Socialist Party, this time pushing for an "updating" of the Common Program of the Left and, in a more covert fashion, demanding new ministries for itself: Planning and Local Governments (municipalities). We shall now see the result.

Fact or fancy

What conclusions can be drawn? Is French Eurocommunism a fact or is it an invention of journalists short of copy? As Jean Rostaud commented, when two solutions are proposed there is a strong chance the right one is a third. The French road to socialism, or "socialism in French colours", is nothing new. Maurice Thorez had already taken the same line when, shortly after the Second World War, he stated that French socialism would be very different from Soviet socialism. France could avoid the dictatorship of the proletariat through a popular democracy in which several parties would flourish. As recently as 1966, the year the first electoral agreement was signed between parties of the leftist union, a senior PCF official gave as an example of party pluralism the German Democratic Republic, where a few parties do, in fact, exist alongside the Communist Party.

Has the Communist Party changed? Its strategy certainly has. The objective remains the same, however: being a party that claims to champion the objective interests of the working class, it still maintains that socialism has to be built under the direction of that class – in other words, under the leadership of the Communist Party. The principles underlying the internal operations of the French Communist Party have not changed any more than have those of the Spanish and Italian Communist Parties. PCF organization remains essentially hierarchical, and is based on a centralism that stifles any desire for true democratic debate or for democracy itself.

With regard to the PCF's partners in the leftist union, the well-orchestrated campaign of the "masses" in the spring and summer of 1977 for updating the Common Program – like other such campaigns before it – was not particularly democratic. It entailed exerting pressure on its partners, accusing them and putting them on the defensive. The element of intimidation in such a tactic is so great that, if it were tried when a leftist coalition was in power, it would bear absolutely no direct relation to the will of the workers.

The leftist union has enabled the French Communist Party to strengthen its presence at the local level – in the municipalities – as well as in the factories, and to recruit more new members than the Socialist Party. Is that not a fine result for a party whose objectives are long-term and non-electoral?

Soviet relationship

The chief obstacle to the credibility of the actions and intentions of the Western Communist parties has always been their close

*French Communists
have strengthened
local presence*

Soviet Union (CPSU). This has often made them appear as instruments of Soviet foreign policy rather than as independent political forces. Identification with the Soviet Union has been strengthened by the rather strict adherence of some parties, such as the PCF, to a socialist model clearly inapplicable in Western Europe without assistance from outside. For this reason, the Eurocommunist hypothesis of a democratic road to socialism, geared to the specific conditions of each country, was credible only if the parties concerned could convince the electorate of their total independence from Moscow.

This international aspect has three interrelated facets that should be briefly analysed. First, there is the problem of relations with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which until recently were encompassed by the doctrine of "proletarian internationalism". A second, equally sensitive, question is that of explicit and implicit criticism of the notorious Soviet model. Lastly, while the possibility of forming a new centre of international Communism is excluded, Eurocommunism does imply closer relations between the three parties.

With regard to the increased independence of the Western Communist parties from the CPSU, the Italian Communist Party can pride itself on being the first Eurocommunist party. Even before the death of Stalin, Togliatti distinguished himself by taking an independent line in relations with the "Father of the People" – an attitude that certainly never occurred to Maurice Thorez. However, it was after Khrushchov's secret report denouncing Stalin's crimes that the PCI gave the clearest illustration of its intention to draw away from Moscow's influence. In an interview published in the May-June 1956 issue of the Italian non-Communist magazine *Nuovi Argomenti*, Togliatti used the term "polycentrism", which was to signify a new style of relations between Communist parties. In other words, he was challenging the predominant role of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in the international Communist movement. This announcement of the PCI's independent path was confirmed at its Eighth Congress in 1957. Until his death in 1964, Togliatti continued to lead his party in that direction and would not, for example, allow formal expulsion of the Chinese party from the international Communist movement. The French and Spanish parties did not wish to follow in the footsteps of their heretical Italian counterpart.

relations with the Communist Party of the
Several events changed this situation and strengthened the camp of those who were critical of Moscow. For the PCF, the

continuing support the Soviet Union gave to the foreign policy of General de Gaulle, his successors directly and adversely affected its interests as a party, and Soviet interference in the French elections through the Tass news agency and through its ambassador in Paris was not appreciated. However, the event that had the greatest impact on relations between the Western parties and the CPSU was unquestionably the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Warsaw troops on August 21, 1968. All three parties protested against this end to the experiment in "socialism with a human face". Santiago Carrillo, leader of the PCE, made by far the harshest denunciation of the Soviet action and in response Moscow tried to bring about a split within his party; the attempt was forgotten.

From that moment on, though the French hesitated for a long time, the CPSU could no longer count on the unconditional support of three of the largest Communist parties in Western Europe. This situation became very clear in 1976. Two events served to show that a change was taking place in relations between certain Western parties and the CPSU. Neither the PCF nor the PCE was represented by its secretary-general at the Twenty-Fifth Congress of the CPSU in February. The Soviet and European leaders criticized the nationalist, opportunist tendencies of certain European parties, while Berlinguer emphasized the equality of the various parties. Four months later, the conference of the European Communist parties in East Berlin, which had required almost three years of preparation, was to discover that the CPSU had no way of imposing its views and that it had to accept the replacement of "proletarian internationalism" by the much less restrictive idea of "internationalist solidarity".

Overt criticism

The challenging of the traditional relations between parties was accompanied by increasingly overt criticism of the model presented by Soviet society. Critics avoided making a comprehensive analysis of shortcomings of Soviet socialism, though Santiago Carrillo's most recent book, *Eurocomunismo y Estado*, which strongly antagonized the Kremlin, goes very far in its negative appraisal of the Soviet experiment. Even Georges Marchais did not hesitate to use the term "garrison Communism" speaking of a road his party no longer wished to take. Such criticisms, which have become more frequent in the press of the three Eurocommunist parties, have been chiefly concerned with the violations of principles that have so often enraged the West.

*Challenge
to predominance
of Soviet Party
in international
movement*

press. The message is clear and is addressed directly to the national elections: "Do not hold us responsible for what goes on elsewhere".

This language has left the CPSU completely confused. Sometimes it issues very stern warnings and calls to order; at other times it congratulates the Eurocommunist parties for adopting strategies that take national circumstances into account. At times the quarrel seems to be channelled through third parties, as was the case in the early years of the Sino-Soviet conflict. The polemic in the Soviet periodical *New Times* against Craxi's book was also – even primarily – aimed at the PCI and the PCF. The various disputes between the PCI and the Czechoslovakian Communist Party chiefly concern the Soviet Union. There seems to be a continuing debate within the CPSU aimed at defining a clear position on Eurocommunism.

However, all the major options of Soviet foreign policy, except the one regarding China, converge with the foreign policy options advocated by the Eurocommunist parties. There is no divergence between the Eurocommunist parties and the U.S.S.R. on European matters, specifically on a regional security agreement that would make the Atlantic Alliance obsolete, on Africa, concern-

ing support of all Soviet initiatives on that continent, and on the United States.

The Kremlin's fears that the Eurocommunists will create a new centre of attraction in spite of themselves are reinforced by the rather frequent meetings between the three parties. Each meeting has resulted in statements confirming a certain community of views while remaining quite cautious in the final analysis. The most interesting aspect of these meetings is that they are increasingly taking on the appearance of meetings of heads of government. The meeting between Marchais and Berlinguer in Rome late in April 1977 is significant in this respect. Marchais confided to journalists: "One of the key questions in our talks was Franco-Italian relations as they are and as they should be". Observers of Eurocommunism no doubt see in the these meetings an expression of the limits of this phenomenon. Marchais indicated clearly, at the end of the celebrated Madrid meeting of the three Eurocommunist leaders in early March 1977, that Eurocommunism could not easily cross national borders, when he offered his own definition of the word: "The term indicates that, beyond the differences between our countries, there are a number of similar situations to which we are responding in convergent fashions".

Law of the sea

Nine years of negotiation may be reaching conclusion

Barry Mawhinney

The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) completed a fifth session in New York on July 15, 1977. In many respects this was a productive session. Whereas almost total frustration prevailed at the end of the fifth session, most delegates emerged from the most recent four-week round of exhaustive and exhausting negotiations with a measure of hope. After nine years of effort (including preparatory work), a new constitution of the oceans may finally emerge from the most ambitious diplomatic undertaking since the establishment of the United Nations.

The success or failure of the conference now turns on the extent to which an accommodation can be found with respect to an international system for exploitation of deep-seabed minerals. In short, delegates must formulate a regime that blends the common

Mr Mawhinney is Deputy Director of the Legal Operations Division in the Department of External Affairs and is in charge of the Law of the Sea Section of that division. He joined External Affairs in 1965 and has served in Accra and London as well as in Ottawa. The views expressed here are those of Mr Mawhinney.

heritage principle with a commercially-viable system to mine the manganese nodules (rich in nickel, copper, cobalt and manganese) that are found in that half of the world lying beneath the seas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.

The sixth session convened in New York from May 23 to July 15, 1977. In accordance with a decision taken at the previous session, the first three weeks of the conference were devoted to questions of deep-seabed mining in Committee I, which is chaired by Paul Bamela Engo of the United Republic of Cameroon. The other two committees, which began work in the fourth week, reverted to such questions as the rights of landlocked and geographically-disadvantaged states (LL/GDS), the status of the economic zone, the definition of the continental margin, fisheries, marine-boundary delimitation (all matters falling within the mandate of Committee II under the chairmanship of Andrés Aguilar of Venezuela), protection of the marine environment and marine scientific research (under the mandate of Committee III, chaired by Alexander Yankov of Bulgaria). In addition, informal plenary meetings under the chairmanship of the conference President, Shirley Amerasinghe, continued work on settlement of dispute procedures.

At the end of the sixth session, a new negotiating text, the "Informal Composite Negotiating Text", was issued by the conference. The ICNT was produced by a collegium of the three committee chairmen and the conference President. The Rapporteur-General, K.O. Rattray of Jamaica, and the chairman of the Drafting Committee, J.A. Beesley of Canada, were, *ex-officio*, kept informed of the preparation of the text. The new text consolidates in a single working document the four separate parts of the old "Revised Single Negotiating Text" (RSNT), which had been produced at the end of the fourth session in May 1976. The ICNT covers all aspects of the proposed new order of the oceans and includes a preamble and final clauses, thus closely approximating the format of a draft treaty though it remains a negotiating and not a negotiated text. Like its predecessor the RSNT, the document has no formal status and is intended as a procedural device to further the negotiating process without affecting the right of any delegation to suggest revisions in the search for a consensus. Each chairman assumed ultimate responsibility for preparing the provisions that fell within his committee's mandate. Many of the provisions in the ICNT repeat the language of the RSNT, though in a revised order. However, in several important respects the ICNT incorporates new language that reflects compro-

mise formulae emerging from informal negotiations at the conference on key outstanding issues.

Deep seabed

The fifth session of the conference held in New York from August 2 to September 10, 1976, had ended in a deadlock on the question of an international system for exploitation of minerals on the deep seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.

The most contentious issue has been that of access – the question of who would be allowed to exploit the deep seabed and on what conditions. The technologically advanced countries originally took the view that the power of the international seabed authority should be limited simply to issuing licences to state or private entities that were actually undertaking seabed mining. Conversely, developing countries insisted that exploitation be undertaken under the direct control of an international authority, with an operating arm of the authority participating in mining operations. The industrialized countries were prepared to accept a parallel system in which both an international enterprise and private or state entities would have guaranteed rights of access to explore and exploit deep-sea minerals. The developing countries insisted that the question of access for state and private entities must be subject to the discretionary control of an international seabed authority. It was this issue that sharply divided major industrialized states and the developing countries, represented collectively in the Group of 77, and led to an impasse in negotiations at the fifth session.

In order to break out of the sterile traditional debate that had characterized the deliberations at the fifth session, the Chairman, Evensen of Norway, with the encouragement of President Amerasinghe, convened intersessional talks in Geneva in February-March 1977. A constructive atmosphere prevailed at these talks, with the result that, for the first time, representatives of developed and developing countries were prepared to examine the various components of an international seabed regime from the standpoint of economic feasibility as well as political preferences. The results were encouraging and Mr. Evensen was asked by the chairman of Committee I to continue his efforts during a good part of the sixth session through the medium of an informal negotiating group. The discussions were wide-ranging and far less politically oriented than at the previous session. For the first time, delegations examined in a comprehensive manner the full range of questions relating to a deep-seabed regime including not only access and resource

(the linkage between deep-seabed and land-based mining operations) but also the institutional structure of the seabed authority, financial arrangements for the international enterprise, the conditions leading to a mining contract and a provision for a review conference.

Significant progress was achieved on the access question. For the first time, a majority of developing countries were prepared to accept a system of parallel access that would permit the concurrent exploitation of deep-seabed minerals by an international enterprise and state or private entities. This constituted a major breakthrough. Until this stage of the conference, members of the group of 77 were apprehensive that any system that permitted private exploitation of seabed minerals would undermine the international authority and thereby impede the application of the common-heritage principle.

Wording not clear

It should be noted, however, that, while the ICNT incorporates the principle of parallel access, the wording of the relevant draft provision is not as clear as it might be. A number of industrialized states have expressed concern in this regard. Moreover, when read in conjunction with the relevant annex, the draft article could be interpreted as restricting access to the seabed area by imposing an obligation to transfer technology to the international enterprise as a condition for obtaining a mining contract, although there is a stipulation that conditions of such contracts should be "fair and reasonable". These provisions of the ICNT diverge somewhat from the compromise formulations emerging from the Evensen informal negotiating group. They might prove difficult for most industrialized countries to accept, particularly states whose corporations have, or would be likely to invest, considerable money and technology in deep-seabed research and development.

A matter of direct concern to Canada is that the world's largest exporter of nickel is likely to have a potentially disruptive effect seabed-nickel protection, stimulated by direct or indirect subsidies or other forms of protection. Other states, could have on land-based production. The RSNT had incorporated a provision that did not afford adequate protection against such an eventuality. However, a thorough review of this question at the fifth session resulted in the incorporation in the ICNT of a formulation that would have the effect of achieving a balanced relation between deep-seabed and dry-land mining operations based on estimates of the growth in total world nickel demand. This formula, while not fully meeting Canadian

objectives, would provide some protection against market disruption of land-based production of minerals resulting from deep-seabed production. The formula allows an economic incentive of up to nine deep-seabed mine-sites upon the outset of commercial production, and it would further allow deep-seabed production to compete for 60 per cent of the cumulative growth of world nickel demand following an initial buildup period.

For the first time, the conference also examined in detail the institutional machinery of the international seabed authority including the powers and interrelations of the Assembly and Council and the basis for electing members to the latter body. The financial structure and legal status of the authority were also examined. Consideration was finally given to a review procedure whereby, after an initial period, state parties would meet to appraise the operation of the parallel-access system. Provisions on these matters are incorporated in the ICNT, but they give rise to certain difficulties and will require further revision and refinement in the course of negotiations at the next session.

One of the most significant developments at the Law of the Sea Conference has been the emerging consensus in favour of a 200-mile economic zone within which coastal states have the sovereign right to manage and exploit living and non-living resources, as well as growing support for the exercise of jurisdiction in respect of the protection of the marine environment and the regulation of marine scientific research. However, the major maritime powers and the coastal states have been sharply divided on how to define the economic zone. The former have insisted that, save for specific resource rights, the area should remain part of the high seas. The latter, with equal force, have maintained that the economic zone is an area *sui generis*, belonging neither to the high seas nor to the territorial seas but possessing some of the attributes of both. The major maritime powers had made it clear that this issue might turn out to be a "conference-breaker" unless there were adequate guarantees built into a law-of-the-sea treaty that would prevent the erosion of traditional navigational rights, including free movement for naval vessels, in economic zones. Coastal states were equally adamant that the economic zone must not be defined as part of the high seas, since to do so would derogate from the sovereign rights and jurisdictions exercised by the coastal state in the zone.

Discussion of this question in a subgroup of Committee II failed to break the deadlock. This led to the establishment of an

Coastal states rejected economic zone's being defined as part of high seas

informal negotiating group outside the conference committee structure in order to consider the status question along with the related issue of marine scientific research in the economic zone and dispute-settlement procedures for fisheries (see below). Intensive eleventh-hour negotiations resulted in a compromise formula (to which Canada and other moderate coastal states made a major contribution) that, while preserving the unique status of the economic zone, provided firm guarantees for high-seas rights of navigation and overflight, including the free movement of naval vessels. On marine scientific research the principle of coastal-state consent was coupled with the proviso that coastal states would "in normal circumstances" grant their consent for research projects except where such research affected the exercise of sovereign rights over the resources of the economic zone or on its continental shelf.

Key maritime and coastal-state representatives who participated in the informal negotiations indicated that these formulae constituted a significant improvement over the corresponding language of the RSNT and offered a promising basis for further discussion at the next session. On the strength of these discussions, the chairmen of Committees II and III decided to incorporate the compromise language in the ICNT. There is now reason to believe that the compromise formulae on navigational rights in the economic zone and marine scientific research could ultimately command broad support as provisions of a draft law-of-the-sea treaty. The progress achieved on these issues represents the single most important achievement at the sixth session.

Fisheries

On the basis of the emerging consensus at the Law of the Sea Conference, almost all major coastal states, including Canada, have passed national legislation establishing 200-mile exclusive fishery-zones. Provisions incorporated in the ICNT repeat texts negotiated at an earlier stage of the conference that clearly established the right of a coastal state to set the total allowable catch and determine those fishery stocks surplus to its needs in the 200-mile zone. The ICNT also incorporates earlier agreed provisions that would accord important management rights to coastal states over anadromous species, thereby permitting states in whose inland waters salmon spawn to control the harvesting of such species outside the 200-mile zone.

During the sixth session, substantive discussions on fisheries focused primarily on two issues – the problem of access to liv-

ing resources by landlocked and geographically-disadvantaged states and management and conservation of highly migratory species. An informal negotiating group under Mr. Nandan of Fiji, the called "Group of 21", has brought together representative grouping of LL/GD states and coastal states in an effort to accommodate the demands of the former without duly undermining the sovereign rights of the latter within the 200-mile zone. Ordinarily, the LL/GD states had demanded access to more than simply the surplus in the economic zone. Coastal states, however, have strongly resisted this claim on grounds that access by LL/GDS should be on the same basis as harvesting rights accorded to other third states – namely, access only to stocks declared surplus to the needs of the coastal states. The "Group of 21" which first met at the fifth session, continued its efforts during the sixth session to find an accommodation between these conflicting approaches. Some progress was achieved, but a further round of negotiations at the next session will be required before final agreement is reached on a compromise text for inclusion in the ICNT.

Progress was also made on the question of highly-migratory species through introduction and consideration of a new formula that aims at permitting regional international co-operation and at balancing the rights and interests of the coastal states with those other states that fish for highly migratory species, to ensure both conservation and optimum utilization of the stocks.

International straits

The question of passage through international straits overlapped by the 12-mile territorial sea of one or more coastal states has been one of the key issues at UNCLOS involving, as it does, a delicate balance between the navigational rights of maritime user-states and the environmental and security interests of straits states. In response to an initiative of the maritime powers the first negotiating text, adopted at the first session in Geneva on May 9, 1975, incorporated a new rule consisting of a right of unimpeded transit through all straits used for international navigation (replacing the traditional rule of innocent passage) with no requirement for prior notification for warships and no right on the part of the coastal state to impede such transit passage. This provision is retained in the ICNT despite the continuing reservations of certain straits states. However, as a means of at least partially accommodating the environmental concerns of states bordering international straits, a new draft article has been incorporated.

ed in the ICNT. The article would acknowledge their right to enforce against vessels in transit international safety-of-navigation and marine-traffic rules and international regulations regarding the discharge of oil and other noxious substances. This provision has served to assuage the concern of some of the key straits states, though others continue to speak out strongly against the principle of transit passage. Nonetheless, it is now evident that the transit-passage principle is firmly enshrined in the negotiating text and will have to be incorporated in a final law-of-the-sea treaty in order to ensure the support of major maritime states.

Continental margin

From the outset of the conference, countries with broad continental margins, including Canada, have strongly asserted a coastal state's sovereign rights over the natural resources of the entire continental shelf out to the outer edge of the continental margin, including the slope and rise – rights recognized in the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention. The RSNT, which defines the continental shelf as the natural prolongation of the land territory of a coastal state to the outer edge of the continental margin, is consistent with the position of broad-shelf countries. A number of states, however, in particular the LL/GD group (which together represent a blocking group at the conference), consider this definition to be so ambiguous as to allow a coastal state to extend its sovereign right to areas that should legitimately fall within the ambit of the international seabed authority and are therefore not subject to national appropriation. To the present definition they would much prefer either a strict application of the 200-mile limit with no coastal-state resource rights extending beyond the economic zone or a limitation based on depth of coastal waters.

In order to attract wider support for their position, the broad-shelf countries have sought to formulate a precise geological definition of the continental margin (based on the thickness of sediments on the continental rise), coupling this with a scheme for sharing revenues derived from the exploitation of the mineral resources of the continental shelf beyond 200 miles, such a scheme being without prejudice to the sovereign rights of the coastal state over these resources.

However, continued strong opposition from the LL/GD group prevented the inclusion of a precise definition of the continental shelf in the ICNT, even though a revenue-sharing formula along the lines proposed by broad-shelf states was included. Since acceptance of such a formula by broad-shelf

countries was conditional on the inclusion of a precise definition of the outer edge of the margin, this is a matter that will require further negotiation at the next session of the conference.

Positions polarized

Despite intensive discussion, positions remain polarized on whether the median-equidistance line or equitable principles should be the paramount criteria for delimiting the continental shelf and economic zones of opposite or adjacent states. The RSNT put primary emphasis on equitable principles. Canada and a substantial number of other like-minded countries argued that the RSNT provisions constituted a departure from existing international law as codified in the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention and, by putting emphasis on the ambiguous notion of equitable principles, would have the effect of introducing uncertainty into the law, thereby further complicating marine-boundary disputes.

A Spanish proposal, co-sponsored by Canada and 20 other states, stipulated the median line as the general rule for the delimitation of maritime boundaries unless special circumstances justified another line. A Libyan amendment, on the other hand, would have had the effect of further strengthening the primary emphasis on equitable principles reflected in the RSNT. Because of this sharp cleavage of views, the RSNT provisions were retained in the ICNT. However, debate on this issue will probably continue at the seventh session since a substantial number of states remain dissatisfied with the present text, as establishing far too subjective a criterion for marine-boundary delimitation.

Marine environment

As in previous sessions, discussion of the protection of the marine environment concentrated at the sixth session primarily on vessel-source pollution and the standard-setting and enforcement powers of coastal states in marine areas adjacent to their shores. It has been one of the principal Canadian objectives at the Law of the Sea Conference to incorporate in a new law-of-the-sea treaty rules, global in scope, that would define the basic rights and duties of all states for the protection of the marine environment. Negotiations at the sixth session confirmed the growing support in favour of this comprehensive approach, including an enhanced role for coastal and port states, concurrently with flag states, in enforcing internationally-agreed anti-pollution standards out to 200 miles. Coastal states retain the right to set vessel-discharge standards in the territorial sea and are accorded the

additional right to enforce international environmental standards in respect to vessel-source pollution out 200 miles, though the right of inspection and arrest is carefully circumscribed. In addition, the innovative universal port state idea, now firmly enshrined in the ICNT despite opposition from some maritime powers, would permit a state to take proceedings against a vessel voluntarily in one of its ports which had committed a discharge violation anywhere on the high seas or in the internal waters, territorial sea or economic zone of another state if requested by that state.

In certain important respects, however, the text falls short of Canadian objectives. The old RSNT contained language that imposed serious fetters on a coastal state's competence within the territorial sea to regulate ship design, construction, manning and equipment standards or to establish national rules in respect of any other matter pertaining to marine traffic that was already governed by international standards. Canada lobbied on this issue both between sessions in capitals and with delegations at the recent session. Fairly broad support was enlisted for a revision of the relevant text, with the result that the corresponding draft article of the ICNT is a marked improvement over its predecessor. However, the new language would still have the effect of barring a coastal state from setting design, construction, manning and equipment standards in the absence of international rules. This restriction would, in Canada's view, represent a significant erosion of the sovereignty coastal states have traditionally exercised in accordance with customary and codified international law. Canada had joined with other like-minded coastal states in submitting alternative language that would at least save a coastal state's right to act in the absence of international standards. In the event, the more restrictive alternative text found its way into the ICNT.

Canada also took the lead in seeking stronger enforcement rights for a coastal state in the economic zone. However, proposals put forward by the Canadian delegation, particularly for the strengthening of the inspection rights of a coastal state in cases of apprehended risk of pollution damage, were not reflected in the ICNT. These matters are being further examined in the intersessional period and will no doubt be discussed again when the conference resumes.

Of particular satisfaction to Canada is the fact that the RSNT provision recognizing the right of a coastal state to apply special environmental standards in ice-covered waters, the "ice-covered areas" article,

has been incorporated unchanged in ICNT. This has the effect of further strengthening international acceptance of Canada's Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, which, when it was originally passed in 1970, evoked strong criticism from maritime states.

While there are some serious shortcomings in the ICNT relating to the protection of the marine environment, considerable satisfaction can be derived from the fact that the basic conception of a comprehensive and global approach to pollution control and a functional sharing of jurisdiction between coastal, port and transit states has received strong support at the conference and is clearly reflected in the negotiating text. This constitutes a major step forward in the development of international environmental law and paves the way for a radical change from the previous regime based upon the principle of flag-state sovereignty and unrestricted freedom of the high seas.

Settlement of disputes

Significant progress was made at the session in refining and consolidating the draft text on settlement of disputes. There now appears to be a broad consensus in favour of an optional approach to third-party procedures, whereby state parties would be obligated to designate by a declaration at least one of four types of binding adjudication or arbitration for the resolution of disputes arising out of the interpretation or application of a Law of the Sea Convention. The four options would be: a Law of the Sea Tribunal established by the Convention; the International Court of Justice; and Arbitration Tribunal; a Special Arbitral Tribunal in accordance with terms specified in annex to the Law of the Sea Convention. A state which is party to a dispute not covered by a declaration would be deemed to have accepted arbitration. Of major importance at the recent session was the consensus accepting the creation of a separate Sea Chamber of the proposed Law of the Sea Tribunal. The Chamber would have jurisdiction over disputes arising out of the application of the provisions of the ICNT respecting the exploitation of the deep seabed. The effect of such a provision is to amalgamate in one dispute-settlement system all disputes relating to the application of a law-of-the-sea treaty.

As in the previous session, there was a sharp division of opinion on the extent to which the exercise of coastal-state rights over fisheries matters in the economic zone should be exempted from binding dispute-settlement procedures. The coastal-state group took a strong stand in favour of

exemption, pressing for an amendment to the RSNT provision that allowed for third-party settlement in cases where a coastal state had "manifestly failed" to comply with conditions specified in the Law of the Sea Convention with respect to living resources. This matter was discussed in an informal negotiating group, along with questions relating to navigational rights in the economic zone and the consent regime for marine scientific research (see above). On the basis of these discussions, the conference President incorporated in the ICNT provisions that had the effect of excluding from third-party proceedings the exercise of coastal-state discretionary powers both with respect to the management and harvesting of living resources and the granting or withholding of consent to conduct marine scientific research in the 200-mile zone. Though these exemptions appear to provide a high degree of protection to the coastal state, they are likely to be the subject of further discussion at the next session.

The incorporation of a binding third-party settlement procedure as an integral part of a new law-of-the-sea treaty is, from a Canadian standpoint, of fundamental importance in ensuring a balanced and effective implementation of a new legal order of the oceans. Despite certain imperfections, the present draft text appears to provide a generally satisfactory basis for an effective dispute-settlement system, and it is hoped that the next session will result in consensus support for it.

Seemingly interminable

The United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea has met for six sessions over the past four years and, taking into account the preparatory phase of the UN Seabed Committee, the lawmaking process has lasted nine years. Understandably, some countries are beginning to question the value of pursuing these seemingly interminable negotiations. Some states, in particular the United States, have expressed deep dissatisfaction with the outcome of the last session, most related to deep-seabed issues. Clearly, there are difficult questions that remain outstanding in connection with the international system for exploitation of deep-sea-

bed minerals. In contrast, however, to the deadlock at the fifth session in September 1976, significant progress has been achieved on this question, as well as on other outstanding issues. As a result, consensus is very much closer on a comprehensive draft treaty. If the momentum of the negotiations is to be sustained, intersessional meetings scheduled for early this year must come to grips with the detailed aspects of the system of exploitation of deep-seabed resources, with a view to accommodating the differences between developing countries and technologically-advanced countries.

The conference has already achieved much progress in restructuring international law to meet changing circumstances arising out of modern uses of the world's oceans. It has provided international sanction for an increasing number of coastal states to assert extended sovereign rights over fisheries resources in their adjacent marine areas. But an orderly and equitable development of deep-seabed resources, together with assurances of navigational freedoms in economic zones and in international straits, is very largely dependent on an effective multilateral legal framework that can only be achieved through a comprehensive law-of-the-sea treaty.

Failure to see the conference through to a successful conclusion would be a severe setback to the international lawmaking process recognized in the Charter of the United Nations. Such failure could lead to disputes over navigational rights in straits and economic zones, as well as over rights to mine deep-seabed minerals. The "cod war" between Britain and Iceland could be only a mild forerunner to more serious confrontations if the international community fails in its attempt to formulate a new constitution of the oceans. Maritime states, coastal states, landlocked and geographically-disadvantaged states – all have a vital stake in a successful outcome to the conference. Thus, despite critical reaction after the last session and impatience with the seemingly endless negotiations, it appears that states are prepared to make at least one more effort at the seventh session to achieve a breakthrough on the remaining issues dividing delegations.

CCMS defended. . .

Sir,

The views on NATO's Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society (CCMS) expressed by Patrick Kyba in *International Perspectives* (July/August) are, in fact, a condensed version of a study he made in 1970-71 under a fellowship offered to him under this Committee's Fellowship Program. Since he is the only candidate who has received a grant to study the Committee's own work, and furthermore is described as an observer of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, whatever that means, it is all the more surprising that his article is only riddled with inaccuracies and misconceptions on CCMS but proves a basic lack of understanding of how NATO and its Committee system work in practice.

My problem in commenting is, first of all, that Professor Kyba starts with the wrong end of the stick. After having given his assumptions on why and how CCMS was created, he turns to his "basis of judgment" of the Committee's work and value, which amounts to a stingy criticism based on "factual information" that mostly has no resemblance to reality. He then puts in, as an afterthought, what he calls the "saving grace" of CCMS, which "has proved to be the universally-acclaimed value of the pilot-project idea it adopted as its principal means of fulfilling its mandate".

I find this an absolute contradiction in terms in view of his description of the Committee as more or less useless. Since fulfilling its mandate is what a Committee is all about, in my view, I consider that the success or non-success of the pilot studies is the crux of the matter when judging CCMS.

Before discussing the pilot studies, however, I should like to deal briefly with Professor Kyba's contention that the CCMS is unique because it was created for political, not environmental, reasons. I believe that this is a gross oversimplification and that the truth was considerably more nuanced. Although I accept that political motives probably were important in the creation of CCMS, there is no doubt that the United States and its allies considered that NATO's well-proved political and administrative machinery might be a most effective means for governmental action and exchange of technological information in the environmental area, as it had previously been in the military as well as non-military fields.

As for the political motives, I cannot see why these would make CCMS unique. Political motives have played a part in the creation of the environmental activities of all the other major international organizations mentioned by Professor Kyba, and I cannot see anything wrong in such motives as long as something useful comes out of the work undertaken.

There was, of course, in any event nothing unique about NATO's getting involved in non-military matters, since the Alliance had already since 1958 successfully been co-operating in economic and pure-science matters as a follow-up to Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

NATO took the decision to enter the environmental field at a time when all member countries were applying stringent economic considerations to their international commitments and were expressing growing concern about mushrooming international organizations and costly international bureaucracies. The CCMS was, therefore, set up on the condition that its activities would not require additional international staff at NATO headquarters.

The method of work laid down for the Committee to achieve its objective without the assistance of such additional staff was the pilot-study method, by which the substantial technical/scientific work required is carried out by selected experts from the member countries rather than by international staff. The role of the Secretariat is, first of all, to coordinate and administer the pilot studies and process these up to the Committee's plenary level, and further up to the NATO Council for governmental approval and action.

Since Professor Kyba recognizes the "demonstrated value of the pilot projects", I cannot grasp why he contends that one of the reasons that the Committee cannot "achieve its limited objectives" is that its Secretariat is "deliberately kept to a minimum, and is expressly forbidden to do its own research". The latter part of this statement is untrue, but it would obviously in general be meaningless for the Secretariat to undertake such research since the Committee's projects are the responsibility of the pilot countries, whose experts undoubtedly are of the highest standard you would find anywhere in the world.

I can only conclude that Professor Kyba believes that such experts would necessarily do a better job if they carried an international hat rather than a national one. Although I have myself worked internationally for over 20 years and believe most strongly in international co-operation, I think this assumption is not quite valid. I am convinced that extremely competent studies are carried out by international environmental directorates, but I am also convinced that, regrettably, they too often remain theoretical studies, with no practical follow-up, for a number of reasons, the main one being that the countries concerned with the problems are in practice not sufficiently involved and the studies therefore often fail to take into account various national, regional and local considerations.

By letting the countries themselves choose the problem areas to be studied and allocate the resources required, one can be fairly sure that the studies will be realistic and pragmatic, and include specific aims for practical measures. Since such measures will eventually have to be implemented at the national, regional and local levels, it is essential that the experts who conduct a study are fully aware of and ensure that the relevant considerations at all levels in member countries are taken into account from the outset. I believe this is a prerequisite for arriving at action recommendations that are likely to be implemented by governments and not to remain only a nice piece of research in filing cabinets.

The basis for Professor Kyba's contention that CCMS cannot be very important to any member of the Alliance is that "none of the most important international environmental problems of concern to the members of the Alliance *can be solved* within the confines of NATO". His assumption must be, therefore, that such problems can be *solved* within the confines of international organizations, an assumption I find so completely lacking in realism as to be absurd. In fact, no international environmental organization can hope to do more than *contribute* to reversing trends and to making problems "tolerable".

To take a specific example, the total emission of sulphur dioxide in Europe was estimated to be 60 million tons in 1973 (figures from OECD and ECE), while the upper limit of "tolerable" emissions may be set at 25 million tons. There are technical solutions available to reduce SO₂ emission. However, a reduction from 60 million tons to 25 million tons a year by sulphurization would cost U.S. \$8,750 million annually (Ambio No. 5-6 1976). By reducing SO₂ to that level, the problem has, of course, not been solved but only made "tolerable", and, when one considers the economic implications, it seems evident that it is completely unrealistic to talk in terms of international organizations *solving* such problems.

I would not dare claim that CCMS can *solve* the problem of air pollution, but I think that the Committee can take considerable satisfaction in the fact that their air-pollution study undoubtedly has *contributed* to international efforts in this area, through three and a half years of intensive exchange of technological information, involving the participation of some 25 scientists representing over 100 governmental agencies and research institutes, and finally the adoption by NATO member governments of 15 action recommendations.

I shall now deal with some of Professor Kyba's specific misgivings, or rather preconceptions, about the Committee's work.

First, he maintains that the CCMS has no work program of its own. This is completely meaningless and Professor Kyba, in fact, correctly lists the Committee's very extensive past and current work program under his section on the CCMS pilot studies. The NATO member governments have taken a particularly active interest in the CCMS work program, as every subject to be included must be approved by the North Atlantic Council itself. Professor Kyba's statement seems to be based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the NATO Council committee system, since he seems to believe that a committee has an independent existence outside its national representatives, while in fact a committee only exists as a function of these representatives.

This strange conception of the Committee is further illustrated when he says that the Committee cannot institute changes to its operating procedures on its own and "none of its members is willing to take up the cudgels on its behalf" [*sic*], as if the individual members were something entirely separate from the Committee itself, while they, in fact, *are* the Committee. The truth is that the Committee can at any time change its operating procedures, although such changes will normally have to be approved by the North Atlantic Council.

As for the direction and coherence of the work done under the Committee's auspices, of which Professor Kyba finds a total lack, this is ensured by the countries that take the responsibility for this individually as pilots and collectively at Committee level, as well as by the Acting Chairman, NATO's Assistant Secretary-General for Scientific and Environmental Affairs, and the International Secretariat.

Furthermore, Professor Kyba gives a strange and entirely incorrect picture of the Committee's plenary sessions, which are, in fact, on each occasion based on a detailed

agenda, including a round table discussion as well as a complete review of progress and action on the Committee's work program.

Finally, Professor Kyba maintains that the Committee is hampered by the NATO system of decision-making by consensus, and that this is illustrated in the failure of the follow-up to pilot-study recommendations. It would be too far-reaching to go into the arguments on NATO's consensus system, but I cannot grasp the direct relation between this aspect and the problem of implementation of recommendations.

The fact is that NATO has always placed particular emphasis on follow-up by governments on CCMS pilot-study recommendations. Since the Committee's aim was action rather than new scientific research, follow-up reports to the NATO Council, as provided for in the terms of reference, have been made regularly from the outset, but a new reporting procedure to make this more effective was instituted three years ago, which incidentally proves that the Committee is fully capable of changing its operating procedures.

When Professor Kyba claims that the commitment of member countries to report on implementation has not been honoured to date, he is again completely off the mark, and proof is available in published CCMS reports on air pollution and road-safety follow-up (Reports Numbers 41, 44 and 50). The agenda for the Committee's plenary session in October 1977 called for CCMS, *inter alia*, to examine a substantive evaluation report by Canada on follow-up on the Inland Water Pollution Study, based on input from ten member countries which concludes that member countries are generally following the study recommendations.

Again I believe that Professor Kyba's sweeping statements are based on half-baked information, probably, in this case, that pilot countries have in practice experienced problems in obtaining information on implementation within the agreed time-limits. This is a well-known problem in all international organizations, and the Committee might have been too optimistic when instituting yearly reporting across the board, since this, in the case of some studies, was simply not practical due to ongoing international and national programs and activities.

Professor Kyba finds that the Committee's objectives are admirable but that there is a glaring omission in its terms of reference, i.e. the environmental impact of the military. In fact, there is nothing in the terms of reference that prevents the Committee from studying this subject, but there has so far been no proposal made to that effect. The truth is that the Committee has had more than enough on its plate, as its work program has covered all major pollution problems and, additionally, such varied areas as road safety, energy, health care and urban transportation, to mention only a few.

I shall make an additional point on the Committee's limited membership and scope. Although improvements within a limited number of highly-industrialized countries would in any event be an important contribution to the world-wide effort to control pollution, the CCMS has from the outset avoided a "closed-club policy" and taken pains to co-operate with any interested non-NATO country, as well as other international organizations. The response has been the active participation on subjects like air pollution, road safety and energy by countries like Japan, Sweden, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Australia and Israel, to mention a few, as well as a number of international organizations.

In addition, the Committee's pilot-study publications, which in many areas undoubtedly represent some of the most advanced material available today, are made freely available world-wide. It is with some sense of satisfaction that we send the CCMS Inland Water Pollution Study to engineers responsible for tackling water-management in remote parts of South America, our air-pollution publications to environmental planners in Malaysia, and our urban-transportation studies to urban planners in Australia.

Finally, let me say that, when a scholar examines any international organization, this should be done with a critical mind and with a view to suggesting improvements and alternatives. However, one also has the right to expect that the study is carried out with elementary objectivity and based on well-documented factual information. In Professor Kyba's case, there is such consistent disregard of facts that have been amply available to him both as a CCMS Fellow and as an observer of NATO that one suspects that he has not undertaken his task with an open mind but with preconceived ideas. I have made it quite clear that I do not pretend that the CCMS can solve any of the world's environmental problems, and I willingly admit that its membership and objectives are limited. Nevertheless, I strongly feel that the Committee, with its emphasis on action by member countries and intensive world-wide exchange of technological information, makes a sensible, cost-effective and worthwhile contribution to international efforts to tackle the challenges of modern society.

Leif Klette
Secretary CCMS,
Brussels

Reference Section

Canadian Foreign Relations

I. Recent Books

Beje, Carl E., and Judith Maxwell
Quebec's vulnerability in energy. Montreal: C.D.
 Howe Research Institute, 1977.
 44 pp.

Canadian Council on International Law. 6th, Ottawa,
 1979.

Papers presented on Canada-U.S. relations by
 Claude C. Emanuelli, A. de Mestral, M. Cadieux,
 H.M. Kindred and W. Biggs.

Canadian foreign policy and the law of the sea. Edited by
 Barbara Johnson and Mark W. Zacher. Van-
 couver: University of British Columbia Press,
 1977.
 387 pp.

Cleont, Wallace
*Continental corporate power: economic linkages be-
 tween Canada and the United States*. Toronto:
 McClelland and Stewart, 1977.
 408 pp.

Diefenbaker, John G.
*One Canada: memoirs of the Right Honourable
 John G. Diefenbaker; the tumultuous years, 1962-
 1967*. Toronto: Macmillan, 1977.
 309 pp.

Enish, John
Borden: his life and world. Toronto: McGraw-Hill
 Ryerson, 1977.
 223 pp.

Institut Nord-Sud
*Le défi Nord-Sud: le tiers-monde et les réalisations
 du Canada*. (Canada nord-sud; 1977-1978, 1)
 Ottawa: L'Institut Nord-Sud, 1977.
 212 pp.

Laergnas-Grémy, Isabelle
*L'Europe vue du Canada: rapport d'analyse d'un
 sondage d'opinion publique*. Montreal: Centre de
 Sondage et Centre d'Etudes et de Documentation
 Européennes, University of Montreal, 1976.
 93 pp.

North-South Institute
*North south encounter: The Third World and Cana-
 dian performance*. (Canada north south; 1977-
 1978, 1) Ottawa: North-South Institute, 1977.
 200 pp.

Pae, Donald M.
*A bibliography of works on Canadian foreign re-
 lations, 1971-1975*. Toronto: Canadian Institute of
 International Affairs, 1977.
 300 pp.

Stacey, Charles P.
Canada and the age of conflict. Volume I: 1867-
 1921. Toronto: Macmillan, 1977.
 410 pp.

Vernon, Raymond
Storm over the multinationals: the real issues. Cam-
 bridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1977.
 260 pp.

II. Recent Articles

Astrachan, A.
 "Obsession with unity." In *New Republic* 177:
 21-3 August 20, 1977.

Boardman, Robert
 "Canada and the Community: one year after." In
World Today 33:395-404 October 1977.

"Border problems of the United States and Canada:
 issues of the seventies." J. Richard Wagner, ed.
 In *Social Science Journal* 14:1-69 January 1977.

Bothwell, Robert, and John English
 "Canadian trade policy in the age of American
 dominance and the British decline, 1943-1947."
 In *Canadian Review of American Studies* 8:52-65
 Spring 1977.

Chapdelaine, Jean
 "Esquisse d'une politique extérieure d'un Québec
 souverain - genèse et prospective." In *Etudes in-
 ternationales* 8:342-355 June 1977.

"Le débat nucléaire."
 Articles by Albert Beaudry, Gilles Provost, Yvon
 Pageau and Pierre-Philippe Druet. In *Relations*
 Vol. 37 No. 431 November 1977. pp. 295-312.


Emanuelli, C.C.
 "The right of intervention of coastal states on the
 high seas in cases of pollution casualties." In *Uni-
 versity of New Brunswick Law Journal* 25:
 79-96 June 1976.

Fontaine, André
 "La France et le Québec." In *Etudes inter-
 nationales* 8:393-402 June 1977.

Hero, Alfred
 "Quelques réactions américaines au régime du
 parti québécois depuis le 15 novembre 1976." In
Etudes internationales 8:356-373 June 1977.

"Independence for Quebec: the debate gets sharper;
 with interview with René Lévesque." In *U.S. News
 and World Report* 83:69-72 September 26, 1977.

Lesieur, Jean
 "Québec: une nation qui se cherche." In *Le point*
 No. 268 7 November 1977. Pp. 106-112.

	Canada Post Postage paid	Postes Canada Port payé
Third Troisième class classe K1A 0S7 OTTAWA		

If undelivered,
return cover only to:
DSS Printing Operations
Ottawa, K1A 0S7, Canada

En cas de non-livraison,
retourner cette couverture seulement au:
Ministère des Approvisionnements
et Services-Imprimerie
Ottawa, K1A 0S7, Canada



External Affairs
Canada

Affaires extérieures
Canada

ISSN 0381-4874

March/April 1978

International Perspectives

A journal of opinion on world affairs

56

Canada and the sea

Extended fisheries jurisdiction

Religious solution for Jerusalem

Dialogue between Canada and ASEAN

Super-power diplomacy after Sadat

International Perspectives

Contents

March / April 1978

Canada and the sea	
Maritime forces and law of sea / <i>W. Harriet Critchley</i>	3
Problem of marine pollution / <i>R.M. M'Gonigle and Mark W. Zacher</i>	8
Extended fisheries jurisdiction / <i>Gordon R. Munro</i>	12
Jerusalem: the Holy City	
A religious solution / <i>James George</i>	18
Canadian position / <i>R. V. Lucy</i>	24
Dialogue between Canada and ASEAN / <i>A. Douglas Small</i>	28
Super-power diplomacy after Sadat / <i>Georges Vigny</i>	32
Letter to the Editor	36
Reference section	36

International Perspectives is issued bimonthly in English and French by the Department of External Affairs, Ottawa. Any material in this publication may be reproduced. Mention of *International Perspectives* as the source would be appreciated.

Published by authority of the
Secretary of State for External Affairs.

Authorized as third-class mail,
Post Office Department, Ottawa.

Subscription rates: Canada, \$4.00 a year;
single copies \$1.00; other countries
\$5.00 a year, single copies \$1.25.
Remittances, payable to the Receiver
General of Canada, should be sent to:
Printing and Publishing,
Supply & Services Canada,
Ottawa, Ontario, K1A 0S9.

Editors:

Alex I. Inglis
Louis Balthazar

International Perspectives is a journal of opinion on Canada's role in the world and on current international questions. Its purpose is to stimulate discussion and interest in international affairs. It is not intended to reflect Canadian Government policy or perceptions. Indeed, the editors often seek to include material that expresses different or contrary views. The Department of External Affairs accepts no responsibility for the views expressed except where it is clearly stated that an article by a departmental officer is a statement of Government policy. All other articles contain a specific disclaimer of departmental responsibility for their contents.

Letters of comment on issues discussed in *International Perspectives* are welcome and will be considered for publication. Please address your correspondence to: International Perspectives, Department of External Affairs, L. B. Pearson Bldg., 125 Sussex Drive, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, K1A 0G1.

Canada's maritime forces and the law of the sea

by W. Harriet Critchley

The negotiations at the UN Conference on the law of the Sea (UNCLOS) include a large number of issues of maritime security – in the broad sense of that term. Over 60 articles in the current working document, the Informal Composite Negotiating Text, deal with various aspects of vessel-passage and operation in the territorial sea, international straits and the exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Although much depends on the final content of these articles (indeed, even on achievement of an agreement), the results of UNCLOS could have a direct effect on strategic mobility, naval-presence operations and the range of tasks assigned to naval defence forces. Rather than analysing these law-of-the-sea articles as such, the focus here will be on the implications for elements of the Canadian Armed Forces of what Canada is already putting into effect. Attention will be directed to current maritime-forces capabilities and tasks, and the relevant aspects of foreign and defence policy.

Canada's territorial limits are defined by its borders with two states, the United States and Denmark (Greenland), and three oceans – the Atlantic, the Pacific and the Arctic. By virtue of these long ocean frontiers, Canada is a coastal state with an interest in the assertion of domestic jurisdiction and enforcement rights over coastal waters. In the context of UNCLOS, coastal-state interests tend to favour a restrictive attitude towards the international use of the sea and seabed. Simultaneously, however, as a maritime trading state and an ocean-alliance partner, Canada is a regional maritime power. The global maritime powers at UNCLOS have an interest in the maximum possible freedom for (or the least possible restrictions on) international use of the oceans. Since Canada is a regional maritime power, such interests are of less concern to the Federal Government than to the government of a global power like the United States. The contradiction between the coastal-state set of interests and the global-maritime-power set is clear, but the Canadian position at UNCLOS seems to be suc-

cessful at striking a balance between the two.

Most activities associated with maritime security are carried on by Canadian naval and air forces and are subsumed under the two general categories of national defence and civil regulation. National-defence tasks are defined by Canada's collective defence arrangements with the United States and with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, while civil-regulatory tasks are determined by domestic requirements. The sets of interests that guide these two categories of task approximate the maritime-state/coastal-state division of interests at UNCLOS; one stresses freedom for international use of the oceans, while the other enforces restrictions on such use. The advantages and difficulties associated with the dual aspects of maritime security are clearly demonstrated when the relevant activities on Canada's three ocean frontiers are examined separately and attention is concentrated on Canadian Armed Forces tasks in each case. These findings will, in turn, point to the policy implications of Canadian maritime security interests.

The Atlantic

The Canadian maritime forces' national-defence tasks in the Atlantic are integrated into NATO strategy. The primary task is to contribute to the defence of the land-based U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent. The threat to that deterrent originates from the large submarine force of the Soviet Union's Northern Fleet, which is based on the Kola Peninsula and operates in the Atlantic. NATO strategy also calls for a capability to reinforce and resupply NATO forces in the

Dr Critchley is at the Institute of International Relations, University of British Columbia, where she is preparing a book-length study entitled The Arctic and Canadian Security Policy and a shorter work on the changing strategic significance of the entire Arctic region. The views expressed in this article are those of Dr Critchley.

*Canadian
commitment
to conduct
anti-submarine
surveillance*

European theatre of operations during a war. The shortest route along which ship-borne reinforcements and supplies would move goes north along the east coast of the continent, across the Atlantic in the general vicinity of southern Greenland, Iceland and the Faeroe Islands to Britain and ports on the west coast of Europe. As these lines of communication by sea are also vulnerable to interdiction by the Soviet Northern Fleet, a NATO defence capability is required along the routes and to their north. The Canadian maritime commitment to NATO is mainly that of conducting anti-submarine surveillance in sectors of the Atlantic that contribute to both defence tasks. The maximum possible freedom of navigation, manoeuvre and overflight by NATO forces is vital to that defence capability.

The Canadian maritime forces' civil-regulatory tasks in the Atlantic are related to renewable and non-renewable natural resources in Canada's 200-mile EEZ. The most important resource is fisheries, but there is a potential for offshore oil and natural gas in parts of the EEZ. In addition to direct protection of these resources by licensing and quota regulations, there is indirect protection in the form of regulations on pollution-control and certain aspects of vessel-operation. A number of governmental agencies are responsible for

creating and enforcing these regulations but one aspect of enforcement – surveillance of resource-related activities in the EEZ – conducted to a considerable extent by Canadian naval vessels and aircraft.

So far this "multi-tasking" for Maritime Command Atlantic has been balanced. The civil-regulatory surveillance activities provide training exercises, improve ship-handling and increase naval aircraft activity-rates off the East Coast, all of which improve the skills and capability to perform national defence surveillance tasks successfully. There are, however, certain disadvantages and potential contradictions. The amount of sea duty and flight duty is excessive for the size of the force involved, with the resultant negative effects on morale, recruitment and maintenance of equipment. Secondly, while the co-ordination of fisheries surveillance is put forth as a positive example of interagency synergism, other resource-related regulatory activities are not co-ordinated. Future efforts of such co-ordination involving the use of Maritime Command Atlantic without increasing its size and equipment substantially, the civil-regulatory tasks would seriously detract from the ability to perform national defence tasks. Thirdly, as defence of the transatlantic lines of communication is so vital to NATO, it is reasonable



By sea or by land . . . for much of the year in the High Arctic the means of transportation is the same for both. Two Canadian military exercises (above and opposite) demonstrate the efficiency of snowshoes.



suggest that more attention should be directed towards defence of the ports at both ends of these routes. During a war, one of the more efficient methods of interdicting sea-borne supply is to render the embarkation and debarkation points for the various transit-routes inoperative. The maritime capability required to protect ports – for example, by minelaying and -sweeping – does not lend itself readily to multi-tasking or resource-related surveillance work in the EEZ.

Finally, additional obligations may arise in the future. There are some possibilities of conflict involving a NATO member that do not fit the functions for which the alliance was originally devised – possibilities that fall short of an armed attack by another state on an alliance member. For example, there is an increasing potential for conflict arising while maintaining access to, or protection of, valuable oil and natural-gas supplies. For many NATO members, these supplies originate in OPEC (Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries) states or offshore areas and proceed by ship to their European or North American destinations. The North Atlantic Treaty, however, does not provide guarantees against interference with shipping-lanes outside its area of jurisdiction (*i.e.* outside the North Atlantic). In view of the current dependence on these resources and the projections for greater dependence in the future, providing protection for the supplies and transit-routes by escorting oil-tankers and carriers of liq-

uified natural gas will be required in wartime, and even in some situations short of war. The provision of such protection will be regarded as a national defence task for NATO members' navies. This may be performed unilaterally, as has happened during other crises involving resources, or collectively – in which case Alliance members face the rather daunting necessity of revising the NATO treaty. Whether the task is performed unilaterally or collectively, the capability requirements for this form of maritime security will place an additional peacetime and wartime burden on at least some NATO navies. Meeting those requirements – however successfully or unsuccessfully – will almost certainly detract from the ability to perform other national defence and civil-regulatory surveillance tasks.

The Pacific

The situation in the Pacific with respect to Canadian maritime forces security activities is a modified and smaller-scale version of that described for the Atlantic. National defence in the Pacific is co-ordinated with the United States. Defence of the U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent concerns the threat from the Soviet Union's Pacific Fleet – a smaller force than the Northern Fleet, whose operations are more constrained. Maritime Command Pacific is responsible for anti-submarine surveillance in a sector that stretches from the Strait of Juan de Fuca to the Dixon Entrance. While the



Air-sea co-ordination looms large in both military and civil patrols in territorial waters. Above a Canadian patrol aircraft flies over C.G.S. Chebucto.

United States has a number of vital lines of communication across the Pacific (some of which pass along Canada's West Coast), Canada has none. Thus, defence of the lines of communication are U.S. naval tasks and, indeed, the U.S. Navy dominates the northern and central Pacific. The combination of the moderate size of the Canadian anti-submarine surveillance sector, the smaller threat from Soviet naval forces and U.S. naval dominance reduce Maritime Command Pacific's national defence tasks in comparison with those of Maritime Command Atlantic. Civil-regulatory tasks are mainly associated with fisheries surveillance in the Pacific EEZ and air-sea search-and-rescue services.

Though both sets of maritime security activities are on a smaller scale and seem to have achieved a better balance than is the case in the Atlantic, there remains the

possibility of contradiction in the event that additional civil-regulatory tasks are assigned, or Soviet naval activity in the Pacific increases.

The Arctic

The Arctic Ocean is also a territorial boundary – though few Canadians think of the Arctic as that kind of frontier. The idea of “maritime security in the Arctic” seems incongruous. In fact, any connection between security and the Canadian Arctic automatically translated into thoughts of the Soviet bomber-and-ICBM threat to the continental United States and the consequent DEW Line and NORAD defence measures. This situation is reflected in the small number and few types of national defence activities and capabilities in the region: naval forces have no capability of task apart from short-term summer deployment along the southeastern part of the region; air-defence elements have some reconnaissance tasks, but performing them strains aircraft capability to its limits; some land forces receive brief training in Arctic manoeuvres and provide personnel for the base at Alert; Northern Regional Command is a consultative – rather than functional command. While Canada is the only Arctic littoral state that has no continuing military capability to operate the year round along and near its Arctic frontier, this fact appears to cause little concern as no visible – or believable – military threat to Canadian territory is perceived.

Civil-regulatory tasks constitute a major proportion of Armed Forces activities in the Arctic. The most widely-known activity is the Northern Patrol – more commonly referred to as “sovereignty flights” –, in which anti-submarine surveillance aircraft from the two Maritime Commands are used for surveillance of resource-related activities and wildlife in the archipelago and on the northern fringe of the mainland. These flights average three a month and are dependent upon visual flying conditions for the performance of these photo-surveillance tasks. Other tasks include search and rescue, maintaining and improving a communications network throughout the region, various civil-engineering activities and the survival-cairn construction project for northern native communities.

This modest level of CAF activity belies the growing importance of the Arctic as a strategic zone for Canada proper. The main source of the change in strategic significance is the discovery of hydrocarbon resources – particularly natural gas – near and on the Arctic frontier. Though relatively little exploratory work has been done

In the region, major natural-gas deposits have already been discovered. The National Energy Board calculates, in one of the most conservative estimates available, a combined proved reserve of 12.5 trillion cubic feet for the Mackenzie Delta/Beaufort Sea area and the Sverdrup Basin in the Queen Elizabeth Islands. That constitutes 21 per cent of the total national reserve. Several of the gas deposits already discovered have been in offshore areas, and it is expected that by far the largest quantity of natural gas in the Canadian Arctic will continue to be found in offshore fields. Most analysts agree that Southern Canada will begin to require gas from the North by the mid-1980s, and one Energy, Mines and Resources forecast suggests that half the national demand for natural gas will have to be met by supplies from the Arctic by the 1990s. Irrespective of the method by which this gas is delivered to markets in Southern Canada, the Arctic will loom larger in the public consciousness and the level of activity in the region will increase dramatically over the next decade. More international attention will be focused on the entire region as all the Arctic littoral states explore the promising hydrocarbon potential in their own offshore areas and as they become interested, concerned and involved in the Arctic activities of other states.

To Canadian maritime interests, a number of large and complex issues present themselves. First, enumeration can begin with a whole series of questions on which governmental agencies and what methods will be used to enforce Canadian laws and regulations concerning resource-related and shipping activities in the waters of the archipelago, in the 100-mile zone created by the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act and in the 200-mile Arctic EEZ. Secondly, solutions will be required for the immediate problems of providing communications, year-round navigational aids and ice forecasts, and search-and-rescue services. The increased level of activity associated with natural-resource exploration and exploitation will overstrain, if not overwhelm, current capabilities in these areas. Thirdly, a major research effort is required to redress Canada's lack of knowledge of such fundamentals as bathymetry, winds and currents, and year-round ice dynamics – to mention only a few of the most-immediately needed data on the waters within and near the archipelago. Finally, there are defence issues such as the feasibility of protecting the Canadian supply of these energy resources from interdiction. Other states that have vital interests in energy supplies from offshore areas face this problem, and now Canada joins the club by virtue of the ex-

posed geographical location of Arctic hydrocarbon deposits and their consequent vulnerability. That vulnerability is enhanced by advances in weapons and weapon-systems technology. It should be noted in this context that the DEW Line provides radar coverage across the North up to approximately 70° North latitude. In addition, severe ice conditions prevent those Canadian icebreakers that operate in Arctic waters from entering some basins and channels at any time of the year, and almost all waters during the winter months. Thus, Canada has no air-surveillance system or radar capability for the archipelago, while its maritime-control capability in the area is only partial – and strictly seasonal at that.

This is a very short list of issues concerning Canada's Arctic region. It has been deliberately limited to the types of task that elements of the Canadian Armed Forces already perform in the Arctic or elsewhere in Canadian coastal waters. While the issues for the Arctic are generated directly by resource-related economic activities and interests, their urgency is dictated by Canadian initiatives in relation to a new law of the sea – the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act and the declaration of a 200-mile EEZ in the Arctic.

Policy implications

At present there do not seem to be any significant contradictions concerning Canadian maritime forces' activities and capabilities in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. We need to make a continuing effort to clarify our priorities between and within the two categories of maritime security and to act accordingly, but these are essentially matters of equipment, personnel and capacity. They do not call for changes in defence or foreign policy. To be sure, failure to reach an agreement at UNCLOS, and the consequent possibility that the coastal states of the world will proceed to carve the oceans up into national lakes, would alter the context of international relations and raise innumerable new issues of maritime security. But in fact that possibility may be one of the most powerful stimuli working for the achievement of an agreement.

There is, however, considerable contradiction in maritime security needs, activities and capabilities in the Arctic. There is no capability for year-round operations in coastal waters, in the 100-mile pollution zone or in the 200-mile EEZ. While it is true that the current need for such a capability may be limited, there is ample support for the argument that we shall need such a capability within the next decade. The contradictions are a reflection of the *ad hoc*,

Continue effort to clarify security priorities

piecemeal nature of previous governmental policy-making with respect to Arctic problems. This may be a luxury we can no longer afford as complex issues of economic development, native rights, constitutional development, national defence and security, maritime control and foreign relations with adjacent Arctic littoral states exert simultaneous but somewhat conflicting pressures on individuals, industry and the Government.

In short, Canada requires an Arctic policy that establishes its interests and assigns priorities among them, identifies the issues, co-ordinates the wide range of current and planned activities – a policy that articulates fully and coherently the role seen for the Arctic in the country's future. With such a policy, maritime security issues can be addressed in such a way that effective and balanced solutions are found.

International problem of marine pollution

By R. Michael M'Gonigle and Mark W. Zacher

Within the last decade, a new issue of profound consequence has begun to make its appearance on the stage of international politics – the need for global protection of the environment. The new concern has so far been most dramatically manifested at the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, held in Stockholm in 1972. It has continued to be of considerable political interest, especially as regards marine pollution. The issue of pollution of the seas has been given prominent place on the agendas of the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO) and the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

Canada has been one of the most active and outspoken participants in these deliber-

ations. It is, in fact, fair to credit Canada with much of the responsibility for launching the challenge to traditional maritime environmental law that has so preoccupied these bodies. To a great extent, Canada's concern originally grew out of its jurisdictional interest in the Arctic. However, it has also been affected by the growing environmental concern within the country, the extent of the Canadian coastline and the great volume of Canada's seaborne trade.

Canada's international environmental policies are now at a critical stage. Having largely resolved the *jurisdictional* issues at the Law of the Sea Conference, the country must now turn to the task of constructing a true legal system of worldwide environmental protection. The environmental crisis is planetary in scope, and thus presents a very serious challenge to current diplomatic approaches.

In view of the reluctance of states to accept international controls over domestic activities, negotiations on marine-pollution control have focused almost exclusively on pollution caused by ships, especially oil pollution. Land-based sources contribute enormous quantities of pollutants through the air or by river run-off, but they have to all intents and purposes been ignored. This has certainly been the case at UNCLOS where the multi-faceted Informal Composite Negotiating Text (ICNT) was con-

Professor M'Gonigle is a Research Associate in the Institute of International Relations at the University of British Columbia.

Professor Zacher is the Director of the Institute. They have co-authored an article entitled "Canadian Foreign Policy and the Control of Marine Pollution" in Canadian Foreign Policy and the Law of the Sea (University of British Columbia Press, 1977). They are at present finishing a book-length manuscript entitled Pollution, Politics and International Law: The Control of Ocean Oil Pollution.

cluded in July 1977. The articles of this very important document dealing with marine pollution are not likely to be altered in any significant way in the future, even though the ICNT does not yet represent a formal convention.

Of most concern to the maritime powers and to Canada is the allocation of *jurisdictions* to set environmental standards for shipping. The history of maritime affairs has seen standard-setting powers controlled largely by "flag states", and the ICNT provides few changes in this arrangement. However, ever since the Arctic voyage of the super-tanker *Manhattan* and the passage of the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, the specific jurisdictional issue of greatest concern to the Canadian Government has been that of assuring its right to set pollution-control standards in the Arctic. A long and intensive diplomatic campaign was waged to secure this right and, with the inclusion in the ICNT of the "Arctic exception", it has been successful.

Unfortunately for the "coastal state", the Arctic exception was – an exception. Despite the creation of a broad new coastal economic zone", its powers to set standards within coastal waters are extremely restricted. In the economic zone they are nonexistent and for ships on "innocent passage" through the territorial seas they are extremely circumscribed. In this latter area, the laws of the coastal state must "not apply to the design, construction, manning or equipment" of foreign ships except to give effect to "generally accepted rules or standards". It is hoped that Canada will take the lead in interpreting "generally accepted" more freely than just "legally in force". If it could be extended to include the accepted recommendations of international agencies and the provisions of a convention that has not yet entered into force, then the coastal state would have an important ability to promote the early implementation in law of such standards.

Conflict

Canada's domestic legislation is at present in basic conflict with the new provisions of the ICNT, for, with the extension of the "fishing-zones" on January 1, 1977, the Canada Shipping Act, Part XX (the part that gives powers to set ship standards), was so extended to the full 200-mile width of the economic zone. The powers conferred by that legislation substantially exceed those allowed by the ICNT. Although they are not at present being implemented, they could pose a deterrent to Canada's ratification of the eventual law-of-the-sea treaty.

This should not happen. Certainly, the provision of existing Canadian law would

represent the defeat of a strongly-backed Canadian law-of-the-sea goal, but to attempt to retain the powers would result in conflict with the maritime states. Moreover, for Canada their loss would have little environmental impact. Almost all vessels travelling near the Canadian coast enter either Canadian or American ports. For those coming to Canadian "internal waters", the Government can legally set whatever standards it likes. The real constraints are not legal but practical. That is, what will the major ship-owning nations on whom Canada relies allow? As to those vessels going on to the United States, many can enter American ports without ever traversing Canadian waters. The issue is clearly one for bilateral negotiation and, on this issue, Canada could have no better neighbour. No government in the world is under more intense pressures from domestic environmentalists and, since the early 1970s, the United States has been in the vanguard of attempts to control marine pollution.

If the accepted standard-setting powers in the ICNT are not precisely to Canada's liking, the powers of enforcement are more so. Here too the capabilities of a coastal state are not enhanced within the economic zone, but port states will now have far greater latitude than ever before. Traditional law left it to the flag state to prosecute all violations beyond the territorial sea. Now the state in whose port a ship has docked may prosecute violations of international standards committed anywhere. It is still provided that, within six months, the flag state may pre-empt the coastal state with its own prosecution. Even so, the new port-state enforcement provision has the potential to be the most constructive development in the environmental law of the sea. It certainly imposes a significant new responsibility on the Canadian Government, especially its Ministry of Transport.

Particular standards

Turning to the particular standards themselves, two areas are of continuing interest in connection with vessel-source pollution: prevention of pollution and compensation for pollution-damage when it does occur. In addition, the control of ocean dumping, on which a convention was concluded in 1972, is an issue of considerable importance.

The prevention of both intentional and accidental marine pollution has been a major topic of international negotiation since the late 1960s. Numerous regulations of relevance to accidental pollution have been drawn up by IMCO over the years and more are still to come. By February 1978, a conference on "tanker safety and pollution

*United States
in vanguard
of attempts
to control
pollution*

prevention" will have been held as a consequence of the American reaction to the rash of accidents it experienced late in 1976 and early in 1977 (of which the *Argo Merchant* disaster was most notable). Another conference to set minimum qualifications for vessel crews will be held in June 1978.

With some exceptions, the major moving force behind the adoption of more stringent and costly regulations has been the United States. With its huge domestic market and its global network of multinational oil and shipping companies, the U.S. can credibly threaten unilateral action and sway the negotiations in its favour. It is important for Canada to work imaginatively within the American-led environmental contingent at IMCO but, realistically, it is the United States that has taken charge.

In any event, however, the nub of the present challenge lies not so much in the advocacy of higher standards (with some notable exceptions) but in the implementation and enforcement of those already agreed upon. For example, despite the enormous effort that went into the drafting of the 1973 Convention on the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, it has, four years later, been ratified by only three countries. Canada is not among them – indeed, Canada has not yet built the reception facilities for oil and chemical residues that would enable the Government to ratify it.

Most important, Canada must undertake to ensure that existing standards are enforced. Domestically, the Government has, like those of other countries, never

financed a major surveillance program far out to sea. Increasingly, ship technologies are available that will allow determination in port of discharge violations. In addition, a truly comprehensive control system must be implemented to detect sub-standard ships long before they are near Canadian shores. At the international level, the Government must press strongly to remove those obstacles that have for so long kept coastal states at the mercy of foreign operators over whom there is no control. For example, despite the need to rely on the certificates provided by foreign "classification" societies, these societies are unpoliced and their certificates are inadequate and often even dishonest. The *Arrow* was issued the top "A1" rating by the American Bureau of Shipping only six days before it grounded in Nova Scotia's Chedabucto Bay in 1970. In addition, if port state enforcement, with its flag-state pre-emption, is actually to work, foreign governments must be held to their commitment to prosecute violations referred to them. So far they have not been. A number of states, including Canada, have recently advocated that IMCO receive and review information on members' enforcement practices – a most welcome and necessary development. With the many changes required, this is a good beginning.

Urgent need

With regard to the rules of liability and compensation for oil-pollution damage, there is an even more urgent need for action. Though both the Arctic Waters Pollution



A Canadian Government inspection team sets out from a patrol ship to inspect a West German trawler working the George's Bank fisheries off the Atlantic coast.

Prevention Act and the Canada Shipping Act, Part XX, were designed in 1970 to improve the position of a Canadian pollution victim, in many respects that claimant is now in a worse position than he would be under the new international laws. However, even without considering ratification of the relevant IMCO conventions, such a welter of traps and loopholes has been identified in the Canadian legislation that its amendment is urgently needed. For example, the provision for requiring pollution insurance under the Canada Shipping Act has not been proclaimed, so none is required. In addition, access to the \$40-million Maritime Pollution Claims Fund has been found to be so restrictive that it has, except for one minus-cule claim, remained untouched. This has happened despite numerous oil-pollution incidents, one approaching \$1 million.

In addition to putting its own house in order, Canada should ratify the two IMCO conventions on this subject. These agreements – the 1969 Civil Liability Convention and the 1971 Convention for the Establishment of an International Compensation Fund – provide an unusual example of what superb treaty law can be produced by the multilateral conference process. The 1969 convention has now been accepted by approximately 35 countries but the 1971 sister convention is not yet in force. Canada's failure to ratify it is helping to hold back its coming into force, as is the U.S. failure to ratify. Indeed, Canada could produce a small reservoir of good will with the maritime states it has opposed so often at UNCLOS and IMCO by attempting to get the United States to accept this convention and to abandon its present plans to create unilaterally an unnecessary and wasteful \$200-million Super Fund.

In addition to these specific issues, the authors believe there is also a present need for the Government to take stock of its more general orientation on international environment questions. In recent years, a nationalist concern for maximizing Canadian jurisdictional gains at the Law of the Sea Conference has predominated in Ottawa and there is the dangerous possibility that this obsession with jurisdictional issues could continue and blind the Government to the crucial substantive issues of environmental protection.

Environmental values must be pursued in their own right and not solely in relation to their jurisdictional consequences. On the one hand, the Government must not reject important conventions such as the IMCO liability conventions, or even the law-of-the-sea treaty itself, because of minor or even imagined "implications" they may have for jurisdictional

ambitions of marginal value. On the other hand, there is also an immediate need actively to seek and resolve environmental problems at the international level apart from any potential jurisdictional gains they may or may not offer. Many such problems were identified above and, on some of these (such as improving flag-state accountability), the Government has already begun to act. But they are only a small part of the issues looming before us. Ship-source pollution is but one aspect of marine pollution. Marine pollution is but a small part of the global environmental crisis.

The challenge

It is this global environmental crisis that is really the challenge before us all. Many commentators have argued that the very nature of international politics is undergoing a fundamental change and the environmental crisis is one manifestation of it. Encapsulated by the phrase "complex interdependence", the changes that are occurring undermine the very basis of our traditional attitudes and strategies. In a very short period, we have witnessed both the rapid growth in the number of national actors on the international scene and a multiplication of the number and variety of issues with which they are concerned. At the same time, powerful non-governmental "transnational" actors such as multinational oil and shipping companies and environmental coalitions add to the complexity of issues. In a "global village" the distinction between matters of domestic and international significance tends to blur. Consequently, purely national perspectives and the failure to recognize the global nature of many environmental issues will only impede an imaginative response. Critics refer to the "logic of state sovereignty" as being opposed to the "requirements of world order". They are correct in the sense that the management of interdependences in our large, complex and global social system will require the construction of stronger and more pervasive international regimes.

Environmental problems in general, and marine pollution in particular, clearly reflect these changes. Indeed, when combined with the pressing demands of 100 new nations for a new and equitable "international economic order", the environmental issue contains the seeds of damaging conflict. In the interests of development, the poorer nations reject our environmental values as irrelevant to their needs. As at the Law of the Sea Conference, they demand a "double standard" for environmental controls. Unless their development aspirations are to be denied, the protection of the global environment requires their co-operation as

*Environmentalists
and multinationals
make issues
more complex*

well. Only the conscious pursuit of both an ecologically-sound and equitable world order can resolve this dilemma.

This is an overwhelming challenge, but it cannot be avoided. Ten years ago, the environmental issue was not really much of an issue at all and the developing countries were not much of a threat. Who can predict a decade hence?

There is truly a need for a new perspective, but it will not develop quickly. However, it must first be realized that the resolution of this global problem is increasingly in the "national interest". Only such a realization can provide the new perspectives that are necessary: on the

constructive relations that are needed with those transnational environmental organizations that are trying to accomplish much-needed changes in attitudes at home and abroad; on the legitimate aspirations of the developing countries; on our own domestic attitudes as we adapt to a "spaceship earth"; and on the invaluable future roles of the United Nations, IMCO and the UN Environment Program.

These are the real challenges of marine pollution and the environment. With its inheritance of concern for the larger interests of the international community, they are challenges to which Canada is well able to respond.

Extended fisheries jurisdiction and international co-operation

By Gordon R. Munro

On January 1, 1977, Canada established an exclusive fishing zone extending 200 miles off the East and West Coasts; on March 1, 1977, the 200-mile zone was also established off the Arctic Coast. The consequences for fisheries will be twofold. First, important fishery resources off the Canadian coasts, which have hitherto been the object of international exploitation, will now become subject to Canadian management. This will be particularly important in the Atlantic region. Secondly, extended fisheries jurisdiction will require Canada to establish a new set of relations with the so-called distant-water nations, which have had a history of fishing within waters now

encompassed by Canada's 200-mile fisheries zone. One might also add that the new regime will have a significant impact on U.S.-Canada relations.

One characteristic of most commercial fisheries throughout the world is that they are eventually over-exploited. Economists and others ascribe this phenomenon to the fact that fisheries are, generally speaking, common-property resources. Fish in the waters of any state are not owned by individual fishermen or by groups of fishermen. The resource, it is true, is technically owned by the state, but more often than not the state is ineffectual in imposing its property rights. Thus the resource is, to all intents and purposes, open to all and owned by none with the inevitable result that it is mismanaged. There is a tendency to exploit the resource to such an extent that the net economic benefits it is capable of generating for society are severely, if not totally dissipated.

What the state should attempt to do is to make its property rights effective by imposing restrictions on fishing. An example of an attempt by the authorities to do this on a major scale is provided by the British Columbia salmon fishery. Ideally the authorities should seek to ensure the greatest possible return to society from the fishery.

More difficult

If a fishery is in international waters, the problem becomes much more difficult, for

Professor Munro is Associate Professor in the Department of Economics at the University of British Columbia. He has worked extensively over the past several years on problems of fisheries economics in general and on law-of-the-sea problems in particular. Among his publications are: "Canada and Fisheries Management with Extended Jurisdiction: a Preliminary View", in L. Anderson (ed.) Economic Impacts of Extended Fisheries Jurisdiction, and "North America, Extended Jurisdiction and the Northwest Atlantic: A Canadian Perspective", in E. Miles and J. Gamble (eds.) Law of the Sea: Conference Outcomes and Problems of Implementation. The views expressed here are those of Dr Munro.

no one nation, or even group of nations, has clear property rights to the resource. If the resource is to be effectively managed, the countries whose fishermen are exploiting it must come together and act as joint owners. It cannot be assumed, however, that the interests of the countries concerned will coincide.

Canada faced this problem in acute form on its Atlantic coast, where the fishing industries are important components of several provincial economies. This importance was and is particularly evident in Canada's poorest province, Newfoundland.

Canada made an attempt in the 1960s to protect its Atlantic and Pacific fisheries more adequately by extending its fisheries jurisdiction from three to 12 miles and by introducing certain closing-lines on both coasts. It remained true, however, that large potentially-rich fishing resources on the Scotian Shelf off the coast of Nova Scotia, on the famous Grand Banks, and on the Hamilton Inlet Bank north of Newfoundland lay far outside the 12-mile limit. Most of these resources consisted of groundfish such as cod, redfish and flounder; the groundfish industry is the major employer in Canada's Atlantic fishing industry.

There had for centuries been some foreign fishing off Canada's Atlantic coast, and the country had learnt to live with it. In the late 1950s, however, the level of foreign fishing activity began to rise sharply. Whereas in 1956 the foreign fleets had accounted for roughly one-third (by weight) of the harvested fish, in 1974 the foreign share was almost double that proportion. The ships of the U.S.S.R. had achieved the most spectacular increase in their catch. In 1956 the Soviet share of the catch was negligible; by 1974, it was equal to that of Canada.

In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the global catch off the Atlantic coast increased with the growing effort. Canada's total catch also increased as it began to expand its offshore capacity. The expansion in catches, however, could not be sustained. A peak was reached in 1968 from which the big catches gradually declined. In 1968 the total catch was about 2,600 thousand tonnes. By 1975 this had decreased to approximately 2,000 thousand tonnes, a decline of roughly 25 per cent. Total Canadian catches had fallen by one-third over the same period.

Inshore fisheries

It was not just Canadian offshore catches that were affected by the expansion of the foreign fishing effort. In Newfoundland, the inshore fishing industry, which employs far more fishermen than the offshore sector,

was directly affected. The mainstay of the inshore industry is groundfish. When the groundfish stocks were subject to heavier offshore exploitation, fewer groundfish came inshore, with a consequent drastic decline in inshore catches. As the Newfoundland inshore-fishing communities are impoverished at the best of times, the decline in inshore catches had serious social as well as economic consequences.

The increasing weakness of the industry was masked in part during the late 1960s and early 1970s by a steady rise in demand for processed groundfish, which reached a peak in the commodity boom of 1972-73. With the collapse of the boom in the recession of 1974-75, however, the industry found itself in serious difficulty. There might well have been widespread bankruptcy had not the Federal Government intervened with a large emergency subsidy program.

These developments on the Atlantic Coast had not occurred without some attempt at regulating the fisheries outside Canada's jurisdiction. As far back as 1949, Canada and the United States, with the five or six European countries then fishing off the Atlantic Coast, had realized that unregulated fishing in the Northwest Atlantic could have serious consequences. They came together, therefore, to form the International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries. Eventually the ICNAF area covered the waters from Greenland to Cape Hatteras and east to 42°W longitude (south of Greenland). Up to 1970, ICNAF contented itself with problems of scientific research and the setting of gear regulations (e.g. mesh-sizes). Then it began to impose fishing quotas on various species by area and by fishing nation. The quota regulations gradually increased both in scope and intensity.

Too late

It is fair to say, however, that by Canada in general and by the Atlantic Provinces in particular the increased ICNAF activity was seen as coming far too late and as being generally inadequate. ICNAF had not prevented the massive build-up of foreign fishing effort and the consequent depletion of stocks. ICNAF's membership had grown from the original handful of countries to 18. More thoroughgoing and effective management policies were required than those ICNAF could implement. The pressure for greater Canadian control of the Atlantic fisheries began to intensify.

With regard to the Pacific Coast, the need for extended fisheries jurisdiction appeared less urgent. Far fewer fishing-grounds extended beyond the Canadian 12-

*Realization
that fisheries
required
regulation*

mile zone. Indeed, the harvesting of the most important species, salmon, takes place almost entirely within 12 miles of the shore. There were special bilateral problems involving the Americans, but these were not likely to be affected significantly by Canadian extended fisheries jurisdiction. On the other hand, there were a few species of groundfish beyond the 12-mile zone that were being exploited by the Soviets and the Japanese. Moreover, there was the fear that Canadian salmon might become the object of foreign harvesting activities on the high seas.

Events were occurring between 1974 and 1976 that would make it possible for Canada to extend its management control over its fisheries. The first two UN-sponsored Law of the Sea Conferences had not dealt effectively with fisheries, but there was reason to hope that the third conference would do so. In the preliminary negotiations leading up to the third conference, Canada indicated that it would be prepared to accept an extended fisheries-jurisdiction regime in which the coastal state would have management rights over fishery resources but not property rights to the resources. Using this approach, often referred to as the "functional" approach, the coastal state, as the managing authority, would establish the total allowable catches (TACs) for the stocks or stock complexes within its zone. Moreover, it would have first call on these resources. Surplus portions of TACs would then be at the disposal of distant-water nations.

After the conference officially began in 1974, the conception of the exclusive economic zone, advocated primarily by developing countries, began to take hold. The essential difference between the EEZ and the "functional" approaches was that under the former approach, the coastal state would be given clear property rights over the fishing resources within its zone. Canada indicated that it would be prepared to accept the EEZ regime. It was agreed that the zone should extend 200 miles from shore.

The single negotiating text (SNT) that appeared at the end of the Geneva session of the conference in the spring of 1975 contained clauses pertaining to fisheries that have remained virtually unchanged up to the present time, though the SNT, now referred to as the informal composite negotiating text (ICNT), has been revised twice. The coastal state is given property rights to the fishery resources within its EEZ, is admonished to manage the resources in a responsible manner, and is required to make available to distant-water nations portions of the TACs that are surplus to its harvesting capacity. There is, however, nothing in the ICNT that restricts the terms and conditions a coastal state may impose on a distant-water nation seeking access to its surpluses.

Most economists prefer the EEZ regime to the "functional" approach once advocated by Canada. It will be recalled that many, if not most, of the problems encountered in fisheries arise from their common



Even within sight of the shore-line this picture captures the smallness of the boat and the vastness of the ocean. The boat is using gill-nets in the salmon fisheries off British Columbia's Queen Charlotte Islands.



A bucket full of fish is lowered into the hull of a net-dragger off the coast of Nova Scotia.

property aspect. The EEZ approach, as opposed to the functional one, at least assigns unambiguous property rights among states. Indeed, under the "functional" approach, about the only way a coastal state could exercise full property rights over a stock would be by reducing the surpluses to zero. There is no guarantee that such a policy would be valid on economic grounds.

Contentious issue

The conference considered many other matters besides fisheries. Of these other matters, deep-sea mining has proved to be exceedingly contentious and has so far prevented the conference from bringing forth a convention. Canada made it clear that, though it would have preferred to move to extended-fisheries jurisdiction (EFJ) under a law-of-the-sea convention, in view of the urgency of its problems it would move unilaterally if the conference failed to make sufficient progress towards a convention. When the conference failed to make such progress, Canada announced its unilateral move (with the United States) early in June 1976. It should be stressed, however, that the Law of the Sea Conference made this action possible. Indeed, it is quite clear that the fishery clauses of the SNT have provided Canada with the basic framework within which to establish a 200-mile fisheries zone.

Prior to announcing formally its intention of implementing EFJ, Canada set out to win the co-operation of distant-water

nations by encouraging them to sign bilateral agreements. The first such agreement, concluded with Norway in December 1975, has served as the model for those that followed.

The agreement, couched in the language of the SNT, first sets out Canada's intention eventually to extend its fisheries jurisdiction. The distant-water nation acknowledges Canada's sovereign rights with respect to managing and exploiting the fishery resources encompassed by the extended jurisdiction. The distant-water nation is promised, in turn, access to an unspecified fraction of the TACs surplus to Canada's harvesting capacity. The vessels of the distant-water nation will be required to obtain licences from Canadian authorities and comply with – to quote the agreement – "the conservation measures and other terms and conditions established by the Government of Canada".

The problem of high-seas harvesting of salmon is dealt with by having the distant-water nation accept the principle that anadromous species (e.g. salmon) should be harvested only within the EFJ of the country in whose rivers the fish spawn.

Agreements have now been reached with many distant-water nations besides Norway, among them the Soviet Union, Poland, France, Spain and Portugal. An interim agreement is in effect with Japan. All the agreements signed so far are very broad in nature, thereby allowing Canada considerable flexibility in future planning.

Now that EFJ has become a reality, Canada must, as part of its planning for the future, decide on the nature of the relations it is to develop with the distant-water nations, both for the short run and for the longer term.

One immediate problem, which had to be dealt with even before January 1, 1977, was the fate of ICNAF. ICNAF in its old form was clearly incompatible with extended jurisdiction. It could, however, be useful to Canada in a modified form. On the Atlantic Coast, Canada faces the problem that two segments of the Grand Banks, one at the southern tip and the other east of St John's, lie outside the 200-mile limit. Both these "tails" contain significantly-large fishery resources. In addition, there is a fishing bank east of the Grand Banks, well outside the 200-mile limit, commonly referred to as the Flemish Cap, in which the Canadian industry has been taking a growing interest. Thus, with relevant fishery resources not fully encompassed by Canada's Atlantic 200-mile zone, it has been to Canada's advantage to see ICNAF retained, albeit in a highly-modified form, as a consultative body.

Furthermore, ICNAF has an additional useful role to play from Canada's point of view. One of the most troublesome aspects of fisheries-management, virtually throughout the world, is the inadequacy of biological data. Since the resource cannot be observed directly, scientific research on the fisheries tends to be difficult and very expensive. Consequently, if Canada can effectively use ICNAF as a vehicle for consultation with distant-water nations on scientific research, the benefit could be considerable.

At the ICNAF meetings of June 1976, Canada formally announced its intention to withdraw from the organization. However, it also made it clear that what it really wanted was the establishment of a new ICNAF that would be compatible with EFJ. Negotiations leading towards the establishment of a reconstituted ICNAF started in late 1976 and continued during 1977. It is hoped that negotiations will be completed in 1978 and a new treaty signed. The reconstituted ICNAF is expected to be known as the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Consultative Organization (NAFCO).

A meeting of the reconstituted ICNAF was held in June 1977 to discuss management plans for 1978. Canada turned to other ICNAF members for scientific advice on stocks lying entirely outside its 200-mile limit, overlapping stocks and stocks lying within its 200-mile limit that had not been exploited to a significant degree by the

Canadian industry. Examples of the latter are provided by capelin and silver hake.

Canada could not on its own establish TACs for stock wholly beyond its borders such as stocks on the Flemish Cap. The TACs had to be established in co-operation with other members of ICNAF as they were before 1977. On the other hand, Canada claimed the right to establish the TACs, not only for stocks entirely within its zone, but also for overlapping stocks as well. To the best of this writer's knowledge, the other members of ICNAF have accepted Canada's management claim without demur.

If NAFCO does come into existence as planned, it can be expected that Canada will want to have preferential rights to stocks that are off its coast but are also entirely outside its 200-mile zone — e.g., stocks on the Flemish Cap. At the law-of-the-sea negotiations, it had pressed for such coastal state preferential rights.

The much more difficult problem of developing satisfactory relations with distant-water nations over the medium and long run has yet to be resolved. In particular it has to be determined whether we should look forward to a continuing foreign presence in Canada's EFJ or to an eventual disappearance of the distant-water fleets. Off the Atlantic coast, Canada has, over the past few years, accounted for no more than just over one-third of the total harvest by weight. Granted that Canada's share of the catch is higher in value and granted that quotas have been cut back substantially in order to restore stocks that had been subject to over-exploitation, it can still be maintained that at present there is a substantial gap between Canada's harvesting capacity and potential harvests within its EFJ. It is worthwhile noting, however, that what is true of harvesting capacity is not true of processing capacity.

Once again, on the Pacific coast the situation is less drastic. With respect to the most valuable species, salmon, herring and halibut, Canada has more than enough capacity to exploit the first two species fully, and more than enough to capture its share of the halibut harvest. There are, as indicated earlier, species the Canadian industry has fished only lightly or not at all; hake and blackcod are examples.

Expand capacity

What Canada may do, of course, is to expand its harvesting capacity to the point where it can account for the entire allowable harvest. Yet, even if it does adopt this policy, it cannot be accomplished over night. In the meantime, Canada will be obligated to give

Research into fisheries tends to be expensive

distant-water nations access to the surplus portions of the TACs. It will not, however, be obligated to give them access to these surpluses free of charge. It should be remembered that, in the bilateral agreements signed with the distant-water nations, it was stated that the relevant distant-water nations, on being granted access to the surpluses, would be subject to conservation measures and other terms and conditions laid down by the Government of Canada. Thus what one would expect is that Canada, having property rights to these resources, would seek to lay down terms and conditions that would allow it to enjoy benefits from the portions of the TACs harvested by the foreigners.

Various alternatives exist. In the first instance, Canada might simply rent out to distant-water nations fishery resources the Canadian industry was unable or unwilling to exploit. The distant-water nation or nations would be permitted to both harvest the resource and process the catch in return for some form of remuneration. The remuneration could be either in cash or in kind. The distant-water nation might, for example, make a rent payment by contributing to scientific research on fisheries. The earlier comments about the costly nature of such research will be recalled.

While the foreign nation or nations would be permitted to exploit the resource, it should be stressed that Canada would retain all management rights. It would be responsible for monitoring the stock and for establishing the TACs.

The advantage of such a scheme lies in its simplicity. It is easy to establish and to terminate. No large start-up costs are involved and no difficult negotiations are required to bring it to an end. On the other hand, it does involve disadvantages, particularly political disadvantages. Though Canada, as the coastal state, has *de jure* property rights with respect to the relevant stock or stocks, questions may arise with regard to the *de facto* control the coastal state is able to exercise. Furthermore, objections are bound to arise that, though the state is enjoying some returns from the resource, employment opportunities are being lost by permitting foreigners to both harvest and process the resource. While the argument may be a highly questionable one on the Pacific Coast, it is bound to carry substantial weight on the Atlantic Coast, where there are areas in which unemployment is both severe and chronic. Newfoundland provides the most striking example. Seasonal unemployment rates outside the Avalon Peninsula have over the last few years been as high as 30 per cent.

The other major alternative is to enter into some form of co-operative arrangement with the distant-water nation. An arrangement might be established in which certain stocks were harvested but then landed in Canada for processing, thus creating employment opportunities. In effect, Canada would be "hiring" the services of the fishermen of the distant-water nation as "harvesters". An example was provided by an experimental co-operative arrangement in 1976 involving West German vessels and processing plants in Newfoundland. The West German vessels were fishing in Canadian waters north of Newfoundland, where, because of severe weather conditions, Canadian vessels had seldom operated except on an experimental basis. The harvested fish were landed in Newfoundland for partial processing and then shipped to West Germany.

Marketing benefits

An argument often put forward in support of this type of scheme is that it provides not only direct employment and income benefits but marketing benefits as well. In the above example, the arrangement made it possible for the fish to enter Germany without being subject to the EEC tariff. It is argued that, if Canadian processors attempted to market the product (cod) in the EEC unaided, the tariff would be prohibitive.

This example is only one of any number of co-operative arrangements that might be considered. In this case, the crews as well as the vessels were German. However, one can easily think of schemes in which foreign vessels would be chartered and manned entirely or in part by Canadians. If particular technological skills were required to operate the vessels, which Canadians did not possess, one can imagine schemes in which there were initially substantial non-Canadian crew components but in which the Canadian components gradually increased as the skills were acquired. With regard to the catch, there is no reason why the processed catch should be shipped to the market of the distant-water nations. Schemes could be developed in which the catch was processed and sold in North America and in which the foreigners were paid in cash or in fish of different species. For example, a European distant-water nation might be encouraged to harvest cod or other groundfish in areas yet unexploited by the Canadian industry. The groundfish could then be processed in Canada and sold in the U.S. or Canada. The European vessel-owners might then be paid off in, say, herring of equivalent value harvested entirely by Canadian vessels.

All the co-operative arrangements referred to so far have involved foreign harvesting and coastal-state processing. Reverse arrangements are also possible. That is to say, one can think of arrangements in which coastal-state fishing-vessels harvested the fish and delivered them to distant-water processing vessels. The Americans, for example, contemplated an arrangement whereby American fishermen would harvest hake off the coasts of Washington and Oregon and deliver the catches to Soviet factory-ships.

While co-operative arrangements of this nature have many attractions, they also have certain disadvantages. For example, there would be high start-up costs for both sides, which would make short-term agreements unattractive. However, given the uncertainty about the nature of such arrangements, the speed of restoration of the stocks, etc., Canada might consider it very risky to enter into other than very short-term agreements.

What of the longer term? One can do no more than speculate. There will, of course, be strong political pressure on Ottawa to move towards eventual elimination of all foreign fleets. There has been evidence of this already reported in the press. However, it may well be that some co-operative arrangements will prove to be sufficiently attractive, and the alternative of exclu-

sively Canadian efforts so costly, that there will be a strong incentive to maintain the arrangements. For example, the area in which the aforementioned West German trawlers were operating is one, as indicated earlier, that has been fished almost exclusively by distant-water nations. They have used ice-reinforced freezer trawlers because the best fishing season is January-February, when ice conditions are severe. It is not at all obvious that it would be profitable for Canada – even allowing for social considerations – to invest heavily in freezer trawlers. The fishing season mentioned above lasts only two or three months. Some other means must be found of using these vessels effectively during the remaining nine or ten months of the year if they are not to be run at a loss. It is not clear – to the writer, at least – that sufficient alternative uses could be found. Consequently, co-operative arrangements with distant-water nations in this particular area may prove to have more than a short-term attraction.

We have seen that, while Canada moved unilaterally to EFJ, it was able to do so in a spirit of international co-operation. It now faces the problem of developing a new set of relations with distant-water nations that will be both beneficial to Canada and of such a nature as to maintain the co-operation of these countries.

Co-operative arrangements also have disadvantages

Jerusalem: The Holy City

A religious solution for a political problem

by James George

If 1978 is to be the "year of peace" in the Middle East, there is going to have to be a great deal more soul-searching, both among governments and among peoples of good will, than seems apparent to a Canadian observing from the wings of the Arab-Israeli stage. Though the wish to find a solution, in this interval of grace when a real solution might just be possible, is undoubtedly present on both sides of the most dangerous confrontation of our times, it is all too easy

for those not directly involved to leave the dialogue to the political leadership of the states most directly concerned. Up to a point this is as it should be. Outsiders should not put their noses into what is none of their business. But in regard to the future of Jerusalem there is a much wider community of legitimate concern. Indeed, if this concern does not make itself felt internationally, the key-stone of the arch of concord in the Middle East may elude the

negotiating states, whether at a Geneva conference or elsewhere.

I say this because I do not believe there can be lasting peace in the area without a solution for Jerusalem that permits – in practice as well as theory – free access to the Holy Places by Moslems as well as Christians and Jews, and because I do not foresee any likelihood of a political agreement's being negotiated on this issue. In the political context, the problem is deadlocked. Can it be lifted from politics and placed in a totally fresh context that is at the same time the one with the deepest roots in history – the religious context?

Political headway

In political negotiations, with a major effort by all concerned, including the super-powers, I can see headway being made on the question of withdrawal from occupied territories (in accordance with UN General Assembly Resolution 242), except in the glaringly obvious case of Jerusalem. Even a homeland for the Palestinians may be worked out and guarantees given all round that nobody is going to be pushed into the sea or wiped off the face of the new maps. But will this much progress (so devoutly to be wished) be attainable if Jerusalem remains – as far as the Arabs and the Moslems of the world are concerned – an Israeli-occupied territory? Can we imagine the late King Faisal of Saudi Arabia ever fulfilling his life-time desire to pray under these conditions in the silver-domed Mosque of Al-Aqsa, beside the golden Dome of the Rock? Politically, this is a sticking-point for both sides.

If there is to be any solution other than a military solution of fact (which is what we have at present) or a military reversal of the present line of control (which is what the Arabs would sooner or later attempt), the only "third force" which could transcend the political-military state of perpetual confrontation and lead to a solution all concerned might be able to live with is the internationalization of Jerusalem as a Holy City under a religious regime composed of Jews, Moslems and Christians. Despite the enormous difficulties of the task, such a regime could (I believe) become a reality if the three religious communities around the world really want it enough. It will never happen if one or other of these communities is bored with the idea. As communities of the "Peoples of the Book" (to use the language of the Koran) we must all want it very much – with the sort of passion that the call of "Jerusalem" generated in the Middle Ages.

Historically, each community has every right to demand such a solution. We

must each be more aware of the strength of the claims of all three groups, because none of us have been taught about the basis for the claims of the others. So let us look briefly at the case each community can make for access to (and a share in the control of) the Holy Places that are inextricably inter-linked in the Old City of Jerusalem so that no clever "cutting of the cake" could separate jurisdictions in a manner satisfactory to the three communities. The City must be one and has to be shared.

Special importance

Take first the Jewish claims, since they come first in time. All three "Peoples of the Book" share the tradition of Abraham but certainly, for the Jews, special importance must be given to their links with the City of David and of Solomon, the City of the two Temples (Solomon's and Zorobabel's), where the Ark of the Covenant of Moses, the two tablets of the Law, were kept in the Tabernacle on the Rock. Traditionally this was the same Rock on the summit of Mount Moriah where Abraham was prepared to sacrifice Isaac, and where Jacob later rested his head to dream that a ladder was set up to heaven, with angels ascending and descending. In other words, the Rock serves as an *axis mundi*, the centre of the Jewish psyche, their link as a people between God and man, the door or threshold to a higher world, as interpreted by the Kabbalists. So it is easy to understand why, for thousands of years, Jews have faced Jerusalem to say their prayers. It is their spiritual centre.

For the Christians, no less than for the Jews, Jerusalem is the Holy City where Christ was crucified, was buried, rose from the Sepulchre, and ascended to heaven. As Mircea Eliade records the Christian tradition of Golgotha (the "place of the skull"), it "was situated at the centre of the world, since it was the summit of the cosmic mountain and at the same time the place where Adam had been created and buried. Thus the blood of the Saviour falls upon Adam's skull, buried precisely at the foot of the Cross, and redeems him."

*The City
must be one
and must be
shared*

Mr George recently resigned from the Department of External Affairs to work on a series of books and television productions. His last post was Ambassador to Iran and Kuwait. He had previously been High Commissioner to Ceylon and to India. Other positions took him to Athens, New York and Paris. The views expressed in this article are the personal views of the author.



The Dome of the Rock



If Christians orient their churches to the Easter sunrise (i.e. to the East), they are merely following the traditional orientation of the Temple of the Jews in Jerusalem, which probably faced East too.

St Bernard's call "to Jerusalem" ignited the crusading spirit of Christendom not only to capture (or liberate) the Holy Places but to build the City of God on earth – again as a symbol of a communication with the "Presence of the Lord", which the Jews had felt in themselves and filling their Temple, and which they called the holy *Shekkina* "the Glory of the Eternal", whereas the Moslems called it *Sakina* in Arabic. The Presence was, and is, the same.

Co-inheritors

For the Moslems, as co-inheritors of the Abrahamic tradition, the tradition of Jacob, and the Prophets (among whom they include Jesus), Jerusalem has a religious importance second only to Mecca and Medina. The Prophet of Islam describes in moving terms (Surat 17 of the Qoran) the "Night Journey" (*mi'raj*), the supreme religious experience of his life – when he rode in a dream on his winged horse one night from Mecca to Jerusalem and ascended from the Rock through the seven heavens to the Presence of God, to the Throne, returning to awaken in Mecca as a new man, one who had seen God and received a revelation for mankind. As Avicenna's famous Commentary on the "Night Journey" points out, the Rock from which the Prophet rose up to the Throne of God is the same as the Rock on which Abraham prepared his sacrifice, Jacob dreamt of the ladder raised to God, and the Temple of the Jews was raised. It is today the site of the octagonal Dome of the Rock, one of the earliest as well as the finest monuments of Islam, and (like Mecca) a traditional place of pilgrimage for all Moslems.

If I evoke these three great traditions converging on the Holy City, it is to affirm that all three communities have the right to be in Jerusalem. It is their city to be shared and cherished in common, not placed under the exclusive political sovereignty of any one of them. As long as the present situation lasts, it is my conviction that there will be no secure peace. And I see no way out but for the three religious communities together to internationalize the City, or rather to *denationalize* it by redrawing the national boundaries around it, leaving it free at the centre to run itself, with unlimited access from both sides, east and west, provided only that those who come into the city from outside return the way they entered.

To believe in the possibility of a "religious solution" for Jerusalem, one must be

convinced that it could be made to work, that the three religious communities could actually reach agreement on who should represent them and how their authority would be administered. A "Holy City" conception is all very well; but the garbage – and the taxes – must still be collected, and law and order be maintained, in what will continue to be an explosive situation. Could it be done without leaning on the military police and administrative resources of either of the neighbours, Israel and Jordan?

For both Christians and Moslems, it would certainly be difficult to resolve the many conflicting interests in deciding who should represent them, since neither community has a recognized central authority. As far as Christianity is concerned, neither the Vatican nor the World Council of Churches makes such a claim; and if they could jointly propose a Christian council for Jerusalem it would be challenged by the Orthodox and Armenian Patriarchs who share with the Vatican traditional responsibility for the Holy Sepulchre.

So, too, for Islam. The King of Saudi Arabia is the custodian of the chief holy places, Mecca and Medina; but the Hashemite King of Jordan might be held to have a prior claim to authority in respect of the Moslem shrines of Jerusalem, especially those in the Old City (the Dome of the Rock and the Al-Aqsa mosque). If the Moslems could accept King Hussein's religious custodianship of the Moslem holy places of Jerusalem (without implying Jordanian political sovereignty), he would be a logical chairman of the Moslem component of the Holy City.

Once the Jews and the Moslems had been able to nominate their respective representatives to such a Council, the pressures on the various Christian churches to close ranks would become well-nigh irresistible. Christian disunity could not, in the final analysis, be allowed to block a religious solution once such a solution was perceived as attainable. It is only because we Christians can today convince ourselves that it is impractical – or that the squeeze on us is not yet intolerable – that we excuse ourselves from making any effort to overcome the obstacles. So long as the rights of *any* of the three communities are limited in practice, the light of *our* Holy City – and our *shared* tradition – is diminished. Do we not care?

But then, assuming that each of the three communities had been able to nominate its representatives to a Holy City Council, could such a religious Council actually govern the city? I have no competence to draw up a blue-print for such a city government, but I do have one suggestion as to how it might operate. If it is possible for Greeks, Russians, Serbs and

*Communities
have a right
to be in
Jerusalem*



Outside the city walls are modern bungalows and apartment buildings; inside are the narrow, terraced streets of the old city. Everywhere there is evidence that this is "the Holy City".

Bulgars to run Mount Athos as a complex monastic community, it is only one more step to find ways of administering Jerusalem. Perhaps, as in Mount Athos, each of the main communities should hold in its possession a one-third segment of the official seal of government, which must be complete to validate any decision of the High Council. In other words, without the concurrence of each community in Jerusalem, decisions "by majority" would mean nothing. Faced with the alternative of stalemate or co-operation, there would *have* to be co-operation.

Limited area

Nevertheless, the Holy City proposal should not be too ambitious. If the entire city of Jerusalem were to be brought under a religious regime, it might indeed prove impossible to achieve a workable administration. The Holy City idea would, I think have a much better chance of success if the map of the portion to be denationalized were drawn in a restrictive way, keeping only to the essential holy places on and around Temple Mount (Mount Moriah). The Holy City Council might have a consultative and coordinating role in regard to the other holy places scattered around Israel and the West

Bank, but by keeping the geographical limits of the Holy City as small as possible it would not only be much simpler to administer but would probably also be easier to negotiate, since it would take only a minimum bite out of the existing sovereignties. Loading too much on the scheme would probably sink the boat.

Another advantage of circumscribing the Holy City, keeping mainly to the holy places on Temple Mount, is that under a religious High Council administration Jews might be able to pray on the Mount as well as Moslems, and all Moslems would feel free to go. At present Jews are restricted by the Israeli Government administration to worshipping at the Wailing Wall and are not allowed on the top of Temple Mount, while Moslems from most of the Arab world refuse to go there so long as it is under Israeli control. Depoliticize the area and both those religious communities would benefit.

In any case, what is needed at this time is not so much a detailed blue-print for a Holy City administration as to develop the will to seek such a solution and to make it work, in the conviction that it is the only real alternative to having no solution at all. Of course Jerusalem can only be solved as part of a general settlement of the Arab-

Israel conflict, not in isolation. But what is of greater relevance is that there can be no such settlement without solving the Jerusalem question.

If a religious regime can be created, then, and only then, can Jerusalem once again represent for all three "Peoples of the Book" their aspiration to create, on this Rock of Ages linking them with God, a City that, in the words of a contemporary Jewish writer (Amos Oz), will truly be the Jerusa-

lem of absolute love. It is a curious twist of history that this "ideal" solution is now clearly becoming the only one that is practical. Jerusalem can at least become a City of Peace provided it is made in modern fact what it has always been in ancient myth - the Holy City.

Editor's note: This article was written before President Sadat's dramatic visit to Israel and the ensuing negotiations. At press time, however, events had still not overtaken the subject matter of the article.

Jerusalem: The Holy City

Problem can only be resolved as part of general settlement

Canadian position

By R.V. Lucy

President Anwar al Sadat's historic voyage to Jerusalem from 19 to 21 November has highlighted once again the very real problem presented by the status of this holy and historic city in the context of a general settlement for the Middle East situation. The President of Egypt referred to the return to Arab sovereignty of East Jerusalem (which includes the entire Old City); the Prime Minister of Israel, to the "reunification" of the city in 1967. Both leaders, however, referred to the need to have the holy places of Jerusalem accessible to people of all faiths.

In its long history, Jerusalem has changed hands as many as 37 times. Its recorded history goes back at least to the fourteenth century B.C., when it was a Canaanite city state under Egyptian sovereignty. In 1000 B.C. it was captured by King David. Its central location and easily-defensible nature recommended it to him as a good site for the capital of the Jewish kingdom. Surviving the division of Solomon's kingdom, and successive attacks by Egyptians, Philistines and Israelites, it was finally destroyed by Nebuchadnezzar early

in the sixth century B.C. The Persians, however, permitted the exiled inhabitants to return about one century later to restore the city's wall and the Temple.

Jerusalem subsequently came under Macedonian and finally (after a century of independence under the Macabees) Roman rule in 63 B.C. In 4 A.D. it became the capital of the province of Palestine, under a Roman procurator. In 66 A.D. and again in 135, the Jews revolted. Each time the Romans retook Jerusalem, and after the second revolt they razed it to the ground and rebuilt it as Aelia Capitolina. In the fourth century following the adoption of Christianity by the Romans, Jerusalem reverted to its former name. The city fell to the Persians in 614 but after a long war, which was almost a rehearsal for the Crusades, it was restored to Roman control - only to fall in 638 to the Arabs. In 1071, Jerusalem passed under Turkish control, and it was the rumoured excesses of its new rulers against Christian pilgrims that helped inspire the First Crusade. Jerusalem fell in 1099 to the Frankish Crusaders, who put virtually all the inhabitants - Moslems, Jews and Christians - to the sword. In 1189, Saladin brought down the Kingdom of Jerusalem and recaptured the city, this time with minimal bloodshed. The Emperor Frederick II, who was nominally "King of Jerusalem", recovered the city in 1221 from the Sultan of Egypt through negotiation rather than by the sword.

Mr Lucy is an officer of the Department of External Affairs, and has recently been posted to the Canadian Embassy in Baghdad. When this article was prepared for publication Mr Lucy was serving in Ottawa in the Department's Middle Eastern Division.

The historic compromise was noteworthy in that it assured the Moslems control of and access to their holy places and required the dismantling of part of the city's defences. While unsatisfactory to the rank and file of both Christians and Moslems, this settlement endured until 1244, when a horde of Khorezmian Turks, fleeing the successors of Ghengis Khan, seized and laid waste the defenceless city.

Soon afterwards Jerusalem fell to the Egyptian Mamelukes, who held it until 1517, when the Ottoman Turks took over. Four hundred years later, General Allenby led a victorious British army through the streets of the Holy City and began a new chapter in its turbulent history.

As can be seen, Jerusalem has had many ups and downs – now the capital of an independent state, now of a vassal state – and for much of its history it has been just a provincial city in one of a succession of empires. Yet it remains a city sacred to three faiths sharing a common origin.

Canada's concern with the status of the city of Jerusalem goes back more than 30 years. In April 1947, exasperated by the continuing disagreement over their proposed measures to end their mandate over Palestine, the British called on the United Nations to convene a special session of the General Assembly to find a solution.

A UN Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) was formed, with Canada as one of its 11 members. Operating on a tight three-month schedule, the Committee issued a majority report and a minority report. The former recommended partitioning Palestine into independent Arab and Jewish states. Jerusalem would be a separate enclave under the supervision of the UN Trusteeship Council and included in the general economic union of Palestine. The minority report recommended the creation of a federal Arab-Jewish state with Jerusalem as its capital. Canada, as one of the drafters of the majority report, voted for Assembly Resolution 181 on November 29, 1947, approving the majority plan; in so doing, it clearly favoured the full internationalization of Jerusalem.

Events in Palestine overtook the UN Trusteeship Council efforts to submit a draft statute for Jerusalem to the General Assembly, which met during the last three weeks before the end of the British mandate on May 14, 1948. Fighting in Jerusalem was on the increase, and discussion on the statute was postponed. Hostilities finally ended in Jerusalem on November 30, 1948, leaving the city divided: the newer, western part was held by Israeli forces; east Jerusalem, including the Old City and almost all the holy places, remained in Jordanian hands.

The General Assembly then attempted to draw up new plans for an international regime in the Jerusalem area. On December 11, 1948, with Canada's support, it resolved (Resolution 194) that the Jerusalem area should be accorded special treatment, separate from the rest of Palestine. The Palestine Conciliation Commission was asked to submit proposals, which it did in September 1949. It accepted the Israel-Jordan Armistice Agreement, which provided for the division of Jerusalem into Arab and Jewish zones, but suggested that Arab and Israeli authorities should jointly provide the municipal administration and establish a general council to look after common interests such as transportation and communications. A UN Commissioner would supervise the demilitarization of Jerusalem, assure the observance of human rights and protect and guarantee freedom of access to holy places. Neither the Israelis nor the Arabs would be able to establish their capital in Jerusalem, and the proportion of Jews to Arabs in the area would be maintained.

After these proposals were submitted to the General Assembly, three points of view emerged: (1) Israel and Jordan claimed full sovereignty over the respective portions of Jerusalem under their control. While both refused to consider any secular international administration over these portions, they were prepared to give full guarantees for the protection and freedom of access to Jerusalem's holy places, including international supervision. (2) The great majority of delegations supported the principle of full internationalization under a direct UN administrator. (3) A Western minority, including Canada, supported a modified form of internationalization covering only those secular responsibilities necessary to ensure the safety of the holy places. The second view prevailed and was embodied in Resolution 303, adopted on December 9, 1949.

Canada voted against this resolution on the ground that it was a reflection rather of Resolution 181 of November 1947 than of the actual situation as acknowledged by the Palestine Conciliation Commission. To revert to the principle of full internationalization in the face of opposition from Israel and Jordan would entail "heavy financial, administrative, and military obligations" for the United Nations. By disregarding the "real needs and the genuine aspirations of the people who live in the Jerusalem area", the explanation went on, "the result may be to endanger the very Holy Places whose protection is our greatest interest and concern". Then as now, practicability was the touchstone of the Canadian policy in the UN, and the application of

*Delegations
supported
international
principle*

Resolution 303 was clearly beyond the capability of the organization. Canadian reservations about full internationalization were borne out by events.

The Trusteeship Council encountered serious difficulty in completing its draft statute, and insurmountable difficulty in applying it. The president of the Trusteeship Council therefore suggested in January 1950 that effective international control be established only in an area containing little more than the Christian holy places, the Western Wall and adjacent quarters. The larger area described in Resolution 303 would be an economic free zone, demilitarized and neutralized.

The Trusteeship Council rejected its president's proposal on the grounds that it was incompatible with the Assembly resolution calling for full internationalization of the whole Jerusalem area. The Council thus proceeded with the completion of the draft statute.

This was approved in April 1950 and submitted to the Governments of Israel and Jordan, with a request for their co-operation. Jordan did not reply and Israel conveyed the view that neither government would collaborate in implementing the statute. The matter was then referred to the General Assembly, which considered it in December 1950. Only one draft resolution



Aerial view of Jerusalem. The Israeli Government has made the city its capital. The Canadian Government, like others, refuses to recognize it as such, and continues to maintain its Embassy in Tel Aviv.



Secretary of State for External Affairs Don Jamieson visited the Middle East last October. He is seen here being greeted by Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan at Ben Gurion airport. In the background are Mrs Dayan and Mrs Jamieson.

received enough support to be voted on, and it was defeated.

Meanwhile, Israel had decided to transfer its seat of government from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. This measure was opposed by the Trusteeship Council and several UN members. The transfer was completed in 1953, though few countries recognized its validity. From 1950 to 1967, the status quo prevailed and there were no real efforts by Canada or other UN members to modify Israel's or Jordan's positions on the question of Jerusalem. This situation came to an abrupt end during the June 1967 war, when the Israelis occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the area west of the Jordan. On June 28, the city was formally annexed to Israel. Faced with this *fait accompli*, the General Assembly passed a resolution on July 4, 1967, which Canada supported, ruling that the annexation was invalid and vainly calling on Israel not to take any measures to alter the status of the city.

In the autumn of 1967, the Security Council, of which Canada was a member, adopted Resolution 242 laying out the basis for a general settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Though it made no specific mention of Jerusalem, it called for the "withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict". This resolution has since remained the cornerstone of Canadian policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Resolution 252, passed on May 21, 1968, was the Security Council's first to deal specifically with Jerusalem. It deplored Israel's non-compliance with the two General Assembly resolutions of the previous year, confirmed that any measures taken by Israel to alter the status of Jerusalem were invalid and called on it to rescind all such measures and to refrain from similar actions in the future. Notwithstanding Canada's previous positive votes on the two resolutions referred to in Resolution 252, and despite the fact that Canada stated publicly its support for the principles embodied in it, both Canada and the U.S. abstained on Resolution 252; it was feared that such a resolution would undermine Jarring's mission, then under way. It was also considered that the status of Jerusalem could not be resolved as an isolated issue.

As Canada's mandate on the Security Council ended in 1968, the vote on Resolution 252 was the last occasion on which the Canadian Government voiced its opinion specifically on the question of Jerusalem in an international forum. Canada also abstained that year on two UNESCO resolutions on Jerusalem, Nos 3.342 and 3.343, which were the basis for subsequent actions by that body. The Canadian delegation took no part in the discussion at that time.

In subsequent UNESCO sessions, Canada abstained on resolutions or decisions dealing with Jerusalem, with one important exception in 1974, when a negative vote was

Canada feared that resolution would undermine Jarring mission

cast on Resolution 3.427, suspending financial assistance to Israel by UNESCO for archaeological projects.

The Canadian Government position, both in private and in public, is that the status of Jerusalem and of the Holy Places must, in practical terms, be considered and resolved only as part of a general settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute. The Government has not, therefore, condoned any steps to alter unilaterally the status of Jerusalem and has confirmed this position by maintaining its embassy in Tel Aviv, as do most other Western countries. The Government has also laid down strict guidelines for travel by Canadian Government officials, including diplomats, in the territories occupied by Israel in 1967.

This position is consistent with Canada's general policy on the Arab-Israeli conflict, i.e. balance and objectivity, support for Resolutions 242 and 338 and the right of all states in the area, including Israel, to live in peace with secure and recognized boundaries. In addition, there exists the political dimension of the Palestinian problem, including the right of the Palestinians to be represented in any negotiations affecting their future.

The stipulation that the Jerusalem issue can be resolved "only as part of an overall settlement" is an important one. Only negotiations, where all concerned parties are represented, and all points of contention subject to discussion, provide sufficient room for manoeuvre and hope for a just and lasting peace.

Pacific neighbourhood

The developing dialogue between Canada and ASEAN

By A. Douglas Small

"Southeast Asia has always been regarded as one of the most volatile regions in the world. For centuries, the region has been subjected to strife and conflict, often not of its own making, but the result of the designs and interplay of external forces. The Indochina war was the latest of the series of traumatic events in the region's history and, even though the war there has been concluded, many observers regard its aftermath as the setting of the stage for further threats to stability in Southeast Asia . . .".

Mr Small is the Director of Pacific Affairs Division of the Department of External Affairs. He has served in Canadian diplomatic missions in Bonn, Lagos, Kinshasa, Dar-es-Salaam and London. The views expressed here are his own.

These were the opening words of a noteworthy speech on ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) and Southeast Asia that Datuk Hussein Onn, Prime Minister of Malaysia, gave on October 4 of this year to the Asia Society in New York.

There can be no doubt that the ending of the Indochina war in April 1975, the reduction of the United States presence in Southeast Asia, and the resulting transformation of the politico-military situation in the region posed one of the most serious challenges to ASEAN since its founding in 1967. One need not subscribe to the "domino theory" – and certainly Hussein Onn does not – to see the implications for ASEAN of the emergence of Vietnam as a unified power, flushed with military success and offering to the peoples of Southeast Asia the Communist model as the system of political and social organization that will best meet their needs and aspirations.

The response of ASEAN to this challenge was made at the heads-of-state meeting in Bali on February 23 and 24, 1976. The results of that meeting marked a new and significant stage in the development of the association. Moved by a fresh sense of urgency, the members agreed to a greater centralization of the organization and to a wide range of measures in the political, economic, social and cultural fields calculated to achieve closer regional co-operation. The fundamental purpose was to create a regional group of increasingly self-reliant states that would work together to bring social justice and economic well-being to their peoples and to ensure the peace and prosperity of Southeast Asia without the intrusion of external powers.

Not military

Emphasis was deliberately placed on the political and the economic, and not on the military, as the means to achieve this goal. As Hussein Onn said to the Asia Society: "All considered, the countries of ASEAN, in the strength of their respective national foundations, and the increasing areas of their collective co-operation and response, are geared to meet the challenge that the Communist forces in Indochina may pose for the future, without having to go backwards to the politics of a major power umbrella or the inception of the military bloc."

Since the Bali summit meeting, ASEAN has shown real determination to work towards fulfilling the commitments assumed on that occasion. Not surprisingly, there have been differences of view among the members concerning priorities and the rate of progress. However, the summit meeting at Kuala Lumpur on August 3 and 4, 1977, which celebrated the tenth anniversary of the association, was able to carry out an impressive stocktaking exercise.

ASEAN has made it clear that, while its immediate goals are regional, its concern is global. It is part of the Third World and, as such, is resolved to help create a new international economic order. It recognizes, therefore, the need for a constructive relation between the industrialized and developing parts of the world. Consequently, to develop links with third countries and regional organizations in the industrialized world has been one of the most important activities of the association. In pursuit of this aim, ASEAN has established "dialogues" — to use its own term — with Australia, New Zealand, Japan, the EEC, the United States and Canada.

What, precisely, attracts ASEAN to Canada? In his welcoming remarks to the first ASEAN-Canada meeting, held in Manila on February 3 and 4, 1977, the Phi-

lippines Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Carlos Romulo, referred to Canada's *Strategy for International Development Co-operation 1975-1980*, and noted that "Canada will encourage and promote a regional focus on development problems by supporting regional institutions which bring together several developing countries and by promoting development projects undertaken by groups of countries". In addition, ASEAN, as an exponent of the new international economic order, seeks to improve the terms of trade with Canada for its members. This matter has figured prominently in ASEAN-Canada discussions.

Mr Romulo went on to say: "It is, of course, in the interest of Canada and of all other developed countries of the world for developing countries such as the members of ASEAN to accelerate their pace of development so as to be better and active partners in trade and industry." The benefits of co-operation were recognized as not being one-sided. Mr Romulo also pointed out that "... ASEAN, with its over one-quarter of a billion population, its rich natural resources, and its five countries whose economies are on the thresholds of high levels of sustained growth, presents enormous potential for mutually-satisfying collaboration with any country or groups of countries."

Pacific nation

What other considerations draw Canada to ASEAN? Since the early postwar years, we have been involved in Southeast Asia. As a Pacific nation, it is logical for Canada to become involved with countries across the Western ocean. Canada was a founding member of the Colombo Plan in 1950, one of the early enterprises in the field of international development assistance and one that was devoted to the welfare of the countries of South and Southeast Asia. Two participants in the Colombo Plan are Commonwealth partners of Canada and members of ASEAN. Canada participated in all the truce-supervisory commissions in Indochina, with, on one occasion, Indonesia, from their inception in 1954 until the Canadian withdrawal in 1973. The ending of the war in Indochina afforded Canadians the opportunity to apply their resources more productively in other areas. It meant that they could give greater, more fruitful expression to the Pacific dimension of Canadian foreign policy and could pursue more vigorously the expansion of relations with countries in Asia in accordance with the Third Option. Canada had already established good working relations with each of the five members of ASEAN. It had already invested substantial human and material resources over a period of 20 years in an

*Improvement
of trade terms
discussed*

effort to bring peace to one crucial area of Southeast Asia. It was hardly surprising, therefore, that Canada should decide to commit itself to support a grouping of countries dedicated to the regional development and security of Southeast Asia.

On March 24, 1975, the then Secretary of State for External Affairs, Allan MacEachen, wrote to Tun Abdul Razak, the then Prime Minister of Malaysia and Chairman of the ASEAN Standing Committee, advising him that the Canadian Government wished to work out a program of development assistance with ASEAN. He said that this proposal was prompted in part by the excellent relations Canada enjoyed with all the members of ASEAN and in part by the fact that, by the efforts of its members alone, ASEAN was clearly making a real contribution to the political and economic stability of Southeast Asia.

On April 24, 1975, Tengku Ahmed Rithauddeen, the Malaysian Minister with Special Functions for Foreign Affairs, replied on behalf of the Standing Committee acknowledging the offer and indicating that the Philippines had been chosen as the coordinating point for Canada's communications with ASEAN. In October and December 1975, discussions between Canadian and ASEAN officials were held in Manila in an effort to identify areas in which developmental co-operation could be most usefully pursued. Further exchanges took place early in 1976.

Formal dialogue

In July of that year, the ASEAN side suggested that a formal dialogue should take place in order to put the developing relation on a proper footing. On August 25, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, speaking to the Press Club in Jakarta, confirmed that an important aspect of Canada's policy in the Pacific was support for ASEAN and that Canada was ready to open a formal dialogue "in order to enhance our lines of communication and to facilitate co-operation in the field of development assistance". It was subsequently agreed that the first session of the Canada-ASEAN dialogue should take place in Manila on February 3 and 4, 1977.

That meeting was an educational affair for both sides. Although ASEAN and Canadian officials were filled with good intentions, the plain fact was that the negotiators needed to become better acquainted with each other if they were going to have any success in giving substance and direction to the relation. From the meeting Canada gained a better understanding of the precise needs and priorities of ASEAN. ASEAN obtained a greater appreciation of


Canada's capabilities. Both sides learned more about each other's principles and procedures.

Agreement was reached at an early stage of discussion on adherence to the following four ASEAN principles governing foreign aid:

- (1) Co-operation with ASEAN should not be at the expense of bilateral assistance to individual members.
- (2) Projects should benefit all ASEAN members.
- (3) Projects should be of a regional character.
- (4) Co-operation should be supplementary to and should not supplant ASEAN capability.

There was detailed discussion of the procedures to be followed in the development of an aid program, and understanding was reached on what was involved for each side in each of the following stages of project identification, request, appraisal, approval, agreement and implementation. Regional satellite communications and regional air-transportation had earlier been identified as two areas that might be suitable for Canadian assistance, and it was agreed that the work already under way on these two projects should be pursued. CIDA informed the meeting that a fisheries project was also being developed, and it was decided that it, too, should be regarded as a priority area for co-operation. The ASEAN side indicated that proposals for devel-

*Contribution
to political
and economic
stability*



**Prime Minister Hussein Onn
of Malaysia**



Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew
of Singapore

Development assistance would be drawn up for future consideration in the fields of forestry and reforestation, oceanography, agricultural research, mineral surveys and development, and transportation techniques.

Greater efforts

Both sides agreed that, though the two-way trade between Canada and ASEAN countries had doubled in the years from 1970 to 1975, the potential for further expansion in both trade and industrial co-operation called for greater efforts to be made in developing the opportunities available. ASEAN representatives raised the question of improving access to the Canadian market for ASEAN goods, and this led to a discussion of the relative advantages and disadvantages of the Canadian generalized system of preferences (GSP) and of various ways in which ASEAN trade promotion and marketing could be assisted. Interest also focused on ways to increase investment in ASEAN countries and on the respective roles of government and private industry in this field. The Canadian side indicated the ways in which the government helped private companies through trade missions and IDC financing, and in joint ventures, especially in those fields where Canada had demonstrated expertise.

The Manila meeting closed with an agreement to hold the next session of the dialogue in Canada in May 1977, the exact timing and the agenda to be determined in subsequent communications between Canada and the ASEAN National Co-ordinating Agency in Manila. However, it became apparent that, if adequate preparation for the next meeting was to be made by both

sides, it would have to be delayed. A principal factor in this was the formidable schedule of meetings including the Kuala Lumpur summit meeting that stretched before ASEAN through to the autumn of 1977. After extensive consultation, it was finally agreed that the second session of the Canada-ASEAN dialogue would take place in Ottawa on October 31 and November 1.

Trade, development assistance and industrial co-operation were the main subjects dealt with at this meeting. The questions of improving access to the Canadian market and of obtaining a greater share of that market for ASEAN goods were discussed at length. It was pointed out that under the most-favoured-nation policy and the Canadian GSP, ASEAN and other developing countries enjoyed duty-free entry of 83 per cent of all their exports to Canada but that consideration would be given to the ASEAN request for adjustments during the annual review of the GSP. It was also suggested by the Canadian side that further consideration of the ASEAN position would be given within the context of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations. The various ways in which Canada could assist ASEAN export promotion through the facilities of the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce were outlined.

Set aside

In the development-assistance field, it was agreed that the proposed regional-satellite communications project would be set aside for the time being because of recent advances in communications within ASEAN. On the regional air-transportation project, it was agreed that ASEAN would produce a clearly-defined proposal related to training for consideration by Canada in the near future. Canada indicated that work on the regional fisheries project was well advanced and would be ready for study by ASEAN in the new year. Canada agreed to consider further the possibility of assistance in forestry and port development.

The Canadian side indicated that a more extensive program of industrial co-operation was being examined and, if it were approved, could provide a new and fruitful means of co-operation with ASEAN.

The meeting was brought to a close with agreement in principle on a Canadian proposal for the establishment of a group in Ottawa, composed of representatives from the ASEAN diplomatic missions and of Canadian officials, to act as a consulting mechanism in dealing with Canada-ASEAN matters. It was agreed that the next session of the dialogue should be held in one of the ASEAN countries at a time to be determined later.

Super-power diplomacy limited after Sadat's visit to Israel

By Georges Vigny

The major event of 30 years of Israeli-Arab history has clearly been President Anwar Sadat's trip to Israel. The visit was the political and moral equivalent of the Six Days War. Thirty years after the birth of Israel, Sadat's recognition of its existence imparted an irreversible legitimacy to the country. It was as if the Egyptian head of state had turned his back on war and decided to go in search of peace. So Anwar Sadat, the man who made the improbable happen, has knocked down the psychological wall that accounted for 70 per cent of the problem. In doing so he has made the remaining 30 per cent still more difficult to solve – what used to be only part of the problem has become the whole of it.

What was surprising was not so much the spontaneity and warmth of the welcome the Israelis gave Sadat (who was greeted by a 21-gun salute, although the two countries were still technically at war) as the perfect understanding achieved by the Arab visitor and his Israeli host. After that Sabbath sunset when Sadat inspected an Israeli guard of honour, there was an obvious *rapport* between the two old adversaries. The knowing smile that passed between them in front of the American cameras said more than their statements, which were necessarily evasive.

This wholly natural *rapport* between Israel and Egypt marked the turning-point in Middle East politics. It has set bounds on the freedom of action of the super-powers – for the Soviet Union as much as for the United States.

Two approaches

Let us enter into the debate on the merits of two approaches to the Middle East question, which are said to be complementary but are

in fact basically different: the Kissinger-style "step-by-step" diplomacy compared with the global approach; the bilateral approach as practised by Israel and Egypt along the Suez Canal, for example, compared to the multilateral approach, in which all parties are supposed to come together in a forum dedicated to the search for a general peace.

Before the Sadat trip to Israel, the latter approach was – both rightly and wrongly – identified with the Geneva Conference. Rightly, because all the "confrontation states" would have found themselves in a single Arab delegation (and why not?) face to face with Israel, the other party to the conflict. Wrongly, because the flaw in the bilateral approach – evading the Palestinian issue, which is nonetheless a basic part of the whole problem – is also to be found in the Geneva Conference approach. Until Anwar Sadat's historic visit, the Palestinians, represented by the PLC (Palestine Liberation Organization), were not invited to attend.

Even if they had been invited, they would not have been able to take part. The Geneva Conference was conceived in terms of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 of 1967 and 1973, both of which refer to the Palestinians as "refugees". Claiming, as it does, an exclusive Palestinian legitimacy, the PLO felt that it could not go to Geneva as the representative of a refugee cause rather than a national one. Not having renounced its charter (the articles of which claim that Israel must disappear and give way to a vague "democratic and secular" state for the three faiths), the PLO could not be accepted by Israel as a participant in the conference, nor could there be any question of changing the terms of the UN resolutions without at the same time having to re-think the conference itself.

The disquieting conclusion is that while the bilateral approach risks ignoring the Palestinian issue, that very issue is a stumbling-block in the way of the multilateral approach.

Mr Vigny is Associate Editor of Le Devoir of Montreal, and has special responsibility for international politics. The views expressed in this article are those of the author.

Under these circumstances, what hope is there for the American "shuttle diplomacy" created by Henry Kissinger? The new American Administration has given up being a mere "broker" and is now itself a party to the conflict. With President Carter in power and the arrival on the scene of the anti-Kissinger school of political thought, the United States is no longer content, in its position as "co-chairman" of the Geneva Conference, with trying to narrow the gap between the positions of the belligerents. It is now making public statements on what shape it feels the Arab-Israeli peace plans should take. The question now is whether the United States, the self-styled broker, was passing on messages in its shuttles between Israel and the Arab countries or whether, on the contrary, it was trying to sell its own plan to the parties involved.

Let us pass over the details of this plan, which, though it caused consternation in Israel because of the ambiguity of the phrase "Palestinian homeland", should be taken into consideration here only because it exists and not because of what it contains. Let us pass over its possible merits and come to the main point: the emergence of a "Carter Plan" necessarily changed the rules that had been laid down for the game. Because it dealt the cards differently, it forced a redefinition of positions. Instead of one rejection there were two and a whole mountain of reservations. Whatever the issue at hand – the Israeli-American "working document" or the curious joint Soviet-American declaration –, it was becoming clear that the reconvening of the Geneva Conference, which had been foreseen as taking place at the end of 1977, now fell into the category of pious hopes and also that the Soviet Union might return to the Middle East arena because of the vagaries of American diplomacy. Incidentally, it should not be forgotten that, in the words of President Carter's security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, who has a fondness for the game three in all its forms, Moscow has a part to play in the last of the three concentric circles that would encompass the Middle East situation.

In other words, although they are pursuing opposite ends and supporting irreconcilable camps, the two super-powers are making a joint approach, an approach that is camouflaged by their joint title of "co-chairmen" of the Geneva Conference. We may even wonder what distinguishes their positions if both of them see the solution as a Palestinian entity ("state" for the one and "homeland" for the other) and an Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories (total withdrawal for the one and "minor adjust-

ments" for the other), all within the framework of a Geneva Conference to be reconvened as soon as possible. Given these circumstances, it is easy to see why the United States, while congratulating itself on Sadat's breakthrough, was anxious about the negative repercussions of a trip that brusquely removed the initiative from the hands of the super-powers.

Even if later developments slow down the pace of events and lead to disappointments, it has been proved since Sadat's trip that the two super-powers fear an acceleration of the peace process as much as a loss of momentum. It is not intentions that are being questioned here. Not only have authoritative American circles mentioned the risk that Anwar Sadat may overplay his hand, not only have the Americans been in constant contact with Moscow (to which Philip Habib paid a fleeting visit before joining Cyrus Vance in the Middle East), they have clearly also been worried by the lethal blows the Egyptian head of state has been dealing to Soviet interests.

So the United States gave priority to slowing down the breakneck speed at which Sadat, encouraged by Israeli receptiveness, was moving. Caught up in their *a priori* theory of concentric and other circles (which has still to be tested), the Americans have been taken by surprise three times in a row in the same area. First there was Sadat's improbable trip to Jerusalem and the intense exhilaration of his recognition of Israel and of shared hopes. Then, immediately after the publication of the final communique of the "rejectionist" Tripoli "summit", there was the breaking-off of Cairo's diplomatic relations with Damascus, Baghdad, Tripoli, Aden and Algiers on the initiative of the "isolated" Anwar Sadat, who earlier had muzzled the "Voice of Palestine" radio transmissions from Cairo and expelled the PLO representatives. Finally, shortly thereafter, there was the closing of the cultural offices of the U.S.S.R. and its satellites on Egyptian territory, all to the accompaniment of veiled threats of breaking off diplomatic relations.

It was some time, however, before it was understood that Sadat's attack on the Soviet Union was aimed more at preventing Washington from bringing the Kremlin back into the arena than at warding off any real danger that Moscow might represent. The Soviet Union does, of course, support the Palestinian movement, but it would be difficult to show that it backs the most radical members of the PLO, even if some of them do claim to be Marxist-Leninists. The U.S.S.R. also supports Assad in Damascus and, even if it is to be found alongside the

Americans surprised three times in a row



On November 21, 1977, Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Egyptian President Anwar Sadat were all smiles at their joint press conference in Jerusalem. Sadat's sudden visit to Israel had touched off a wave of hope that peace would at last come to the Middle East. Negotiations have since bogged down and confident smiles are once again rare.

diehard Baghdad regime, it was perhaps thanks to the Soviet Union that Syria did not fall into line immediately with the rejectionists, who refused *any* negotiated solution, while President Hafez Assad opposed only the direct talks set up by Cairo.

Consequently, since it has become standard procedure for Washington and Moscow to co-operate, they can oppose each other with complete cordiality, negotiating as they go along not only the Middle East situation but also all other current bilateral matters. In this context, it is easy to understand why, if ground is lost on a matter of capital importance (for example, if the initiative on the Middle East slips from their grasp), there is a risk that the whole process of horse-trading that goes on between the super-powers will be disrupted. This reveals if not the existence of complementary interests, at any rate "collusion" or a convergence of interests that are nonetheless substantially different!

After trying in vain to demonstrate that Geneva was the only path to salvation, and after having themselves believed for a

long time that even the resounding success of the Sadat visit could pave the way to Geneva, the American leaders have resigned themselves to jumping on the band wagon. However, this dramatic diplomatic *volte-face* did not mean that the United States had also resigned itself to travelling at the same speed. It made plain its intention of taking over the reins and, following Sadat's invitation to the pre-Geneva conference in Cairo, President Carter proposed a possible date (which was flexible for a meeting to be convened by someone else. Egypt accepted with alacrity. There followed an opening session of low-level delegates, which brought together only Israel and Egypt in the presence of a representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and of the United States. In the meantime, Cyrus Vance had returned to the Middle East, where he remained during the conference but not for the purpose of taking part. As soon as Cairo had pushed Geneva into the background, it became the purpose of the United States to ensure that the Cairo conference was a success. To this

and, Cyrus Vance turned from mediating between Israel and the Arab states to mediating among the Arabs themselves. After having played the false broker, the senior American diplomat now found himself acting as a go-between, his purpose being to bring other Arabs to Cairo and, in collusion with a willing Saudi Arabia, to start off by bringing King Hussein of Jordan into the mainstream of events generated by the Sadat trip.

It was precisely this role that Begin and Sadat had chosen for Washington, and it will be recalled that, after paying tribute to President Carter's efforts, both of them admitted in front of the television cameras the importance of the role the United States would play from then on. Some people were taken in – what had been said meant that henceforward, Jerusalem and Cairo could dispense with the services of just anyone but that they needed the United States to ensure the participation of other Arab nations in their negotiations. It was this situation, apparently irreversible, that became a tumbling-block for the all-powerful Americans, and therefore for the Russians too.

Intermediaries

Until Sadat's trip, the American intermediaries had carried the message, passing on as they saw fit and paying due regard to their own interests. Nothing would ever be the same after November 19, 1977. Those 30 hours that Sadat spent in Israel cancelled out 30 years of hostility, made the intermediate level of negotiations superfluous and placed any future intermediary in the uncomfortable position of being the last to be informed of any expected developments. Thus Cyrus Vance, coming to the rescue of the Cairo conference, knew only as much about the Sadat-Begin talks as they wanted him to know. In view of the difference in the interests of the parties involved and of the intermediary, which wanted to assume its position of world leader at any cost (I am not making a value judgment here), it is easy to see why two skilled politicians such as the Egyptian President and the Israeli Premier did not show their hands. They said just enough to make sure that the American safety net was in position. It is symptomatic of this state of affairs that President Carter, at his December 15 press conference, said he did not know what Menachem Begin had to tell him the next day about the basic points of a possible peace.

The central issue since the Sadat visit has been what the ultimate result of the November 19 initiative will be. It has already led to Egypt's *de facto* recognition of Israel, and the end of the war between the two countries may well be said to be implied

by President Sadat's promise that no woman would ever again have to weep for her son, husband or father. These facts all point indisputably to one goal: bilateralism. But officially this is quite out of the question – at least in the sense that such an "extreme measure" is not inevitable. President Sadat has said often enough that he will negotiate with Israel alone if Israel alone accepts his invitation. However, he has always made a point of adding that, although it is a peace between only two countries that he will be negotiating, it is still a general peace, even though he has no such mandate.

To Israel, any peace is a good one, especially if, in the first instance, it is simply an Israeli-Egyptian one. For all that, Menachem Begin himself, when talking of peace between Israel and the Arab states, did say that he would sign peace *treaties*. Should this be taken to mean that the peace treaty to be signed by Israel and Egypt will be used as a model for others and that, in this sense, it will be general in scope? Or should it be taken to mean that the said "general peace" will be a series of bilateral treaties? In that case, the next treaty could be between Israel and Jordan if the Palestinian obstacle has been removed – an obstacle made all the more formidable by the radicalization recorded at the Tripoli "summit".

However, that stage has not yet been reached. There will be many other instances in which American diplomacy will realize that it is not all-powerful and will have to adjust to the situation. The fundamental error is to use theory as the basis for understanding and controlling the realities of life. The most effective policy – one that is based on foresight – is arrived at intuitively through a thorough knowledge of the facts. Theory comes into play at a later stage.

The events that are taking place in this region sacred to three religions have a direct effect on the whole of the Red Sea, the famous "Arab Lake" that is closed to Russian influence – which once again disproves the theory of the "third circle", where one super-power reserves a seat for another.

The frantic catching-up process that American diplomacy embarked on in December is welcome on condition that it is understood that there is no good or bad peace plan – the only good peace treaty is one that starts by making a new war impossible. It is only afterwards, when confidence is inspired by reality, that both sides can risk making concessions that were formerly considered unthinkable. It is in this sense that President Sadat's unprecedented visit was exemplary. Whatever the cost, the forces it generated must be irreversibly channelled in a positive direction.

*Theory
is no basis
for understanding
and controlling
realities*

Sovereignty. . .

Sir,

I offer the following comment on "Limitations on Sovereignty" by Winston Chambers and John Reid, which appeared in the November/December 1977 issue.

- (1) On Pages 18 and 19, the authors state "... Canada could benefit from pursuing policies designed to foster greater government-industry co-operation in the development of ... technology. . .". "Certain federal systems could profit from promoting greater co-operation between the two senior levels of government. . .". "Difficult though the attainment of these objectives may appear they constitute a potentially rewarding challenge to policy-makers". I recognize that the authors cannot pursue in detail the impact of the Quebec experiment in the paper. The challenge (rewarding or otherwise) will be immensely complicated by the redistribution of power already envisaged and visible by the interaction of Messrs Lévesque, Davis and Lougheed *versus* the Federal Government and Prime Minister Trudeau. This new factor in the assessment of sovereignty is not only disturbing but is also one which may become the most significant force in the realignment and redistribution of economic power in our country. A separate Quebec – i.e. economically separate – will provide a new incentive for the multinational enterprises, which, as the authors have pointed out, are quick to capitalize on the opportunity of states that are short on technology and/or investment capital.
- (2) The authors have described at some length the history of the development of political attitudes in the nineteenth century with respect to the exploitation of natural resources. The nineteenth-century conception of sovereignty of nation states was (in some cases) marketed as the ultimate protection of citizens, based on the fallacious notion that a nation can become totally independent of all other nations. Even the nineteenth-century exponents of this nonsense did not believe it; they recognized the necessity of the "blood-flow" from colonies which they joyfully and rapaciously exploited. The notion, however, justified a lot of tariff walls and other devices that are still with us.
- (3) The illusion of twentieth-century economic sovereignty is accurately set out by the authors. However, the MNEs are not necessarily the "enemies". The push-pull between "sovereign" economic states has revealed a deficiency or vacuum in the areas of technology and capital flow so well described by the authors. The deficiency has been counterbalanced and the vacuum filled by the MNEs, which have adapted and moulded themselves in a rapid, efficient manner, not only to meet the economic needs of global society but also to earn a profit. The inability of the sovereign states to collectively meet the problem within or without the framework of the United Nations demonstrates that private enterprise can and will do the job better.

The failure on the part of our Ottawa Government to develop a basic economic policy suitable to the twentieth and twenty-first centuries will be (once again) at the highest cost to the citizen of this country.

Philip Shier
Vancouver

Reference Section

Canadian Foreign Relations

I. Recent Books

Canada's energy resources: edited proceedings of a symposium on Canada's energy resources, Calgary, October 26-27, 1977. Ottawa: Canada-Japan Trade Council, 1977. 124 pp.

Conference on Technology and Canadian International Relations, Ottawa, 1975. *Proceedings.* J. George Neuspiel, ed. Ottawa: Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, 1976. 84 pp.

Corbett, David

Looking at Canada. London: Nelson, in association with the Australian Institute of International Affairs, 1976. 226 pp.

- Byrks, Gerald E.
Canada's refugee policy: indifference or opportunism. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1977. 316 pp.
- Brolet, Jean-Paul
Resource diplomacy revisited; seminar in mineral economics. Montreal: McGill University, February 14, 1977. 66 pp.
- Frank, James G.
Assessing trends in Canada's competitive position: the case of Canada and the United States. Ottawa: Conference Board in Canada, 1977. (Canadian Studies, No. 47). 148 pp.
- Jordan, Walter
A political memoir. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977. 395 pp.
- Kranatstein, J.L., and J.M. Hitsman
Broken promises: a history of conscription in Canada. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1977. 281 pp.
- Gram, Derek
The imperfect Commonwealth. London: Rex Collings, 1977. 165 pp.
- Jonnet, François-Marie
Le défi Québécois. Montreal: Editions Quinze, 1977. 258 pp.
- North-South Institute
Third World deficits and the "debt crisis". (Canada North South; 1977-78, 2). Ottawa: North-South Institute, 1977. 60 pp.
- Boy, Reginald H.
For most conspicuous bravery: a biography of Major-General George R. Pearkes, V.C., through two world wars. Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 1977. 388 pp.
- Wynan, Thomas Martin
The role of the Arctic in Canadian-American relations. The Catholic University of America Ph.D., 1976. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University Microfilms International, 1977. 485 pp.
- Young, Oran
Resource management at the international level: the case of the North Pacific. London: Frances Pinter, 1977. 252 pp.
- I. Recent Articles**
- Barry, P.S.
 "The prolific pipeline: finding oil for Canol." In *Dalhousie Review* 57:205-223 Summer 1977.
- Battner, Donald F.
 "A maple leaf in the North Atlantic: Canada and the defence of Iceland, 1940." In *Canadian Defence Quarterly* 7:48-53, Autumn 1977.
- Blyth, John A.
 "The bomber offensive, youth, and Canadian nationalism." In *Canadian Defence Quarterly* 7:44-49 Winter 1978.
- Byers, R.B.
 "Defence for the next decade: the forthcoming White Paper." In *Canadian Defence Quarterly* 7:18-22 Autumn 1977.
- Byleveld, Herbert C.
 "Is foreign capital leaking out or pouring in?" In *Canadian Banker and ICB Review* 84:26-29 November-December 1977.
- Carruthers, Jeff
 "Coming to grips with plutonium." In *Report on Confederation* 1:19-23 January 1978.
- Chodos, Robert
 "Continentalism rears its head." In *Last Post* Vol. 6 No. 6 January 1978. pp.6-9.
- Clift, Dominique
 "External faces internal." In *Report on Confederation* 1:7-8 January 1978.
- Epstein, William
 "The Trident nuclear threat to Canada." In *Canadian Forum* 57:No.678 February 1978. pp.6-10.
- Gagnon, Lysianne
 "Le voyage d'Astérix." In *L'Actualité* 3:No. 2 February 1978. pp.53-57.
- Green, L.C.
 "From empire through Commonwealth." In *Alberta Law Review* 16:52-69 1978.
- IDRISSI
 "Québec de l'An Deux; la genèse d'une nation." In *Défense nationale*. 33:43-60 November 1977.
- Leslie, Brigadier General E.
 "Some thoughts on international peacekeeping." In *Canadian Defence Quarterly* 7:18-22 Winter 1978.
- Lindsey, G.R.
 "Protection of shipping in the 1980s." In *Canadian Defence Quarterly* 7:6-12 Winter 1978.
- Maisonrouge, Jacques
 "La gestion et les multinationales: réflexions sur les solutions à la crise de l'énergie humaine." In *Canadian Public Administration* 20:578-599 Winter 1977.
- Manor, F.S.
 "Canada's crisis (1): the causes." In *Foreign Policy* No. 29 Winter 1977-78 pp. 43-55.
- Morrison, Robert W.
 "Is Canada peddling nuclear bombs world-wide in the guise of nuclear reactors?" In *Science Forum* Vol. 10 No. 3 December 1977. pp. 3-7.
- "Secession v. Survival" In *Time* February 13, 1978. pp. 24-31.
- Schlecler, G.
 "Successful alternative? Canada and the European Community." In *Round Table* 66:55-64 January 1978.
- Shields, R.A.
 "The Canadian tariff and the Franco-Canadian Treaty negotiations - 1907-1909; a study in imperial relations." In *Dalhousie Review* 57:300-321 Summer 1977.

Stetham, Nicholas

"Canada's crisis (2): the dangers." In *Foreign Policy* No. 29 Winter 1977-78. pp. 56-64.

Stouffer, Allen P.

"Canadian-American relations in the shadow of the Civil War." In *Dalhousie Review* 57:332-346 Summer 1977.

Sturm, Paul

"Arabs with a French accent." In *Forbes* 120:63-65 December 15, 1977.

White, Sam

"Québec demi-libre." In *Spectator* November 12, 1977. p. 8.

Publications of the Department of External Affairs

Below are lists of the most recent publications of the Departmental Press Office and the Information Services Division dealing with international affairs and Canadian foreign policy.

Press Releases, issued by the Departmental Press Office, Ottawa:

No. 117 (December 30, 1977) Visit of Secretary of State for External Affairs to Japan and People's Republic of China, January 24 to February 3, 1978.

No. 1 (January 3, 1978) Production of *Woyzeck* by National Arts Centre French Theatre to tour France and Belgium.

No. 2 (January 12, 1978) Senior External Affairs appointments – de Goumois and Gignac.

No. 3 (January 13, 1978) Toronto Symphony on tour of People's Republic of China.

No. 4 (January 13, 1978) Canada and France extend interim fisheries arrangements.

No. 5 (January 16, 1978) Nuclear agreement signed by Canada and European Community.

No. 6 (January 18, 1978) Appointment announced of Michel Dupuy to Board of Governors of International Development Research Centre.

No. 7 (January 18, 1978) Canada/U.S.S.R. general exchanges agreement – 1978-79 program of Mixed Commission.

No. 8 (January 18, 1978) Canada and Romania sign mutual fisheries agreement.

No. 9 (January 20, 1978) Canada and Australia announce literary award winners.

No. 10 (January 26, 1978) Nuclear agreement signed by Canada and Japan.

No. 11 (February 2, 1978) Garrison Diversion – revised plan released.

No. 12 (February 3, 1978) Diplomatic relations established between Canada and the People's Republic of Angola.

No. 13 (February 8, 1978) Notes regarding re-entry over Canada of Soviet satellite *Cosmos 954* tabled in House of Commons.

No. 14 (February 16, 1978) Canadian embassy to be opened in Kuwait.

No. 15 (February 16, 1978) Foreign Service Visits appointed.

No. 16 (February 17, 1978) New IDRC President named.

No. 17 (February 21, 1978) Two Montreal theatre companies to represent Canada at Festival d'Avignon.

No. 18 (February 28, 1978) Japan establishes satellite station in Canada.

No. 19 (March 2, 1978) Commonwealth Day to be March 13.

No. 20 (March 3, 1978) Honourable Jean-Pierre Goyer visits French-speaking Africa, March 3 to 13, 1978.

No. 21 (March 3, 1978) Canadian contribution to ILO announced.

No. 22 (March 3, 1978) Commissioner of State for Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation of Republic of Zaire, H.E. Umba Lutete, visits Ottawa.

No. 23 (March 8, 1978) European Community Canada Joint Co-operation Committee, second meeting – joint communiqué.

No. 25 (March 16, 1978) Canada-France Trade Agreement Act repealed.

No. 26 (March 17, 1978) Ministerial delegation from Guinea visits Canada March 19 to 23, 1978.

No. 27 (March 22, 1978) Canadian delegation named to seventh session of Law of the Sea Conference, Geneva, March 28 to May 19, 1978.

No. 28 (March 23, 1978) Emergency assistance to Lebanon announced.

No. 29 (March 28, 1978) Release announced of Joint Report by Special Negotiators on Canada-U.S. Maritime Boundaries and Related Resource Issues.

No. 30 (March 28, 1978) Canada accedes to UNESCO convention prohibiting illegal import or export of cultural property.

No. 31 (March 28, 1978) Jacques Godbout of Canada wins 1978 Canada-Belgium literary award.

No. 32 (March 28, 1978) Sixth Student Commonwealth Conference, April 3 to 7, 1978 announced.

No. 33 (March 28, 1978) Commonwealth Youth Affairs Council – biennial meeting held April 3 to 7, 1978.

Statements and Speeches, published by the Information Services Division, Ottawa:

No. 77/23 Canadian Policy Towards South Africa. A statement in the House of Commons, Ottawa, on December 19, 1977, by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Don Jamieson.

No. 77/24 Current Issues of Concern to Canada and the International Community. A statement in the House of Commons, Ottawa, on December 19, 1977, by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Don Jamieson.

No. 78/1 Use of Nuclear-Power Sources in Outer Space. A statement to the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, Ottawa, on December 19, 1977.

Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space on February 13, 1978, by the Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations, Mr. William F. Barton.

Romania on Mutual Fisheries Relations
Bucharest, January 17, 1978
In force January 17, 1978

U.S.A.

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America, together with the Annexed Memorandum of Agreement, providing for a Revised Schedule of Tolls to be levied for the use of the Navigational Facilities of the St Lawrence Seaway

Washington, March 20, 1978
In force March 20, 1978

Treaty Information

Bilateral

Barbados

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of Barbados constituting an extension of the Interim Air Transport Agreement of November 20, 1974, as extended, to April 30, 1978

Ottawa, December 28, 1977, and January 29, 1978

Euratom

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the European Atomic Energy Agency (EURATOM) to amend the Agreement between the Government of Canada and the European Atomic Energy Community for Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy of October 6, 1959, particularly in so far as it relates to Safeguards (with additional Exchanges of Letters)

Brussels, January 16, 1978
In force January 16, 1978

Ghana

Technical Assistance Agreement on Military Training between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Republic of Ghana

Accra, February 14, 1978
In force February 14, 1978
With effect June 1, 1976

Jamaica

Agreement between Canada and Jamaica for the avoidance of Double Taxation and the prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income

Kingston, March 30, 1978

Japan

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of Japan concerning the establishment of a Temporary Satellite Support Facility at Churchill Research Range

Ottawa, February 16, 1978
In force February 16, 1978

Romania

Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Socialist Republic of

Multilateral

Convention Providing a Uniform Law on the Form of an International Will

Done at Washington, October 26, 1973

Canada's Instrument of Accession deposited January 24, 1977, with the following declaration -

"the Government of Canada accedes to the Convention providing a Uniform Law on the Form of an International Will, done at Washington, D.C., on October 26, 1973, subject to the following declaration:

1. The Government of Canada declares that pursuant to Article XIV of the Convention, the Convention shall extend only to the provinces of Manitoba and Newfoundland.
2. The Government of Canada further declares that it will submit, at any time after accession, other declarations, in conformity with Article XIV of the Convention, stating expressly the additional provinces to which the Convention shall extend, when such provinces have enacted the necessary implementing legislation."

Entered into force February 9, 1978


Convention on the means of prohibiting and preventing the illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property

Done at Paris, November 14, 1970
Canada's Instrument of Acceptance deposited March 28, 1978

Statutes of International Centre for Registration of Serial Publications

Entered into force 21 January 1976
Canada's Instrument of Accession deposited March 28, 1978





If undelivered,
return cover only to:
DSS Printing Operations
Ottawa, K1A 0S7, Canada

En cas de non-livraison,
retourner cette couverture seulement au:
Ministère des Approvisionnements
et Services-Imprimerie
Ottawa, K1A 0S7, Canada



External Affairs
Canada

Affaires extérieures
Canada

ISSN 0381-4874

May / June 1978

International Perspectives

A journal of opinion on world affairs

AI
A
-156

Recap of UN General Assembly

British economic recovery

Responsible government and policy

Approach to disarmament session

Soviet-U.S. arms talks

Inequalities and conflicts in Africa

International Perspectives

Contents

May/June 1978

United Nations	
Recap of UN General Assembly / <i>Ross Francis</i>	3
Canadian voting on Mideast questions / <i>L. I. Grossman</i>	9
British economic recovery / <i>Victor Keegan</i>	14
Canadian-Brazilian relations / <i>Jim Guy</i>	18
Public influence on foreign policy / <i>Donald Page</i>	21
Responsible government and foreign policy / <i>Denis Stairs</i>	26
Canada's approach to disarmament session / <i>G.R. Skinner</i>	30
Soviet-U.S. arms talks / <i>Robin Ranger</i>	35
Canadian-Danish relations / <i>Paul Painchaud</i>	39
Inequalities and conflicts in Africa / <i>Timothy Shaw</i>	44
Letters to the Editor	50
Reference Section	53

International Perspectives is issued bimonthly in English and French by the Department of External Affairs, Ottawa. Any material in this publication may be reproduced. Mention of *International Perspectives* as the source would be appreciated.

Published by authority of the
Secretary of State for External Affairs.

Authorized as third-class mail,
Post Office Department, Ottawa.

Subscription rates: Canada, \$4.00 a year
single copies \$1.00; other countries
\$5.00 a year, single copies \$1.25.
Remittances, payable to the Receiver
General of Canada, should be sent to:
Printing and Publishing,
Supply & Services Canada,
Ottawa, Ontario, K1A 0S9.

Editors:

Alex I. Inglis
Louis Balthazar

International Perspectives is a journal of opinion on Canada's role in the world and on current international questions. Its purpose is to stimulate discussion and interest in international affairs. It is not intended to reflect Canadian Government policy or perceptions. Indeed, the editors often seek to include material that expresses different or contrary views. The Department of External Affairs accepts no responsibility for the views expressed except where it is clearly stated that an article by a departmental officer is a statement of Government policy. All other articles contain a specific disclaimer of departmental responsibility for their contents.

Letters of comment on issues discussed in *International Perspectives* are welcome and will be considered for publication. Please address your correspondence to: International Perspectives, Department of External Affairs, L. B. Pearson Bldg., 125 Sussex Drive, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, K1A 0G1.

Thirty-Second General Assembly: improvement over recent years

By Ross Francis

In his speech to the General Assembly last fall, the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, Don Jamieson, startled many both in New York and at home with the blunt statement: "What Canadians are saying is that the performance of the United Nations is not good enough".

Those who had read the UN Secretary-General's annual report would have been less surprised, for Mr Waldheim had raised the related question of "the political will of governments to utilize existing institutions for the constructive purposes that they were designed to fulfil". Without this political will, he warned, coupled with self-restraint and statesmanship, the confidence of governments in international institutions might be eroded. He concluded that it was easy to blame international institutions for shortcomings that were the direct result of the conflicting policies or actions of governments.

Mr Jamieson, for his part, said that he could not agree that "the organization and its member states are powerless to remove the root causes of those major tensions that now require all of us to live out our lives in the constant shadow of impending disaster". Like Mr Waldheim, he stressed to the foreign ministers present the need to make the United Nations more effective.

As an organization with 149 members (Djibouti and Vietnam were added last fall) that have widely differing objectives, the General Assembly could scarcely be expected to change its habits within a single session. Many of the debates were reminiscent of the UN at its worst – repetitive, unconstructive, leading to resolutions that contributed little to the solving of the problems with which they dealt. But most observers detected encouraging signs of improvement. The General Assembly demonstrated its ability to make decisions quickly – by condemning aerial hijacking, for example. (A cynic might conclude that, as perhaps the world's largest *per capita* users of jet aircraft, diplomats are particularly sensitive to threats to their safety, regardless of ideology.) Members were in-

creasingly sensitive to the charge that the UN had been one-sided in its condemnation of violators of human rights, attacking only those out of favour with the majority, and were willing to consider, if not yet to implement, reforms. Of perhaps greater long-term significance, the Assembly successfully completed its lengthy negotiations to reorganize the economic and social structure of the UN.

Record number

Judged by the number of resolutions it passed, the Assembly could be considered a record success, with a total of 262, requiring a 495-page book to contain them. Those who have come to believe that fewer resolutions taken seriously by more people are better than the reverse were not impressed by the record. They were, however, pleased with another – that of the 158 resolutions accepted by consensus or without objection. This figure demonstrated that the non-aligned nations, which made up the bulk of the membership, were more interested in carrying the rest of the membership with them than in relying on their automatic majority to push through resolutions. Of the resolutions requiring recorded votes (11 were non-recorded), Canada voted for 54, voted against nine, and abstained on 30. Canada was, therefore, able to support over 85 per cent of the resolutions. Incidentally, in view of the widespread Canadian impression that abstaining at the UN is a uniquely Canadian form of behaviour, it is worth while noting that Canada did so less than the other Western countries on the Security Council: Britain, 34; France, 44; Germany, 36; U.S.A. 36.

The Assembly debates on the Middle East were unquestionably the most disappointing. The dramatic events in the area

*Non-aligned
less interested
in automatic
majorities*

Mr Francis is Director of the United Nations Political Affairs Division of the Department of External Affairs. He is a former departmental Press Officer and has served in London, Jakarta, Pretoria and Laos. The views expressed are those of Mr Francis.

triggered by President Sadat's historic visit to Jerusalem were scarcely reflected in the speeches, and not at all in the resolutions, in New York. Canada has consistently supported Security Council Resolutions 242 of 1967 and 338 of 1973 as establishing a framework for negotiations that could lead to a peaceful settlement of disputes. Canadian delegates to successive Assembly meetings, as to the meetings of other UN bodies, have expressed the belief that repetitive debates, too often leading to one-sided resolutions, have only served to exacerbate the differences between the parties rather than to improve the atmosphere for negotiations. Canada attempted to judge each resolution on its merits, with the result that of the 18 put forward it supported nine, abstained on five and voted against four – almost half the negative votes the delegation cast at the Assembly. This followed the previous year's pattern of eight yes, four no and five abstentions on 17 resolutions.

One new Middle East item was placed on the agenda at the request of Egypt, criticizing Israel for establishing settlements in the occupied Arab territories. Canada voted for this resolution because of the belief that the Israeli insistence on the right to create settlements was hindering the prospects for negotiations. On the other hand, Canada was one of a tiny minority – with El Salvador, Israel and the United States – that voted against the resolution entitled "The Situation in the Middle East". This resolution called for the participation in a peace conference of the Palestine Liberation Organization "on an equal footing" with the other parties and for Israeli withdrawal "from all Arab territories occupied since 5 June 1967". Canada judged that, by adopting such a resolution, which went beyond the terms of Security Council Resolution 242, at precisely the moment when there appeared to be prospects for reaching agreement on new negotiations, the Assembly was endangering, rather than furthering, the prospects for peace.

Canada had far more company in voting against two resolutions concerning the recommendations contained in the report of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, which attempted to prejudge what the results of negotiations might be, and called for the establishment of a special unit on Palestinian rights within the Secretariat. Canada's fourth negative vote was cast on a resolution singling out Israel for condemnation for its alleged increasing collaboration with South Africa.

As one of the major supporters of the UN Relief and Works Agency, to which it has pledged over \$4 million this year, Can-

ada supported five resolutions relating to the Agency's work. It abstained on a sixth concerning Palestinian refugees in Gaza, to take into account Israel's provision of housing for some hardship cases.

The Assembly's performance on the Middle East was in marked contrast to that of the Security Council during 1977. Council members showed a marked disinclination to interfere with the continuing negotiations in the area. The Council met to renew the mandates of the two UN forces – the UN Emergency Force between Israel and Egypt and the UN Disengagement Observation Force between Israel and Syria. Otherwise it held only two short, relatively non-polemical, debates to enable members to express their views, and no new resolutions were proposed. As a member of the Council, Canada welcomed this responsible approach by the UN organ with primary responsibility for peace and security.

Southern Africa

For several sessions, the other area of major political concern for most member states has been southern Africa, with annual debates on Namibia, Zimbabwe or Rhodesia, and South African *apartheid*. This year's discussions in the General Assembly were overshadowed by the Security Council's adoption on November 4 of Resolution 418. The Council unanimously determined that the continued acquisition by South Africa of arms and related materials constituted a threat to the maintenance of international peace and security. Acting under the terms of Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council decided that all states should cease to provide arms of any kind. This was the first time the Council had ever proclaimed a mandatory embargo against a member state.

The Council's action was influenced by the results of two conferences held in Africa earlier in the year. At a conference in Maputo, Mozambique, on Namibia and Zimbabwe, and another in Lagos, Nigeria, on *apartheid*, member states unanimously adopted statements supporting the right of the majority peoples to struggle for the attainment of their full rights, and recommending action to end *apartheid* and racial discrimination. The readiness of African and other states to agree to a common approach to southern African questions reflected their understanding that Western countries accepted a responsibility for taking the initiative in trying to resolve these problems. Britain and the United States produced joint proposals for bringing about majority rule in Zimbabwe. The Security Council authorized the Secretary-General to name a special representative, General

*Insistence
on settlements
hindering
prospects for
negotiations*



Secretary of State for External Affairs Don Jamieson is shown delivering his speech at the United Nations General Assembly last September.

Prem Chand, to enter into discussions with all parties concerning the arrangements for the transition to majority rule. The five Western Council members began discussions with the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the South West Africa People's Organization concerning the holding of free elections in Namibia under UN supervision and control, as called for by Resolution 385 of January 30, 1976.

The Assembly debates on southern African questions were affected by the Council's agreement on an arms embargo and by the knowledge that negotiations on Zimbabwe and Namibia were going on. Many of the resolutions reflected the spirit of the Maputo and Lagos conferences; others were inspired by more extreme views and a certain scepticism about the likelihood of the various initiatives succeeding.

In voting on the 30 Assembly resolutions that related directly or indirectly to

southern Africa, Canada was careful not to jeopardize negotiations in which it was involved as a member of the Council. On a number of resolutions that appeared to conflict with possible action in the Council, Canada decided to abstain or cast negative votes in agreement with the other Western Council members. As a result, out of 30 resolutions, Canada supported 16, voted against three and abstained on 11 – a larger number of negative votes and abstentions than usual.

Any resentment African members might have felt at Canada's voting pattern was more than offset by their favourable reaction to Mr Jamieson's announcement on December 19 of Canada's new policy on South Africa, which involved phasing out all its Government-sponsored commercial-support activities, stopping Government-account export credit and foreign-investment insurance, withdrawing trade

commissioners, adopting a code of conduct for Canadian companies operating in South Africa and reviewing a number of other links. Canada was particularly active in drafting a resolution approving an international declaration against *apartheid* in sports. Because of Canada's role as host to major international sports events, including the 1978 Commonwealth Games in Edmonton, it has been important to establish clear rules on this question.

Cyprus

The debate on Cyprus in plenary produced little evidence of reconciliation between the Turkish-Cypriot and Greek-Cypriot communities 13 years after UN intervention first became necessary and a peacekeeping force was set up. The Canadian delegate raised the question whether a "continued involvement by United Nations peacekeeping forces might become an excuse for political inactivity or a substitute for serious negotiations". In 1976, the resolution had not referred to UNFICYP (the UN Force in Cyprus) at all, and Canada had abstained in protest. At the 1977 Assembly, the resolution called for the resumption of negotiations between the communities and asked the parties to co-operate with the Secretary-General and with the UN peacekeeping force. As a result, Canada was able to support it. The delegation did abstain on a clause recommending the Security Council to keep the question of Cyprus "under constant review". In Canada's experience, such a recommendation was superfluous since the Council was already committed to meeting at least twice a year to renew the mandate of UNFICYP, and had demonstrated in August that it was willing to convene at once if required. Canada believes that a solution will be found by negotiations between the parties, and not through decisions by the Council.

Although this debate was discouraging, there was some comfort in the fact that Greek and Turkish Cypriots were subsequently able to agree in the Third (Social, Humanitarian and Cultural) Committee on a resolution calling for the establishment of an investigatory body with the participation of the International Committee of the Red Cross to trace missing persons.

Belize was the subject of more interest than usual during the Assembly, in part because of the activities of the Commonwealth Ministerial Committee, which included Canada. The Commonwealth Caribbean countries were alert to the concern of many Latin American countries that a resolution calling for the self-determination, independence and territorial

integrity of Belize should not appear to be aimed against its neighbour Guatemala. The resolution called on Britain to pursue negotiations vigorously in close consultation with the Governments of both Belize and Guatemala, and drew considerable Latin American support.

Peace-keeping

The debate on peace-keeping continued to reflect the fundamental differences of view among members of the 33-country Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, particularly concerning the respective roles of the Security Council and the Secretary-General in the authorization and control of forces. In an emergency, states have been prepared to forget their doctrinal differences and to make practical compromises in order to place a peacekeeping force in the field. Countries providing units to the force have found it frustrating, however, not to have prior agreement on how they are to be constituted, financed or controlled, so that adequate advance planning can be done. Canada is the largest contributor, with 1,562 of 8,176 UN peacekeeping troops (19 per cent of the total) and has therefore been particularly interested in the success of the Committee's work.

So far the Committee has had no success in working out guidelines that would set out a theoretical basis for conducting peacekeeping operations or at least codify existing practice based on the way the three forces now in the field have been formed and controlled. Despite some doubts about the value of continuing these frustrating discussions, Canada joined in passing a resolution that renewed the Committee's mandate for another two years, requested it to renew efforts for an early completion of acceptable guidelines and asked it to devote attention as well to specific questions related to the practical implementation of peacekeeping operations.

The debate on disarmament looked forward to the special session on disarmament, to be held in May-June 1978. This session is expected to adopt a declaration outlining general principles for arms-control and disarmament negotiations and a program of action for the next few years. The session will probably also consider the best way of conducting future disarmament discussions, particularly as two nuclear-weapon states, France, and China, do not take part in the present negotiating body, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. Many states will want to concentrate on the relation between disarmament and development, since they believe that, if less were spent on arms, more would be available to promote eco-

*Security Council
committed
to meeting
twice a year
about Cyprus*

economic and social progress in developing countries.

Apart from discussing preparations for the special session, the Canadian delegation was particularly interested in strengthening nuclear safeguards. At Canada's urging, the Assembly adopted a resolution affirming that all states had the right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes but that this must be under effective and non-discriminatory safeguards. The resolution asked states to adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty or at least to accept other arrangements involving the application of safeguards to their complete nuclear-fuel cycle. Canada co-sponsored a resolution pressing for the successful completion of a convention banning chemical weapons, and strongly supported resolutions concerning the completion of negotiations on a comprehensive test ban and on strategic-arms limitations between the two super-powers.

North-South

Despite the disappointment of the developing countries with the outcome of the Conference on International Economic Co-operation and the breakdown of negotiations in Geneva in December on the establishment of a common fund under the integrated program for commodities, the Assembly made considerable progress in establishing a framework for future North-South discussions. There was a greater appreciation of the need to approach complex economic issues carefully, with a corresponding understanding of the need to take seriously the concerns of the industrialized democracies, particularly in the present uncertain economic circumstances. The Assembly affirmed that all negotiations of a global nature relating to the establishment of a New International Economic Order should take place within the framework of the UN system. It decided to convene a special session of the General Assembly in 1980 to assess progress in this area. It further decided to establish a committee of the whole (in effect the Second Committee meeting on a year-round basis) to prepare for this special session.

The Assembly recommended ways to strengthen the Economic and Social Council as the central forum for the discussion of economic and social issues on a global basis. ECOSOC should have shorter but more frequent subject-oriented sessions spread throughout the year. It should hold periodic meetings at the ministerial level to review major issues. It should assume direct responsibility for the performance of the functions of its subsidiary bodies, simplifying and streamlining their structure.

Except for UNICEF, the UN Environment Program and the World Food Program, the operational activities of the UN should be integrated as to their funding and administration. ECOSOC should assume a greater role in co-ordinating the work of the Specialized Agencies. The Assembly asked the Secretary-General to appoint as his deputy a Director-General for Development and International Economic Co-operation to provide effective leadership in this area.

After extensive negotiations, which took 18 months from the holding of the *Habitat* conference in Vancouver, the Assembly decided on a framework for international co-operation on matters of human settlement. The Assembly created a 58-member Commission on Human Settlements, on which Canada has been chosen to serve. It also created a small secretariat, named *Habitat*, Centre for Human Settlements, to bring together existing UN units, to harmonize UN human-settlements programs, and to provide a focal-point for international information and research in this field. The Centre will be located in Nairobi, where it will have close links with the UN Environment Program, but it will report directly to the Secretary-General or the new Director-General.

*Framework
for cooperation
on questions of
human settlement*

Human rights

Discussions in the Third Committee led to modest progress on human-rights matters. A decision on the major Western initiative to create a UN High Commissioner for Human Rights was deferred, partly because many states saw the issue as developing into East-West confrontation and preferred to avoid a vote until the atmosphere had improved. Nevertheless, the proposal gained considerable support in a short time, and there was general agreement to continue discussion in the Commission on Human Rights.

The Assembly set up a number of priorities for the international community in its approach to questions of human rights and requested the Commission on Human Rights to undertake an analysis of alternative ways within the UN system for improving the defence of these rights. Four resolutions were carried on torture and related issues, including one inviting the Commission to draft an international convention on the abolition of torture. The Assembly continued the process of drafting a convention on the elimination of discrimination against women.

Canadian delegates urged the Assembly to break away from the pattern of repeatedly criticizing a limited number of states – principally Chile, Israel and South Africa – and to look instead for abuses

wherever they might occur. A resolution that would have condemned Uganda failed to win support. The Assembly did, however, adopt a resolution, sponsored by Nigeria, calling for the establishment of regional machinery for the promotion and protection of human rights. The Nigerian initiative was one of several indications of an interest on the part of Third World states in establishing a consensus with the West on this important subject.

The Assembly agreed to call a world conference in Geneva in August 1978 to combat racism and racial discrimination. Following the passage of a resolution in 1975 defining Zionism as a form of racism, Canada had voted against further resolutions on the Decade against Racism. At the 1977 Assembly, the Canadian delegation recognized the concerted efforts that had been made to recall the decade and the conference to their original purposes, and accordingly voted for the resolutions concerning them. Canada's representative in the debate, Miss Coline Campbell, quoted the definition of racism given in the basic UN convention on this subject as "any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin". She said that this definition would continue to be understood as the basis of Canada's support of the Decade, and its acceptance would be one of the elements determining the decision of the Canadian Government with respect to participation in the world conference.

Hijacking

As a consequence of the tragic hijacking of a Lufthansa aircraft, the International Federation of Air-Line Pilots' Associations requested the UN to give urgent consideration to the problem of safety in international civil aviation. The Canadian delegation, to which a representative of the Canadian Air-Line Pilots' Association was added as an adviser, co-sponsored the inclusion of this item on the agenda and the resolution that was eventually adopted condemning hijacking and calling for further measures to combat it. As the airline pilots have observed, resolutions cannot in themselves stop hijackers, but they have helped create an international atmosphere that has made their operations increasingly difficult.

The Assembly noted progress in the drafting of an international convention against hostage-taking, and authorized the committee on this question, in which Canada participates, to continue its work during 1978. On a related issue, Canada voted against a resolution concerning the Committee on International Terrorism. The

delegation judged that, by giving first priority to studying the underlying causes of terrorism, the mandate of the committee would effectively prevent it from recommending practical measures to combat terrorism.

The Assembly welcomed progress in formulating draft principles on direct-broadcast television satellites and remote-sensing of the earth from space. Canada, in concert with Sweden, laid particular stress on the importance of consultation and agreement between states with respect to direct broadcasting from satellites. The comparatively obscure UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space gained sudden prominence just after the Assembly when its subcommittee debated whether present international conventions should be modified, or a new one negotiated, to prevent a repetition of the incident involving the crash of a nuclear-fueled Soviet satellite in Northern Canada.

The Assembly adopted a record biennial budget of \$986 million for 1978-79. Large though it was, it represented a saving of \$32 million in the resources requested, as the result of the determination of the principal contributors to hold growth to a minimum. The Assembly adopted without difficulty a new scale of assessments recommended by the Committee on Contributions. This result was a tribute to the skill of the Committee, to which a Canadian, A.J. Mathewson, was re-elected. Under its new assessment of 3.04 per cent, Canada will pay \$12.3 million to the UN regular budget for 1978, remaining the ninth-largest contributor.

Obscure issues

A summary of some of the highlights does not capture the full flavour of the Assembly. Much of the Assembly's work involves relatively obscure issues that attract little press attention but are of great interest to a minority. A useful example this year was the resolution on self-determination for the people of Guam. This was framed in consultation between members of the Committee of 24 on decolonization and the United States delegation. It was, therefore, adopted without objection: a contrast to the controversial resolutions on this subject in previous sessions, and one that demonstrated in miniature the improved relations between the non-aligned countries and the United States delegation, led by Ambassador Andrew Young.

An example of a different kind – which did draw press attention because an astute film-publicist linked it to the advertising campaign for a currently-popular film – was the handling of an item on unidentified

*Definition
of racism
given as basis
for Canadian
support*

flying objects. The Special Political Committee heard with interest a statement by the Prime Minister of Grenada, but declined the request to establish a new UN agency to study these phenomena.

Asked for a quick summary of the Assembly's performance, one Western Ambassador gave it a "B" average as an end-of-term grade. As with all report cards, his mark obviously lacked precision, but the Ambassador did draw attention to real improvement in the work of the Assembly over the past two years. Despite disappointment over the handling of some issues, particularly Middle East questions, the

Canadian delegation concluded that the Assembly had accomplished its main purposes with improved efficiency, less rhetoric and a greater degree of consensus than previously. Speaking on behalf of the Western group to the session's closing meeting on December 21, the Canadian Ambassador, W. H. Barton, concluded that, though the representatives had not resolved major problems, "we have seen some modest gains in the art of living and working together—in the recognition that in the final analysis we make progress not by confrontation but by the adaptations that lead to agreed solutions".

*Modest gains
in the art
of living
and working
together*

United Nations

The shifting Canadian vote on Mideast questions at UN

By Lawrence I. Grossman

The Middle East debates of the 1977 sessions of the United Nations General Assembly came and went with less than the usual amount of public notice. During the months of November and December, when the Assembly voted on resolutions, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat monopolized press attention by travelling to Jerusalem and opening a historic dialogue with Israel. The debates and resolutions on the Arab-Israeli dispute were, nevertheless, as antipathetic to genuine peace in the Middle East as were those of any previous year.

The Assembly passed 16 resolutions either singling out Israel for harsh criticism or endorsing Arab prescriptions for a Middle East settlement. There were no real surprises, just a continuing increase in the volume of declarations. At the same time, the bloc-voting leverage of the Arabs in the Assembly assured that no criticism of their policies *vis-à-vis* Israel crept into any of the resolutions. Neither did it permit the Assembly to examine such threats to world peace and security as the continuing crisis in Lebanon or the untidy disposition of the Spanish Sahara. The lowest-common-denominator logic of "Arab unity" at the UN, in fact, divines that no Arab state ever shares the dock with Israel.

The Arab bloc demonstrated its power at the UN once more by churning out anti-Israel propaganda in bulk. The real impact

of these activities on world public opinion in convincing people that the Jewish state was somehow an elemental evil among the family of nations should not be underestimated. In the Soviet bloc and among the Third World nations of Africa, Latin America and Asia, the state of Israel—and often, as a corollary, world Jewry—have now become associated with the universally-recognized crimes of racism, imperialism and colonialism.

United Nations efforts to disseminate this one-sided perspective were given added impetus in 1977 by the Assembly's passage of a resolution establishing for the first time within the UN Secretariat a Special Unit on Palestinian Rights, with a 1978 budget allocation of \$450,000. Its basic mandate is, working in conjunction with the Palestine Liberation Organization, to promote "max-

Mr Grossman is Director of Research of the Canada-Israel Committee and Editor of the CIC's Canadian Middle East Digest. He has a master of arts degree in international affairs from Johns Hopkins University and has written numerous articles in both the Canadian press and in the Jewish press. The views expressed here are those of Mr Grossman.

imum publicity" for the studies and recommendations of the Committee on Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People. The Committee, which was created in 1975, has recommended that the exercise of Palestinian rights "may be carried out in two phases: The first phase involves the return to their homes of the Palestinians displaced as a result of the War of June 1967... [and handing over the West Bank and Gaza Strip to the Palestine Liberation Organization]... The second phase deals with the return to their homes of the Palestinians displaced between 1948 and 1967". According to this plan, Israel has no rights – just an obligation to comply with instructions to self-destruct.

Jamieson at the UN

The significance of the UN's lopsided treatment of the Arab-Israeli dispute has not been missed by Canadian diplomats over the past few years. It was not unusual, therefore, that the speech of the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Don Jamieson, in plenary last September emphasized the profligate nature of the Assembly's Middle East deliberations. The Minister warned that "sterile debates of recent years where the outcome is always a foregone conclusion" were leading the UN down the road to "unlamented oblivion", and he pointedly criticized the Assembly for passing too many resolutions on the Middle East:

To what purpose was all that time and effort, not to mention money, expended? The answer is surely very little, because many of those resolutions simply expressed moral judgments and were devoid of practical proposals for action. Furthermore, everyone knew that they had little if any prospect of being implemented.

The Minister's blunt words drew criticism from a number of Arab delegations and congratulations from the Israeli UN Ambassador.

Turning to the Middle East situation in detail, Mr Jamieson expressed Canada's unequivocal "support for Israel's right to exist" and commitment to Security Council Resolution 242 as a basis for a settlement. He said that Canada "deplores" Assembly efforts to "attribute patently-false motives to Israel or to diminish its status and rights within the UN or as a legitimate member of the world community". At the same time, the Minister expressed Canada's "regret" that Israel was still establishing settlements that "unilaterally or illegally" predetermined the situation in the occupied territories prior to the conclusion of Arab-Israeli negotiations. In addition, Mr Jamieson both reaffirmed the need to provide a "just, humanitarian and political solution

for the Palestinian Arab people" and emphasized that it must "include their clear and unequivocal acceptance of Israel's permanent existence as their neighbour".

In conclusion, the Minister urged the Assembly to help bring about the resumption of negotiations, rather than to conduct "empty debates" or pass "one-sided resolutions".

Two groups

The 16 Middle East resolutions passed by the 1977 General Assembly can be divided into two substantive groups. Ten core resolutions dealt directly with issues of the Arab-Israeli dispute. The other six were miscellaneous matters of indirect and varying consequence to the Middle East, while of basic concern to the Third World generally.

Canada supported two of the ten core resolutions. These included criticism of Israel for establishing "illegal" settlements and taking other measures in the occupied territories, and for refusing to "take steps" for the return of refugees displaced since 1967.

On three resolutions, Canada voted no. One was an omnibus condemnation of Israel as the sole party responsible for the general Middle East situation and for the "three decades" during which the Palestinian people were "denied their inalienable rights". The other two resolutions endorsed the proposals, already mentioned, of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People and the establishment of the Special Unit to propagandize on behalf of the Palestinians.

Canada abstained on the five other core resolutions. These included: criticism of Israel for its governing of the Gaza Strip; condemnation of Israel for "the massive, deliberate destruction of Kuneitra" on the Golan Heights; an omnibus condemnation of Israeli practices in the occupied territories – from the annexation of land to the establishment of settlements, transfer of population, destruction of property, ill-treatment and torture of persons, pillaging of archaeological sites and interference with religious freedoms; another omnibus text concerning Israel's "illegal" exploitation of the national resources of the occupied territories; and a declaration of concern for the "living conditions of the Palestinian people".

There were six "miscellaneous" resolutions. Canada voted for two concerning the United Nations program against racism. Three were opposed by Canada: a condemnation of Israeli ties with South Africa; one that strongly condemned Israel, along with the United States, Britain, France, West Germany, Japan and Italy, for collabo-

*Criticism
of Assembly
for too many
resolutions
on Middle East*

rating with South Africa; and another that, *inter alia*, linked Israel with the "racist minority regimes in Southern Africa". Canada abstained on a general resolution concerning self-determination that, among other things, strongly condemned those responsible for denying the Palestinian people their "inalienable national rights".

On the whole, Canada's 1977 Middle East policy at the UN was largely consistent with the pattern established in recent years. Canada's basic policy is rooted in Security Council Resolution 242 of 1967, whose essential elements call for peace, Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in 1967 to secure and recognized borders, and a solution to the refugee problem. Since 1974, Canada's policy on the Palestinian refugees has evolved to an endorsement of a solution entailing their "political self-expression" – consistent with the principle of self-determination – upon a "territorial foundation". (No Canadian official, however, has ever indicated that 242's reference to the "refugee problem" meant, as the drafters intended in 1967, to encompass Jewish as well as Arab refugees.) Voting positions taken by Canada over the years have tended to flow from Canada's appreciation of this resolution. It is quite common, therefore, to hear Canadian diplomats explaining votes on Middle East resolutions in the light of a resolution's compatability, or inconsistency, with 242.

Keeping company

Canada's voting record in 1977 was most similar to the common performance of the nine European Community states. In fact, since 1973 Canada has tended to give substantial weight to the positions taken by the European Community when deciding how to vote on Middle East questions. The purpose of this policy appears to be the maximization of voting "company", or the avoidance of positions that leave Canada in conspicuous minorities along with Israel and the United States. This policy has at times entailed the apparent compromise of Canadian support for Resolution 242 and other policy principles.

The existence of a policy giving consideration to "company", which has never been officially confirmed, does not come as a surprise. Almost all members of the United Nations General Assembly are also members of political and/or regional sub-groups that attempt to employ bloc-voting strength whenever possible. Canada, for example, is a member of the "West European and Other" group, which includes 20 states. Other such blocs at the UN include the developing nations' "Group of 77" (with over 100 members) and the Arab bloc, which is not a

formally-recognized group at the UN but has at its base the 21 members of the Arab League. Israel, on the other hand, is one of the few "pariahs" at the UN that are excluded from all regional groups.

A statistical analysis of Canada's voting "company" on Middle East resolutions over the past 11 years has yielded a number of revealing facts. During the years 1967 to 1972, Canada's votes on Middle East issues coincided with U.S. positions 81 per cent of the time and with the European Community 44 per cent of the time. Since 1973, however, Canada's votes have matched American positions 38 per cent of the time and European Community positions 89 per cent of the time. The dramatic switch in the company Canada has kept has been matched by a clearly-discernible erosion of Canadian support for Israeli positions, as represented by "average votes" between the two periods. In the earlier period, Canada's "average vote" was between a no and an abstention on 16 anti-Israel resolutions; since 1973, on 46 resolutions Canada's "average vote" has moved much closer to an abstention. In contrast, both the Europeans and the Americans have moved in the opposite direction since the Assembly of 1973, manifesting relatively greater support for Israel, as represented by their "average votes", than in the 1967-72 period.

The findings of a parallel examination of Canada's voting record are consistent with this broad statistical perspective. An analysis of Canada's "explanations of vote", which attend almost every vote taken by Canada in international forums, indicates that 1973 represented a turning-point in Canadian policy on the Middle East. In comparison with the former era, Canada's support for Resolution 242 has been less firm and the consistency with which Canada applied official policy principles has been less manifest during the latter era. For example, Canada often opposed resolutions in the earlier period because they did not endorse the balance of principles embodied in Resolution 242; since 1973, Canada has supported a number of resolutions greatly at variance with Resolution 242. (In fact, since 1973 the Assembly has not reaffirmed Resolution 242 even once!)

These concomitant movements towards neutral and European Community positions on Middle East votes were again seen in 1977. Canada and the Europeans voted similarly on 14 of the 16 resolutions discussed above; Canada and the United States, on the other hand, agreed on nine of the 16. Canada's record of votes was four yes, six no and six abstentions. The common European Community record was five yes, five no and six abstentions. The United

*Canadian
turning-point
on Middle East*

States voted yes on one occasion, no 12 times and abstained on three resolutions. While Canadian votes were more pro-Israeli than the Europeans on two of the 16, the United States registered a more pro-Israeli position than Canada on seven of the 16 votes.

Policy change

While Canada's position last fall was consistent with recent practice on the core Middle East issues, there was a major change of policy regarding the UN's racism program. The original "Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination", which the UN launched in 1973, received overwhelming support from the world community. In 1975, however, the General Assembly passed a resolution "de-

termining that Zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination". While the vocal concern expressed in many democratic states following that vote has largely abated, the resolution has remained on the books and continues to define racism within the context of the United Nations lexicon.

As a consequence of the "Zionism is racism" resolution, Canada opposed in 1975 two accompanying resolutions of the UN racism program because they were "tainted". Ambassador Saul Rae, speaking before the Assembly on November 10, 1975, expressed Canada's policy: "as long as this 'Zionism' resolution stands, we are unable to support any of the three resolutions". Under Standing Order 43, the House of Commons on November 12 unanimously condemned



Canada's Ambassador to the United Nations, William Barton, is shown here during a recent debate in the UN's Economic and Social Council chamber. For the past 18 months, Mr Barton has been Canada's representative on the Security Council.

the United Nations for the Zionism vote. At the following General Assembly, Mr Jamieson also warned that, if the link between Zionism and racism was maintained, "my Government will not participate in the Conference to be held in 1978 on racial discrimination". And, in a similar vein, Mr Jamieson told the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defense on March 3, 1977: "Where there is the slightest association, or where there can be an interpretation placed, that puts the Zionism issue into any other question involved, my instructions to the (UN) delegation will be to vote against it". Mr Jamieson did not, however, refer to this issue during his latest address to the General Assembly.

Yet the apparent meaning of Canada's policy on the Zionism issue seems now to be lost. The two resolutions on racism passed in 1977 found Canadian support notwithstanding the fact that they remained in all essential respects identical to the racism resolutions Canada opposed in 1975. In explanation of last year's affirmative votes, Canada's delegate could only advance unconvincing rationales: "We are conscious of the concerted efforts that have been made to restore the Decade and the Conference to their original purposes. . . for this reason, we supported the racism resolutions". In addition, the basis of Canada's new support for the racism program was said to be Canada's "interpretation of the term 'racism', as defined in Article One of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racism and Racial Discrimination. . . . This definition will continue to be understood as the basis of Canada's support of the Decade and will be one of the elements that will eventually determine the decision of the Canadian Government with respect to participation in the World Conference Against Racism to be held in 1978."

Concrete modification

Fine rhetoric, however, cannot obscure the concrete modification of Canadian policy regarding United Nations racism activities in a manner paralleling the European Community policy: Canada's opposition to "tainted" racism votes in 1975 changed in 1976 to one negative vote and one abstention – as did the European Community – and in 1977 to two positive votes – again as did the European Community. Moreover, Canada's new official policy formulation rings particularly hollow when contrasted with the fact that there has been absolutely no success since 1975 in removing the Zion-

ism issue from the UN racism program. At the same time, the passage of numerous resolutions each year indirectly associating Israel with racism and the racist regimes of Southern Africa leave little to the imagination regarding the UN's treatment of this issue. (It might also be noted in this regard that it was only the American delegation to the UN that attempted during 1977 to find some way around the Zionism issue. Canada, along with the West European states, wrote off the American initiative as unrealistic. And, as it happened, the American effort was a total failure. Meanwhile, the Americans continue to protest the link between UN racism activities and Zionism by absenting themselves from votes and declaring that they would not participate in the 1978 Conference on Racism.)

Notwithstanding this volte-face on the racism issue, Canada's performance at the 1977 Assembly remained essentially unchanged from the pattern initiated in 1973. In terms of official policy, Security Council Resolution 242 continued to form the centre-piece of Canada's perspective on Middle East peace and UN resolutions. Ottawa's voting behaviour also demonstrated a similar consistency with respect to the "company" principle.

Support for Israel

For over a decade, Canada's voting record on Middle East issues has been second only to that of the United States in demonstrating support for Israel. Yet many Canadian backers of Israel now find the continuing, though gradual, shift of the Government's voting policy since 1973 disconcerting. Ottawa's "second-best" record before the Yom Kippur War and the oil embargo was excellent, just marginally less supporting than that of the Americans; since the 1973 war, however, Canada's "second-best" status has, in fact, been just marginally better than the European position. Moreover, the recent drift towards "evenhandedness" stands in sharp contrast to the relative increase of American and European support extended to Israel over the last five years, when Middle East resolutions have become all the more extreme. When each and every Middle East resolution passed by the General Assembly continues to be "one-sided" – to use Mr Jamieson's phrase –, many observers have difficulty comprehending the wisdom and "balance" of Canada's new policy for the Middle East at the General Assembly.

American initiative written off as unrealistic

Will energy resources spark economic recovery in Britain?

By Victor Keegan

The scene is December 1976: The balance of payments is showing an annual deficit of about \$2.4 billion. Prices are rising at over 17 per cent a year and the pound sterling has slumped on the foreign-exchange markets to less than 1.7 against the dollar. To avoid the run on sterling getting out of control, the British Government has gone abjectly to the International Monetary Fund and negotiated a large loan that carries stiff conditions with it. In particular, the British Government undertakes to keep its borrowing ("the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement") within a ceiling of £8.7 billion, compared to nearly £12 billion last year.

A year later, in December 1977, the balance-of-payments deficit had been turned into a small surplus, the pound had soared to 1.95 against the dollar and inflation was down to 12 per cent a year, with every sign of dropping into single figures. People were beginning to mutter the words "economic miracle".

And so it was – at least in a strictly financial sense. The rise in the money supply was contained within a range of 9 to 13 per cent agreed on at the time of the IMF loan, wage increases had come down from nearly 30 per cent a year to under 10 per cent and government borrowing by the end of 1977 was much lower even than the targets – considered onerous at the time – laid down by the IMF.

Many pundits – particularly abroad – attributed the vast improvement in Britain's financial environment entirely to the imposition of the IMF's restrictive regime. This was not entirely fair. The two main pillars of recovery – reduced inflation and the turn-around in the balance of payments – had little to do with the IMF.

The improvement in the balance of payments was due largely to the fact that increasing quantities of oil were pouring into the country from Britain's important

discoveries in the North Sea. By the end of 1977, over half the country's oil requirements were being met from this source, thereby reducing imports of oil.

At the same time, the reduction in inflation was brought about by the tight control of the money supply (which really antedated the IMF intervention) and the startling success of the Government's incomes policy.

During the first 15 months of the present Labour Government, following its success at the polls early in 1974, there was a period of runaway wage inflation, which culminated in average increases of about 30 per cent. As a result, the Government negotiated a tough incomes policy with the unions, limiting increases to £1 a week plus 4 per cent. This nearly halved the rate of wage increases and a further year of restraint halved it again, to about 9 per cent.

Economists still argue whether the sharp deceleration of earnings was the result of a tight rein on the supply of money in the economy (the view of the financial experts) or whether it was entirely due to the unions' act of self-restraint. The truth may lie somewhere in between, in that union acquiescence in wage restraint made it politically possible to control the money supply.

Whatever the reason, the consequence of the sharp decline in wage increases was a steady reduction in price increases, from over 25 per cent a year in 1975 to 12 per cent in December last year.

Although, with the benefit of hindsight, we now know that there was an underlying improvement in the financial environment of Britain even before the IMF team arrived to assess our prospects, this was not so evident at the time, especially to foreigners. Overseas bankers were falling over themselves to sell sterling during most of 1976, partly owing to a misreading of the financial situation.

Under these circumstances, the main significance of the IMF package in December was immediately to restore confidence on the foreign-exchange markets. The

*Deficit
in balance
of payments
reversed*

Mr Keegan is Business Editor of The Guardian and a resident of London. The views expressed here are those of the author.

pound rose sharply because foreign bankers were convinced that the profligate spending policies of the British Government had at last been checked by the IMF. It is true that the British Government made a token obeisance to the Fund by cutting public spending and promising to keep public-sector borrowing within an accepted limit. But this was akin to wearing a hair shirt over a strait-jacket.

By the end of 1977, the Government had *undershot* the onerous IMF ceiling on its borrowing requirement by a considerable amount. This achievement was already arousing accusations of "overkill" from commentators – not against the IMF but against the Government, on the ground that the main constraint on the economy was not the IMF's borrowing limit but the money-supply ceiling of 13 per cent that had been self-imposed by the Government. Many critics felt that the Government's self-denying ordinance was beginning to hamper the growth of the economy.

It is not difficult to see why. For all the undoubted improvement in the financial environment, there was precious little evidence that any of it had seeped into the "real economy". In December of last year, unemployment was still at a record 1.5 million and output from the country's factories was showing no sign of emerging from two years of recession. The official index measuring industrial production stood at a lower level than during the early months of 1974, when a strike by the miners had put the whole country on a three-day week.

Such evidence of continued recession cast a gloomy shadow over the second anniversary of the Government's much-vaunted "Industrial Strategy" which had been launched in November 1975 with the aim of expanding the base of manufacturing industry in Britain even at the expense of other social policies normally given priority in Labour Party thinking. The Strategy was intended to boost exports and increase manufacturing investment in order to bring about a sustained expansion of the economy without triggering the sort of consumer boom that had so often before ended in a balance-of-payments crisis. As part of the exercise, some 40 working parties have been set up, representing industrial sectors covering most of the country's exporting capacity. These have all produced reports suggesting action that could be taken to improve their share of world markets. In a number of cases, the Government has invested public money to implement the recommendations, which include reorganization proposals for industries, like machine-tool factories and ferrous foundries, where bottlenecks in production have

in the past occurred during upswings of the business cycle.

The Industrial Strategy was designed to reverse Britain's industrial decline relative to other countries. It is important to stress the word "relative", because, if no other countries existed, Britain might have been quite content with its recent performance. This is so because, since the end of the Second World War, the British economy has grown – admittedly by fits and starts – over 3 per cent a year on the average, and the gross national product is some 60 percent higher than it was 25 years ago. Britain still exports a higher percentage of its national product than almost any other industrialized country. In fact, Britain has expanded in the 30 years since the war at a faster rate than in the 30 prewar years – a period some people look back on, mistakenly, as a halcyon period.

The problem has been, quite simply, that, since the war, other closely-competing countries like Germany, the United States, France and Japan have grown faster than Britain and now have a significantly higher standard of living.

Many reasons have been put forward for the "British Disease", including too many strikes, over-taxation and lack of investment. In fact, international statistics show that Britain is seated about the middle of the strikes-league table. It has more working days lost per 1,000 employees than France, Japan and Germany, but fewer than the United States, Italy and Canada. A recent Government survey showed that 98 per cent of the plants in Britain were completely free of strikes. However, there is some truth in the retort that industrial disputes in Britain are smaller but more disruptive than in America, where they are disproportionately associated with the ending of long-term wage agreements against which production-schedules can be adapted. In Britain, it is probably true that more strikes are of a wildcat nature and are disproportionately concentrated in a few large industries like motor-manufacturing, which are major exporters.

Similar international comparisons show that Britain is not abnormally taxed despite a widespread feeling to the contrary. Taxes and social-security payments as a percentage of gross national product are lower in Britain than in Germany and France, though higher than in the United States and Canada. What is different in Britain is that there are higher direct taxes (income taxes) and lower indirect taxes (like value-added tax). Also, the top marginal rate of tax on high earned income (83 per cent) is one of the highest in the world and is considered by some to be a disincentive.

*Competitors
have enjoyed
faster growth
than Britain*



British Prime Minister James Callaghan is shown with Mrs. Callaghan on his way to Buckingham Palace to be appointed Prime Minister in May 1976. Faced with the task of leading his country through troubled economic times, he has found his job made easier by the fact that the first oil from the North Sea began to flow in June 1975.

Investment as a percentage of national income is lower in Britain than in many other countries, but it is probably a symptom rather than a cause of low economic growth because, in the short run, there is so much spare capacity in the economy that higher growth could be achieved simply by making better use of existing resources, at least for a few years.

Part of Britain's problem almost certainly arises from the fact that, though a small country (55 million inhabitants), it continues to maintain a capability right across the industrial spectrum – especially in advanced technology – at a time when its successful competitors, like Japan, have lined-in on a comparatively small number of known “growth areas” and then thrown substantial resources into them. Thus, in 1978, Britain is still a technological conglomerate trying to maintain a capability in aircraft, aero-engines, computers, nuclear development (with at least three different systems), defence and numerous other projects, including the *Concorde*. No other country of comparable size, with the possible exception of France, attempts to compete simultaneously in so many fields. And France has the advantage of being self-sufficient in food whereas Britain has to import half its requirements.

The Government is hoping that a combination of its Industrial Strategy and its plans for improving labour relations through encouraging companies to experiment with industrial democracy will provide a background in which the bonanza revenues from North Sea oil (which will soon reach £5 billion a year) can jack the economy up onto a permanently-higher growth-path.

But will it happen? The evidence of the last 12 months is not encouraging. Despite repeated Government forecasts that the economy was at last beginning to recover, nothing has so far happened. At the time of the talks with the International Monetary Fund in December 1976, the Government predicted economic growth of 2 to 3 per cent based on a 9 percent rise in export volume. In the event, though exports were surprisingly buoyant (enabling Britain to achieve the rare distinction of increasing its share of world trade), they fell short of expectations and the economy remained flat throughout 1977. However, the financial indicators exceeded all expectations. The money supply was kept very tight; the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement (i.e., the difference between income from taxes and government spending) much lower than expected. The balance of

*Wide-ranging
technological
capability
causes problems*

payments showed a small surplus instead of the deficit of £1.5 billion forecast to the IMF at the end of 1977. If financial orthodoxy were an acceptable substitute for factory output, the country would have been on the road to recovery.

For 1978, the Government is predicting that the economy will grow at 3.5 per cent, fuelled by a 14 percent rise in manufacturing investment, a 3.5 percent rise in output and a 6 percent rise in exports. It is hoped that a revival this year will be merely the beginning of a sustained period of expansion, made possible by North Sea oil, which will propel Britain up the international-league table of economic growth.

Most commentators agree that there is likely to be substantial revival of investment this year and that the Government's target of bringing inflation down to single figures will be achieved. The annual rate of price rises (12 per cent at the end of 1977) is almost certain to come down further because of the success of the previous year's incomes policy (bringing wage rises down to under 9 per cent) and as a result of the strength of the pound, which is reducing the "imported" content of inflation.

The unanswered questions are whether output will rise – and whether any rise will be sustained. In theory it should, because it is expected that there will be a rise of at least 3 per cent in consumer spending. The Government cut taxes in 1977 and is planning further cuts of £2 billion in the forthcoming April budget. This will create more spending power at a time when price rises are expected to drop below the level of wage-increases under the more permissive Stage Three of the Government's policy for incomes, thereby putting more money in people's pockets.

Thus, unless there is an unexpected decision by people in Britain to save this extra money, the scene is set for a small consumer boom, which ought to create a fresh demand for goods that would start Britain's factories rolling again. But that presumes that the extra cash will not be spent on imports, which brings us to the economists' worst fear – that North Sea oil, instead of being an unqualified benefit, will actually reduce the country's manufacturing-base still further.

The argument runs something like this: Because of North Sea oil, the Government is able to cut taxes in order to stimulate consumer demand. But North Sea oil has already helped to restore foreign confidence in Britain to such a degree that the pound has been riding high on the foreign-exchange markets. This is very good for the balance of payments in the short term, as is proved by the fact that Britain's reserves of

gold and foreign currencies have more than doubled, to \$20 billion, making them comparable with the reserves held by Japan.

But the other consequence of a strong exchange-rate is that after a while it makes exports dearer and imports cheaper. Thus there is a growing fear – already expressed by some of Britain's biggest companies – that exports will become more difficult to promote at a time when cheaper imports are capturing a bigger proportion of domestic sales. The result could be a decline in domestic employment as imports soar. Under such circumstances, it would not take much to cause the emerging strength of the balance of payments to evaporate.

The argument in refutation is that in recent years both Japan and Germany have proved that an appreciating currency is no bar to improving the general performance of the economy. That is true but, it is pointed out, the currencies of these countries were strong because of industrial efficiency, whereas Britain's is strong mainly because it is riding on the crest of an oil-discovery that will make it completely self-sufficient by 1980.

The strength of Britain's currency would not matter so much if world trade were expanding at a fast pace. But the growth of world trade is now below earlier expectations, which means that Britain is competing for a smaller-than-expected world market with a currency that may make some of its products less attractive.

That, of course, is the gloomy picture. The truth is that no one knows quite what is going to happen, if only because the discovery of North Sea oil is so unprecedented.

Most people in Britain believe that oil will give Britain a head-start on the rest of the world and that it could provide the platform for a period of economic growth considerably higher than would otherwise have been the case. Britain already has very large reserves of coal and natural gas (in addition to a large nuclear-power program) and so, by 1980, will be one of the very few industrialized countries to be totally self-sufficient in energy. At the very least, this ought to remove one of the historical obstacles to previous growth-plans – the inevitable arrival of a balance-of-payments crisis after a period of expansion. The Government – surprisingly for a Labour administration – is also keeping a tight control on monetary policy and is retaining as a central plank of its policy the control of inflation. Britain still has numerous industrial problems to solve, but the arrival of North Sea oil at least provides a gilt-edged background in which to solve them. The "British Disease" may yet turn out to be curable.

*Emerging strength
of balance
of payments
could evaporate*

Brazil's pursuit of greatness affects relations with Canada

By Jim Guy

Brazil is a land of the future. In its quest for greatness it has evolved a nation of integrated races that seems the future image of mankind. What immediately strikes the observer of this multiracial society is the way Brazilians give complete social recognition to the most fundamental biological fact of human existence: that there is only one human species, to which all races belong. Indeed, its generally relaxed attitudes on race distinguish Brazilian society from the many caste-like social rigidities and hostilities that often characterize the North American and European societies.

Since the early Sixties, a sense of unity has pervaded the country as a new form of nationalism, possessing both political and economic dimensions. Brazil now looks beyond the Western hemisphere in pursuit of one foreign-policy objective: national prominence as a world power. Certainly the echo of Brazil's vaunted "economic miracle" is now being heard at the global level as well as in the hemisphere.

Unlike many of its less-fortunate neighbours, Brazil is not condemned to remain an exporter of primary products or to cling to import-substituting industrialization as the sole paths to modernization. In fact, Brazil's economic growth has been so remarkable that it now extends aid to poorer Latin American states. And accompanying the aid goes the undisputed message that Brazil has acquired a new self-respect and international status.

Brazil dwarfs its regional neighbours in size, population and gross national product. It is the largest country in Latin America, equal in size and population to the rest of the South American continent. It has

approximately 50 times the population of Panama and Costa Rica combined and its gross national product is about 60 times that of Paraguay. Furthermore, its potential as the ascendant power in the region, with its politically-articulated "manifest destiny", makes Brazil a priority item on the foreign-policy agenda of every hemispheric state – and Canada is no exception.

Attraction

Canada's attraction to Brazil has been based on status, similar patterns of economic development and the economic potential of that country. For the Trudeau Government, Brazil's status is not only "ascribed" on the basis of its size and population but also "achieved" in relation to economic growth and political presence. Since the 1964 *coup*, which clearly marked the entrenchment of "praetorian" rule, leaders of the regime have advanced their ambitions to make Brazil a world power, pursuing an active, visible foreign policy not only in Latin America but in Africa and Western Europe as well. Canada has given formal recognition to the tangible elements of Brazil's power – its population (which passed the 100-million mark in 1972), its territory (fifth-largest in the world, at 8,511,965 square kilometres), its agricultural resources (world's leading producer of coffee and sugar cane) and its industrial capacity (Brazil accounts for 30 per cent of Latin America's total manufacturing output). During a ministerial mission to Brazil in January 1977, External Affairs Minister Don Jamieson made specific reference to Brazil's status in a speech in Sao Paulo:

You should know that we attach a high priority to our relations with Brazil. In fact, there is no country in Latin America that is more important to us than you... you, with your gigantic size and your population of 110 million, are surely destined to become one of the major powers of the world.

Brazil's increasing status will continue to arouse Canadian interest in the political and economic future of that country. If the

*Sense of unity
has pervaded
as new form
of nationalism*

Dr Jim Guy, a native of Montreal, is currently an associate professor of political science at the College of Cape Breton, Sydney Campus. His interests include Canada's foreign policy and Latin American government and politics. He has travelled extensively in Latin America and published numerous articles on Canadian/Latin American relations. The views expressed here are those of Dr Guy.

Trudeau Government's foreign-policy "Third Option" continues to have any validity at all in the determination of Canada's trade and alliance behaviour, a partnership between Canada and Brazil could be seen as a winning coalition to balance the economic power of the United States in the Western hemisphere.

As federal systems of government, Canada and Brazil have common goals. They must concern themselves with regional economic disparities covering vast territories that must be developed if modernization and urbanization are to take place evenly and equitably. In his book *Gringos From the Far North*, Professor Ogelsby describes Canada's Northwest Territories and Brazil's Mato Grosso and Amazon basin as empty hinterlands waiting to be developed. The common interests of the two countries are illustrated by Brazil's huge development ambitions in the Amazon region and Canada's gigantic goals in the Arctic, which will require similar orientations of national interest.

Brazil and Canada share common agricultural problems. Though there are many geographical and crop dissimilarities between the two countries, both must aim at efficiency in farm-management, transportation, livestock-raising and plant-breeding. Over 25 per cent of their gross national products and their employment of labour is generated for both countries by the exporting of food and agricultural products.

Potential recognized

The economic potential of Brazil was recognized early in Canada's history and has continued to attract government and non-government interest in investment. Canada's corporate presence in Brazil dates from the last century. Today companies such as Brascan Ltd, Alcan Aluminum Ltd, Massey-Ferguson, and John Labatt Ltd are just a few of the many corporations involved in the Brazilian economy. The Canada-Brazil Joint Committee was formed in June 1976 to foster the development of joint ventures, trade and investment opportunities. The federally-incorporated Brazil-Canada Chamber of Commerce disseminates information about both countries in Canada. Brazil's generally favourable economic outlook provides Canadian exporters with considerable reason for long-term optimism regarding the sale of agricultural and industrial machinery, as well as the provision of technical and consulting services.

The dramatic expansion of Canada's relations with Brazil over the past eight years has been due chiefly to Brazil's strong and steady economic growth. By 1975, Brazil's gross national product occupied tenth

place in the world, at \$93.103 billion, just below that of ninth-place Canada, with \$136.57 billion. The Brazilian Government's Second National Development Plan aims at a GNP of \$125 billion by 1979. This is a credible projection in the light of Brazil's increase in real growth, which averaged 9.2 per cent between 1969 and 1976. This remarkable rate of growth must be balanced against the severe blow dealt the international economy in 1974 by the Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries when it raised the price of oil. But in fact the economic policies of the military regime have contributed immensely towards sustaining an incremental growth-level. This, coupled with the fact that Brazilians have accepted the need to devalue their currency, has encouraged a more optimistic view of the economy. And the Government has adopted the practice of frequent small devaluations, thus rendering it unprofitable to speculate against the *cruziero*.

In 1976, Canada exported \$324.4 million, just over 20 per cent of its total sales, to Latin America. Canada accounts for a relatively small share of Brazil's imports — just over 2 per cent of the market compared to 28 per cent for the United States, 14 per cent for West Germany and 10 per cent for Japan. What is noteworthy about Canadian sales to Brazil is the upward trend pattern, which increased over 600 per cent in just eight years. Over 70 per cent of Canadian exports to Brazil are agricultural and fabricated commodities. In 1976, the major commodity exports were wheat (\$164.7 million), newsprint (\$23.9 million), aircraft engines (\$12 million), potash (\$11.8 million), aluminum (\$10.7 million) and electrical equipment (\$10.5 million).

Canada imported Brazilian products worth \$162.5 million, consisting mainly of motor-vehicle engines (\$37.7 million), coffee (\$28.9 million) and cocoa and chocolate (\$9.3 million). The Canadian Government has consistently recorded a trade surplus with Brazil. Since 1969 this balance has averaged \$75.5 million.

The latest statistics on Canada's direct foreign investment abroad show Brazil with a total of \$1,074 billion in 1975, second only to the United States as a recipient of net capital outflows. This represented nearly 90 per cent of the \$1,234 billion invested by Canada in South and Central America, which made Canada the fourth-largest international investor in Brazil. Investment priorities are currently shifting to the agricultural sector and to the desire to reduce the country's need for imported oil. The Cerrado of Brazil offers a vast potential for investment in food production. And Petróbras, the government oil corporation, has

*Acceptance
of devaluation
has encouraged
optimistic view
of economy*

accelerated the signing of risk contracts for exploration with foreign oil companies.

Brazil presents to the potential Canadian investor and entrepreneur a combination of a huge, dynamic domestic market, ready access to technical and managerial expertise, a boundless supply of productive labour and a wealth of natural resources. It is not an exaggeration to claim that the Brazilian economy is normally one of boom conditions, regardless of the economic situation in the rest of the world or of the political situation in Brazil itself. The old Brazilian saying that "the country grows at night, while the politicians are sleeping" still applies.

Human rights

Political development has not accompanied Brazil's economic miracle. Since 1964, successive military leaders have tended to view modernization as a purely economic goal rather than a political one. As a result, the Brazilian army has suspended many constitutional rights. The power of the labour unions has been broken and a substantial number of union leaders and "political undesirables" have been deprived of their political rights judged by any standards of government – authoritarian, totalitarian or other. This is not to mention the many atrocities committed by the military regime against Brazil's native Indians.

In the United States, the Carter Administration has openly criticized Brazil's dictatorial methods and its violation of basic human rights. President Carter seems to have made the issue of human rights a key factor in his Administration's approach to the distribution of military aid. Already U.S. military assistance in a variety of forms to Argentina, Chile and Uruguay has been reduced. It is significant that the U.S. has made its position clear to the Brazilian Government notwithstanding the important volume of trade that exists between the two countries.

The Trudeau Government has remained silent on this question despite flagrant violations of human rights in Brazil. To date, Canada has tended to be inconsistently responsive on the issue of human rights on the international scene. In December 1977, it took economic measures against South Africa over *apartheid* and before that was instrumental in persuading members of the Commonwealth to expel South Africa. Yet Canada has not reacted effectively to instances of the suppression of human rights in Brazil and other countries of Latin America. Of course it is difficult for any government to establish clear directives as to those nations that qualify for trade sanctions or diplomatic pressure and those that

do not. But Canada has built much of its external reputation on the recognition of human rights, and in this case the Trudeau Government would be in agreement with the Carter Administration on a human-rights policy in the Western hemisphere.

The Canadian Government should break its silence and express its concern to the Brazilian authorities on behalf of those who have been unjustly treated by the military regime. As a permanent observer to the Organization of American States, Canada should seek to participate in the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, which undertakes to investigate violations in the hemisphere. This step would intensify international pressure and add considerable legitimacy to Canada's growing position in the inter-American system.

It seems probable that, in the years ahead, Canada's economic associations with all of Latin America will increase. This probability, coupled with what now appears to be a shift in Canadian foreign policy towards greater hemispheric assimilation, may be expected to result in a more articulate political role for Canada in relation to the Latin countries of the region. Canada's new commitments to the national development goals of these countries through its contributions to the Inter-American Development Bank and its bilateral project-assistance programs all serve to stimulate a more enduring foreign-policy adaptation in the hemisphere. In the light of such adaptation, the conduct of "Giant Brazil" should not go unnoticed by Canada's decision-makers. Given the experience and confidence Canada has acquired in its dealings with Europe and the Commonwealth, it should no longer refrain from asserting its national values in its dealings with Brazil.

New influence

Brazil is now regarded as an important new influence in the current balance-of-power system and must be included in the international equation of power along with the United States, the Soviet Union, China, Japan and Western Europe. There is no question that Canada has accepted this change in Brazil's status. The extension of Canada's relations with Brazil is also associated with the growing recognition by the Department of External Affairs that Canada will in future be inextricably linked in a partnership with the nations comprising the inter-American system. Thus the factors that are bringing Canada into closer association with Brazil will inevitably serve to increase the intensity of its total relations with all of the nations of Latin America.

What should be learnt from Brazil is that, despite its rapid socio-economic

*Violations
of human rights
criticized
by United States*

progress, it continues realistically to classify itself as a "developing" rather than "developed" nation. And whether one likes to admit it or not, so is Canada. In many ways, Canada is truly an "affluent under-developed nation". As John Harbron points out in his new book *Canada Without Quebec*:

If Canada is going to define long-range plans to serve her domestic needs, she will have an excellent model in Brazil – another huge western nation which, like Canada, is searching for new directions, although admittedly under the unsavory rule of its army and conservative technocrats. The recent spectacular growth of Brazil as an export nation demonstrates

the effectiveness of a strong economic strategy.

Canada-Brazil relations demonstrate a growing awareness on the part of Canadian makers of foreign policy that the Latin nations situated in the Western hemisphere share a common concern with development and can co-operate with Canada in resolving mutual political and economic problems. In future, Canada's external policies will have to reflect a more realistic appraisal of its ability to accomplish specific national objectives. But the main conclusion to be drawn here is that Canada's promotional ties with Brazil are a step in the right direction.

Public influence on policy

Does Don Jamieson read all those letters you write?

By Donald Page

We cannot expect to build a structure of co-operation that will prove solid unless it involves our people and unless they identify their interests with it.

We also accept the right, in Canada as elsewhere, of individual citizens to concern themselves with these matters and to enter into a dialogue with their governments where precept and practice appear to diverge.

For anyone reading these statements in the opening Canadian speech of October 6, 1977, to the Belgrade follow-up meeting to the Helsinki Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, there is no question that the public is expected to play a role in the making and implementation of foreign policy. The old distinction between domestic and international concerns are becoming blurred and human rights are now considered part of the legitimate diplomatic baggage, not because states want to interfere in the affairs of other states but because people everywhere are finding it more difficult, if not impossible, to be indifferent to the denial of human rights.

Although the publicity given to human rights has accentuated this transnational concern with the problems of others, the growing public awareness goes beyond the

purely human ones to embrace most multi-lateral issues. Acquisition of seal-pelts on the ice-flows, manganese nodules on the deep sea-bed and foreign-satellite debris have illustrated the point that almost every domestic issue has an international projection and, equally important, almost every international happening affects in some way the management of domestic concerns. Since Canadian foreign policy has become increasingly "the extension abroad of na-

Dr. Page is deputy director of Historical Division in the Department of External Affairs. Before joining the Department he taught history at the University of Saskatchewan and edited Volume 12 in the Documents on Canadian External Relations series. The views expressed here are those of Dr. Page.

tional policies", the opportunities for interested members of the public to become involved in the policymaking process have also proliferated, but without doing much to dispel the pervasive cynicism of the watchful public as to whether their views are really wanted in Ottawa or have any effect. Were the nine paragraphs devoted to the importance of public opinion in the seven-page Belgrade speech of 29 paragraphs mere window-dressing for the audiences back home or did they represent what Canadians were demanding from the international market-place of give-and-take diplomacy?

Traditional ingredients

The CSCE case is an interesting one because it encompasses all the traditional ingredients for arousing public interest. Well-organized Eastern European ethnic groups have a compelling personal interest in family-reunification, and in conditions, especially those affecting travel, in their former homelands. Moreover, prominent and outspoken Soviet dissidents have encouraged a variety of humanitarian, civil-liberties and religious groups to make representations to the Canadian Government. The result has been an unusually sustained public interest in the issues. Between the opening of the preparatory meeting of the CSCE in June 1977 and the presentation of the Canadian speech, the Department of External Affairs clipped 36 articles and editorials from 13 Canadian dailies and received 3,340 letters, either directly or through third parties, about human-rights issues in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Though some clearly were inspired by the local activities of Amnesty International and of church and ethnic groups, the representations arrived from all parts of Canada and, in general, insisted that the Government take a firm stand on human rights and humanitarian questions at Belgrade. It was clear from these letters and articles, and from meetings with a few academics and interest groups, that Canada would be wise to warn the delegates at Belgrade that "the factor of credibility could be crucial to public support for *détente* in Canada". In this case, however, as so often in multilateral negotiations in which Canada has little leverage, the credibility factor is ultimately beyond its grasp. But failure to achieve was not failure to present, and the next challenge for the interest groups is the development of a new set of policy recommendations and means of implementation that will meet the realities of organizational, international and other domestic constraints experienced in this round of diplomatic encounters. For, within

most amalgams of policy considerations and constraints, the public sectors can play, and sometimes have played, a useful role that deserves to be known and appreciated if a mutually-constructive dialogue is to evolve between the policy-makers and the alert public.

In direct representation, the written dialogue is the means most often used by individual members of the attentive or concerned public. In the early Seventies, the Secretary of State for External Affairs received annually just over 6,000 written representations on all matters affecting Canada's external relations. The year 1973 saw Canadians swept by a letters-to-the-editor craze that had its impact on External Affairs as well, since 10,467 written representations were received that year and a slightly higher total the year after, before descending to the present plateau of approximately 7,000 a year (actually 7,456 in 1976 and 7,056 in 1977). These totals cover only those representations that reached the Department through the Minister's Office. No effort is made to tabulate collectively the representations sent directly to civil servants. An analysis of the Minister's departmental correspondence for 1977 shows that 40 per cent were simple requests for information, most of which went directly to the Information Services Division or the operational divisions and 7 per cent dealt with consular assistance, of which the Department now handles more than half a million cases a year. The policy-oriented subjects that attracted the most attention on a monthly basis were economic support for Chile (87 – May), protest against Soviet Matzah import restrictions (84 – March) and support for a Canadian call for enquiry into Uganda (73 – March, and 111 – April).

Written representations usually take the form of personal letters, multiple-signature letters, petitions, and various forms of organized write-ins (coupons are not included in the above totals). Of these the most effective would be a personal letter that succinctly, in not more than two typed written pages, addresses itself to three issues: (a) what the problem is; (b) what should be done about it; and (c) why something should be done now or why it demand an immediate place in departmental priorities. Obviously the Minister cannot personally respond to every letter, but he does have the opportunity to see statistics on the correspondence and to read individual letters and responses. From a policymaking point of view, the most important fact is that the reply to every serious letter must be drafted by the very desk officer responsible for the daily monitoring of that policy area. This means that the officer responsible for

*Insistence
on firm stand
on human rights
at Belgrade*

making the policy recommendations in the first place must also draft answers, thereby acknowledging a letter that can be a fertile source of new ideas or new perspectives. Other forms of written representation have less impact because it is recognized that too often signatures are appended to a document out of deference to the personal friendship of the promoter rather than out of a real understanding of and concern with the issue. Moreover the "whereas – therefore" protests seldom provide the policymaker with any indication beyond generalities of what subsequent policy should be if the recommended action is followed. A nationally-based but not obviously orchestrated expression of views in personal letters can carry the weight of the concerned public, but the Department is seldom the recipient of such united expressions.

Human rights

Taken apart from other forms of representation of individual opinion, the most effective policy-directed letter-writing has been in the field of specific human-rights violations and family-reunification, perhaps because the Government has a better chance of rectifying individual abuses and aberrations in a state's normal functioning in the human-rights field than when an alteration is sought in the very basis of another society's traditions or laws. Naturally, the Canadian case will be strongest when the offence is blatant and other states add their weight to the protest. A recent case is that of Soviet dissident Anatoly Shcharansky, who, on March 15, 1977, was arrested as a result of his activities with the Moscow group monitoring the implementation of the Helsinki Final Act. From June to December 1977, the Department received 35 requests for the granting of asylum in Canada, and 57 Parliamentarians sent a protest telegram to Brezhnev. Citing these representations and the fact that Shcharansky had relatives in Canada, Canadian officials told the Soviet Union that Canada would grant him landed-immigrant status. In the meantime, the Department has continued to receive a steady flow of representations concerning Shcharansky – 45 in January and 61 in February. Not all cases are so easy to follow through on, owing to the intricacy of foreign laws and complicated family entanglements that concerned Canadians are often not aware of at the time they make requests. When success is not quickly apparent, frustrated individuals may take their case to the public in the hope of mounting a formidable protest that will persuade the Government to make a public protest. The choice between private or public diplomacy is not an easy one, and

cases in which public pressure has caused a hardening of attitudes in foreign capitals rather than a meeting of minds are not unknown, since no government wishes to be accused of bowing to the whims of a foreign public.

Letters are often received on both sides of broader policy matters, as in the case of Canadian policy on recognition of the new Chilean Government and the admission of refugees during the winter of 1973-74. In December 1977 and January 1978, the written representations supporting the new South African policy were offset by 82 in disagreement. In cases such as these, obviously, the size and balance of the written representations would suggest that the Government look elsewhere for any decisive expression of public opinion. In any year, the vast majority of letters received do not show much concentration as to subject-matter. For example, in October 1977, the mailbag included single letters on Canada's attitude on Walvis Bay, a protest against the visit of Nkomo to Canada, a request for assistance in recovering money from a Romanian bank, a proposal for a Senegalese art exhibition in Canada, a demand for release of unionists imprisoned in Ecuador and a request for an emergency food shipment to Vietnam.

Apart from Canada's Rhodesian and South African policies, the only policy areas attracting more than ten representations were the Young Leaders '77 program and Canada's abstention in a vote in the International Civil Aviation Organization over observer status for the Palestine Liberation Organization. Their impact is a variable dependent upon a curious undefined balance of the quality, quantity and status of the purveyors of opinions that changes with each issue and each set of decision-makers. Certainly, in individual human-rights cases Government action would not always follow without a show of public interest. One of the best examples of the Department's sensitivity in this area was the protest by the Canadian Government to the Zambian Government after two Canadian girls were shot and killed while swimming in the Victoria Falls region in May 1973. The widespread Canadian public reaction to this case made an official protest to President Kuanda more meaningful because it had the credibility that is usually essential in persuading foreign governments to acknowledge protests. Another successful letter-writing impact on policy occurred in 1974, when, as a result of the number of letters received following a series of *W5* television programs about mass starvation in Ethiopia, the Government decided to increase its emergency aid commitment.

More recently, the flow of letters in 1976-1977 about conditions in Chile encouraged the Canadian Government to consider authorizing 5,360 Chilean refugees to make their permanent homes in Canada, since, through normal diplomatic channels, representations against the violation of human rights in Chile were having no effect. Even in these cases, however, decisive action took place only after the Government decided that it was in Canada's interest, and within its capacity, to do so, for this is the ultimate decision-making mandate given to a responsible democratic government by the electorate.

Most written representations on broad policy areas are accompanied by representations from interest and pressure groups through the medium of meetings with the Minister and officials. The interest group is usually a legal, professionally or ideologically homogenous, entity with a variety of foreign-policy interests (such as a church, a union or a business group), while the pressure group is usually formed for a specific short-term purpose. Interest groups can usually make a formidable representation but may not carry their views if they become victims of their own fragmentation, as in the cases of the churches over the provision of assistance to Biafra and of the academics in their views on continued Canadian participation in NATO.

Brief existence

Pressure groups usually have a brief existence associated with a specific international event and can be most effective when they see their pet idea in the context of total Canadian policy and capability. For example, it was impossible to act upon pressure-group demands in the Sixties for official condemnation of the violation of human rights in South Vietnam and South Korea without also considering violations in North Vietnam and North Korea. Any protest against the violation of human rights that is to be credible at home and abroad must be universal, reflect a single standard, and not be selective according to the violator's political system or beliefs; otherwise it becomes a political rather than human-rights protest, involving a different set of evaluative criteria.

The interchange of ideas between the Department and major interest groups is almost continuous as the Minister and his officials often attend the national gatherings of such groups as speakers, panelists and observers when foreign-policy issues are on the agenda. In the past year, Departmental representatives have participated in over 100 meetings with such diverse groups as the Association of Cana-

dian Slavists, the Evangelical Fellowship of Canada, the Canadian Business and Industry International Advisory Committee, Rotary International and the Canadian Association of Young Political Leaders. In each of these dialogues, the organization has an opportunity to learn, discuss and present views on international issues of concern to Canada. When the Department does not have the opportunity to hear or read the views of certain attentive sections of the public, invitations have been extended for meetings in Ottawa. For example, ten academic experts on disarmament were recently invited to Ottawa to present their views on what Canadian policy should be at the forthcoming special disarmament conference of the United Nations.

Seminar

The receptivity of the Department to this kind of dialogue was illustrated by the Minister's attendance on March 16, 1977, at a human-rights seminar sponsored by the Canadian Council of Churches and the Canadian Council of Catholic Bishops. For several years, certain religious denominations have been suggesting to the Government that economic, as opposed to food, aid be suspended to any state violating human rights. The question is a difficult one when it comes to deciding whether the benefits of a Canadian-financed irrigation scheme go more directly to the people or the government that refuses to protect the human rights of its citizens. After discussing the constraints and opportunities for action in such cases, the Minister concluded: "I have an open mind on this subject. I am prepared to consider possible courses of action available to us if I can be convinced that such action will prove effective." If the attentive public can demonstrate, as the bureaucrats themselves must do, that a specific Canadian action will be effective and appropriate in the existing international environment, the opportunity for influencing policy implementation does, in fact, exist. In addition, there has been a host of interest groups that have participated directly in policymaking and conference diplomacy through membership in the Canadian delegations to international conferences dealing with clusters of functional and economic issues.

Some interest groups have recently developed very effective means of mobilizing widespread public support for the purpose of making their views known to the Government. One of the best known of these organizations is GATT-Fly, an inter-church initiative for an alternative trade policy. GATT-Fly has made its presence felt at recent UNCTAD conferences through its consistent support of the position taken by

the Group of 77 as expressed in the New International Economic Order and its emphasis on the progressive development of self-reliant countries that could enter the global economy on terms favourable to themselves. At the UN Food Conference in Rome, they presented a challenge to official Government policy that could not be ignored because of their capacity to mobilize effectively and quickly public support back home. Likewise, interest groups themselves claim that they have had a profound influence on *Habitat* and on the cancellation of the proposed 1975 UN Crime Conference in Toronto.

The new Canadian South African trade policy is but one example of how combined letter-writing and interest-group pressure has had an influence on the policy-makers. For some time now, the Department has found it increasingly difficult to justify before religious and pressure groups the use of Canadian tax dollars for the promotion of trade and industry with a country whose policy of *apartheid* it publicly condemns. Canadian policy in South Africa was the subject of 132 written representations in 1976 and 256 in 1977. If it had not been for these, along with press and parliamentary demands for a change in policy, it is doubtful that the issue of a policy change would have been raised by External Affairs, and even now the strength and

implementation of the proposed changes may rest in the balance, for that elusive public, and equally elusive opinion, are split between the churches and humanitarian groups, on the one hand, and, on the other, those persons who are concerned about the economic impact on Canada and those who fear Communist domination of southern Africa.

Although the recent Sadat-Begin-Dayan efforts at wooing selected American publics prove that public diplomacy is very much alive, public opinion cannot be isolated or given any pre-eminence among the decision-making factors. Neither the departmental files nor the testimony of any two policy-makers dealing with the same subject can yield much evidence for the existence of any consistent empirical relation between public opinion and the behaviour of governments. Furthermore, the variations simply defy the best efforts of the model-builders on policy-formulation. Pressures and constraints emanating from external and organizational environments have their countervailing influences, as do other domestic considerations such as inflation and jurisdiction. Yet Canadian policy-makers, by virtue of their political connections if not their democratic heritage, spend considerable time and money ascertaining what the public wants or can be educated to accept. While it may not always be easy for

*Variations
defy efforts
of model-builders*

**Examples of written policy-related representations to
External Affairs in 1977**

	JAN FEB	MARCH APRIL	MAY JUNE	JULY AUG	SEPT OCT	NOV DEC	TOTAL
Arms embargo against South Africa	70	59	12	3	1	1	134
Death of Anna Mae Aquash	38	11	1	0	0	0	50
Law of the sea and 200-mile limit	35	7	2	2	2	0	48
Canada's policy on Arab boycott	71	50	4	0	0	0	125
Maritime boundaries	2	2	6	8	0	0	18
Garrison Diversion	17	3	0	2	0	0	22
Cultural affairs	33	48	25	0	43	39	188
Objection to Canadian assistance to Cuba	0	6	0	0	0	0	6
Steve Biko	0	0	0	0	10	0	10
Urge Canada to press UN enquiry into Ugandan affairs	0	67	13	0	0	0	80
Support for Canadian call for Uganda enquiry	0	184	6	0	0	0	190

the diplomat reared in the aristocratic tradition to accept the public's intrusion into his private domain, the advent of internationally-conscious participating democrats leaves him no alternative. Never in the history of Canada have there existed so many opportunities for attentive citizens to play a part in the dialogue concerning the making and implementation of foreign policy that must remain the heart of the democratic system. The conveying of views to External Affairs is not limited to the means of direct

representation discussed here, but also involves the indirect channels provided by the various information media, by Parliament and by other domestic governments. When such opinions are recognized as legitimate, informed, clearly-defined and functionally manageable in the international arena and within the totality of Canadian Government priorities, the dialogue on policy will work best, and its results will be in every diplomatic bag.

Responsible government and foreign policy

by Denis Stairs

International politics used to be "high". It dealt mainly, that is, with politico-security issues – with alliances, peace-keeping, collective security, arms control and the related mechanics of peace and war. But increasingly, in recent times, it has come to deal with other matters as well, at once more common and more complex. The consumption of energy, the proliferation of peoples, the maldistribution of food, the depletion of resources, the pollution of environments, the misallocation of wealth – such problems now invade the agenda of world affairs with an urgency no modern statesman can afford to ignore.

The importance of these issues, moreover, is matched by their intractability. Perhaps they ought not to be further complicated by casual reflection from an ivory tower. Nonetheless, there is evidence that their rapid growth may eventually strengthen an already serious challenge to the survival of the constitutional principles and practices of "responsible government" as these have been developed in Western parliamentary systems. If so, the problem may warrant at least preliminary speculative examination. The difficulties involved are not entirely of international origin – they have domestic origins as well – but the global element is certainly an aggravating factor. It derives partly from the incapac-

ities of the policy-making process but even more from a conflict between the requirements of contemporary world affairs and the premises of the liberal democratic state.

The new international agenda – and in particular the increasing volume, complexity and interdependence of the issues from which it is derived – challenges the capacity of the policy-making process, first, by multiplying the number and variety of government departments and agencies involved in responding to individual problems and, secondly, by accentuating the technical obscurities of the factors that must be taken into account in the making of policy decisions.

Great acceleration

These are not entirely new phenomena, but in the foreign-policy field there is fairly general agreement that they have been greatly accelerated in the past 15 to 20 years. From the point of view of the public service, certainly, they have become familiar and pervasive features of modern government, and have produced an impressive array of visible manifestations. Among these are: (1) the constant complaints of public officials that they are unable to get on with their jobs because some other department is in the way; (2) the not-uncommon spectacle of different agencies of government rushing madly off in opposite directions (in Canada foreign-policy relations with South Africa are usually the textbook example); (3) the substantial increase in the number of inter-departmental committees, and the con-

Serious challenge to survival of responsible government

Professor Stairs is a member of the Department of Political Science and the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies at Dalhousie University. The views expressed here are his own.

stantly-expressed view that still more coordinating mechanisms are needed; (4) the increasing involvement (in Canada especially) of sub-national levels of government in external affairs; (5) the lamentations of professional diplomats that their roles are being usurped by bureaucratic interlopers – lamentations supported by the fact that in the past ten years virtually all the diplomatic services of the Western world, including the Canadian, have experienced major, and sometimes unflattering, investigations of their functions; and (6) the experimentation of governments with managerial devices for bringing the process under a modicum of centralized control – “country-programming” procedures, for example, as well as decision-making by reference to long-range objectives, elaborate cost-benefit budgeting techniques, and the rest. The difficulties have been accompanied by an intensification of the traditional patterns of “in-house” politics. With each new organizational adjustment, senior officials naturally fear the erosion of their fiefdoms, while officers at a lower level hastily recalculate their long-range prospects for advancement.

Forced to adapt

Academics, too, have been forced to adapt. Formerly persuaded that all serious public “policy” was the product of the rational calculations of identifiable office-holders (an assumption central to the notion of “responsible government”), political scientists have come increasingly to believe that it results instead from an inertial process. With occasional, and sometimes dramatic, exceptions, its substances derives, it is said, from long trains of compromises reached in kaleidoscopic successions of conflicting committees. The change in the very vocabulary of policy analysis is itself worthy of note. “Decision” having already given way to “output”, the latter is now replaced by “outcome”, in what amounts to a continuing progress towards the final removal of identifiable agency. Who, then, is “responsible”? No one. The answer sounds Kafkaesque – but lacks even Kafka’s comforting presumption of conspiracy.

The central question, however, for the analysis of “responsible government” is the condition of the political leadership. At this level, the dilemma is clear. If the issues are excessively numerous; if their subject-matter is technically complex; if their implications are uncertain, and apply in the long run as well as the short; if they produce unpredictable side-effects in other fields at home and abroad; and if, in dealing with them, a daunting array of conflicting governmental and constituency interests must

be brought into reconciliation – if the issues have all these characteristics, how, then, can political leaders hope to comprehend, much less control, the behaviour of the governments they ostensibly lead? And how can Parliament, and ultimately the “public”, reasonably hold them responsible for what they (figuratively) “do”?

In the foreign-policy field, the most visible consequence of this general difficulty is that public discussion of concrete issues is gradually being driven out by empty sloganeering, one of the purposes of which is to convey an impression of control at the helm, which does not, in fact, exist. Perhaps the most spectacular Canadian example in recent years was the set of pamphlets that emerged from the foreign policy review, with its three basic national aims, its six policy themes, its hexagonal depiction of “systemic” interactions, and all the rest. But evidence of the phenomenon can be found as well in the “trialectics” of the “Third Option” paper on Canada-U.S. relations, in the somewhat obscurantist fanfare over the “contractual link” with the European Economic Community, and in much of Canada’s declaratory foreign policy elsewhere.

Its traces can be found, too, in the Prime Minister’s repeated declarations in the media of the need for a fundamental change in public attitudes as a prerequisite for coping with the new global crisis. These recurrent rhetorical displays can, of course, be viewed as no more than the idle reflections of a veteran inhabitant of the ivory tower on temporary secondment to government office. But, if taken more seriously, they can only leave the well-intentioned citizen wondering what he is supposed to do next. Members of the public service presumably experience, on occasion, a similar sense of perplexity.

To be fair to the political leaders, it should be conceded at once that in raising such questions they have received little genuine help from either the “think-tank” or university communities, which appear themselves to be suffering from a form of intellectual “overload”. The problem is reflected in their attempt to cope with the awesome complexity of current global issues by discussing them in biological, ecological, or other “systemic” terms. This may have some use as a means of gaining access to the problem-solving abilities of computers, but in the political world it can produce an empty rhetoric that intervenes between genuine policy choices and needs, on the one hand, and public understanding of the issues, on the other.

As long as the object under examination is the “external-functions” hexagon

Political leadership has received little help from thinkers

of the foreign-policy review, this probably matters very little – though it is possible to argue even here that the Cabinet was convinced that it was making important decisions even when it was not. But when the result is apocalyptic social engineering of the sort initiated by the Club of Rome, or when the “conceptualizations” are converted for political purposes into over-simple slogans like the “New International Economic Order,” or “Spaceship Earth,” or the “Global Village,” the effects may be much graver. Obviously such flourishes can have a constructive long-term effect in “sensitizing” attentive publics to important issues, and by altering the climate within which problems are subjected to debate. But to the extent that they also serve as substitutes for a genuine understanding of cause-and-effect relations, they serve to disguise the consequences of substantive (as opposed to declaratory) public policies, and hence inhibit the development of precisely the kind of knowledge required for the effective working of “responsible government” processes.

No substance

The point of all this is not that the Prime Minister is necessarily at fault for engaging in “consciousness-raising” but otherwise vacuous exercises in public education. The point is rather that, on many of these global questions, neither he nor his colleagues have much of substance to offer. They have, in other words, no directives to give. This is doubtless the result in part of the traditional pluralism of their domestic constituency – pluralism that inhibits any political leadership intent upon staying in office from taking excessive policy risks. But in a profound way it seems to derive as well from the fact that, even if they were completely free of electoral constraints, they still would not know what to suggest. Short of a wholesale revision of the basic assumptions upon which modern industrial and technological societies are based, the problems are simply too large and too complex to permit them to develop clearly-defined policy responses. They continue, therefore, to await the output of a complex machine over which they exercise only nominal control, while pursuing in public an increasingly empty and charade-like ritual. In the meantime, the machine itself is found to be largely incapacitated by the scope and intricacy of many of the problems it confronts – not in the sense of being unable to act at all (for it does produce “actions”) but in the sense of being unable to act with coherence or with an understanding of the implications of its behaviour.

These problems of political leadership are compounded at the level of Parliament, whose job it is to keep the Cabinet under a close and critical scrutiny. The individual Member, generally unsupported by a research staff or other significant sources of independent expertise, cannot begin to grapple with the complexities of the issues. Even if he scores a point, it will frequently be against a minister who did not himself commit the sin of making decisions for which he is being held accountable. In some degree, of course, this has always been the case, and the fiction that ministers control in detail what their departments do from day to day is a traditional feature of the conventions upon which the parliamentary system has been based. Presumably, however, there can come a time when the fiction is so much at odds with reality that it can no longer be sustained except by the pursuit of unacceptably empty rituals.

The character of the current international (and domestic) agenda suggests that this situation is now well on the way to being reached. Under such circumstances, the difficulty with Parliament is not, as is often alleged, that its members are stupid, parochial, corrupt and obstructionist – though this can sometimes be part of the problem. The difficulty is that Parliament is grossly overtaken and, as a result, its performance does not measure up. Accordingly, public servants come to refer to it with contempt, journalists desert it in droves and its own members grow increasingly despondent with each new demonstration of their own impotence.

Advancing farther down the chain of accountability, to the level of the citizen, it is clear that the problem is here compounded yet again. How could it be otherwise – given the elaborate intricacy of the issues, the evidence of public ignorance of such matters, for example, as the size of CIDA’s budget, the character of the questions so hotly contested at the CIEC meetings in Paris, or the implications for Canada of a failure to moderate the exploitation of manganese nodules on the ocean floor (to say nothing of the secondary and tertiary effects of these developments in other areas)? This further compounding of the problem reflects the inescapable limitation of human capacity.

The argument, in sum, is that the development of each new interaction between Canadian and global interests, the growth of each new complexity in the agenda of national and international politics, and the appearance of each new pluralism in the processes by which public

*Inhibitions
against taking
policy risks*

policy responses are produced together contribute to the erosion of the chain of accountability that is the central feature of any established system of responsible government. Over the long haul, this may pose a serious threat to a type of political regime that it has taken thousands of years to create, and that flourishes even now in only a small part of the globe.

Principle level

But the dimensions of the problem go well beyond the level of mere managerial and technical difficulty. They appear also at the level of principle, and in the current context are raised in their most obvious form by the widely-expressed demands for the creation of a "New International Economic Order". Such demands aggravate the situation because they entail a series of claims that are fundamentally at odds with the conviction that the domestic constituency is the community to which political leaders in a parliamentary system are ultimately responsible. In short, it attacks the very foundations of the nation state.

This is not an original observation, but it serves to remind us that thus far in the Western liberal tradition, with its deeply-ingrained conception of the social contract, no satisfactory political or constitutional principle for dealing with the needs of the global community has been developed. The essential premise of the liberal-democratic state is that political leaders and their advisers are in office to serve the interests of their constituents, and the central object of liberal constitutions is to establish mechanisms for ensuring that, within reasonable limits, this responsibility will be met. Underlying the argument for a New International Economic Order, however, is the expectation that policy-makers will in some measure be as responsive to the welfare of peoples *outside* their national boundaries as to the welfare of the peoples within – an expectation that derives from new conditions of global interdependence that could hardly have been envisaged by the political theorists of the seventeenth century. The conflict of principles that results is direct and inescapable.

Thus far, it would appear that the difficulty has been evaded by resort to one or more of three basic strategies, all of which have been very evident in the history of debates on "foreign aid" and "development assistance". The first such strategy (if it can be justly called so) has consisted in a *de facto* refusal to take the principle of international equity seriously at all – whenever, at least, it is recognized that doing so would seriously jeopardize a domestic constituency interest.

If this were done openly, it would amount to declaring in simple and explicit terms the primacy of the principle of responsible government as embodied in the nation-state construct. In practice, however, this would amount to a wholesale repudiation of competing, and very powerful, "Samaritanesque" principles of private morality – a repudiation that policy-makers and their publics alike, to their credit, find it difficult to contemplate. The result, therefore, is a continuing obfuscation of the issues, often with the help of arguments that obscure the underlying question of principle by focusing on problems of practical implementation (e.g., emphasizing the limited "absorptive capacity" of potential recipients).

The second strategy for coping with the conflict is to argue that redistributive programs are as much in the interests of the "donor" as of the recipient, and hence that no significant trade-off of "domestic" and "foreign" welfare is really involved. Suggestions, for example, that development-assistance is an effective mechanism for promoting exports, or winning diplomatic friends or maintaining international stability over the long term fall into this general category.

The third strategy for resolving the problem – most frequently observable in cases of apparently unadulterated altruism (e.g., disaster relief) – is to argue that the act of national self-abnegation is based on an implied, understood, or sometimes even explicit, constituency instruction. Here the policy-maker's dilemma is resolved by the claim that while he is in some measure promoting the welfare of "foreigners" at the expense of his own citizens, he does so with the latter's authorization.

General limits

Clearly the effect of the first of the three strategies has been to establish general limits on the degree of genuine wealth-transfer that the developed states have been prepared to consider. Even so, the second and third strategies have thus far done reasonably well in Canada (they have been less successful in the United States) in sustaining a significantly-expanded program of external assistance. In this, they have been greatly assisted by the fact that very few Canadians are sufficiently attentive to the details of the program to understand how large it actually is, or to observe in any direct way such linkages as might exist between the government's collective "sacrifice", on the one hand, and their own individual sacrifices, on the other.

To put the point another way, the complexity of the debate itself makes it very

difficult for the ordinary citizen to apply a cost-benefit test even if he has the will to do so. If one participant in public discussion argues that the development-assistance program promotes Canadian economic interests while another claims that these interests could be advanced much more efficiently by other means and still another suggests that the program does not contribute to the country's economic prosperity at all, how is the ordinary man to decide the issue? Without an expenditure of time and resources unreasonable to expect even of the most conscientious citizen, the task is obviously impossible. Except for occasional expressions of scepticism by Members of Parliament from poorer regions of the country ("charity begins at home"), the normal response is simply to abandon serious consideration of the problem and accept what the government does as a reasonable (since invisible) manifestation of public morality. In these circumstances, the government has substantial, though certainly not unlimited, freedom to respond as it sees fit to the demands of the international community.

It is not clear, however, that burying the issue in this way can sustain a *major* response to pressures for a new international order, such as would involve a genuine and highly-visible redistribution of wealth at domestic expense. That this is so is demonstrated, for example, by the difficulties encountered by developing countries in their attempt to secure significant concessions on tariffs. Since the free admission of cheap foreign imports (textiles are the standard Canadian example) has a direct and immediate impact on the previously-protected sectors of the domestic constituency – an impact whose origins are un-

ambiguous –, the underlying conflict between domestic and external welfare becomes clear and the policy-maker is compelled to choose. In practice, he has tended to choose in favour of the first of the three strategies discussed above, thereby acceding to the practical requirements of domestic politics and reasserting, by implication, the primacy of his commitment to the premises of "responsible government."

Quite apart, therefore, from the technical and managerial complexities of the new international agenda, which create difficulties for the *practical* conduct of the "responsible government" system, we may well be reaching a position in which the political leadership will be able to respond meaningfully to demands for a more equitable international order only if it violates its domestic social contract and puts the interests of "foreigners" ahead of the interests of its own constituents. In practice, the processes of "muddling through" may continue to obscure the issue – and of course it will be argued, rightly or wrongly, that short-term sacrifices are necessary in the long-term self-interest. But the problem is not a trivial one, and there is nothing in the philosophical underpinnings of Western governmental practice that will make it easy to solve.

Demands for global economic change thus entail a claim not only against the wealth of the developed countries but also against the fundamental premises of their politics. There may be irony in the observation that, at a time when nationalism appears to be in almost universal favour, its principal institutional vehicle, the "sovereign" nation state, is experiencing, on both moral and practical grounds, its most significant challenge to date.

Primer on Canada's approach to UN disarmament session

By G.R. Skinner

In international affairs, arms control and disarmament add up to one of the most compelling – and intractable – issues of our time. How to construct practical measures to reduce arms and armed forces while maintaining adequate levels of security has been the subject of a debate virtually infinite in variation and complexity. The existence of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction has imposed a sense of urgency; and the asymmetrical economic and political relations between

the developed and developing worlds have also entered into the debate. Much of the vocabulary of arms control and disarmament is daunting in its technicality and, like the debate itself, has sometimes obscured rather than clarified the actual impediments to progress – political and other tensions among states.

The special session of the United Nations General Assembly, which is meeting between May 23 and June 28, 1978, in New York, is not the first, and it is unlikely to be

the last, world-wide forum devoted to disarmament and arms-control issues. Such gatherings have had a long and rather uneven history. They represent, however, a certain departure from the past. The non-aligned countries (most of which belong to the Third World, or, at the United Nations, the "Group of 77"), have exerted a major influence on the agenda of the special session, and were prime movers in its realization; the decision to hold the gathering is the culmination of over ten years of effort, beginning with the Belgrade "non-aligned summit" of 1961.

Frustration

The sense of frustration (and perhaps powerlessness) shared by many of the non-aligned countries towards what they see as lack of progress in arresting, or at least reducing, the waste inherent in East-West military competition (not to mention the danger it represents) is very strong. A sense of grievance that has been added in recent years is evidenced in the extensive debate on economic relations between the developed and developing countries. Consequently, many in the Third World regard this special session of the UN General Assembly (the eighth) as the direct and logical extension of the sixth and seventh special sessions on the New International Economic Order (NIEO). Canada, which endorsed the call for a special session on disarmament, has tended to regard it as an opportunity to seek progress in arms control and disarmament for their own sake.

Canada has recognized and supported a broad range of Third World economic objectives, and has, indeed, undertaken a number of initiatives aimed at reducing some of the economic causes of tension in the North-South relation, as was demonstrated not only at the United Nations but also by the Canadian contribution to the Conference on International Economic Cooperation (CIEC), of which Alan MacEachen was co-chairman. Yet, while deeply sensitive to Third World concerns, Canada has continued to emphasize the security aspects of arms-control and disarmament measures, especially in the East-West context. The process of *détente* (which has taken place, by and large, outside the United Nations system) is of prime importance for the successful realization of East-West arms control. Equally, should progress towards disarmament fail, so ultimately will *détente*. The terms, though not co-equal, overlap – and the former is the touchstone of the latter.

In the world community, then, there is a divergence of perspective on the significance and purpose of arms-control and

disarmament measures. In the East-West context, the pursuit of arms control and disarmament is an integral part of the continuing elaboration of the process of *détente*. There is at least as much emphasis placed on negotiating forums, such as SALT and MBFR, outside the United Nations framework as within it. In the North-South context, however, arms control and disarmament, while indeed ends in themselves, are closely associated with the economic dimensions of redressing the unequal relations between North and South, between the First and Third Worlds, and far more stress is placed on broadening and enhancing the authority of the United Nations to deal with arms-control and disarmament matters.

This being the case, the special session will be, in the words, of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kurt Waldheim, "in all probability the largest, most representative gathering ever convened to consider the question of disarmament in all its aspects".

Despite the enormous range of subject matter covered by the special session, debate will focus on three broad topics: nuclear-arms control, control of conventional weapons, and negotiating machinery. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in effect divides the problem posed by the spread of nuclear weapons vertically and horizontally. There is, however, an interrelation between these two aspects, since the ability of the super-powers, in particular, to report progress on limiting further vertical proliferation will have an effect on efforts to contain horizontal proliferation. Indeed, the efficacy of the NPT as a major instrument for inhibiting horizontal proliferation is assessed by many countries in this light. The problem is further complicated by the fact that two nuclear-weapon states, France and China, are not parties to the NPT. Nor are several potential nuclear-weapon states.

Good faith

In the eyes of many, the test of the good faith of the super-powers resides in demonstrable progress in two sets of arms talks – the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., and the trilateral (U.S.-Britain-U.S.S.R.) talks leading to a Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty

NPT divides nuclear problem horizontally and vertically

Mr Skinner is deputy director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Division of the Department of External Affairs. He joined the Department in 1966 and has served in New York, Cairo and Warsaw. The views expressed here are those of Mr Skinner.

(CTB). Progress has hardly been rapid, and this unhappy fact has prompted an annual ritual in which the UN General Assembly "regrets the absence of positive results". The appreciation by some of the complexities of the issues involved, particularly in the SALT, is outweighed by the frustration of many. Despite recent signs of progress, the temptation to insist on greater United Nations involvement in the process is considerable. Whether such involvement would actually be effective, or even marginally helpful, is another question.

By virtue of Canada's role as an exporter of nuclear technology, it has a deep commitment to non-proliferation, and this subject is accorded top priority in Canadian foreign policy. On vertical proliferation, our ability to influence the outcome of the SALT talks is at best indirect, and we shall not be able to contribute further to the process of achieving agreement on a CTB Treaty until the three states most directly involved can table for discussion the outlines of a draft text in the Geneva Disarmament Conference. Even so, Canada has already contributed to preparing the groundwork through international seismological studies that have helped to demonstrate how underground nuclear tests might be identified by teleseismic means.

Canada's commitment to horizontal non-proliferation has been expressed through its efforts in the London Suppliers Group, the role it has played in supporting the acceptance of more comprehensive and effective safeguards administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its participation in the International Nuclear-Fuel-Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) exercise. The standards set as a result of Canada's safeguards requirements for nuclear exports, announced in December 1974 and December 1976, are the most stringent in the world. At the special session, one of Canada's major tasks will be to do what it can to encourage a rededication of the international community to non-proliferation, especially as it is embodied in the NPT and the "full-scope" safeguards system.

The aim of strengthening the safeguards system is not universally shared, and the Third World's idealism on things nuclear tends to dissolve when the subject is raised. Much of the debate may centre on a question of principle: how to reconcile the prerequisites of effective safeguards and non-proliferation guarantees with what some countries of the Third World consider their "inalienable right of unrestricted access to nuclear technology" for peaceful purposes, as defined by themselves. In the Canadian view, these aims are not as incom-

patible as they might seem, and can be reconciled if non-nuclear-weapon states agree to make binding non-proliferation undertakings backed up by the acceptance of comprehensive safeguards administered by the IAEA. Some Third World countries, however, have been reluctant to accept this formula, arguing that the "imposition" of safeguards would represent an encroachment on their sovereignty. In the meantime, and as an adjunct to encouraging non-proliferation, Canada has proposed that there be assurances by nuclear-weapon states designed to increase the confidence of non-nuclear-weapon states in their own security from nuclear attack.

More reticent

Since it directly affects their own requirements for security, many Third World countries become much more reticent on the subject of conventional arms than on nuclear weaponry. This despite the fact that Third World countries spend, generally speaking, at least as large a part of their gross national product on defence as industrialized countries. And they can afford it less. Paradoxically, it is only in Central Europe, where the NATO and Warsaw Pact forces are involved, that there are any talks (MBFR) in progress aimed at reducing levels of conventional forces.

Yet Third World countries are acutely aware that, of the roughly \$350 billion spent annually on armaments, the greater part is related to the East-West military competition, and the largest part of *that* on conventional (as opposed to nuclear) weapons. They are particularly mindful of the fact that UNGA Resolution 2603E(XXIV) of 1969 declared the 1970s the Disarmament Decade and recommended that:

Consideration be given to channeling a substantial part of the resources freed by measures in the field of disarmament to promote the economic development of developing countries.

The idea of channeling funds from destructive to constructive purposes may have a certain degree of elegance in its symmetry – and, indeed, moral appeal. Many countries, Canada included, believe that disarmament and development are two distinct objectives – related, perhaps, but not directly – and that the conceptual link between them is not well understood. Canada has, therefore, supported a proposal by the Scandinavian countries that there be a United Nations study of the relation between these two subjects.

An additional problem is the symbiotic relation that has frequently developed between the supplier and the recipient of arms. This means, in effect, that through

Demonstrating the potential for identifying nuclear tests

arms transfers a complex series of interlocking dependency relations has arisen among industrialized and developing countries. The latter, as jealous and sensitive about their sovereignty as any other states, and just as concerned about their security, are perhaps even less disposed to accept restraints on the transfer of conventional arms than are the suppliers, who, despite many accusations to the contrary, are not necessarily motivated by purely commercial considerations.

Here, too, Canada has tried to adopt a positive and constructive approach. It has suggested that there be an international register of arms transfers, that there be regional conferences between recipients and suppliers on how to restrain such transfers, and that there also be regional conferences seeking to restrain local arms races.

As a further parallel measure designed to ensure confidence, Canada has also supported the development, under United Nations auspices, of a uniform system of reporting, comparing and monitoring military budgets. Should such a system be adopted and receive the full co-operation of countries of military importance, it could well represent a solid first step in the process of negotiating reductions in military budgets on a known and equitable basis.

Disarmament machinery

"Democratizing" disarmament negotiations – primarily by extending and strengthening the authority of the United Nations over them – is seen by many as the obverse side of the substantive issues and an aim to be pursued for the sake of ensuring greater progress. The Geneva Disarmament Conference (formally the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD)), over which the United Nations does not exercise authority, has come in for special criticism. Its unique U.S.-U.S.S.R. dual chairmanship, its membership, limited for the purposes of negotiation, and the self-imposed absence of France and China, as well as its unenviable record as a meeting where things rarely happen, have combined to make it a target difficult to miss. However, it may be illusory to place exclusive onus on the institution, taking into account the issues that are before it. Indeed, there appears to be a strong human temptation to look to organizational "fixes" for deep-seated political problems, as if motivation – political will – might be created through alterations in negotiating structures. Majority votes are unlikely to have much effect if vital security issues are involved. Institutional arrangements are far more amenable to adjustment than are the problems with which they are supposed to deal.

The need for reform of the CCD and the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, which annually debates disarmament issues, does, however, exist. With other like-minded countries, Canada has put forward a number of specific proposals, including the strengthening of the role of the United Nations Disarmament Centre and more clearly defining the link between the CCD and the United Nations. Whatever the new name and chairmanship of the CCD arrangement might eventually be, Canada remains strongly of the view that it must continue to operate on the basis of consensus, and not run the risk of irreconcilable division – and hence immobility – through vote.

Special session

The special session is charged with responsibility for embodying a commonly-accepted approach, reached through consensus, in a basic document, or Final Act. It may turn out to have four parts: Preamble; Declaration; Program of Action; Machinery.

In anticipation of the special session, the General Assembly established a 54-nation Preparatory Committee, of which Canada is a member, which, during its fifth session before the opening of the special session, has begun work to give shape to the basic document.

The variety of interests represented in the Preparatory Committee is matched by the diversity of objectives and preoccupations. The informal political-geographical groupings of UN members – East, West and Neutral and Non-aligned – have been indispensable in simplifying a negotiating process that involves, ultimately and at last count, some 149 member states. The amount of agreement can vary from topic to topic within each group and from one group to another.

Here it might be noted that a plenary United Nations body is not automatically the most productive or appropriate venue for disarmament talks and that, despite its unquestioned responsibilities under the Charter, the United Nations has certain limitations on its abilities in this field. The United Nations membership does not, in its collectivity, reflect world power relations – which are inextricably linked, through measures of collective security, to disarmament and arms control. The United Nations principle of equality (one state, one vote), while just, bears little relation to the structure and dynamics of an international-relations system interlocking security relations with regional preoccupations.

The Group of 77 is capable of wielding, through its votes, the "power of the automatic majority". There is some concern that

*Diversity
of objectives
and preoccupation*

knowledge of this power reduces the will to negotiate and encourages the temptation to seek to impose views and solutions, including unrealistic deadlines or objectives on disarmament, through fiat of numerical vote. At the special session, the temptation will be very strong – and the greater the temptation the greater the danger that consensus will not be reached. Many militarily-significant states, especially nuclear-weapon states, could feel themselves obliged to abstain, or vote against parts of the Final Act, and accordingly to ignore or discount the results issuing from any special session that have been obtained by weight of number alone. Should that occur, more damage would probably be done to the credibility of the General Assembly than to the actual process of arms control and disarmament, particularly between the super-powers, which has an independent dynamic of its own.

Whatever brave words might follow, any such result would represent a failure of the special session and of the states that took part. Thus the negotiating process should have one fundamental objective: to find the lowest common denominator of agreement and raise it to the highest.

Canadian role

The interest of a considerable section of Canadian public in arms control and disarmament has traditionally been lively, and has been confirmed as the date of the UN special session on disarmament approaches. The Government has appointed a Canadian co-ordinator for the session with a view to ensuring that the views of interested Canadian groups and organizations and individual Canadians with special expertise on disarmament matters are heard. Consultations will continue until the special session opens.

By virtue of its history, and by the conscious design of successive Canadian Governments, Canada, a Western industrialized country, a leading member of the Commonwealth and of La Francophonie, yet with no imperial or colonial legacy abroad, enjoys a virtually unique position of confidence in the Third World. At the same time, as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Canada is directly and vitally interested in *détente*. The fact that it is one of the largest exporters of nuclear technology has brought special responsibility – and leverage – in the field of non-proliferation. For these reasons, Canada has a certain ability to influence events – not a

decisive ability, perhaps, but at least a constructive one. Transcending all other concerns is the necessity to avoid the disaster of nuclear war.

There is little international disagreement on the ends of arms control and disarmament, but there is debate on the precise means to ensure national security in an uncertain world where ideological, economic, and even racial, fissures run deep. This fact has a bearing on the chances of success if the results at the special session are not agreed to by consensus. The potential for hortatory, morally-satisfying but sterile statements and for the immediate imposition of long-term or unrealistic goals or deadlines for disarmament measures is very great. A Comprehensive Program for General and Complete Disarmament, which the General Assembly called to the attention of the CCD in 1970, has not been implemented and is not likely to be achieved in this decade, if in this century.

With these considerations in mind, Canada, in concert with others, is seeking to encourage the special session to focus on the concrete and the specific, where, by the adoption of a step-by-step approach, tangible results can be sought through negotiation in the next three to five years.

The world has avoided nuclear war for 33 years, and the relative stability of the international system is dependent upon a finely-tuned military balance, of which the process of arms control and disarmament is an integral part. During the past 20 years, eight multilateral treaties and ten bilateral Soviet-American pacts on arms limitations and control have been concluded. Other significant agreements have also been reached. For example, the Treaty of Tlatelolco, though imperfect (it permits nuclear explosions), is an application to Latin America of the conception of a nuclear-weapon-free zone. There have been treaties on the banning of nuclear weapons from the seabed and outer space, and on the prohibition of warfare by means of environmental modification. A chemical-weapons treaty may soon be negotiated.

The decision of the United Nations General Assembly to hold a special session on disarmament reflects the general desire of the world community to infuse a renewed sense of purpose into the process of arms control and disarmament, and to reaffirm its resolve to move toward this common goal. The major challenge the special session will face, however, is to match this idealism with realism, and to make the abstract concrete.

Editor's note: The above article on the United Nations special session on disarmament was written before the General Assembly convened in New York on May 23, 1978.

*Fundamental
objective
is to find
lowest common
denominator*

Explanations and implications of Soviet-U.S. arms talks

By Robin Ranger

Sir Winston Churchill's advice that "jaw-jaw is better than war-war" seems to have been heeded this year. The super-power Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) have produced an outline for a SALT II agreement. The United States, the Soviet Union and Britain seem close to agreement on a Comprehensive Test-Ban (CTB). These two agreements combine to limit the strategic-arms race, according to their supporters. Reducing the greatest concentration of military power in the world – the U.S./West European North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the U.S.S.R./East European Warsaw Pact Organization (WPO) – has proved more difficult. The negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) – to use the NATO term – that started in 1974 are stalemated. In addition, the Soviet Union has deployed a new generation of "Euro-strategic systems", notably the SS-20 IRBM, the *Backfire* bomber and a new generation of vastly superior fighter-bombers. Since they can strike strategic targets, including capital cities, anywhere in Western Europe in a matter of minutes, they are, to the Western Europeans, "strategic systems".

The French Government, in its statement on disarmament of January 25, 1978 (an interesting indication of renewed French interest in negotiations in this area, from which France had held aloof), suggested a novel solution. While SALT II dealt with the strategic nuclear balance, the European balance, both nuclear and conventional, should be dealt with in a larger forum than the MBFR talks, which cover

only the Central Front. This new group would comprise all 35 signatories to the August 1, 1975, Final Act of the Conference on Co-operation and Security in Europe (CSCE). They would consider arms control "from the Atlantic to the Urals", resurrecting the Gaullist definition of Europe.

Finally, the United Nations is holding a special session on disarmament. If words were acts, then 1978 would be a good year for arms control. But to judge by actions, especially Soviet actions and those of the U.S.S.R.'s involuntary allies in the WPO, 1978 will see the continued failure of arms control to deal with any of the rapidly-increasing threats to strategic and tactical nuclear stability, and to related conventional balances – inside and outside Europe.

Since the U.S.S.R. prefers the slogan "arm to parley", the West, especially the United States, must follow suit. While arms control remains a desirable object, effective negotiations require rough parity of forces; the U.S. failure to hold the Soviet Union to the 1972 SALT I agreements or to take the necessary steps to correct the resulting strategic imbalance has removed any Soviet incentive to negotiate seriously in SALT or MBFR. The same is true, though to a lesser extent, of NATO *vis-à-vis* the WPO – though it must, regrettably, be noted that Canada has been the worst offender here, spending less on defence than any NATO member except Luxembourg and Iceland. Recent efforts have been made to remedy these deficiencies, but there is still much leeway to be made up.

If this assessment seems unduly bleak, it is worth while to remember that, when the SALT I agreements were signed in 1972, their architect Henry Kissinger hailed them as an earnest of a super-power *détente* that would eventually become an *entente*, while a SALT II based on the 1974 Vladivostok accords would "put the cap on" the strategic arms race.

But following these euphoric predictions, Dr Kissinger was unable to negotiate a SALT II because of excessive Soviet de-

Rough parity of forces required for effective negotiations

Dr Ranger is a member of the Department of Political Science at St Francis Xavier University. During 1978-79 he will be on sabbatical leave and will be working in London and Washington on a Department of National Defence fellowship. He has written widely on strategic questions. The views expressed here are those of Dr Ranger.

mands. Meanwhile, his vision of *détente* – and it must be doubted whether it was ever anything more than a vision – disappeared in the face of increasing Soviet intransigence. The most significant evidence of this was the an evasion of every meaningful provision of SALT I, an evasion Dr Kissinger could not challenge because he had staked his reputation on SALT I and *détente*. The new Carter Administration came to power in 1977 committed – perhaps over-committed – to arms control. They quickly pressed for a comprehensive SALT II in March, but were brusquely rebuffed by the U.S.S.R. Thus the major part of SALT I (the Interim Agreement on the Limitation of Offensive Missiles) expired on October 3, 1977, without a replacement. An outline SALT II agreement was reached by October, but its terms were so unfavourable to the United States that major U.S. Senate opposition, led by Senator Henry M. Jackson, emerged. The Carter Administration subsequently tried, unsuccessfully, to secure more favourable terms from Moscow.

Since Senate ratification by a two-thirds majority will be required for SALT II, the resulting debate on U.S. foreign policy is the most important since the debate on the Vietnam war. The Senate, preoccupied with other things, however, is not likely to begin its consideration of SALT II until November, after the mid-term elections. This delay will intensify the already bitter argument between proponents and opponents of SALT II. At stake is the central issue of U.S., and Western, foreign policy – not to mention human survival. How stable, or unstable, are the super-power strategic balance and the linked conventional military balances going to be over the next decade? And what will be the effects on the super-powers' political relations, currently at their worst in a decade?

Political issues

What follows is a rough guide to this debate, stressing the central political issues rather than the complex and hotly-disputed technical questions. The first and most important point to make is that our way of thinking – and by we I mean analysts, media and citizens – has become dangerously erroneous, because it gives a false sense of security. Nuclear war, or the threat of nuclear war, had, we thought, become unthinkable because both super-powers had more than enough nuclear weapons to destroy each other, and the rest of the world, however successful a first strike the U.S. launched against the U.S.S.R. or vice-versa.

Given this nuclear “overkill”, the costs of the strategic-arms race and the political uselessness of nuclear weapons, this sense-

less competition could, and should, be halted. The vast literature on arms control explained how to do this, so all that was wanting was for the U.S.S.R. to perceive that it had reached strategic parity with the U.S. and for both sides to provide the political push needed to secure SALT I (and II, III and so on). Because these views were so widely held, Western political and public support was overwhelming for SALT I and Kissinger's claims for its strategic and political significance. His views, essentially those of the liberal, largely Democratic, arms-control community, thus became accepted as the only correct ones on arms control. His critics, and those of SALT I and U.S. strategic thinking, seemed to be preoccupied with politically-irrelevant strategic possibilities – as Kissinger said: “What in God's name do you mean by strategic superiority? And what can you do with it?” The Carter Administration is also deeply committed to this ideology of arms control. Yet there is a distinct feeling that this thinking is on the defensive. Why?

Essentially, Soviet actions and changes in strategic technology since 1972 have laid this thinking open to increasingly valid criticism. It fails to correspond to the reality that no negotiable SALT II – or, indeed, the SALT talks themselves – can provide effective arms control or prevent the erosion of strategic and political stability. Since Cas-sandras are always unpopular, there has been a natural reluctance to listen to the critics of SALT, *détente* and arms control. Two factors have reinforced this reluctance to question liberal arms-control thinking. First, critics were (and are) forced to advance complex objections to politically-attractive proposals that can be defended by much more understandable (if often inaccurate) generalities. This was the pattern with charges of Soviet violations of SALT I and claims that SALT II would leave U.S. strategic forces dangerously vulnerable to a Soviet first strike.

Secondly, most critics were politically right-wing – although they have been joined by liberals pointing to the lack of real restraint on strategic arms. The natural reaction the Vietnam war produced against unthinking anti-Communism produced the equally unthinking proposition that doves were always right and hawks were always wrong. For example, two of the main figures in the SALT II debate are Paul Warnke (appointed Head of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency – ACDA – and of the SALT negotiating team in 1977) and Paul Nitze (Senior U.S. Department of Defense representative on the SALT negotiating team from 1969 to 1974). Warnke had impeccable credentials as a liberal

arms-controller and so, initially, his arguments seemed acceptable, while Nitze's did not, because he was a hawk.

The personal bitterness the SALT debate has produced is understandable in view of the crucial issues involved. But the debate cannot be understood if one side is labelled good, and its arguments uncritically accepted, and the other labelled bad, and its arguments uncritically rejected. An obvious analogy is the current Canadian debate on the future of the country. Despite the deep personal differences between Prime Minister Trudeau and Quebec Premier Lévesque, neither Trudeau's insistence on the preservation of Confederation nor Lévesque's stress on Quebec separation – however defined – can be ignored. Nor can the arguments of their supporters.

What has made Nitze's position, and that of his supporters, impossible to ignore was the evidence that, under SALT I, the Soviet Union engaged in an unprecedented expansion of its strategic forces, ignoring SALT limitations, especially on increases in its "throwweight". This has become a major cause of concern because of the very rapid increase in missile accuracy, which has occurred much more quickly than expected and will continue to do so. The U.S.S.R.'s combination of throwweight and accuracy will give it the capability, by about 1980, to destroy the U.S. ICBM (Intercontinental Ballistic Missile) force in a first strike, using only a small part of its forces. The land-based, fixed-site ICBM is approaching obsolescence, creating a whole new set of uncertainties about the stability of the strategic balance.

To say that the Soviet strategic first-strike capability is increasing is not to say that the U.S.S.R. is likely to use it in a political vacuum. Whether it might not be tempted to do so in a crisis is another, and much more serious, question. Thus the stability of the super-power strategic balance can no longer be taken for granted; it can only be maintained in the future by major increases and changes in U.S. strategic forces, including the move to mobile ICBMs. Moreover, the Soviet Union has not, as was predicted, been educated by SALT into accepting Western theories of deterrence, stability and arms control. Instead, it has maintained its own quite different doctrine, stressing the political and military benefits of strategic and conventional superiority in deterring war and, if it comes, winning it. This doctrine is currently being tested in Africa by Cuban proxy.

Soviet behaviour in Europe also illustrates this doctrine. The NATO arguments for MBFR were that the WPO forces were quantitatively superior to NATO's (though

the qualitative balance was debatable) but certainly more than the WPO needed for defence. The WPO's capacity for a surprise attack could, therefore, be reduced, as could NATO's forces. So could defence spending by both sides. The U.S.S.R. and the WPO have rejected these arguments, while making massive quantitative and qualitative increases in their forces targeted on NATO. Hence NATO's interest in the neutron bomb, to counter the WPO's three-to-one tank superiority, and concern that the U.S. should not trade this for unverifiable Soviet promises of restraint with the Euro-strategic systems, and should not impose restraints on the range of the Long-Range Cruise Missile or on the transfer of LRCM technology to NATO. The LRCM is now NATO's only means of disrupting WPO supply-lines in case of a Soviet attack. In addition, Britain and France are keenly interested in securing LRCM technology to boost their tactical and strategic nuclear delivery systems; the Soviet Union has, of course, tried to prevent this in SALT II.

SALT II thus faces the impossible task of shoring-up a deteriorating strategic balance, which is shifting in favour of the U.S.S.R., with an agreement acceptable to the U.S.S.R., the U.S. Senate and America's NATO allies. President Carter's campaign promises included massive reductions in strategic forces. So far, SALT II satisfies only the Soviet Union, restraining U.S. but not Soviet strategic forces. President Carter's March 1977 comprehensive SALT II proposals attempted to restrain the lead of the U.S.S.R. in throwweight represented by its heavy ICBM (SS-18) and MIRVed (Multiple Independent Re-entry Vehicle) strategic delivery vehicles (sdv), besides limiting the flight-testing needed to give a potential attacker high confidence in its forces. This, plus the proposed force reductions, especially in MIRVed ICBMs, would have postponed the vulnerability of the U.S. strategic forces. A simple comparison of these March proposals with the SALT II thus far negotiated shows that the Carter Administration has completely reversed itself. The only restraints are those in the U.S. ALCM (Air-Launch Cruise Missile) force, which was to replace the B-1 bomber the President cancelled in June, and on the U.S. G/SLCM (Ground-Sea Launch Cruise Missile) needed to defend NATO. Carter has repeated Kissinger's SALT strategy of pre-emptive surrender to all Soviet demands.

But this SALT II is going to be very difficult to sell. Technically, it is incapable of prolonging the capability to survive of the U.S. ICBM force, despite Administration claims. Politically, the implications of U.S. acceptance of the U.S.S.R. drive for strate-

*Super-powers
likely to revert
to limited
adversary
relations*


gic superiority, ignoring the constraints of SALT I, in the proposed SALT II, could have adverse effects on international peace and security. The Soviet leadership would be reinforced in its apparent conviction (evidenced by the Cuban African adventures) that the U.S. has lost its understanding of the political use of military power and the will to use it. Strengthening the Soviet hawks would increase the chances of a major confrontation between the Super-powers and their allies, including Canada.

Disarmament has long been dead, because impossible, and useful only for political rhetoric. But, far from being a year of arms control, 1978 is likely to see the effective end of SALT and a continued lack of progress in MBFR. Even a comprehensive test-ban, if achieved, will restrict the U.S. rather than the U.S.S.R., and will, therefore, be of little worth. Politically, the super-powers are likely to revert to a "limited adversary relationship" (a phrase coined by Marshal Shulman, now President Carter's chief adviser on Soviet affairs). Moreover, the adversary elements are likely to predominate, with or without a SALT II. But the SALT II debate will show which way U.S. public opinion is moving.

This opinion is now clearly, and substantially, shifting to support a much firmer assertion of the United States' legitimate security interests, and those of its real allies. This is also the view on the Hill and, judging by President Carter's recent speeches, that of his Administration – especially "Zib" Brezinski, whose persuading of the President to change his views indicates his growing influence and that of the hardliners in the policymaking and analytical communities. This general shift, described above, has been accelerated by two sets of events. The first has been the new Soviet demands in SALT II, which, if accepted, would make a mockery of the Joint Draft Text the Carter Administration thought both sides had

agreed to. The U.S.S.R. is now arguing, for example, that ALCM-carriers can only comprise U.S. strategic bombers, limiting these to 70-120, and cannot include transport aircraft, like the Boeing 747 *Jumbojet*. Yet this is President Carter's substitute for the B-1 bomber he cancelled last June. Furthermore, the U.S.S.R. is adamant that there shall be no transfer of any cruise-missile technology to U.S. allies, especially in Western Europe, where they are also stepping-up their propaganda campaign against the neutron bomb.

A SALT II treaty meeting these conditions would not only be rejected by the U.S. Senate – it would be so heavily criticized that the Administration would be unlikely to risk signing it until after the mid-term October elections. Indeed, President Carter may find it politically necessary to pull out of SALT II, at least temporarily, this summer. SALT has deteriorated so drastically that the ordinary voter can see that Soviet demands are grotesquely one-sided. But voters are also concerned about the victorious conclusion of the Soviet-Cuban-WPO-backed imperial-colonial war in Ethiopia, which went unopposed, except verbally, by Carter. Quite rightly, the average American, and his representatives, feel that this will only encourage further Soviet use of force. Yugoslavia, after President Tito's death, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, and the Middle East, especially after Israel's move into Southern Lebanon, are favourite candidates for what could become, all too easily, another Korean War, involving the U.S. and its allies in local, limited war against the U.S.S.R. and its allies. Under these circumstances, the prospects for arms control look very bleak. It is, as the late President Kennedy said 17 years ago, after his June 1961 meeting with Russia's Nikita Khrushchov, going to be a long, hard, cold winter.



From the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

Growth in bilateral relations between Canada and Denmark

By Paul Painchaud

Until the Second World War, and for the next 20 years, Canada's European policy revolved round two main poles: Britain, on the one hand, and the multilateral organizations, on the other – Britain, because of strategic and economic links built up within an Empire that had only partly become a Commonwealth whose transformations were to force involvement of Canadian foreign policy in international problems on a global scale, and multilateral organizations such as the League of Nations, whose mission, in Canada's eyes, was largely European, and others that were to succeed it from the standpoint of regional security (such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization) or economic co-operation (such as the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development). In reality, this dual concentration, on a single country and on functional organizations, prevented the development of a real regional policy towards Western Europe – in other words, an integrated and systematic set of objectives comprehending the main areas of government activity in this part of the world. It took the Third Option to render such a policy theoretically possible.

It is general knowledge that the most tangible expression of this policy was the 'contractual link' with the European Communities. What is less-well known, however – or, rather, what has been less noted – is the parallel intensification of Canada's bilateral relations with various countries of Western Europe – relations that had previously been, if not neglected, at least conducted on an often formal and routine level. This statement must, of course, be qualified, depending on the countries and postwar periods concerned. On the whole, however, it does not seem an exaggeration so far as most European countries are concerned.

But the Third Option and the contractual link were to place greater emphasis on the value for Canada of bilateral relations. The latter, in particular, prompted Canada to seek direct influence on the different members of the Community because of its structures and decision-making

mechanisms. Furthermore, greater interdependence between Canada and each member of The Nine certainly has an emulative effect with regard to the Community itself. Finally, the increasingly-close relations that unite all the countries of Western Europe, in different fields, must lead Canada to develop its relations with those states that do not belong to the Community. Canada's recent interest in the Council of Europe is proof of this tendency.

Parallel diplomacy

It should also be added that several European governments themselves insist on maintaining a diplomacy parallel to that of the Community in their relations with various countries. This often results in greater efficiency in areas such as industrial co-operation, one of the main instruments of the Third Option, and is even true for the cultural sphere. Indeed, the maintenance of Canada's ethnic diversity, viewed as a check on American influence, can only be achieved by increasing as much as possible bilateral exchanges with the countries of origin – mostly European – of Canada's various ethnic groups. This goal is, in fact, very clear in the light of the priorities of the five-year cultural-activities plan of the Department of External Affairs.

Apart from all these reasons, there are also structural pressures that dictate a widening of bilateral relations with European states. New world-wide problems – the New International Economic Order, the law of the sea, the evolution in Soviet strategy – lead to greater political co-operation between industrial democracies. Moreover, the very transformations in Western

Greater efficiency in industrial co-operation

Paul Painchaud is a professor in the Department of Political Science at Laval University and co-director of the journal Études Internationales. He is at present in charge of a research project concerning various aspects of Canadian-European relations at the Centre québécois de relations internationales. The views expressed here are those of Dr Painchaud.

Europe – the change of régimes in Spain, Portugal and Greece, Eurocommunism – endow certain European countries with new international importance and thus a new significance to Canada's bilateral relations with them.

A good example

Denmark is a good example of this trend, as was shown by the visit of Prime Minister Jørgensen to Ottawa in December 1977. This was the first official visit in 30 years of diplomatic relations by the head of the government of a country that is, after the United States, Canada's nearest neighbour, by virtue of its territory of Greenland. This visit had been preceded by that of Prime Minister Trudeau to Copenhagen in May 1975. The two visits should not only be considered as a new stage in relations between Canada and Denmark but also as examples of a more general trend in Canadian diplomacy in Europe. It is, therefore, instructive to analyze the relation with Denmark from this point of view.

Denmark is a small country, with a population of five million, with which Canada has traditionally had only limited bilateral relations at both the official and the private levels. Until recently, links between the two countries have developed mainly within multilateral organizations, particularly NATO and the United Nations, where they were cordial and close. The mutual interest of the two countries was, therefore, primarily due to their common strategic aims and to the fact that they intended to pursue these within a framework of collective security.

This general characteristic of Canada-Denmark relations is still evident, but two other factors must henceforth be added that are complementary and dependent one on the other: each country's European policy (Denmark's entry into the Common Market, Canada's contractual link) and the development of their bilateral relations through the problems of the Arctic. In a way, Europe and the Arctic have become for both the focal-point round which their bilateral relations have been revitalized, since policies in one sector can help to strengthen policies in another. For Canada, the joint aims it will be increasingly led to pursue with Denmark in the Arctic help to consolidate and widen the scope of its European policies. For Denmark, the closeness of Canada's links with the European Economic Community is a pledge of its co-operation in solving the problems of the Arctic, to which it attaches great importance. For this reason, Denmark was the first EEC member to support Canada's proposal for a contractual link (though it did express last-minute

reservations of a tactical nature).

A new form of interdependence has thus been established between the two countries, which would not have been possible without a certain number of more general socio-political points of common interest that define the relative but specific importance of Denmark in Canada's diplomacy. For instance, the two countries share a similar tradition of constitutional monarchy, and both are strongly attached to democratic institutions and values. In several social and technical areas, Denmark practises progressive and innovative policies of interest to the Federal Government, the provinces, and various groups – as is proved both by the numerous and constant visits of Canadian specialists to Denmark and by the various subjects discussed by Messrs Trudeau and Jørgensen during the latter's recent visit to Ottawa. Furthermore, Denmark has long been open to Anglo-Saxon cultural influences, especially that of Britain – with which it has, like Canada, always maintained special links – and more recently with the U.S. No doubt this accounts for certain types of political behaviour, such as pragmatism and a tendency towards compromise, that have enabled Canada and Denmark to communicate and co-operate easily on numerous occasions.

But it is Denmark's foreign policy that is of particular interest to Canada. Like the latter, Denmark has been deeply involved in international affairs since 1945, and – again like Canada – after a long period of isolation. An active member of the UN, which is one of the mainstays of its foreign policy (as it is for Canada), a fellow member of the Atlantic Alliance, the Nordic Council and, more recently, the EEC, Denmark shares with Canada the need to compensate for its relative weakness by an active role in multilateral organizations that will give it the opportunity to intervene on any question that, by imperilling international security, threatens the freedom of economic exchange on which its prosperity depends. Moreover, like Canada in its relations with the United States, Denmark is subject to the financial and commercial influence of a powerful neighbour and ally – in this case the Federal Republic of Germany. This situation has certainly helped the Danish Government to understand Canada's "Third Option" policy, and so the contractual link. With regard to defence, Denmark, like Canada, has been obliged to review its contribution to NATO and to cut its military spending. Finally, whether the discussion centres on the violation of human rights, the "North-South Dialogue", security in Europe or decolonization, Denmark adopts a liberal position very similar to that

*General trend
in Canadian
diplomacy
in Europe*

position Canada would like to see adopted, sometimes in a different form. It is significant, for instance, that both countries are at present represented on several of the peacekeeping missions of the United Nations (the UN Force in Cyprus, the UN Military Observer Group India-Pakistan and the UN Truce-Supervisory Organization).

Soviet naval might

It is, perhaps, from a strategic point of view that Denmark's international position is of greatest interest to Canada, especially in view of the development of the naval strength of the U.S.S.R. Indeed, in the event of a limited conflict between the countries of NATO and the Warsaw Pact — the only "reasonable" possibility that can be envisaged at present —, access to the Atlantic Ocean would be crucial for the Soviet Union. If it is assumed that the passage from the Baltic Sea to the North Sea will remain under the control of Denmark and other NATO members, then Murmansk, far to the north, is the only ice-free port the U.S.S.R. could use all year round to dispatch its fleet towards the Atlantic. From Murmansk, however, there are only two lines of access to the Atlantic — either through Davis Strait (between Greenland and Baffin Island) or by way of a lengthy passage that includes the Denmark Strait between Greenland and Iceland and the various sea-lanes between Iceland and the Faroes (also under Danish control), the Shetland Islands and Scotland. Apart from engaging in nuclear retaliation, the task of the Soviet submarines would be to force these passages, open the Atlantic to naval elements stationed at Murmansk, and attack Western shipping-links.

Accordingly, through its various territories, Denmark occupies a strategic position in the Arctic and Northeast Atlantic that Canada cannot ignore in its general evaluation of that country's place in its diplomatic relations. These territories will become even more important for Canada as the development of the Arctic's natural resources brings increased commercial shipping to this area (both surface and submarine). Yet the exploration of the Arctic's energy resources has hardly begun and, if it is not undertaken by Americans and Canadians, it may be of the greatest interest to Europeans and the Japanese, who are less well-off in this respect. Denmark, as an Arctic power importing over 90 per cent of its energy, might make a move in this direction. In the long or the short term, then, commercial shipping between the Arctic and the Atlantic is likely to take on new strategic significance. From this point of view, Canada and Denmark have an obvious community of interests.

In spite of these common interests, direct bilateral relations between the two countries have been slow to develop. Canada's first diplomatic mission to Denmark was opened as recently as 1946, in the form of a legation in the charge of a minister, who lived for the first year in Oslo. Ten years passed before the two countries decided to raise their legations to the rank of embassy. In 1956, Denmark was the only NATO member in which Canada was represented only by a minister. Canada's mission in Copenhagen was always modest in size and partly dependent on other Canadian missions in Europe. It was not until 1959, for instance, that a commercial attaché was assigned to it on a permanent basis. The Canadian Embassy now has four resident officers but the military attaché still resides in Oslo; two immigration officers cover Denmark from Stockholm.

Finally, ministerial visits between the two countries were infrequent. The first official visit to Canada by a Danish Foreign Minister took place in 1967, and in 1969 Mitchell Sharp became the first Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs to visit Copenhagen. Visits by politicians and civil servants have, however, become more numerous during the intervening years.

*Official visits
have increased
in frequency*

Trade

Commercial exchanges have been fairly limited up to now, though there has been an upswing recently. Trade is characterized by a persistent Canadian deficit on finished products (24 per cent of Canada's exports to Denmark are finished products, compared to 58 per cent of Danish exports to Canada). In 1976, Canadian exports to Denmark were valued at \$30 million, and imports from Denmark at \$76 million. Canada, moreover, is Denmark's second most-important market outside Europe, after the United States. Canada exports mainly coal, asbestos, salmon and machinery to Denmark, from which it buys furniture, furs, cheese and machinery. Denmark is the country fourteenth in importance as regards direct investments in Canada (\$21 million in 1974) and the seventeenth as regards Canadian foreign investments (\$40 million out of a total of \$9 billion). Since the visit to Copenhagen of an industrial co-operation mission in 1975, Canada has been trying to improve the composition and importance of its economic exchanges with Denmark. A number of "joint ventures" have already been started (for instance, in the brewing and lumber industries, and in shipbuilding). Moreover, Canada has just sold a *DASH-7* aircraft to Greenlandair, and two others may be bought by the same company. Lastly, Canada hopes to sell its CANDU reactor

to Denmark, and defence agreements have been concluded between the two countries.

Cultural relations are also very limited, and mainly of a scientific nature. There is no Canada-Denmark cultural agreement and projects of the Cultural Affairs Division affecting the Scandinavian countries have had to be abandoned because of recent budget cuts. The Canada Council, however, gives scholarships to Canadians wishing to study at Danish universities. From the scientific point of view, Canadian and Danish researchers working together in the Arctic prefer to manage their co-operation by themselves, without formal government intervention.

Movements of people, on the other hand, have been more active, though there is very little Danish immigration to Canada; in 1976, for example, only 377 Danes settled in Canada. But these were "quality" immigrants; 92 per cent of those applying for immigrant status belong to the "independent" category – namely those who already have advanced technical or professional training. In 1974, 40 per cent to 50 per cent of Danish immigrants had guaranteed jobs in Canada before they left Denmark. Finally, since 1955 Canada has been the principal "target country" of Danes wishing to leave their homeland. At present, the Danish community in Canada numbers about 70,000, most of whom have settled in the Toronto area.

But the interest of Canadians and Danes in one another is reflected principally in the exchange of tourists. In 1976, for example, over 92,000 Canadians visited Denmark, whereas Norway and Sweden attracted only about 10,000 visitors each (and Finland 7,000). Denmark may, therefore, be considered the favourite destination of Canadians among the Scandinavian countries. The figures illustrating this have been growing steadily every year since 1967. The inverse is also true as regards Danish visitors to Canada. There were over 11,000 of them in 1973, whereas six years earlier there had been no more than 5,000. The increase has, therefore, been fairly rapid.

Canada and Denmark have also co-operated on military matters within NATO, especially in the immediate postwar period because of the economic problems Denmark was then encountering. Thus, with the U.S.A., Canada made Denmark a joint offer of a squadron-and-a-half of F-104G aircraft. It also helped train the pilots and provided Denmark with various types of military equipment. In all, Canada's military aid to Denmark amounted to 42 million in 1965.

Political co-operation between the two countries has always been excellent. It has often taken the form of concerted action

regarding a third country within the various international organizations. In 1966, for example, Canada and Denmark tried to bring joint pressure to bear on the U.S. and Britain opposing the removal of NATO headquarters to Brussels after France's decision to pull out. The two governments, which were fairly isolated within the Alliance on this question, feared that France would leave the alliance for good in a fit of pique. At the UN, moreover, the two delegations have become accustomed to consulting one another on the main problems under debate. More recently, the Canadian and Danish delegations collaborated closely in the preparatory work for the Helsinki Conference, especially on all matters concerning the section on information and cultural relations. The same was true for the negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions. Finally, Denmark, which is a large importer of oil, counts on Canada's support in pressing the other Western countries to find rapid solutions to the Middle East problem.

Difficulties

This political co-operation has not, however, prevented certain difficulties from arising between the two governments. During the last few years, the most important of these was undoubtedly what was generally known as "the salmon war". Canada feared that the over-fishing made possible by new technology would lead to the extinction of the species. Control measures had been taken in Canadian waters.

The Danes, on the other hand, whose rivers were depleted of salmon and who therefore had to import some of their supply, did not entirely agree with the findings of scientific studies on the threat of extinction of the species, and thus defended the principle of free fishing on the high seas. Canada's view was supported by most members of the International Commission for the Northeast Atlantic Fisheries, but Denmark, which considered this a most important question, agreed only to limit its catches to the 1969 level. The Canadian Government considered that the danger still existed and that protective measures were required. It believed that the problem was not only a commercial one but also a conservation problem of international significance. In the end, multilateral talks at the Law of the Sea Conference and in ICNAF concerning fishing brought a solution to the problem.

More recently, another source of contention has been that of landing rights for Scandinavian Air Services at Toronto. Canada would like to be able to accommodate SAS on this point, but the traffic density at Toronto rules it out. A moratorium has

*Danish community
in Canada
now numbers
forty thousand*

Accordingly, been declared until 1980 on landing rights for foreign airlines. It applies to SAS and all other airlines that have not yet negotiated an agreement. In view of Denmark's strong interest in the matter, however, it has been agreed that negotiations will continue among the airline companies.

But disagreements between Canada and Denmark must be viewed against a background of political co-operation, until quite recently, within the Atlantic Alliance. The same background includes several years of a community of interests in the Arctic. For both countries this is a factor of basic solidarity that enables temporary conflicts to be bypassed without too much difficulty and explains the other aspects of the relations between Denmark and Canada. During the coming years, and without diminishing the importance of the Atlantic Alliance – as well as Denmark's presence in the EEC – as a factor for *rapprochement* between the two countries, the Arctic will increasingly occupy the central role in Canada-Denmark relations.

Several signs point in this direction. Apart from the new strategic significance of the Arctic already mentioned, the responsibility of the two countries for the exploration and development of natural resources in this area will lead them to cooperate more systematically. This co-operation has already begun. It took the form of an agreement in December 1973 concerning the delimitation of the continental shelf between Greenland and Canada, and also of an exchange of scientists and the transmission of various types of information. For example, the results of the oceanographic research now being carried out on the west coast of Greenland by the *Lady Johnson II* will be communicated to Danish research teams, as are the data accumulated on Greenland by the Canada Centre for Remote-Sensing via the LANDSAT satellite. Moreover, researchers in both countries are planning a joint research project on the polar continental shelf.

The development of oil-exploration, which has already been started along the Greenland coasts by both Canada and Denmark, also raises the question of environmental protection. Joint measures must be considered to regulate shipping and deal with emergencies.

Greenland

But in the immediate future it is the problem of the status of Greenland that is of primary concern to both nations. By a 1953 amendment to the Danish Constitution, Greenland became an integral part of Denmark, the citizens of both territories having

thenceforth equal rights. By gaining the opportunity of taking part in general elections, the Greenlanders became aware of their peculiar problems and of the means at their disposal for influencing the policies that most affected them. At the same time, this change of status led to large-scale Danish immigration, which has since modified Greenland's political and social character. In 1965, for instance, 52 per cent of Greenland's revenue went to an 11 per cent minority born outside Greenland. Claims for greater equality were therefore inevitable. Two parties confronted one another on this question: those in favour of greater equality achieved by increasing Greenland's Danish character (known as the "Conservative Greenlanders") and the "Radical Greenlanders" who promote the "Greenlandification" of the territory. This debate could only lead, however, to a still clearer affirmation of the identity and heritage of Greenlanders.

The Danish Government, whose international policy made it impossible for the country to be accused of colonialism in Greenland, set up a committee to study the question in January 1973. This "Home Rule Committee" submitted a preliminary report in 1975 in which it recommended that the *Landsrat* should be responsible for the internal administration of the territory and should possess real legislative powers for this purpose. The Committee had ruled out the possibility of Greenland's complete independence in the immediate future, but did not reject it as a distant objective. On a short-term basis, foreign policy, defence, the police, health and communications would be administered jointly with Denmark and financed by the latter. The *Landsrat* would assume immediate responsibility for economic development, education, cultural affairs, and hunting and fishing in territorial waters, tourism, criminal law and control of mines and resources. Home rule will come into effect on April 1, 1979.

Though favourable in principle to "devolution," the Danish Government is anxious to control the development of mining and oil resources, as well as certain renewable resources such as fishing, that it considers necessary for its own economic development and for the financing of home rule. For its part, the *Landsrat*, by a unanimous resolution adopted in the fall of 1975, claims exclusive ownership of all resources of the subsoil for the benefit of the permanent population of Greenland.

This conflict, whose progress concerns Canada in various ways, especially from the strategic and economic points of view (there is a Canadian company established in Greenland), must also be seen within the

more general context of the growing sense of identity of Arctic peoples that has been manifest for a number of years. This sense of identity has been shown, for instance, by closer East-West contacts between the different groups in the area. Furthermore, a permanent association uniting all these populations – the “Inuit Circumpolar Association” – has been set up with a permanent secretariat. The Greenlanders themselves, in particular, want closer relations with the Canadian Eskimos.

Denmark and Canada are in favour of these contacts and have even contributed to their financing. However, the situation obviously forces them increasingly to align their policies on the problems of social, economic and political development of the Arctic peoples. Models that will be used in

one country are likely to influence the other especially as regards its political organization. Denmark hopes, moreover, to benefit from Canada's experience, which is more advanced than its own in this field – for instance, in all questions relating to the housing and social-security problems of the Eskimos.

In addition to the problem of managing the Arctic's natural resources, the human and therefore political – problem that faces Canada and Denmark simultaneously, the sense of the identity of the local populations, will lead the two countries into even closer co-operation, which will give other aspects of their bilateral relations – particularly their respective European policies – an entirely new dimension.

Inequalities and conflicts in contemporary Africa

By Timothy M. Shaw

Africa has always been characterized by great diversity; it is now also characterized by growing inequality. It has always included a rich variety of religions; it now includes a growing group of ideologies. And it has always experienced conflict as well as co-operation in its international relations; as the prospects of unity continue to recede, the level of interstate violence has increased. The elusiveness of equality, cohesion and peace on the continent has produced new paradoxes in African affairs; these have now reached contradictory proportions.

The disarray and misgiving apparent as Africa approaches the end of its second decade of recaptured “independence” do not inspire optimism about the future of the

continent as a whole. The fictions of equality and unity seem increasingly hollow as Africa moves towards its third decade of dependence and uneven growth. The current realities of pan-Africanism stand in sharp contrast to the rhetoric of independence and development characteristic of earlier, more hopeful years. Initially, tensions on the continent were related to frequent *coup d'état* and border tensions, which were essentially struggles for power and prestige. Current and future conflicts, however, are likely to be more structural and persistent, rooted in emerging contradictions. To the extent they will be more difficult either to resolve or to eliminate.

Inequality and conflict tend to be related in Africa as elsewhere. Because of uneven development, African states are becoming more unequal both among and within themselves; the gap between rich and poor is growing both internationally and domestically. And because of the new characteristics of conflict on the continent, the opposition between “radical” and “conservative” states is leading to common coalitions, whether the issue is Angola or Shaba, the Horn of Africa or the Western Sahara. Moreover, inequality and conflict cannot be separated in Africa from the structure and nature of broader world politics.

Dr Shaw is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Dalhousie University, where he is currently serving as Director of the Centre for African Studies. He is the author of several essays on Africa's international relations and is co-editor (with Kenneth A. Heard) of Co-operation and Conflict in Southern Africa (1976) and Politics of Africa: Dependence and Development (1978). He has taught at universities in Uganda and Zambia. The views expressed here are those of Dr Shaw.

es; the great and middle powers outside the continent have a profound impact on Africa's economies and tensions, as do corporations and churches, the external media and diverse interest groups. Nevertheless, the growing complexity of international politics in Africa itself cannot conceal the underlying trend towards inequality and conflict on that continent.

Notable successes

Despite its contemporary disunity and inequality, Africa has achieved some notable successes during its first two decades of independence, particularly as regards identity, culture and sport. But achievements such as "Festac", all-Africa trade fairs and the Pan-African Games tend to be overshadowed by the unevenness of development, the destruction of unity and the resurgence of interstate conflict. Continental transnational links, no matter how friendly, fail to counterbalance economic and strategic issues in which cohesion is much more problematic.

Africa still retains, however, a degree of unity in its extracontinental relations, as, for instance, in the United Nations or in negotiations with the European Economic Community. Nevertheless, the common front apparent in multilateral relations – as in the "New International Economic Order" debate – has not excluded a great diversity of postures, and results in bilateral deals when individual states needed aid or capital, loans or access. The African caucus, despite its extracontinental activities, has neither prevented the widening of economic disparities on the continent nor reduced the level of conflict. The intentions and resolutions of the Organization of African Unity remain lofty, but the OAU has not been able to secure development and peace through either extraregional advocacy or intraregional diplomacy. And, as the African system has come to include more states, so the inequalities and diversities among them have multiplied.

The OAU is still by far the largest regional organization in the number of its members (49), but recent admissions indicate growing disparities within the African community. In 1976, Angola was finally admitted to the Organization (after liberation and civil and diplomatic wars), as was the island state of Seychelles. Djibouti has now joined as well, thus increasing the potential for conflict-escalation and coalition-formation in the Horn of Africa. Clearly, Angola's own development prospects are considerable – particularly as regards oil, minerals, agricultural products and manufacturing – compared to those of either Seychelles or Djibouti. The eventual inde-

pendence of Zimbabwe and Namibia – to say nothing of the future of South Africa – will only increase such disparities.

Three other new "states" have not been admitted to the OAU. The controversial declarations of independence of the Transkei, Bophuthatswana and Sahara over the last two years are also indicative of growing tensions on the continent. The two "homelands" created in South Africa's attempt to make *apartheid* respectable through "decolonization" have been recognized only by the parent regime in Pretoria. In contrast to this diplomatic isolation by African and other countries, the Sahara Arab Democratic Republic has been recognized as a legitimate government by some radical African states; but it has not been accepted by the OAU. All three pariahs have produced diplomatic and border issues that cannot be dissociated from the activities of liberation movements in the Sahara and in southern Africa.

Resources

The other major cause of growing inequality between states – aside from such additions to their numbers – has been the uneven distribution of resources on the continent. The OAU is not only the largest regional organization in the world, it includes the largest grouping of least-developed, most-seriously-affected and landlocked countries. Furthermore, it contains members of the Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries (OPEC) and other states with considerable production and resources of energy, minerals, primary products and manufacturing. Indeed, the rapid rise in the price of oil and related commodities such as fertilizer, food and machinery has intensified inequalities, as resource-rich states have been able to weather the global recession while others have gone rapidly into serious debt. The coincidence of drought in the Sahel has further aggravated these emerging inequalities.

Because of dependence, inflation, debt and unfavourable terms of trade, the Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Africa lamented recently, "there has been no marked improvement in many African economies since 1960". "The African economy," he added, "today still exhibits all the characteristics of underdevelopment. And, compared with the other regions of the world, Africa has fared worst." Dr Adebayo Adedeji also pointed out that there was "increasing economic disparity among African countries".

So, while less than a quarter of the continent's states have enjoyed reasonable rates of economic growth, most have suf-

Inequalities intensified by rapid rise in oil price

ferred from either minimal or negative rates of expansion. The minority have benefited from the higher prices of oil and uranium, coffee and tea, while the majority have become more dependent on foreign food and finance. Growth, which has always been elusive in Africa, has recently become highly problematic for all but a few resource-rich states. And even in many of these – Gabon, Ivory Coast, Libya, Nigeria, Zaire – growth has not necessarily led to development but rather to the emergence of a new class more interested in immediate consumption than in saving. Different growth-rates and uneven development both within and among states have produced on the continent a diversity of ideologies and development strategies.

The basic choice facing African leaders is whether to continue with the orthodox outward-looking development strategy or to disengage by pursuing a more inward-looking strategy. These two approaches largely coincide with either (1) the perpetuation of the essentially capitalist economic structure inherited at independence or (2) the attempt to transform the established political economy by adopting some form of socialism. The former strategy consists basically of continuing integration into the world economy (which is still dominated by Western countries and corporations), whereas the latter involves a greater degree of national self-reliance. One supplementary form of the second type of strategy is collective self-reliance, or an attempt to increase trade, financial, communications and cultural links within Africa and the Third World rather than along traditional North-South, European-African lines.

Most African regimes have chosen some form of association with the capitalist world, and several have enjoyed high rates of economic growth because of their openness – Gabon, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Nigeria and Senegal in particular. Any attempt to introduce socialism becomes difficult and protracted, involving simultaneous confrontations with both internal *entrepreneurs* and external forces. Nevertheless, a few African leaders have pursued a non-capitalist path with determination – in Algeria, Guinea, Somalia and Tanzania and now in Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique. This expanding group has preferred a slower but surer rate of development to a more unstable, export-led growth, in which a country's role and riches are largely determined by the international division of labour.

Different growth-rates, resource-endowments and international associations have intensified the ideological differences both within and among African states; and

the need for external support, both political and economic, has served to make many of them even more vulnerable to foreign pressure. "Neo-colonialism" through Western agencies is a familiar condition, but dependence is no longer a capitalist monopoly. Economic and strategic crises on the continent have led to growing reliance on the Eastern bloc as well – particularly the Soviet Union and its allies. But the definition and implications of "Afro-Communism" still remain in doubt. And, just as several African regimes have terminated their links with the West, others are now experiencing in breaking ties with the East. Friendship treaties are rarely eternal.

No coups

Despite the growth of internal inequality and ideological diversity, the era of *coups* in Africa seems to have passed, though perhaps only for the time being; at any rate, the number of successful *coups d'état* has recently decreased. This seeming paradox may be explained in part by the trend towards political monopolies on the continent exercised by one-party, no-party, military or one-man regimes. Authoritarian rule, which discourages participation, has served to control or suppress ethnic, racial, religious and regional differences inside many African states, as well as to contain the results of social stratification and ideological factionalism. Political order may be a prerequisite for, but is no guarantee of economic and social justice; stability has sometimes been achieved at the expense of some individual freedoms, in Africa as elsewhere.

As President Nyerere noted recently in a speech entitled "Destroying World Poverty":

In poor countries, if there is a clash between individual freedom and economic development, it is generally not possible to give priority to the former. . . . The most basic human right of all is the right to life itself, and a life which is not made miserable by hunger, ignorance or preventable disease. So the notion of human rights has to be redefined in the context of underdevelopment, basic (physical) needs being accorded a greater emphasis than others. Moreover, African states have been generous in their treatment of the world's largest group of refugees – over one million scattered throughout the continent.

The relative absence of late of *coups* may also be related to some innovative political experiments taking place in a few African states. These involve essentially a return to limited democratic practices without undermining either political stability or

*Association
with capitalist
world system
chosen by most*

economic growth. Plans for (semi-) civilian regimes in Ghana and Nigeria, for three-party competitions in Senegal and Egypt, and for "people's democracies" in Angola and Mozambique are novel variations on the characteristic one-party, or "praetorian", governments already familiar in Africa. In the short-to-medium term, such "constitutional engineering" may be able to contain growing internal inequalities and ideological tensions.

In the longer term, such remedies are unlikely to prevent instability and *coups* unless significant redistribution of resources takes place within some sort of socialist framework. And the pressures for a more radical ideology and structure are likely to grow if the emerging independent states of southern Africa follow the example of Mozambique rather than that of Kenya. The radical grouping in the OAU has been considerably augmented by the independence of Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and Angola after lengthy liberation struggles. If the white "siege mentality" now prevalent in the southern part of the continent further delays the transition to majority rule in Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa, the new black governments will tend to favour socialism rather than mixed economies. In view of the substantial economic and military capabilities of these future states, their inclusion in the radical faction of the OAU would have significant implications for the "radicalization" of the continent as a whole.

External violence

At the international level, in contrast to most domestic situations in Africa, conflict has been neither contained nor resolved; indeed, external violence appears to have increased as internal tensions have been restrained. The OAU was designed to maintain order on the continent by recognizing the independence, equality and sovereignty of its members. Moreover, it was intended to advance African unity and autonomy. But the jealousy of new nationalisms has prevented these two sets of goals from being realized. Instead, Africa's consensual foreign policy has tended to dissolve in practice, except at the most general level of rhetoric.

Through the OAU, Africa seeks liberation in southern and northern Africa and development through a "new international order". But, in reality, the "Front-Line States" in the south and the Sadat initiative in the north have tended to undermine continental understandings. The Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe and the Rejectionist Front over Palestine both oppose negotiated "internal" solutions, so dividing the OAU

and the Arab League. The exchange of support over both issues between these two regional organizations and the attempt to equate *apartheid* with Zionism were central themes in the Afro-Arab dialogue. Moreover, OPEC "petro-dollars" could (still) have a profound effect both on economic prospects in Africa and on the Third World position in the debate on a "New International Economic Order". However, the dialogue has floundered somewhat as Arab beneficence has been limited and as political coalitions and ideological divisions have once again cut across the Sahara to link "moderates" and "radicals" throughout the continent. Such divisions have been reinforced by the several conflicts – both bilateral and multilateral – at present raging throughout Africa.

The reappearance of a significant number of bilateral conflicts in Africa is a reflection of growing international inequality and ideological schism. The border fighting and border-closings in East Africa – between Uganda and Kenya and between Tanzania and Kenya – were the visible signs of deep-seated mistrust, envy and disagreement. Kenya, the regional "success story", aroused animosity in Uganda, where Amin's "economic war" had failed, and in a Tanzania suffering from drought and decline. The ideological component was of even greater significance in the bilateral disputes between Egypt and Libya and Sudan and Libya, in which the Gaddafi regime attempted unsuccessfully to undermine the authority and orientation of the Sadat and Numeiri Governments. The continuing Algeria-Morocco tension is also due to ideological differences as well as to conflicting territorial interests. The intensity and frequency of so-called boundary disputes is particularly high along the "southern border" of Africa as both the "Front-Line States" (especially Angola, Zambia and Mozambique) and the liberation movements attempt to penetrate the remnants of the white laager; in turn, the wagon ring hits back at bases in the black states.

Many of these bilateral disputes are often related to broader regional and extra-regional conflicts and coalitions; and each of the regional conflicts is itself related to other such conflicts. For instance, though the Algeria-Morocco dispute has gone on for over a decade, it has been revived in the mid-1970s because of the Sahara question. The division of the former Spanish Sahara between Morocco and Mauritania was opposed both by Polisario, the Sahraoui liberation movement, and by Algeria, along with a few other Moslem and/or radical regimes. Morocco and Mauritania were, in turn, supported by the majority of OAU members,

*Bilateral battles
reflect
growing
international
inequality*

as well as by several Western interests, particularly through President Giscard d'Estaing's campaign against "radical" Algerian influence in *francophone* Africa.

Similar coalitions have tended to be formed to support the antagonists in related regional conflicts such as those in Angola, the Horn of Africa and Shaba. Clearly, the rebellion in Zaire's Shaba province was one by-product of the Angolan civil war and Zaire's mischievous role in it, as well as a result of indigenous dissatisfaction with Mobutu's permissive rule of *embourgeoisement*. If the MPLA has held on to power in Angola because of Cuban and Russian support, so Mobutu – having backed the FNLA and supported secession in the Cabinda enclave – has retained power because of Moroccan, Egyptian and French support. And Moroccan and Egyptian interest in Shaba reflects their mutual opposition to the common interests of Algeria and Libya in the Sahara and the Horn, as well as the bilateral disputes of both of them along the Mediterranean coast. Such tacit coalitions involving African and extra-African countries are reminiscent of the earlier period of African international relations in which the Casablanca, Brazzaville and Monrovia blocs jockeyed for influence and membership.

*Regional
integration
advocated
as pathway
to development*

Horn of Africa

The situation in the Horn is even more complex because of the role of the Eritrean and Somali liberation movements and because of the U.S.S.R.'s apparently precipitate switch from socialist Somalia to revolutionary Ethiopia. Moreover, as the radical Arab states now tend to support the Derge in Ethiopia rather than the liberation movements in Eritrea or the Ogaden, Egypt, Sudan, Saudi Arabia and Iran have begun to provide assistance to the anti-Derge forces. With the demise of Soviet-Cuban plans for a socialist-oriented federation around the Red Sea, the "anti-Communist" Middle Eastern members of OPEC hope to make it an "Arab Lake" rather than a "Red Sea" in the political sense.

Bilateral Egyptian-Libyan and Sudanese-Libyan disputes cannot be separated from the role of each of these countries in antagonistic coalitions in the Horn or differences over Shaba and the Sahara. And the interests of France in Djibouti and Morocco, those of the Soviet Union in Libya, Uganda and South Yemen and those of the United States in Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Iran serve both to intensify and to link these "regional" issues. Meanwhile, after conflicts in the Sahara and the Horn, OAU insistence on the inviolability of inherited borders – which have now been subject to invasions, not just

clashes – looks rather threadbare. And the Organization's claim to exclude external powers – whether super-powers, middle powers (eg. France, Iran) or Third World states (eg. Cuba) – has been further belied. As Peter Enahoro, one of Africa's leading political commentators, noted in a year-end review, "1977 was Africa's year on the calendar of international power politics: his "political horoscope" for 1978 consisted largely of a continuation of these conflicts and compromises.

Nor can the increase of interrelated conflicts in Africa be separated from the demise of regionalism. Regional integration had been advocated as a pathway to both peace and development. African statesmen have often expressed their confidence in regional as well as continental unity. The decay of the East African Community – Africa's oldest and most advanced regional grouping – has shocked and saddened many leaders, as well as exacerbated bilateral conflicts among the three ex-members. However, new regional associations – both single and multipurpose – continue to rise Phoenix-like from the ashes of other institutions. The Mano River Union, Egyptian-Sudanese links, the Economic Community of the Great Lakes and embryonic ties between Tanzania, Mozambique and Zambia all illustrate residual confidence in the regional approach.

The largest and most ambitious new regional institution is the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) which stretches from Mauritania and Senegal to Nigeria and Niger and includes the Entente, Mano River and other sub-groupings. It also spans linguistic, ideological, cultural and religious divides and could emerge as a very cosmopolitan and pluralistic community. Its core consists of the three major states of the region, each of which dominates its respective hinterland – Senegal, Ivory Coast and Nigeria. The presence of this trio – Nigeria is clearly *primus inter pares* – may serve to avoid some of the problems caused in other regional groupings by a single dominant state or city. But the appearance of difficulties associated with the emergence of "sub-imperialism" in Africa is inseparable from the problems of regionalism and the growth of inequality.

Regional and continental politics in Africa are increasingly dominated by a few "sub-imperial" powers that – in part because of their essentially symbiotic relations with external interests – are able to exercise a local hegemony similar to that of the great powers on a world scale. In general, Africa's leading states are either the resource-rich or those most permissive towards foreign states and corporations and

both. The resource-rich "sub-imperial" states include Algeria and Nigeria (and Zimbabwe and South Africa); states that serve as regional centres for corporations and communications include Egypt, Kenya, Ivory Coast and Senegal. Other potential sub-imperial states include Angola, the Sudan, Zaire and Zambia.

International and internal inequalities, as we have noted, tend to be related, and most sub-imperial states, in particular, are characterized by growing internal stratification. This is especially true of those countries that have adopted a more outward-looking, capitalist style of development strategy. Their brand of nationalism generally eschews socialism but insists on greater local participation in corporate activities by the new *élite*. Capital-intensive manufacturing, growing service-sectors, access to "Euro-dollar" credits, and growing "agribusiness" activities are signs of such an orientation.

So far, sub-imperial, or "go-between", states have largely exerted a regional dominance over economic issues and within the essentially "Western" world order. In the future, however, sub-imperial countries may become influential in the ideological or strategic spheres (for example, a grouping of socialist states in Central Africa or Nigerian military supremacy in West Africa) and sub-imperialism may occur within the socialist world as well (for example, Algeria and Angola might be candidates) despite Soviet dilemmas in northeast Africa.

In any event, the widening of external and internal inequalities in Africa has profound implications for the future of the continent. They make the adoption of a consensual foreign policy or a collective continental ideology less likely. They retard both regional and continental unity. And they make the achievement of collective self-reliance and autonomy problematic, with profound implications for the peoples of Africa. As Mwalimu Nyerere of Tanzania has recently noted, in something of an understatement: "The present economic order governing international production,

development and exchange does not in practice ensure progress towards meeting those basic human needs for all people, all over the world."

Unless internal changes reduce domestic stratification or external changes result in a "New International (Economic) Order", the prospects for peace and development in Africa are not particularly promising. The revival of tacit and ideological coalitions and the appearance of sub-imperialism, in economic and potentially strategic issues, along with the variety of development strategies, all make the quest for unity and development elusive. And without integration and equality international and internal conflict is likely to continue.

Africa's division into Third and Fourth World states and the harshness of *Realpolitik* in the late 1970s have further exposed the pretence of Pan-Africanism. "Decolonization", along with recent changes in the global economy, has had an ambivalent impact on the continent, producing greater inequality and conflict. The achievement of a *Pax Africana* characterized by development and unity appears to be as elusive as ever despite good intentions and grand dreams.

In conclusion, it is worth while noting the caution of Dr Adedeji of the Economic Commission for Africa about the rather unpromising future for the continent as a whole:

Africa cannot afford to continue to perform in the field of development during the next decade or two at the same rate as it has performed in the last 15 years or so. If it does, the Africa region will be a much poorer relation of the rest of the world than it is now.

He warns, moreover, that, unless there are changes in economic strategy and structure, the ECA estimates "reveal the prospects of even greater disparities in income and levels of development among the countries". "The implications of these are clear and, of course, rather sombre," Dr. Adedeji concludes.

Limits of sovereignty. . .

Sir,

The article "Sovereignty over Natural Resources: Reality or Illusion" by Chambers and Reid published in the November-December 1977 issue raises some interesting points.

If the word is taken literally in the sense of supreme power, then each nation does have sovereignty over its natural resources, in that basically it is free to produce or not to produce. The situation is, of course, somewhat different when we consider such factors as control over economic viability. A nation will have less than complete control over economic viability as outside parties become involved in one or more stages of the cycle – from financing to production, marketing and consuming. Each party in the cycle, including the nation itself, will only agree to proceed if economic gains – whether in the form of cash profits, more employment, etc. – are foreseen.

Thus, while the nation state does have supreme power in the sense that it is the party that has the final say on whether or not a particular project proceeds, its control over the economic gain it receives from the project is a function of the number of outside parties involved and the terms they impose to take part in the project. These outside parties may be of course, not only multinational enterprises but also international institutions, other nations, etc.

The developing countries are particularly vulnerable to this situation because, of necessity, they must involve outsiders in several of the stages of the cycle.

It is worth while noting, and of particular importance to the world supply/demand situation, that, once production is under way, there is a definite resistance to cut-backs or shutdowns in the face of low- or zero-profit levels, because the nation state is often measuring the "profit" in many different ways – such as foreign-exchange earnings, maintaining employment levels, etc. This situation appears to exist right now in the world copper and nickel industries.

In all of this there is a considerable danger for the Canadian mineral industry. Continuing low levels of metal prices will result in the closing of some of Canada's higher-cost mining operations and the diversion of investment either to other countries or to other sectors of the Canadian economy. Is much of the problem due to the fact that Canada has failed to some extent to move along in the natural order of economic development – from an initial dependence on natural-resource exports to the building of a manufacturing sector, until a broad-based economy evolves? Is it fair to say that we have used natural-resource export revenues to pay for consumer imports, rather than for the building of a broader-based economy? At present the Canadian mineral industry is being threatened as the least-developed countries maintain or increase their mineral production and reach trade agreements with our traditional trading partners, but isn't this problem likely to get worse as the LDCs integrate downstream into basic manufacturing?

What are Canada's alternatives in this situation? It seems to me that basically we have a choice between (a) resigning ourselves to the fact that at present a large portion of our domestic mineral industry is not competitive and allowing it to struggle on as best it can, and (b) attempting a basic change in strategy, to one of definitely encouraging those sectors in which we still have some underlying advantages, such as mining, and using the resulting benefits to encourage a change in the structure of our economy – rather than merely to maintain a high level of consumer imports.

At present we appear to be following course (a), although there are signs of a partial change towards (b). Course (b), while difficult to follow, particularly in view of the federal-provincial dialogue over the sharing of tax revenues, appears the logical route and probably entails not only an increase in the level of tax incentives but also some direct government involvement, at least initially. Perhaps we should think of such things as permitting a portion of exploration and development expenditures to be written off against other types of income at the same rate as is at present permitted against mining income. Perhaps a portion of mineral-industry tax incentives should only be permitted if the money is reinvested in the mineral industry, or in selected higher-technology industries. For example, earned depletion could be on a \$1-for-\$2 basis, but with only half being eligible for write-off against mining income and only half being eligible for write-off against selected higher-technology income.

The previous paragraph contains some possible moves that may prove impractical when considered in more detail. Essentially, all I am suggesting is that Canada can't really afford to allow its mineral industry to disappear, at least not in this century. However, it must recognize the growing challenge from the LDCs and switch to the higher-technology industries. Any incentives should be such as to encourage the mineral industry, as a sector where we have proved expertise, and also to encourage the use of profits arising from mineral-industry activities in the development of higher technology, rather than in the maintenance of what may prove to be an artificially-high standard of living.

C.G. Delbridge
Toronto

Oppenheimer preferred. . . .

Sr,

I have just read the article on South Africa by Christopher Young in your January/February 1978 issue. It is very dismaying to me to read such an emotional article written after "a first, brief visit to South Africa". Noting that the purpose of your journal is to stimulate discussion and that you are interested in material that expresses different views, I enclose for your consideration an address by Mr Harry Oppenheimer to the Foreign Policy Association in New York last October.

Harry Oppenheimer is a South African, probably the prime industrialist in that country, recognized all over the world; he is not a supporter of the National Party, and strongly opposes *apartheid*; nevertheless, his article gives a much less emotional, much more reasoned and truer picture of conditions in South Africa, and I hope you will find an opportunity to reprint it.

Rex F. Pearce
Toronto

Editor's note: Reprinting Mr Oppenheimer's speech would not be consistent with our editorial policy. Copies of the speech, however, are available from the Foreign Policy Association in New York City (price 50 cents). It is entitled "Prospects for Change in Southern Africa".

. . . . Young challenged

Sr,

In your January-February 1978 issue, you carried an article by Christopher Young on the "gagging of the press in South Africa". The main drift of the article was that South Africa was abandoning "any pretence of freedom of the press", that the trends in South Africa were "towards more repression - not less", that the time for talking might soon be over and that "civil war" might soon begin. Dire forebodings, indeed, illustrated by highly-emotive cartoons and photographs.

I should like to draw your readers' attention to the following points that emerged from Mr Young's article.

First, I hope that they noticed that Mr Young forthrightly declared where he stood on our affairs at the very beginning of the article. He stated that: "There is no longer much point in arguing the moral issues of South African policies."

Thus, at the very outset, he dismisses the value of any further debate on what surely must be one of the central issues of South African politics. He creates the impression that peoples' minds are made up, that their attitudes are inflexible.

Evidently, his mind might be "set against conversion", but it is unfair of him to ascribe such inflexibility to the vast majority of South Africans. One has but to open any South African newspaper or speak with any concerned South African of any race to become aware

of the vigorous national debate that centres precisely on the morality and practicality of South Africa's policies. It is almost impossible not to notice the intensity and openness with which we are searching for solutions to our extraordinarily complex problems.

Perhaps Mr Young did not notice this debate because, as he admits, his visit to South Africa was brief. The brevity of his visit did not, however, prevent him from reaching sweeping conclusions concerning our affairs or from ascribing to us racial attitudes we do not hold. It did not stop him from passing judgment on our press, based to a large extent on no less an authority than *Content*, "a Toronto monthly magazine devoted primarily to news and criticism of the Canadian media". He has much to say about our Afrikaans newspaper – but does Mr Young understand Afrikaans? Has he ever in his life actually read an Afrikaans newspaper?

It is hardly necessary for me to spring to the defence of the South African press. Indeed I am sure that our newspapers would be horrified at the prospect of a government official doing so. The South African press is quite capable of speaking for itself, as any of your readers who have ever seen a South African newspaper will be able to attest. There can, indeed, be few governments in the world that are criticized as persistently, as vehemently, and sometimes as irresponsibly, by the national press as is the South African Government.

Mr Young, nevertheless, accuses our Government of embracing "the more repressive methods of Communism" to suppress dissent in South Africa. Here, I should like to refer your readers to Moynihan's Law – so called after Daniel P. Moynihan's observation that the more voices we hear in a particular country protesting injustice the less repressive that country is likely to be. If Mr Young's charges are correct, how does he explain that every negative detail of Steve Biko's death was rigorously exposed in open court and relentlessly reported in the South African press? How does he explain that he himself was allowed to visit South Africa and to write so freely and negatively on our affairs, as so many of his colleagues also have done? How does he explain the caption to one of the photographs illustrating his own article, which reads: "At the stadium a succession of speakers condemned the South African Government and its security police". I suggest that Mr Young consult with someone who has firsthand experience of Communist and Third World countries to ascertain whether such manifestations would be tolerated in those societies.

Mr Young goes on to tell your readers that "the trends of policy are towards more repression". He completely ignores the far-reaching constitutional changes that are taking place in South Africa, the steps that have been taken away from racial discrimination, the narrowing of the wage gap and the reforms that are being made in respect of the urban blacks. He might conceivably differ with us with regard to the pace of these reforms, or even with regard to their underlying philosophy, but he cannot in all conscience pretend that there are not taking place or that they do not constitute progress.

Of course, Mr Young does not have to explain these developments, because he does not choose to mention them at all in his article. Like so many of his colleagues in the Western media, he has selected only those pieces of the South African mosaic that accord with the popular caricature of our country – a caricature that is likely to earn plenty of pats on the journalistic back but one that hardly helps the overseas public to understand what is *really* happening in our complex society.

Finally, there are Mr Young's gloomy prognostications concerning the possibility of civil war in South Africa. We reject this view. It is clearly in the overwhelming common interest of all peoples of South Africa that we should solve our problems peacefully. No one except radical interventionists and adventurers would welcome the terrible destruction that war would bring. Admittedly, our problems are complex, concerning as they do the mechanisms by which different peoples at different stages of economic development can live together amicably in a common geographic area. There is, however, a growing consensus that a viable solution must take into consideration the justifiable rights of *all* South African peoples. The search for, and the evolution of, such a solution is the theme of our ongoing national debate – a debate Mr Young appears not to have noticed during his brief visit to South Africa.

D.W. Steward
Chargé d'Affaires
Embassy of South Africa
Ottawa

Reference Section

Canadian Foreign Relations

Recent Books

Canada et le Québec sur la scène internationale. Under the direction of Paul Painchaud. Quebec: Laval University, Centre Québécois de Relations Internationales, 1977.
643 pp.

Northbertson, Brian

Canadian military independence in the age of the superpowers. Toronto: Fitzhenry and Whiteside, 1977.
282 pp.

Thuphin, Roma

The impact of free trade in Canada. Ottawa: Economic Council of Canada, 1978.
185 pp.

The future of the offshore: legal developments and Canadian business. Edited by Donald J. Patton, Clare Beckton and Douglas M. Johnston. Halifax: Dalhousie University, Centre for International Business Studies, 1977.
243 pp.

Millerton, Douglas H.

The dangerous delusion: Quebec's independence obsession. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1978.
240 pp.

Greenwood, Ted

Nuclear proliferation: motivations, capabilities, and strategies for control. (1980's project/Council on Foreign Relations) McGraw-Hill, 1977.
210 pp.

Harbron, John D.

Canada without Quebec. Don Mills: Musson, 1977.
164 pp.

Hill, Roger

Political consultation in NATO. Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1978. (Well-lesley Paper; 6/1978)
143 pp.

Hilmer, Norman, and Garth Stevenson

A foremost nation: Canadian foreign policy and a changing world. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977.
296 pp.

Law of the Sea Institute

Law of the sea: conference outcomes and problems of implementation; proceedings/Law of the Sea Institute tenth annual conference, June 22-25, 1976, University of Rhode Island, Kingston, Rhode Island. Edited by Edward Miles and J.K. Gamble. Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1977.
425 pp.

Easton, Richard A.

The defence of the undefended border: planning for war in North America 1867-1939. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1977.
300 pp.

Radwanski, George

Trudeau. Toronto: Macmillan, 1978.
372 pp.

Simeon, Richard E.

Must Canada fail? Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1977.
307 pp.

Tomlin, Brian W.

Canada's foreign policy: analysis and trends. Toronto: Methuen, 1978.
213 pp.

Wesson, Robert G.

Foreign policy for a new age. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977.
462 pp.

II. Recent Articles

Acker, Alison

"Blood on the balance sheet: the Chilean connection."
In *Canadian Forum* 58:15-18. April 1978.

Barros, James

"Alger Hiss and Harry Dexter White: the Canadian connection."
In *Orbis* 21:593-605 Fall 1977.

Britton, J.N.H.

"Locational perspectives on free trade for Canada."
In *Canadian Public Policy* 4:4-19 Winter 1978.

Cohen, Maxwell

"The régime of boundary waters - the Canadian-United States experience."
In *Académie de Droit international. Recueil des cours.* 146: 219-340 1975 III (published 1977).

Cuff, Robert, and J.L. Granatstein

"The rise and fall of Canadian-American free trade, 1947-8."
In *Canadian Historical Review* 58: 459-482 December 1977.

Denis, Jean-Emile, and Emmanuel Lindekens

"Perspective de coopération industrielle dans le contexte de l'accord cadre entre le Canada et les Communautés Européennes."
In *Revue d'Intégration européenne* 1:107-124 September 1977.

Gordon, Myron

"A world scale national corporation industrial strategy."
In *Canadian Public Policy* 4:46-56 Winter 1978.

Gotlieb, A.E.

"The incidental question revisited - theory and practice in the conflict of laws."
In *International and Comparative Law Quarterly* 26: 734-798 October 1977.

Gwyn, Sandra

"Where are you, Mike Pearson, now that we need you?: decline and fall of Canada's foreign policy."
In *Saturday Night* 93:27-35 April 1978.

Hunt, C.D.

"Canadian policy and the export of nuclear energy."
In *University of Toronto Law Journal* 27:69-104 Winter 1977.

Levy, David

"Canada is not Russia."
In *Spectator* 4 February 1978 pp. 9-10.

LoGalbo, John R.

"The Time and Reader's Digest Bill: C-58 and Canadian cultural nationalism."
In *New York University Journal of International Law and Politics* 9:237-75 Fall 1976.

Munton, Don, and Dale H. Poel

"Electoral accountability and Canadian foreign policy: the case of foreign investment."
In *International Journal* 33:217-247 Winter 1977-8.

Murchland, Bernard

"Quebec's politics of vengeance."
In *Worldview* 21:14-18 January-February 1978.

Ostman, Ronald

"The C.B.C.'s 'The world at six' looks at the U.S. - content analysis as an aid to understanding the media."
In *American Review of Canadian Studies* 7:33-50 Autumn 1977.

Page, Donald

"The Institute's 'popular arm': the League of Nations Society in Canada."
In *International Journal* 33:28-65 Winter 1977.

Philip, C.

"L'accord-cadre de coopération commerciale économique entre les Communautés européennes et le Canada."
In *Annuaire français de Droit international* 822-835 1976.

Smith, Burton

"The United States in recent Canadian nationalism."
In *World Affairs* 140:195-205 Winter 1978.

"Southeast Asia: Canada's untapped market."

In *Econoscope* Vol. 2 No. 3 March 1978 pp. 13-14.

Stairs, Denis

"Public opinion and external affairs: reflection on the domestication of Canadian foreign policy."
In *International Journal* 33:128-149 Winter 1977-8.

Thakur, Ramesh C.

"Change and continuity in Canadian foreign policy."
In *India Quarterly* 33:401-418 October/December 1977.

SUBSCRIPTION ORDER FORM

International Perspectives

Published bimonthly, subscription rates Canada, \$4.00 a year; other countries \$5.00 a year.


Name

Address

Country **Postal/Zip Code**

**Please make your remittance, in Canadian Funds, payable to
The Receiver General of Canada and mail to:**

**Printing and Publishing,
Supply & Services Canada,
Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, K1A 0S9**



If undelivered,
return cover only to:
DSS Printing Operations
Ottawa, K1A 0S7, Canada

En cas de non-livraison,
retourner cette couverture seulement au:
Ministère des Approvisionnements
et Services-Imprimerie
Ottawa, K1A 0S7, Canada



External Affairs
Canada

Affaires extérieures
Canada

ISSN 0381-4874

uly / August 1978

International Perspectives

91
4
I56

Portrait of Norman Robertson

Human rights and world affairs

Belgrade review conference

Water shortages are coming

Ethiopia after the Empire

Search for nuclear safeguards

International Perspectives

Contents

July / August 1978

Portrait of Norman Robertson / <i>Douglas LePan</i>	3
Human rights	
Emergence into international relations / <i>Geoffrey Pearson</i>	9
Impact on the process of <i>détente</i> / <i>Adam Bromke</i>	12
GCE Review Conference	
Human rights on agenda / <i>John Best</i>	16
Success or failure / <i>H. Gordon Skilling</i>	19
Canadian-American relations	
Hard realities behind the rhetoric / <i>Don Munton</i>	23
Water shortages are coming / <i>Robert James McGavin</i>	27
An American looks at Canada / <i>Donald Nuechterlein</i>	31
Ethiopia after the Empire / <i>Marc Parent</i>	35
Canada's search for nuclear safeguards / <i>John J. Noble</i>	42
Reference section	48

International Perspectives is issued bimonthly in English and French by the Department of External Affairs, Ottawa. Any material in this publication may be reproduced. Mention of *International Perspectives* as the source would be appreciated.

Published by authority of the
Secretary of State for External Affairs.

Authorized as third-class mail,
Post Office Department, Ottawa.

Subscription rates: Canada, \$4.00 a year, single copies \$1.00; other countries \$5.00 a year, single copies \$1.25. Remittances, payable to the Receiver General of Canada, should be sent to: Printing and Publishing, Supply & Services Canada, Ottawa, Ontario, K1A 0S9.

Editors:

Alex I. Inglis
Louis Balthazar

International Perspectives is a journal of opinion on Canada's role in the world and on current international questions. Its purpose is to stimulate discussion and interest in international affairs. It is not intended to reflect Canadian Government policy or perceptions. Indeed, the editors often seek to include material that expresses different or contrary views. The Department of External Affairs accepts no responsibility for the views expressed except where it is clearly stated that an article by a departmental officer is a statement of Government policy. All other articles contain a specific disclaimer of departmental responsibility for their contents.

Letters of comment on issues discussed in *International Perspectives* are welcome and will be considered for publication. Please address your correspondence to International Perspectives, Department of External Affairs, L. B. Pearson Bldg. 125 Sussex Drive, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, K1A 0G1.

Portrait of Norman Robertson

Douglas LePan

One of Norman Robertson's favourite quotations was the remark by Dr Johnson that: "In lapidary inscriptions a man is not upon earth". There have been many lapidary inscriptions about him – at his death, when he retired from the diplomatic service, when he left London at the end of his second term as Canadian High Commissioner there, when he received an honorary degree from Cambridge. I have composed a few such inscriptions about him myself. But the purpose of this essay is rather different. It is intended to be more intimate and personal. And I certainly regard myself as being upon earth!

What has been recorded memorially about him is that he was superbly intelligent; that he was highly literate; that, over and above that, he had a brooding humanity and compassion that he could use to interfere imaginatively and illumine almost any issue in international affairs, and particularly any economic issue; that he could command a seemingly inexhaustible fund of political and economic device. All that is true, I believe – profoundly true. But behind this impressive, almost marmoreal, presence commemorated was to be found a remarkable creature who was more human, more fallible, more various than those generalizations, accurate though they are, would suggest. Whenever I think of Norman Robertson (and I often do), I think of him standing up and down in his vast office overlooking Trafalgar Square, excited with some new idea or some possible solution to an apparently intractable problem, combining in his talk fragments of economic analysis with literary allusion in a unique and sometimes nebulous mixture, stopping only to spit into his handkerchief from his already ravaged lungs, and then resuming the chase, while I tagged along behind; both literally and figuratively, trying as best I could to keep up – esteemed partly for myself, I think, but perhaps even more because I was not entirely thrown off the scent either by the economic analysis or by the literary allusions. Or I think of him in a series of informal meetings we held in 1947 and 1948 with Sir Stafford Cripps, when he was Chancellor of the Exchequer, and with a few of his senior officials. Norman would

mix the dry martinis himself, very strong dry martinis, and I would pass them about. The conversation would continue over dinner and for hour after hour afterwards. And then, when it was over and the guests had departed, Norman would suggest very gently (for by this time, at least, he wrote very little himself) that I should prepare a memorandum of the conversation in the morning. I would leave the hotel in a haze shot through with something like panic and would almost collapse as I was met by the cold night air blowing across Hyde Park. Or I think of him sitting relaxed, and Buddha-like, and with a brow as bare and broad as Shakespeare's in the Droeshout engraving, in his office down the hallway in the East Block when he was Secretary to the Cabinet and Clerk of the Privy Council and I was Mr Pearson's Special Assistant and I would come to consult him on some issue that was arising in Cabinet, or some problem that was perplexing the Department, or some subject that Mr Pearson was intending to deal with in public; and he would as often as not come up with a solution from the wealth of his experience and reading, and in the process would unobtrusively instruct me in how principle and shrewdness were both required in the formation of policy and how enthusiasm needed to be tempered by knowledge of the political situation and the political possibilities. Any conversation with him became almost inevitably part of one's continuing education in the art of policy-making in a democracy.

Political masters

To write of Norman Robertson's relations with his political masters – with ministers and with political parties, that is – would take not one essay but several. But there are some matters that I should like to set straight.

Professor LePan is University Professor at Massey College, University of Toronto. He was formerly a member of the Department of External Affairs, where he worked closely with Norman Robertson. This article, which contains the views of Professor LePan, is based on a paper presented at Government House.

*Dry martinis
conversation
and memoranda*

It is often thought that virtually all the most senior civil servants in Ottawa during the Second World War and through the post-War period were partisan Liberals. As a generalization, I believe that to be shaky in the extreme. As applied to Norman Robertson, I know it to be false. It is true that he was appointed to the Department of External Affairs in 1929 by Mackenzie King. But it is also true that he served as loyally and conscientiously under the governments of R.B. Bennett and John Diefenbaker as he did under the governments of Mackenzie King, Louis St Laurent and L.B. Pearson. To have acted otherwise would have seemed to him a stain on his honour as a civil servant, which he took very seriously. Incidentally, he once confided in me that he always had himself inscribed in his diplomatic passport as a "civil servant", rather than as a "diplomat", a small but significant fact that says a good deal about him, as I shall try to illustrate later. It is also relevant that there was no Secretary of State for External Affairs for whom he had a warmer regard or under whom he served more happily than Howard Green, the Conservative M.P. for Vancouver-Quadra.

The reason why he is often thought of as a Liberal, I suppose, is that the period of his greatest influence and importance coincided with the period when he served Mackenzie King most closely, from January 1941, when he succeeded O.D. Skelton as Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, until September 1946, when he became High Commissioner in London. Indeed, during that period there were few individuals, if any, who were closer to the Prime Minister or saw him more constantly than Norman Robertson. But it would be mistaken to assume from the closeness of that relationship that it was accompanied by personal or partisan commitment. On that point I can offer some direct evidence to the contrary.

When Mackenzie King died in July of 1950, Norman and Jetti Robertson were staying with my wife and myself at my parents' summer place on an island a little north of Pointe-au-Baril in Georgian Bay. The day the news arrived, Norman and I had gone by outboard-motor the mile or two to the general store to get the mail and gas and groceries. It was there that he received word of Mackenzie King's death and of the arrangements for the funeral and learnt that he was to be a literary executor, as well as honorary pall-bearer. Clearly he would have to return to Ottawa without delay. But in the meantime we went back to the island. After I had started the motor and it had stopped coughing and kicking, I turned to Norman and made the kind of anodyne remark about

the late Prime Minister that the circumstances seemed to require. I will never forget his reply. He said quite simply "I never saw a touch of greatness in him". That remark, coming from someone in such a good position to judge, has stayed with me ever since and has inevitably coloured my view of all the assessments that have been made over the years of Mackenzie King as man and leader.

Other countries

I realize that I should also say at least a little about his attitudes towards other countries and particularly towards other countries that loomed large in Canada's foreign relations during the period when he had responsibility for them at one post or another. My starting-point is the belief that almost all diplomats, in my experience, however hotly they might deny it, however manfully they may struggle against it, are prejudiced, and often deeply prejudiced against one country or another. They are anti-American, or anti-French, or anti-British, or anti-Arab, or anti-Israeli. Norman Robertson was one of the very few diplomats of my acquaintance in whom I could never detect any of that kind of underlying prejudice. If his term as Ambassador in Washington was not the happiest period in his career, I could never find any trace of anti-Americanism in him. That should not be surprising in one who had studied at the Brookings Institution and who had taught not once but twice, at Harvard, returning on his own request in 1933-1934 on a year's leave of absence. In London he was completely at ease; and I doubt whether relations between government departments in Ottawa and in Whitehall have ever been closer than they were during his two terms as High Commissioner. What may not be so well known is that he felt almost equally at ease and at home in Paris. I was with him there in the late fall of 1958 for a meeting of the North Atlantic Council and for a meeting afterwards of Canadian heads of mission in Europe. We found time for walks together through the city, and I was constantly being surprised by his knowledge of what had happened in this or that *arrondissement*, of what famous writer or musician had lived in this street or that. And he enjoyed his holidays more than those he spent with his old friend, Darsie Gillie, who for many years was Paris correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian* and had a flat on the Île St Louis.

What about his attitude towards the Soviet Union, it may be asked. On that too I do not feel myself sufficiently qualified to be categorical. But, looking back, it seems to me that he was only as anti-Soviet as he was forced to be by events. There, too, his fun-

*Few individuals
were closer
to Prime Minister*

mental predisposition was one of sympathy. In nature and temperament he was not against any country. And that, in my opinion, is a quality almost as rare among diplomats as it is valuable.

More Canadian

It might be suggested that that quality in him was connected with a certain vein of cosmopolitanism. An essayist with more room for nuance at his disposal than I have might find some truth in that suggestion. But it seems to me of little importance. For he was far more profoundly a Canadian than he was a cosmopolitan. How many Canadian diplomats know almost from week to week what the prospects are for the Prairie wheat crop? Norman Robertson did. How many Canadian diplomats know from month to month what the carryover is? Norman Robertson did. How many Canadian diplomats can find fascination in reading the *Canadian Statistical Review*? Norman Robertson could. How many Canadian diplomats can guess fairly accurately from the bare figures to be found there what the economic situation is likely to be in Cape Breton or Prince Edward Island or Sorel or St-Hyacinthe or Sudbury or Kelowna? Norman Robertson could. He knew this country intimately, and loved it in a way that is only possible for someone with such intimate knowledge of it, and, in my experience, never failed to relate his policy recommendations to what he believed its best interest to be. He was far from being immune to the attractions provided by allowances and servants and limousines, to the "spoils" provided by the diplomatic system to those serving abroad – particularly to those serving as heads of mission. He frankly welcomed his postings abroad as a relief from the daily servitude of being Under-Secretary for External Affairs or Secretary to the Cabinet. He was no O.D. Skelton, for whom distance from the centres of power in Ottawa would have seemed almost inconceivable. But he regarded service abroad as being merely another means of continuing his work to promote Canadian interests in a different setting and a different milieu. It always excited him, I remember, when an opportunity arose to serve those interests directly and tangibly. One such occasion occurred during his first term in London, when he was asked to help sell Canadian *North Stars* to the British Overseas Airways Corporation (as it was then) and so keep open the Canadair plant in Montreal. He threw himself into that effort as though his life depended on it.

I also remember very vividly the reply he would make to British ministers or officials whenever they attempted to inveigle

Canada into the sterling area by dwelling on our economic problems, either real or apprehended. "I wouldn't exchange our problems for those of any other country in the world," he would say as he courteously showed his visitor to the door. So long as the spirit of Norman Robertson remains strong in the Department, there can never be any risk of its becoming a haven for those who dislike their own country or their own countrymen and want to escape from it into the company of such few other Canadians as they believe to have a sensibility as fastidious as their own.

It was a weakness in him, of course, that he spoke no French; and I do not intend to try to minimize it either by relating it to the very different circumstances that obtained in Ottawa when he first became a civil servant from those that prevail today or by explaining it in terms of a certain motor ineptness in his physical constitution that always prevented him from driving a car, for example. But I think it is fair to set beside that undoubted deficiency the equally undoubted fact that he was almost as widely read in French literature as he was in English. It is also fair to record that he did what he modestly could to promote bilingualism among younger officers in the Department and that few developments in the Department gave him more pleasure than the appointment of two French-speaking Canadians to the Under-Secretaryship, of Jules Léger first in 1954 and of Marcel Cadieux ten years later.

The language that Norman Robertson spoke best was economics. Columns of figures to him were avenues leading to human and social realities. Marshalling and interpreting and analyzing them were for him intensely human and vital tasks, of crucial importance not only in domestic affairs but in the conduct of foreign policy as well. That was why he valued his friendships with such well-known professional economists as J.R. Hicks, for example. That was why he was so close to many of the principal figures in the tightly-knit economic community in Ottawa, particularly in the Department of Finance and the Bank of Canada. So long as Norman Robertson was Under-Secretary, there was never any danger of External Affairs lacking influence in the formation of Canada's foreign economic policy. He respected the economic judgment and expertise of his colleagues in other departments and agencies; and they returned the compliment because he spoke the same language. He dirtied his hands almost every day of his life in the minutiae of economic problems and never thought that was beneath the dignity of a diplomat. Instead, he thought of it as an activity essential for a

*Robertson's
language
was economics*

servant of a great trading nation, because he understood the filaments connecting international economics with domestic wellbeing. More generally, he thought of economics as part of the equipment of a complete diplomat in contemporary times – and that is intrinsic to the legacy he bequeathed to the Department. I venture to guess that it is an inheritance that has never been of greater importance than it is today, when so many countries are suffering painfully from the ravages of unemployment and inflation combined and when the international economic system seems to have become so ramshackle and to be in such need of radical repair.

Intelligence community

About the role he played in the Canadian intelligence community, I feel less competent to speak. I was a nominal member of that community for a little more than a year when I was an Assistant Under-Secretary of State and had among the divisions for which I was responsible the division that dealt with intelligence and security. But it is not an easy community to enter, and I felt that it

never fully accepted me. That is one reason for my diffidence in discussing Norman Robertson's role in the community. Another is that that would require me to assess handling of the Gouzenko affair and continuing relations with the RCMP, both of which tasks are beyond me. But, in spite of these reasons for diffidence, there are a few simple points I should like to make. Though Norman Robertson was deeply involved in the work of the intelligence community, there was never any possibility of his being subdued by it, of his taking on colouring as his habitual guise. His interests were far too wide, his responsibilities were far too various, for that. He was never under any temptation, for example, to forget the foreign news printed in the *New York Times* might be of far greater significance than intelligence secured by the most subtle and secret means. Above all, he never wore the Mona Lisa smile of those who always seem to be saying: "I have information that you haven't, and so I mustn't be questioned". I have seen that enigmatic, self-satisfied smile on the face of John Foster Dulles.

Commemorating Norman Robertson

To honour the memory of Norman Robertson, on February 18, 1978, the Governor General held a round-table discussion. Excerpts of remarks by some of his colleagues dealing with his role as an administrator, his influence generally and his views on national unity follow:

JOHN HOLMES: When I was very green to the Department [1943-44] . . . I saw all the papers coming through. I controlled the flow, and I must say that I had the impression then of a man superbly in control of the whole Department, of all foreign policy – practically all the policy of the Canadian Government. There was his desk, of course, which everybody commented on. My impression was he was in complete control of that untidy desk. He knew where everything was.

One of the things he taught me . . . was a sort of creative delay. People would come storming up and say: "What has happened to that memorandum I put on his desk on Thursday? Nothing's been done about it." And I would say: "Well, I'll try to put it on top of the pile." It would go back – he knew exactly where it was, it was intended to be there – and a week or so later you knew why he'd put it there because the action was impulsive and it would go away.

MARCEL CADIEUX: . . . if I may say a word about that, it is that one of the things that terrified him when he went away is that some of those who were acting, who wanted to show their great efficiency proceeded to empty the basket. He used to say that any time he went away it took him months to sort of retrieve things and to get back to the precarious equilibrium that he wanted to maintain. That's why I don't go along with the view that here was a fellow who was overwhelmed and confused. . . . Basically, when I try to account for what many people interpret as lack of interest in administration, I think he had the feeling that, in the end, the essential thing that an Under-Secretary or a senior official must do is achieve a useful rapport with those who have power. That, if you achieve that, then the question of how you manage to get enough officers and enough money for travel takes care of itself. . . . Keep your eye on the main thing and never mind, then the rest will fall in place.

ED RITCHIE: It's not the organization chart; it's the use of the talents that are at your disposal, and the application of them for the needs of the Government, which Norman did so effectively.

well as on the face of the humblest intelligence operative. Norman Robertson could sometimes be inscrutable, but never in that pellent and dangerous way.

How variously he participated in the work of the Canadian Government is perhaps best indicated by a remark he once made to me in confidence, in secrecy really, at which I think I can now properly dispose. He told me that he didn't think there was a department in Ottawa of which he couldn't be the deputy. I think he may have been right, too. It has been said of Walter Bagehot, the Victorian essayist and economist, that he was so knowledgeable and adept in finance and government that at any time he could have taken over the Exchequer, the Treasury, and have run it effectively – and for that reason might be called “the spare Chancellor”. In the same vein Norman Robertson might perhaps be called “the spare deputy”. The commanding knowledge and expertise that that phrase calls up is part of the secret of his remarkable influence and ascendancy, is part of the secret of his strength. He knew this country

intimately. He knew the Government of this country even better. He could connect the formulation of foreign policy with internal, even local, interests with exceptional thoroughness and skill. That was a source of his strength, as I say. But in some quarters it may have been held against him that his gaze was so far-ranging and his influence so omnipresent. There may have been deputy ministers who didn't know, but who nevertheless sensed, that he thought he could take over their departments and run them at least as well as they could. They may have sensed that, and resented it. I think some of them did. And that was probably a source of weakness.

Faults

I have no zest for dwelling on his faults. But at least some notice of them is necessary to maintain a balance.

Sometimes his good ideas came too late. And, since timing can often be all-important in foreign policy, that can be as serious a fault as not to have any solution at all. Yet the idea that came too late for the crisis or problem in hand often remained

CHARLES RITCHIE: ... If you were abroad and you sought instructions ... you telephoned Norman, because that was really the only way to get into communication with him; you very seldom got any concrete instruction as to what you should do the next day, but you did get a most brilliant analysis. ... When it was all over, and you tried to write down these ideas, and perhaps if you were going to the State Department, you still had not any direct instruction as to what to do on the concrete thing of the day – that was really up to you.

GORDON ROBERTSON: Norman's influence was profound on a number of areas of domestic policy. Among the more fruitful interventions when he was Secretary of the Cabinet [were those associated with] ... the problems of stockpiling of various agricultural products at that time. I think he was as influential as anybody in Agriculture in devising policies to deal with the foot-and-mouth-disease problem that afflicted us. ...

Norman said on one occasion to me that he thought the Department he would most like to be Deputy Minister of was Agriculture, because he thought the problems there were things in which he could really bring his mind and his interest and his training to bear.

He also had, in my recollection, very considerable influence on immigration

policy. He was much concerned about the very ungenerous quality of the prohibited categories in the immigration legislation, and he was a strong influence in bringing about a total revision of the immigration policy and the Immigration Act. So that there were a number of areas that ... Norman had a great interest in and an influence on.

C. RITCHIE: On one occasion he said to another colleague: “I reproach myself most of all, the time that I was in the Department, that I didn't give more thought and attention to the question of Canadian unity. ... This is the question of the future for Canada.”

M. CADIEUX: That is a point that he made to me very often ... particularly in the later stages ... and he added that he thought he should have encouraged the development of internal machinery to relate to the provincial governments. ... Of all the senior people that I have dealt with here in Ottawa, I don't know of one who was more conscious of the implications of the problem of unity than Norman. In his own Department, I think, he was very clear that he wanted a larger measure of bilingualism and he wanted the Department to be a leader in this area. But then I think that he and Mackenzie King probably saw eye to eye, that keeping the country together was the Number One problem.

*Saw himself
as civil servant
rather than
as diplomat*

available and was put to effective use at a later turn of the wheel.

Nor, it must be admitted, was he ideally endowed for the representational functions of a head of mission. It was a prerogative of the Under-Secretary in his time – and it may still be today – to be able to call for his own personnel file and see what it contained. When Norman Robertson called for his own file, he discovered in it, he once told me, a report on him by Vincent Massey during his first, brief foreign posting, as a Third Secretary in the Canadian Legation in Washington in 1929. Vincent Massey had some pleasant things to say about his intelligence and conscientiousness, but added that he had found him “a little uncouth”. Since I know that Vincent Massey sometimes also found me “a little uncouth”, I am not too shaken by that revelation. But perhaps it may be used as a pointer to some of the characteristics of his personal style as a diplomat, most of which I found deeply congenial but which may have been attended by some disadvantages. He never paid so much attention to his clothes as many diplomats consider indispensable. He preferred to call himself a civil servant, rather than a diplomat, as I have mentioned. He substituted for a black homburg a softer black hat with a broad brim turned down in front. These were slight things, but they were marks of his fundamental modesty and seriousness and of his desire not to be cut off from ordinary people and not to let his sympathy for them atrophy. I suspect, though, that it may be in the same recesses of his being that one should look for the explanation of why he was such an ineffective public speaker. And that is putting it mildly. At the University of Toronto the speech he gave there after receiving an honorary degree is still remembered as little less than a disaster.

He was also a very poor administrator. That fact is so notorious that I think I need do no more than provide a few good-natured illustrations of it so as to bring it into clear relief. When I was serving under him in London, I sometimes became mildly exasperated by the length of time it seemed to take for my draft dispatches to secure either his approval or correction. I confided my sense of frustration in his secretary, and she counselled me to be patient. She explained that each night she changed the order of the files and papers in the boxes on his desk, so that I could be sure that in due course my drafts would come to the top. So it always turned out. But I sometimes thought that the work of the mission would probably have come to a dead stop if Miss Fleming had ever neglected her nightly task of rotating the compost-heap.

My other illustration is a little macabre. When Norman died in July 1968, he was buried with very considerable circumstances from the Anglican Cathedral in Ottawa, in spite of his having been all his adult life a sceptic and unbeliever. Most of the arrangements were made, and admirably made, by Arnold Heeney, who was a devout Anglican and whose great forte had always been administration and execution. After the service at the graveside was over in the little hillside cemetery at Wakefield, there was a relaxation of tension, as there often naturally is after a funeral, and I remember there was a good deal of laughing and joking, as well as reminiscing, in the car I was in as we drove back down to the highway. I remember that Arnold made us all roar with laughter when he said: “Today has been so typical of the relations between Norman and me; he was always involved in the big issues, while I came along behind to look after the nuts and bolts!” No, Norman was never very good at attending to the nuts and bolts. I sometimes think that it may have been a nemesis on the Department that after having been for so long under-administered under Norman Robertson, it now seems to my view to have become so laboriously over-administered.

But it is time to return to the lapidary sentences with which I began. He was a man of capacious intellect. He was full of enthusiasm, and ingenuity, and humanity. He could interpenetrate economic categories with surprising flashes of insight and imagination. He was widely and scrupulously literate.

And he was all those things while at the same time retaining and nourishing some saving grains of cynicism. It was he who first made me acquainted with the remark made to his son by Count Oxeński, Queen Christina of Sweden's chamberlain: “My son, you will never know what little wisdom the world is governed by.” He also told me that, once, when he had been attending a meeting of Commonwealth prime ministers in London with Mackenzie King (it must have been in 1944, I think), he was standing with his back to the wall in the Cabinet Room in Downing Street to let the prime ministers file out, when Churchill stopped in front of him and remarked without pretext or sequel: “You seem to have been taking a very cynical interest in these proceedings, young man”. A remark as shrewd, I think, as it certainly was startling.

Norman Robertson no doubt had his faults. I have mentioned some of them; others I have at least hinted at. But, if you infer from what I have said that I loved the man only this side idolatry, you will not be mistaken.

Emergence of human rights in international relations

by Geoffrey Pearson

In the past year or so human rights have become a subject of special international interest. The awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to Amnesty International caused much less surprise than it would have done five years earlier. The anarchist used to be a figure of fear; the "dissident" is now much admired. Everywhere governments are anxious to explain away, even if they cannot deny, practices that used to be considered entirely within their domestic jurisdiction.

Human rights have been part of the international agenda for a long time. The French set out in 1789 to liberate Europe in the name of freedom, not long after the Americans had turned their backs on Europe for the same reason. Much of Britain's nineteenth-century foreign policy turned on questions of morality, whether in the Balkans or in Ireland. President Wilson hoped to universalize democracy and set all nations free. The International Labour Organization was created in 1919 to defend the rights of the working man. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was proclaimed in 1948. Agreements on the prohibition of genocide, slavery, racial and other kinds of discrimination were amongst the early successes of the United Nations. The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights were under negotiation for many years, and were opened for signature in 1966. The UN Commission on Human Rights has done its work for 30 years in virtual obscurity. What, then, has suddenly seized the public imagination in Europe and North America? (One may assume that the objects of most of this attention – ordinary people in other parts of the world – are less likely to believe that anything has changed.)

A combination of events has led to this unusual interest, though it was brought to a pitch by the central emphasis placed on human rights by President Carter. In Europe, the Greek and Iberian dictatorships crumbled, ridding the North Atlantic Treaty Organization of inhibitions about proclaiming one of its major goals, and the

Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe focused attention on the contradictions of a superficial *détente*.

Taking heart, the victims of repressive measures in Eastern Europe made themselves better known in the West. At the UN, the impatience of African members with the apparent lack of success of the world organizations's attempts to free Rhodesia and Namibia from white rule led to even greater preoccupation with the race policies of South Africa. Revolution and violence in Latin America spread in brutal ways to the democracies of Chile and Uruguay.

Finally, the atrocities in Uganda shocked public opinion, particularly in Britain, Canada and the United States, and engaged the special concern of Commonwealth leaders. Part cause, part product, of public interest, Amnesty International supplied facts and figures on the treatment of political prisoners that came as a revelation to many. And, in 1977, the new American President, searching for new goals, revived the dormant but old and powerful ideal of human freedom under law.

It is one thing to stimulate public interest in aspects of foreign policy; it is another to translate this interest into coherent goals and feasible means of achieving them. The American Congress, for example, last year refused to pass legislation relating to appropriations for the international financial institutions until the Administration agreed that the U.S. would oppose international bank loans to seven countries (including Uganda) six of which had Communist or Marxist governments. Restrictions were also placed on U.S. development assistance to these countries,

*Revelation
on treatment
of political
prisoners*

Mr. Pearson is Director-General of the Bureau of United Nations Affairs in the Department of External Affairs. He joined the Department in 1952 and has served in France, Mexico and India. He was formerly Chairman of the External Affairs Policy Analysis Group. The views expressed are those of Mr Pearson.

and military aid to several Latin American countries, as well as to Ethiopia and the Philippines, was prohibited or reduced.

Questions have been asked in Washington about the criteria by which certain countries have been chosen for special treatment, when others, which might be thought to have engaged in gross and persistent violation of human rights, were apparently exempt; similarly, the practice of the UN General Assembly of concentrating attention on South Africa, Israel and Chile has prompted the allegation of a "double standard". However the implication that a single standard of judgment can be rigorously applied ignores political realities.

Elastic notion

The conception of human rights is elastic, encompassing such ideas as the self-determination of peoples, equal rights of men and women, equality before the law, genuine elections, anti-slavery, privacy and an adequate standard of living. For this reason, priorities are difficult to establish. By and large, non-Western states attach greater significance to violations of economic and social rights. They tend to believe that Western notions of civil rights and democracy are reflections of religious traditions or of economic conditions they do not share. They are inclined to emphasize the priority of satisfying basic human needs.

Western states, while not denying the intimate connection between human needs and human rights, are inclined to place more emphasis on respect for the rights of persons as citizens. There is a rough consensus that basic or fundamental rights relating to the security of persons or groups (torture, genocide, etc.) are of universal concern whatever the stage of development of a country or of its cultural history, though there is some disposition to excuse violations of such rights under certain circumstances. Moreover, the practice of racial discrimination is seen by many governments as a peculiarly Western (or white) habit, derived from the centuries of European dominance. It is this perception that gives to the situation in South Africa its special character, in addition to the fact that no other country claims *legally* to defend racial discrimination.

Finally, there is no agreement on what is meant in practice by "gross and persistent" violations of the rights of individuals, and there are no accepted criteria by which to make judgments. One might say that the common law of mankind is still in its infancy. The actions of the UN in this respect reflect political, not moral or legal, intentions.

Despite these uncertainties, a gradual

assimilation of concerns about human rights into the foreign policies of states appears to be occurring. The spread of technology, the universal acceptance of the idea of "development", the need for international co-operation on more and more subjects previously the exclusive concern of national governments, are factors tending to erode such notions as sovereignty and institutional legitimacy. No government can mistreat large numbers of its citizens and expect its relations with other governments to remain unaffected, nor can it escape the effects on its own domestic authority. It is true that other states can usually do no more than limit the damage caused to human rights under repressive regimes. Economic sanctions may have little effect, for example, unless they are universally observed, nor is the UN likely to order such sanctions except in the case of an overriding threat to international peace and security (the case of Rhodesia in 1966 may be the exception that proves the rule).

But the fact remains that the moral disapproval of Western opinion and some willingness by Western governments to act in response to such disapproval, especially accompanied by domestic resistance to oppression, have had and continue to have positive consequences in many countries. No situation is exactly like any other and therefore no single prescription is generally appropriate. Action by the United States, for example, will usually have more weight than action by other Western countries. In some cases (Europe is the best example) regional machinery is available and is used to good advantage.

The influence of UN agreements and machinery on the climate of human rights is probably less significant than action taken by states unilaterally, even though some 20 treaties have come into force under UN auspices. The two major covenants of 1966 referred to above have been ratified by fewer than 50 states, and the Human Rights Committee, an expert body that is required to monitor the performance by states of their obligations under the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and may receive complaints both from individuals and from governments, has yet to establish its authority.

In the case of the Commission on Human Rights, an intergovernmental body, the record over the past few years regarding the protection of human rights has been poor. This is partly because procedures instituted in 1970 to allow complaints to be made confidentially have diminished the threat of publicity for the actions of repressive regimes, even though the purpose of the procedure – to stimulate individuals

*Intimate
connection
of human needs
and human rights*

complain without fear of reprisal – remains valid. In addition, a majority of the members of the Commission have refused to accept evidence of gross violations of human rights except in the cases of Chile and South Africa, and attempts at the last session of the General Assembly to appoint a High Commissioner for Human Rights were frustrated. A majority of UN members remain wary of any body or agency likely to engage in what they view as interference in their internal affairs, and prefer that the UN be restricted to drafting standards and legal instruments such as the covenants.

Nevertheless, there was some evidence at the last session of the UN General Assembly of a greater willingness to strengthen such standards. India and Nigeria, for example, introduced resolutions on torture and regional human-rights machinery respectively; there was agreement to initiate a review of UN efforts; greater publicity will be given to the Universal Declaration; work will soon begin on a convention to prohibit torture; and drafting is continuing on conventions to prohibit discrimination against women and to discourage religious intolerance. Thus, while the influence of UN agreements and machinery on concrete violations of human rights round the world may not be significant, the trend is in the direction of strengthening the role of the United Nations in this field.

Two policies

What, then, can governments that take human rights seriously do about the actions of other governments that violate human rights flagrantly and persistently? Broadly speaking, there are two kinds of policy that such governments can follow. The first kind is to work through the United Nations towards the improvement of the existing machinery and the drafting of new instruments. The idea of a UN High Commissioner for Human Rights may not have enough support at the UN to become a reality soon but there are variations of the idea that might stand a better chance, including the greater use of commissions of fact-finding and enquiry. Furthermore, the confidential procedures of the Commission on Human Rights might be re-examined with a view to finding some compromise between the need for protection of the opinions of individuals and the need for open debate on situations that appear to involve gross violation of human rights.

Governments can also be urged to make better use of the instruments we now have – to ratify the covenants and the other major UN conventions if they have already signed them, and to reconsider the signing of those that may cause difficulties for them,

though not all the UN conventions are of equal merit (Canada, for example, has not found it possible to sign the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of *Apartheid*, which includes an unacceptably-broad definition of *apartheid* in conjunction with provisions for legal prosecution by any state of those charged with having practised it).

It has also been recommended that the international financial institutions take account of human rights in their decision-making procedures. As mentioned above, this approach encounters peculiar difficulties, including the danger that these institutions will become embroiled in political disputes that may undermine their capacity to operate effectively. It may be that further time will be required to develop an international consensus on what is meant by gross violations of human rights before such institutions are able to cope with the introduction of new criteria. In the meantime, of course, governments are free to vote as they see fit on the applications before the boards of these institutions.

Secondly, governments can reassess the nature of their interest in relations with countries that take a different view of the protection of human rights from their own. Countries such as Canada, for example, where there are significant numbers of political refugees, have a clear interest in promoting co-operation for the reunification of families and in stimulating conditions of relative freedom for those who remain. Most Western countries also give development assistance to countries where human rights may often be violated, and it is not unreasonable for them to acknowledge that support for such assistance by their citizens will be affected by the treatment of human rights in recipient countries. The dangers of denying aid on these grounds alone are obvious. But the danger of denying that any link exists, in times of budgetary austerity and growing domestic unemployment, is also clear.

Relations between countries differ significantly, both in terms of traditional diplomatic and other ties and in terms of the nature of the violations of human rights that are at issue. At best, only countries with significant weight in world affairs are likely to have much influence on the conduct of others. Even in cases where direct interests may be at stake, such as family ties and investments, the results of any action contemplated will not always be predictable. A public protest, for example, may stiffen resistance if it is made without warning and in isolation. If it is made in concert with others and after careful consideration, it may achieve effective results. A

*Interest
in promoting
reunification
of families*

private protest might be easier to ignore but could also be accepted more conveniently if it were interpreted as being linked to other aspects of the relations that were regarded as important. In each case, diplomatic and political judgment have to be brought to bear on the issue and general rules will be found to be of little relevance.

It may be thought that too much is made above of the difficulties of putting into practice the principles and ideals of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Yet, in this case as in others, it is not always true that to understand all is to forgive all. Better understanding of the variety and complexity of the issues involved in human rights and foreign policy is desirable if the worst abuses are to be ended or prevented. Whether or not such understanding implies a weakening of the capacity for moral judgment is a matter of individual character. It certainly need not do so. Indeed, to make such judgments without at least attempting to discover the facts is more likely to render them suspect. Few governments are ready

*Without facts
judgments
are rendered
suspect*

to delegate to international instruments the powers of investigation and of arbitration that we have come to expect in our domestic affairs, but most have to take account of international public opinion if it is based on informed and impartial sources.

The last word may be left to the U.N. Secretary-General:

Perhaps more than in any other field of international activity the UN faces in the human-rights field a gulf between idealistic declarations and hard realities. The fundamental principle is that respect for individual human dignity is based on universally-accepted values, and therefore abuses of human rights, wherever they may occur, are a legitimate subject for international concern. However, the concept, touching as it does upon the sovereignty of states as well as on the relations between human rights and the individual's duty to his society, confronts the UN with a challenging problem in putting principles into action and effectively balancing national and international concerns.

The impact of human rights on the process of *détente*

By Adam Bromke

The growing interpenetration of nation states has universalized the issue of human rights. Those of us who live under democratic governments are sensitized daily by the mass media to violations of personal freedoms in some other part of the globe – be it Uganda, Chile or Iran. This offends our dignity as human beings and evokes our

sympathy for the victims of persecution. For some ten years now, the Western media have been giving special attention to infringements of human rights in the Soviet Union. This article is confined to a discussion of the human rights of individual and does not deal with the aspirations for freedom of various nationality groups in the Soviet Union or with the strivings by the Eastern Europeans for national independence. The latter problem is more complex for it involves, in addition to the suppression of personal liberties, the denial of the right to national self-determination.

Our special interest in the situation within the Communist orbit has coincided with the progress of *détente* in East-West relations. In fact, the two developments have been closely linked. Better access to the U.S.S.R. has made us more responsive

Professor Bromke is Chairman of the Department of Political Science at McMaster University and President of the International Committee for Soviet and East European Studies. He has written and edited several books, including The Communist States and the West (with Philip E. Uren). The views expressed here are those of Professor Bromke.

re restrictions on personal freedom in that country. In the period of the Cold War, when repression was more widespread and brutal, we felt remote from these occurrences and, in any case, we were resigned to the fact that there was little we could do about them. In the era of *détente*, when pictures of our political leaders rubbing shoulders with communist dignitaries have been brought into our living-rooms, our sense of obligation towards the victims of abuse has been heightened. At the same time, an improved international climate has emboldened human-rights activists in the Soviet Union to promote their cause openly. They have taken advantage of their access to the Western mass media to disseminate information about their activities, considering this as offering a measure of protection against reprisals by their governments.

In turn, popular pressure on Western governments to try to help the dissidents has elevated the issue of human rights to the level of East-West diplomacy. The Western powers placed it on the agenda of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and succeeded in incorporating into the Final Act provisions against violations of basic personal freedoms. Subsequently, at the meeting in Belgrade, they examined the implementation of those safeguards. Meanwhile, the new administration in the United States adopted a more articulate stand on human rights. The issue has become one of central concern in East-West relations.

The progress of *détente* and the observance of human rights are closely linked, but they are not the same. The movement of the Soviet dissidents has been helped by the improved climate in East-West relations, but it grew from indigenous roots and was not instigated – as some of its Communist critics claim – by the West. Conversely, the initial Western efforts at *détente* were concerned with reducing the danger of nuclear confrontation, and whatever beneficial effects they may have had upon human rights were incidental. Indeed, there are definite limitations on the use of *détente* as a vehicle to promote freedom in the Communist orbit. The constraints are inherent both in the nature of the existing balance of power and in the system of values to which we adhere in the democratic world.

Restricted action

In the present constellation of forces in the world, the ability of Western democracies to influence Soviet policies, especially domestic ones, remains greatly restricted. As President Carter bluntly put it: "I can't go in with armed forces and try to change the internal mechanism of the Soviet Government". Any attempt by the West to dictate

its terms to the U.S.S.R. by force would be resisted, as we ourselves should resist a similar endeavour on the part of the Soviet Union. Risking a nuclear holocaust to uphold respect for human rights would be, of course, senseless – it could obliterate oppressors and oppressed alike.

Our first obligation to humanity is to reduce the danger of nuclear war. Negotiations with the Soviet Union aimed at limiting the nuclear-arms race and nuclear proliferation and at containing any conventional confrontation that may threaten to escalate into a nuclear conflict represent minimum goals of *détente*. These objects, as Marshall Shulman reminded us recently in *Foreign Affairs*, should be consistently followed, for even when they produce no other beneficial effects they are valuable in themselves.

Yet, even if we could change the Soviet system by force, we ought not to do so. Democracy cannot be imposed from outside but has to be nurtured in native soil. The Soviet political tradition is very different from ours. For centuries the people of the U.S.S.R. have been reared under autocracy; the notions of personal liberty, equality before the law and self-government are alien to most of them. They compensate for their lack of freedom with pride in the accomplishments of their state. They derive great satisfaction from the present position of the U.S.S.R. as one of the two super-powers in the world. They resent any criticism of their system by outsiders, and they are unlikely to adopt any foreign models, especially under duress. If democracy is ultimately to prevail in the Soviet Union, it will be as different from that of the Anglo-American political tradition as are the democratic systems of France or Japan.

This does not mean that over the last quarter-century there has been no progress in the U.S.S.R. Soviet society today is very different from what it was during the Stalinist era. Extensive contacts with the dissidents tend to distort our picture of Soviet reality – we minimize the positive changes and focus our attention on the continuing aspects of autocratic tradition. Yet the very presence of dissidents testifies to substantial change. Under Stalin, Solzhenitsyn would never have escaped from the "Gulag Archipelago" to the West, and Sakharov, after holding his first press conference in Moscow, would have disappeared for good.

Our admiration for the human-rights activists in the U.S.S.R. is amply justified by their intellectual ability, determination and courage, but it must not prevent us from seeing them for what they really are. They do not, unfortunately, represent the mainstream, but only a marginal element of

*Presence
of dissidents
testifies
to change*

political life in the Soviet Union. Their number is insignificant, and recently, owing both to forced emigration and to numerous arrests, it has dwindled even further. Their influence among the Soviet people is negligible – indeed, they are less well known in their own country than in the West. By themselves, the dissidents will not be able to change the political system of the U.S.S.R.

Our capacity to assist the dissidents, moreover, is restricted. Too close a Western identification with the human-rights activists would be counter-productive. It would evoke the atavistic Soviet resentment, aggravated by the Communist propaganda, against foreign influence and would alienate the dissidents even further from their own society. It could also antagonize many reform-minded people, who, unlike the dissidents, prefer to advance their goals within the existing system. The situation was aptly summed up by Roy Medvedev. *Détente*, he argued, though extremely important, is only one element advancing the process of democratization in the Soviet Union. In the final analysis, the problems of any country, and especially of a great power such as the U.S.S.R., must be resolved by its own people.

Dissidents

We cannot introduce democracy into the Soviet Union for the dissidents, but we cannot withhold our sympathy and support from them either. We should not be true to ourselves were we to abandon the people who, with great tenacity, uphold the principles in which we believe. Fortunately, this is not an either-or proposition. The progress of *détente* and the observance of human rights are not identical, but they are also not contradictory, and in some respects they even complement each other. We should consciously and persistently strive to relate them as closely as possible. Provided its limitations are carefully observed, *détente* could and should be used to advance the cause of personal freedom.

Détente takes precedence over personal freedom, not only because it reduces the danger of nuclear war but also because, as an astute Swedish observer, Karl Birnbaum, noted in the July 1977 issue of *Foreign Affairs*, it represents a precondition for the improvement of the human-rights situation in the East. A return to the Cold War and the renewed isolation of the U.S.S.R. from the West would eliminate even those few opportunities to help the dissidents that are available to us today. Conversely, in the conditions of a continued *détente*, with our lines of communication to Moscow open and a modicum of mutual trust created by reduced military tension, the possibility that

our concern for personal freedom will be heeded in the East should be enhanced.

In recent years, modest but tangible progress toward the linking of *détente* and human rights has already been made. However slowly and grudgingly, the Soviet leaders have accepted the fact that a connection does exist between the two. In response to pressure from Washington and Bonn, though they still refuse to acknowledge the link formally, they have eased the emigration from the U.S.S.R. of the Jews and the ethnic Germans. At Helsinki they solemnly conceded that the behaviour of governments towards their own subjects was a matter of legitimate international concern. That the Helsinki Declaration has been at least partly effective is best evidenced by a volte-face in its appraisal by the dissidents themselves. When it was signed in 1975 they expressed a great deal of scepticism and some of them even described Helsinki as a "second Munich". Yet, as the meeting in Belgrade approached, the human-rights activists shifted their stand and recognized it – even to the point of exaggerating its significance – as a useful international forum where their grievances could be aired.

The Western pressure has been persistent but cautious. It has stopped short of anything that would damage East-West *détente*. The frontal demands on the U.S.S.R., such as the unsuccessful attempt in 1974 to link the emigration of Jews to the expansion of Soviet-American trade, have been rare. Despite the Carter Administration's strong commitment to human rights, the performance of the U.S. delegation at the Belgrade Conference was low-key. Any connection between expansion of personal freedoms and the progress of SALT II has been explicitly denied. Washington's posture *vis-à-vis* Moscow seems to be deliberate. The Americans are apprehensive about the coming changes, which will also mark a generation turnover, in the Kremlin. They are anxious to establish an early *rapprochement* with the younger Soviet leaders and to encourage them to move in the direction of external, as well as internal, moderation.

The issue of human rights has by now become an integral part of East-West relations. It is, of course, possible, that the new generation of Soviet leaders might decide to move not in the direction of moderation but of militancy. Intensified repression at home would have an adverse impact on Moscow's relations with the Western countries, and it might even prove detrimental to the achievement of the minimum goals of *détente*. Popular pressure in the United States, regardless of the stand taken by the Executive, might prevent the ratification of SALT

*Precondition
for improvement
of human rights
in the East*

by the Senate. However, should the opposite happen and East-West *détente* be consolidated, small but nevertheless tangible opportunities to assist the human-rights movement would continue to exist.

The Western program is, at best, very modest. It assumes that the improvement of the human-rights situation in the U.S.S.R. is going to be a slow and tedious process. It does not even promise that any improvement will necessarily occur. As such, the program is hardly satisfactory, either from the dissidents' point of view or from our own. Yet, under the existing circumstances, this is the best course that the Western democracies could follow. It is more realistic, and, indeed, more moral, than any alternatives that are being currently proposed.

Harsh criticism

The program of using *détente* to improve the human-rights situation in the U.S.S.R. has been subjected to harsh criticism by Western writers, as well as by the Soviet dissidents. Strange as it may seem, it has been denounced at the same time (and occasionally even by the same people) for not being realistic enough and also for not adhering sufficiently to moral principles. These two lines of argument are not always compatible, but they serve to justify the same end. In both cases, their ultimate aim is to make the progress of *détente* conditional on prior observance of human rights.

The "realistic" line of argument is that governments that do not respect the rights of their own citizens also do not respect the rights of other nations, and, as such, cannot be reliable parties to any international agreement. A policy of *détente* with the repressive Soviet Government, then, is not good *Realpolitik*. As Andrei Amalrik argued in *The New York Times* (February 3, 1977), "the West could never feel safe while compromising with violence, instead of fighting against it".

This is not sound political realism. The essence of *Realpolitik* is that international agreements rest not on goodwill but on the balance of power. Such a balance exists today in East-West relations, and *détente* operates strictly within its limits. This is precisely what restricts the possibilities of using *détente* to improve the human-rights situation in the East. In order to surmount this barrier, expanding *détente* beyond the limits of *Realpolitik* would be necessary. By proposing to move in the opposite direction, Amalrik defeats his own purpose.

Détente is also criticized on moral grounds. It is argued that the Western democracies should not enter into agreements with repressive states. By doing so

the democratic governments become a party to condoning immorality, and, in this way, the very principles on which democracy rests are eroded. In a dramatic warning against signing the Helsinki Declaration, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn claimed that, as a result of repeated compromise with the Soviet Union, the decline of the West was already under way. Since the Second World War, he declared, there had been "nothing but a descent, a plummeting down, nothing but enfeeblement and decadence". (*New York Times*, June 22, 1975.)

This line of argument is not very fruitful either. Negotiations between the Western powers and the Soviet Union have followed a time-honoured pattern of international diplomacy, in which agreements are entered in a purely pragmatic fashion by states with different political systems. Some of the East-West accords have been good and some bad, but Solzhenitsyn's dire picture of a declining West is grossly exaggerated. Indeed, his vision would be more likely to come true had the Western powers, in response to the Communist threat, abandoned their pragmatic stance and launched an ideological counter-crusade of their own. Then our system would have become more like the Soviet one, and the foundations of democracy could have been undermined.

Moralistic streak

There does exist in the Anglo-American political tradition a strong moralistic streak. During the last Presidential elections in the United States, it surfaced anew in the platforms adopted by Governor Ronald Reagan and Senator Henry Jackson, both of whom denounced a *détente* rooted in the balance of power as immoral. Yet they were so adamant that the issue of human rights should be made an integral part of East-West *détente* that it was clear that not the former but the latter was their major concern. It seems that, rather than using *détente* to promote human rights, they were trying to exploit the human-rights issue to wreck East-West *détente*.

As to the criticisms of *détente* by the Soviet dissidents, these, paradoxically, often fit more into the Russian than the Western political tradition. The dissidents' great readiness to make sacrifices resembles that displayed by the revolutionaries against the Tsarist despotism. Their moral strictures on the West echo the disillusionment with Western "commercialism and pointless diversity" voiced by the nineteenth-century Slavophiles. Their insistence on "everything or nothing" reflects the traditional Russian proclivity towards political extremism. This dissident counsel of despair we cannot accept – for our own sake as well as theirs.

*Solzhenitsyn's
dire picture
of declining West
exaggerated*

Human rights on agenda despite Soviet opposition

By John Best

Belgrade called to examine implementation of Helsinki Final Act

Despite the rather ignominious end to its recent deliberations in Belgrade, the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) has generated a kind of momentum that is evidently going to be hard to arrest.

"Momentum" is perhaps a little too strong a word, considering the minimal results of the Belgrade meeting, as officially recorded in the concluding document. It was totally devoid of substance. The closest it came to saying anything concrete was to state that delegates "reaffirmed the resolve of their governments" to implement fully the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, implementation of which the Belgrade meeting was called to examine.

As a summation of the sometimes vigorous debate on concrete issues at Belgrade, the concluding document left plenty to be desired. It was certainly below the expectations of most of the delegates from 35 countries who had assembled six months earlier, in gorgeous Yugoslav Indian summer weather, to take a look at what had and had not been accomplished since 1975.

The document could not get into specifics because of Soviet determination to keep specifics out of it. Thus the strong criticism that the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia in particular were subjected to in closed session went officially unrecorded for public consumption.

Yet, in its own way, the Belgrade document adopted by consensus speaks volumes about the present state of the East-West

"dialogue", such as it is, on humanitarian issues. Communiqués can sometimes be more eloquent by what they do not say than by what they do say. There was something devastatingly accurate about the remark of the chief Soviet delegate, Yuli Vorontsov that the concluding document reflected a "realistic assessment" of the situation. Another remark of his is also worth pondering – that the Soviet Union must not be "placed under pressure" through a human rights campaign in the West.

For all the anaemic character of the Belgrade final report (reflecting "lowest common denominators", as Canada put it in a concluding presentation), there can be little doubt that the CSCE has developed an inner dynamic of sorts. Western states have evolved their own special and collective interest in pursuing the process in which they acquiesced when, a few years before Helsinki, they decided to take Russia up on its long-standing proposal for a European security conference.

Reunification of families

All, to a greater or lesser degree, see it as a means to further the reunification of families hitherto kept apart by Europe's East-West division. At the opening of the Belgrade meeting last October, Deputy External Affairs Under-Secretary Klaus Goldschlag, speaking for Canada, said the Canadian Government was pursuing a policy "that attached priority to the reunification of families", and looked to the Final Act "to break the impasse that has often inhibited the pursuit of that policy".

Canadian officials say that, owing at least partly to the Final Act's influence, there has, in fact, been an increase in the number of East Europeans allowed to emigrate to Canada or visit relatives in Canada. The stake that Canada has in this aspect of the affair is nothing, however, compared to

Mr Best runs Canada World News, an Ottawa-based agency specializing in foreign policy and defence questions. From 1964 to 1967, he was based in Moscow for Canadian Press. The views expressed here are those of Mr Best.

nat of West Germany, which, under the umbrella of the Helsinki Act and other records, has brought about the repatriation of more than 60,000 Germans from countries to the east.

The hope for expanded commercial exchanges has figured in the calculations of men on both sides of the East-West divide. And on the Western side the idea of "linkages" also plays a role. Progress, or at least participation, in CSCE will, it is fondly hoped, facilitate progress in strategic-arms talks and talks on mutual force reductions.

The Kremlin, on its side, has already achieved one of its primary objects: a form of international sanction for the wartime territorial acquisitions of the U.S.S.R. in Eastern Europe and the Baltic states. "The participating states regard as inviolable all one another's frontiers as well as the frontiers of all states in Europe, and therefore they will refrain now and in the future from assaulting these frontiers," declared the Helsinki Act.

Soviet view

The Soviet Union did not spend 20 years or more preparing CSCE to achieve only that, however. It views the CSCE as a vehicle for helping to realize the old Tsarist ambition to make Russia the dominant power throughout Europe, West as well as East. To advance this cause, the U.S.S.R. is advocating all-European commissions on energy, the environment and transportation. The climate at Belgrade was not conducive to pushing these ideas very hard, but more will be heard about them at future CSCE meetings, such as the one planned for Madrid in 1980. In the meantime, the design is also being pursued through such organs as the UN Economic Commission for Europe.

To be fair, it has its counterpart in the determination of some Western powers, particularly the United States and West Germany, to use the opportunities afforded by CSCE to increase their influence in Eastern Europe. It is fair game for these states to use the Act to draw closer to, for example, Romania, Hungary and Poland. The Act is full of references to the need for improving relations and promoting cooperation among its signatories — without exclusion or ideological limitation. It also happens to be very popular with certain East European countries because it forcefully lays down the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of states, which to them means non-interference by the Soviet Union.

An intriguing glimpse of the problems Moscow faces in keeping the diverse and often divergent regimes of Eastern Europe on line at Belgrade was offered by a news

dispatch that told of Romania skipping East-Bloc caucuses and Hungary and Poland frequently pressing moderation on Mr Vorontsov.

An unnamed diplomat from a "neutral" nation was quoted as saying: "It is these caucuses, as well as the more open debates, that are enabling some of these countries to assert their own independence and their own voices. And most of them tell me they hope this will spill over well after everyone has left Belgrade and Helsinki is only a vague memory."

For a complex of varied, subtle and sometimes conflicting reasons, then, the impulse to keep the CSCE going is widely shared, notwithstanding the exceptionally modest results achieved at Belgrade.

Cafik speech

A good indication of its capacity to overcome was afforded by Norman Cafik, Canada's Minister of State for Multiculturalism and Special Representative of the Secretary of State for External Affairs. Don Jamieson, in his wind-up address to the Belgrade meeting, Mr. Cafik went to great lengths to emphasize Canada's disappointment at the outcome. He stressed the importance of public attitudes towards the whole CSCE exercise, and even went so far as to suggest that the Madrid meeting might be a last-chance effort. "At Madrid," he said, "we shall have a clearer picture of where we stand. It will then be five years from the signature of the Final Act. Public opinion in our countries is not likely to grant us much of a further reprieve if we are not seen by them to have pursued the course we charted together at Helsinki with a greater sense of commitment and with greater imagination." The real test of the CSCE lay in "the commitment we are prepared to give to its continuity, and in whether concrete adjustments will be made in our national policies".

Then, quite suddenly, Mr Cafik changed direction, ending up on an entirely different note. "Some undoubtedly feel frustrated and disappointed in the concrete achievements to date," he said. "I would ask them whether, a decade ago, they would have even envisaged that meetings such as this would ever have taken place. Can anyone have doubts as to the value of nations of different ideologies sitting down together and freely and frankly discussing their mutual concerns? . . . As long as this process of dialogue continues, we need not be discouraged."

If the Minister's change of direction seemed somewhat startling, at least it was in tune with the prevailing tendency among Western delegations to come to terms with

the fact that the Soviet Union was not going to budge on the human-rights issue and to get out of the meeting as gracefully as possible. (An earlier, 22-page Western draft, strongly reaffirming human-rights values, was summarily rejected by Mr Vorontsov, just as the West rejected a slightly-overdrawn Soviet draft expressing the readiness of delegates "to continue expansion of co-operation in humanitarian fields".

Until a few weeks before the meeting ended, Western delegations were emphasizing the importance of a comprehensive concluding document. The permanent head of the Canadian delegation, W.T. Delworth, told the conference on January 17 that it would be "in the interests of all of us to ensure that our concluding document is substantive and convincing, to avoid calling into question the usefulness of *détente* itself".

Fall-back

As it became more and more apparent that the hope of a substantive final document was misplaced, Western spokesmen adopted a fall-back position. They began arguing that the aims of the West were achieved in the first part of the conference, when the Helsinki accord was reviewed and the human-rights issue thoroughly discussed. Names were named in that period of relatively free-wheeling exchanges, and individual transgressions were cited. Canada, for example, singled out human-rights violations by both the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia.

The very fact that human-rights issues were discussed in the presence of Soviet-Bloc delegates was an achievement, Western delegates claimed. The point, or some variant on it, must have commended itself to the Soviet delegation since the concluding document was allowed to contain this passage:

It was recognized that the exchange of views constitutes in itself a valuable contribution towards the achievement of the aims set by the CSCE, although different views were expressed as to the degree of implementation of the Final Act reached so far.

The point was underscored by a sentence in Mr Cafik's text, to the effect that the Belgrade review had confirmed that humanitarian questions were "a legitimate subject of multilateral discussion".

It is questionable whether the statesmen and diplomats responsible for getting the West involved in the CSCE affair really thought that it would substantially influence Soviet policy over the short term. They felt that it was sufficient for the time being to ensure that human rights were irre-

versibly inscribed on the agenda of East-West dialogues.

Eventually, the alchemy would work. Communism would start to wear a more human face, with beneficial consequences for people living in Eastern Europe and presumably also for East-West relations. It was Mr Cafik who pointed out at Belgrade that "relations between states cannot remain unaffected where respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms is seen to be deficient".

The Canadian Government has been at some pains to reinforce this particular brand of linkage. In a statement to a close meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels in December (subsequently released to the press), External Affairs Minister Jamieson warned Moscow of the consequences of putting members of Helsinki-monitoring groups on trial. Such action could serve to undo "much of what has been achieved" under the Final Act.

Mr Cafik pursued the matter in a discussion with Mr Vorontsov at Belgrade. He complained particularly about the treatment of the Soviet dissident Anatol Shcharansky, and reiterated Canada's previously-expressed readiness to accept him as an immigrant. He drew the Soviet delegate's attention to Canadian Parliamentary resolutions on human rights, including House of Commons one, unanimously passed a month earlier, expressing "deep disappointment" at Moscow's failure to respond to the Canadian offer respecting Mr Shcharansky and at the treatment of Soviet citizens who had attempted to exercise their rights as embodied in the Helsinki Final Act. Mr Vorontsov replied that Mr Shcharansky – who at that point had been a year in jail – was to be tried as a spy and not as a dissenter.

Soviet strategy

Soviet strategy appears to be based largely on the expectation that the West will ultimately recognize the futility of the human-rights battle and lose interest in it. For the Kremlin, it is just a matter of waiting – something the Kremlin is good at. The genie that was let out of the bottle at Helsinki, and did some running around, can then be stuffed back in and human rights will not be heard of again, at least in this particular forum.

In the meantime, the Soviet Union will be pursuing, with due patience and care, the goal of shaping CSCE to its own trans-European, and possibly more global, interests. It has become something that Westerners cannot afford to lose interest in, even though many may wish at times that there were a way to turn it off.

*Discussion
of human rights
was in itself
an achievement*

Belgrade and human rights – success or failure?

by H. Gordon Skilling

To assess the success or failure of the recently-concluded Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) in Belgrade is difficult, owing to the paucity of information about its proceedings as well as the extraordinary diversity of opinion on its outcome. In a quite positive review of the conference, Moscow's *Pravda* (March 10, 1978) concluded that the meeting had "fulfilled the mandate" defined at Helsinki and demonstrated the determination of the European nations to follow further along the path" opened by its predecessor. *Rudé právo* (March 11), the organ of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, which might have been expected to complain of the censure of its country at Belgrade, echoed *Pravda*, declaring that the conference had achieved "a very important positive result". The *Sunday Times* of London (March 12) thought that, as "a human rights conference," Belgrade was "a success for the West".

At the other extreme, the Swiss delegate was quoted as estimating the balance of success as 1 per cent and of failure as 99 per cent. According to West Germany's *Die Zeit* (March 3), the conference ended with "a failure – and a setback for détente". Striking a more even balance, the London *Times* (March 10) headed its leading article "Disappointment, Not Disaster". The *New York Times* (March 9), under the title "The Unending Human Rights Review", concluded that Belgrade "marks a modest but significant accomplishment". In somewhat similar vein, Canadian diplomats have spoken of "a disappointment but not a failure", but calculated the results as a 70 percent success.

The evaluation of any international conference is difficult, and can hardly be measured with any degree of assurance, let alone with mathematical exactitude. Criteria for assessment are bound to be imprecise and ambiguous, and to differ widely from country to country and from person to

person. Yet at first sight a largely negative verdict seems warranted on a meeting that occupied some 400 representatives of 35 countries for five months, from October 4, 1977 to March 8, 1978 (after a preparatory meeting of eight weeks from June 15 to August 5), and produced a final document of a few hundred words containing almost nothing of substance – "a mouse," as one German newspaper called it.

No proposals adopted

Moreover, not one of the over 100 concrete proposals for implementation of the Helsinki agreement was adopted. All foundered, as did the proposals for a substantial concluding statement, on the rock of the "consensus" required for adoption. The sessions, it is true, produced a torrent of words and a mountain of paper on every subject mentioned in the 135-page Helsinki Final Act, including the contentious issue of human rights. All this, alas, occurred behind closed doors, so that the general public remained in almost total ignorance of what took place, and had a deep suspicion that, in fact, nothing of any significance happened. The media of the world, restricted to the occasional press release or regular press briefings, virtually ignored the proceedings, with a few notable exceptions in Europe. Not a single Canadian newspaper or radio and television network sent a representative to Belgrade for the entire conference, and only one newspaper, *Le Devoir*, provided regular and well-informed coverage.

The inability of the Belgrade conference

No comprehensive Canadian newspaper or network coverage

Professor Skilling has been teaching political science at the University of Toronto since 1959. He has been specializing in the history and politics of Eastern Europe since his first visit to the region in 1935. He is the author of Czechoslovakia's Interrupted Revolution (Princeton, 1976). The views expressed in this article are those of Professor Skilling.

to reach a consensus on a concluding document of any substance, and the final adoption, after weeks of wrangling, of a brief and eviscerated communique, tended to discredit the entire meeting in the eyes of the world. A comparative analysis of the rival drafts of the final statement clearly reveals the points at issue and the causes of deadlock. The original Soviet draft and its three later versions, each longer than the one before, all embodied a very positive appraisal of the Belgrade discussions and made no mention of sharp differences of opinion or criticisms of shortcomings in the implementation of Helsinki. The Soviet draft was also marked by what came to be called "the escape forward", i.e. an emphasis on positive proposals for future action in fields such as energy, transport and environment, and in disarmament. The draft referred to the ten Helsinki principles governing peace and security, and the necessity of "strict compliance", but made not a single mention of human rights, which constituted the most controversial topic during conference discussions.

*Soviet draft
did not mention
human rights*

The Western draft, hammered out jointly by the members of the European Economic Community ("The Nine") and the wider grouping of NATO countries ("The Fifteen"), with the exception of France, was much longer and, though it recognized some progress, openly admitted failure to implement Helsinki, including the ten principles. It paid much attention to divergence of opinions, and placed great emphasis on human rights. It included many proposals for improving the procedures for carrying out the commitments of Helsinki in "Basket II" (on economic affairs), and "Basket III" (on human contacts), as well as the confidence-building measures of "Basket I" – especially the reporting of military manoeuvres. A much weaker statement by France was found inadequate by the Western powers, as well as by the "neutral and nonaligned" countries. A compromise, submitted by the latter as a "non-draft", approached Western ideas in its discussion of shortcomings and differences of opinion, and in its proposals for improved implementation of Helsinki, including its human-contacts provisions. Like the Soviet draft, however, it referred only to the need for compliance with the ten principles as a whole, and said nothing of human rights in particular.

The Western delegates eventually came to the reluctant conclusion that a brief communique, avoiding almost all contentious issues, was better than one that concealed the realities of the situation and omitted all references to human rights. As the London *Times* (February 21) said: "Bet-

ter an empty document than a bad one". The third alternative, the breakup of the conference without agreement, was rejected by the *Times* on the ground that it would have marked the end of Helsinki, closed the door on a future conference, and been a serious blow to *détente*. In the end the idea of a terse document, though opposed by some participants, such as Romania and Yugoslavia prevailed, and a draft, three pages long submitted in the name of Denmark, became the basis of a final conference statement approved unanimously. This document made only passing reference to the "different views" expressed on the degree of implementation, and the lack of consensus on a number of proposals, but confirmed the Final Act of Helsinki and the necessity of its implementation, and scheduled another meeting in Madrid in November 1980.

Endorsed

Most official observers, and many others consider that the main achievement of Belgrade was the reassertion by all participants of their commitment to the Helsinki agreement and the endorsement of Helsinki's reference to "further meetings, beginning with one in Madrid. This commitment implied the possibility of a series of regular conferences of the European and North American states (except for Albania and Mexico), initiated in Geneva and Helsinki, and continuing, after Madrid, into the future. Such a series of meetings seemed to represent the gradual institutionalization of a "multilateral process" of European and North American exchanges of views on matters of common concern – something unique in the history of these two continents. This idea, which had been embodied in all the conference drafts, was accepted by the U.S.S.R. and was described in Soviet commentaries as one of the benefits of Belgrade.

This series of conferences is not as formally organized as, for example, the United Nations. The preparatory meeting however, had adopted an agenda and procedures that assured the fullest exchange of views at Belgrade and were confirmed as the bases for the discussion of the "modalities" of Madrid at the next, briefer, preparatory meeting scheduled for September 1980. Madrid, and future meetings, will be restricted, it is true, to consideration of the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act. These were, however, broad and numerous and, in the case of the general principles, elastic enough to justify the inclusion of many matters not specifically enumerated in other clauses, including human rights. Moreover, the exchange of views on the implementation of Helsinki conducted at

Belgrade was singled out for explicit praise in the final communique, suggesting that Madrid, and future meetings, would be entitled to engage in similar discussions. These meetings will be hampered, as was Belgrade, by the principle of consensus that was the main unwritten rule of procedure, and that, going beyond the practice at the United Nations, gives every state, large or small, the right of veto on all decisions, procedural or substantive.

It may still be asked whether, after the experience of Belgrade, such conferences can perform a useful function. Is the "process" so much hailed by spokesmen of both East and West anything but a meaningless harade, having merit only in the minds of the diplomats who participated? The response to this query depends on one's evaluation of the debate on implementation that consumed most of the time of the Belgrade conference. In the opinion of some observers, for example the *Baltimore Sun* (February 28, 1978), the value was found in "Roasting Bear in Belgrade" – i.e., condemning the Soviet Union for its human-rights record. It was this kind of confrontation that some governments had feared before the session, and that the Soviet-bloc countries condemned as a deliberate Western effort to turn it into "a platform for a campaign of slander against the socialist countries" (*Rudé právo*, March 11, 1978). It seems highly doubtful, as it did before Belgrade, that such a bonfire of polemics would contribute to the trust and confidence required by *détente*, or would even encourage the Soviet regime to honour its human-rights commitments.

Accountability

In another, less provocative, sense, the Belgrade debate established the important principle, presumably to be respected at Madrid, that the signatories of Helsinki – all of them, West and East – were accountable to the others for their observance of the commitments assumed. This confirmed the right of Belgrade, of Madrid and of future meetings, as well as of governments, through diplomatic channels during and between conferences, to discuss human rights and their violations openly. Such matters, whether linked or not to specific commitments under the Final Act, are clearly seen to be, as was implicitly proclaimed at Helsinki, matters of legitimate concern for all signatories, and hence the proper subject of discussion, and are not protected by the ban on so-called "interference in domestic affairs" under Principle I of Helsinki. Ironically, the Soviet Union made many charges of infringements of human rights in the West, thus ignoring its

own professed principle of non-interference in domestic affairs.

The debate at Belgrade was, it is true, not the frank and genuine dialogue some observers had hoped for. In the cut and thrust of debate, many delegations – for instance, those of France, Belgium and even West Germany and Canada, as well as some neutral and non-aligned states – that had hoped to avoid an open confrontation over human rights joined in public criticism of the U.S.S.R. and other bloc countries, notably the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia. Provocative actions by certain Communist governments, such as the political trials in Czechoslovakia and the arrest of Shcharansky and others in the Soviet Union, literally forced certain Western governments, including those that had not wanted to discuss concrete cases or name names, to condemn the Soviet and Czechoslovak regimes. Thus the differences in tactics and in style between the more polemical approach of some delegations, and the more reserved attitude of others, assumed less serious proportions than was expected. The nine countries of the EEC, and the broader group of members of NATO, usually found themselves in basic agreement, and were often joined by neutral or non-aligned states. The Soviet Union and its bloc allies, though responding in emotional tones to censure of their policies and actions, did not, as they sometimes threatened, walk out, and even accepted the likelihood of a repeat performance at Madrid.

Hopes doomed

A more serious question remains: Did Belgrade succeed or fail, and will the CSCE process in the future succeed or fail in effecting changes in the policies of participating states? Certainly, hopes that Helsinki and Belgrade would produce substantial and rapid transformation of basic features of the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe were doomed to disappointment. It was, and is, clear that systemic changes in "real socialism" (for instance, concerning human rights), would occur, if at all, only in the long run, and would be produced by powerful domestic forces rather than by external pressures. Even the strongest of outside diplomatic actions would accomplish little in the absence of such indigenous forces and might, on the contrary, lead to a harsh backlash by existing regimes. Other "actions", in the form of "words", at Helsinki, Belgrade and Madrid, were not likely to produce fundamental alterations in the Communist systems in the near future.

What *was*, more properly, expected, or at least hoped for, was that Helsinki would bring about some changes in the policies of

*Differences
in tactics
and in style
less serious
than expected*

*Human-rights
situation
has worsened
in some countries*

East European governments on the specific matters dealt with in Baskets II and III, and might perhaps also lead to a less-repressive policy in accord with the principle of human rights. It was also hoped that Belgrade, through a process of "mutual education", would contribute further to this result. Yet it is doubtful whether there were more than marginal improvements in the implementation of a few of the many and varied commitments of the Helsinki Final Act (estimated by Canadian experts as numbering about 148). Changes in procedures affecting emigration, exchange of information, the working conditions of journalists, etc. have been modest, and sometimes minimal, and have varied from country to country.

On the broader question of human rights, the situation in the "socialist" countries has hardly altered – and, indeed, in certain cases (the Soviet Union, the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia), has worsened. These governments, the main targets of censure at Belgrade, regarded every criticism of their specific shortcomings in carrying out Helsinki as striking at the very heart of their systems and reacted with increased repression. Other countries, such as Hungary and Poland, had followed more conciliatory policies in recent years and were spared the sharp condemnation suffered by their allies. The diversity of conditions and policies among the Communist-ruled countries existed before Helsinki and does not seem to have been affected, except marginally, by Helsinki or by Belgrade. In general, Belgrade did not show itself to be effective in promoting implementation of the Helsinki commitments, either through general discussion or by the adoption of new procedures.

Human rights

Perhaps the most important contribution of Belgrade, and of the CSCE process, was the support given to the human-rights movements in Eastern Europe. These groups, such as the monitoring committees in the Soviet Union and Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia, which were seeking to promote the observance of Helsinki, were subject to severe reprisals and harassment, and inevitably became the subject of sharp discussion at Belgrade. They were considered by Western states as embodying "the right of the individual to know and to act upon his rights and duties" in the field of human rights, as stated in Paragraph 7 of Principle VII of the Helsinki Final Act. More important still, they are the main forces oriented to change in these countries, keeping alive democratic aspirations, raising the

morale of dissenting forces, and striving for fundamental change in the existing model of socialism. Conscious of their significance both symbolic and practical, Western delegates made a concrete proposal that would have confirmed "the right of institutions, organizations and persons to assist their governments in the task of ensuring the full implementation of the provisions of the Final Act".

This proposal and a similar phrase in the Western draft of the concluding statement were not approved, owing to the absence of consensus. Though such "civil initiatives" were thus not given "legal support", to use the terms of the post-Belgrade statement of Charter 77 (March 12), they did receive "moral support" from Belgrade, thus "firmly anchoring them in the consciousness of the European and world public". The decision to hold a conference in Madrid, said *The New York Times* (March 12), would, like Belgrade, give the "courageous members" of these groups "a focus", without which they would have been undercut. Anything less would have been a blow to them, and hence to the principal forces in Eastern Europe striving for serious implementation of Helsinki and working towards democratic change.

Sharp focus

Belgrade was valuable, therefore, in putting in sharp focus the status of human rights in Europe. The Soviet Union revealed its fundamentally conservative character and its fear of human rights even when such matters were discussed in secret, and its political image throughout the world suffered as a consequence. The profound differences of viewpoint among the delegates of East and West on human rights were clearly exposed, as was the lack of the confidence that is so necessary for real *détente*. It was also demonstrated that Belgrade, and Madrid, could not accomplish miracles of change, at least in the short run, and could not even serve as an effective instrument for improvement in the application of the Helsinki agreement. Belgrade thus served as a mirror of reality, reflecting how hard and long was the road to the adequate safeguarding of human rights in Europe, and therefore to genuine *détente*. It made manifest the fact that the conflicting nature of the Eastern and Western systems was a major hindrance to *détente*, but also that it constituted the primary reason for continuing the effort. Though the weaknesses and inadequacies of the CSCE process were rendered obvious, this process was endorsed and extended as the only available European mechanism for promoting human rights as a constituent element of *détente*.

Behind all the rhetoric the hard realities remain

Delphi Exercise

By Don Munton

Even without an official announcement about a funeral, various Canadian observers have recently, and suddenly, decided that Ottawa has buried the Third Option. One journalist, in fact, has suggested that Canadian-American relations are so now bereft of problems that we have to invent them. Such utterances, one is tempted to observe, not only lack any perspective on Canadian-American relations but also fail to distinguish between currently fashionable rhetoric and stubborn realities.

To be sure, 1977 was a remarkably amicable year, at least on the surface. And for a while we are unlikely to hear much talk about lessening our dependence on the United States. It would be shortsighted, however, not to recognize that concern about dependence is a long-term phenomenon, deeply embedded in the entire history of Canada's relations with its neighbour. The degree of co-operation and conflict in these relations, whether increasing or decreasing over the long term, has and will continue to fluctuate over the short term. Although the Canadian Government's capacity to alter the basic fact of dependency is severely limited, its ability to change the current tone and rhetoric is considerable. Some evidence for these observations can be adduced from a recent attempt to forecast the future of Canadian-American political-economic relations.

One of the formal forecasting methods that have been developed to help obtain a longer-term perspective on future developments is the "Delphi Exercise". Briefly, the Delphi technique is the focusing of the knowledge and thinking of a group of presumed experts upon trends or developments in a certain area by means of a multi-stage questionnaire. Originally developed at the Rand Corporation during the 1950s (its first application was the forecasting of the effects of Soviet A-bomb attacks on the U.S.), Delphi" has been widely applied in government, industry and Academe. It has been employed in the Canadian Government by a variety of agencies and departments, including the Bureau of Staff Development

and Training of the Public Service Commission, the Department of Public Works, the Post Office, Environment Canada and the Department of External Affairs. Though it is probably most often used to arrive at a *consensus* regarding the most probable, most important, or most desirable future events, it may well be more valuable in identifying and exploring *differences* in expert opinion. There are many variations, but the typical Delphi exercise has three main features: (1) individual opinions are secured by means of an anonymous questionnaire; (2) these are then analyzed and aggregated to determine the consensus, or lack of it, on specific items; and (3) results are reported back to the participants as a basis for reassessment for the next round.

One Delphi Exercise, conducted by mail between late 1975 and spring 1976, was concerned with the *probable* developments in Canadian-American political-economic relations over the period 1976-1986. The participants in the exercise were some 30 experts on international relations, most of whom teach in Canadian universities. The participants were asked to evaluate the probability of a large number of possible future developments that were grouped in seven categories: (1) international (2) U.S.A. (domestic), (3) trade, (4) energy, (5) resources, (6) industrial, and (7) Canada (domestic). Participants were

Professor Munton is an Associate Professor of Political Science and a member of the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies at Dalhousie University. He has written on Canadian-American relations, Canadian diplomatic images of the Cold War, public opinion and foreign-policy, the use of quantitative methods, and foreign-policy forecasting and planning. A more extensive analysis of this subject may be found in the recently-published book Canada's Foreign Policy: Analysis and Trends, edited by Brian Tomlin. The views expressed in this article are those of Professor Munton.

*Forecast
for decade
conventional
but not optimistic*

asked to indicate for each development whether it was (1) very improbable, (2) improbable, (3) probable or (4) very probable. They were also asked to provide written comments on their own evaluations and on those of others. The evaluations were analyzed to determine the degree of consensus on each possible development. (A "consensus" meant that about two-thirds of the participants indicated either "probable" and "very probable" or "improbable" and "very improbable".)

On the international scene, the consensus forecast for the coming decade was a conventional but not optimistic one. On the one hand, certain presumably beneficial developments were expected to occur – industrial growth in the Third World and agreement on a basis for a new international monetary system. Major disruptions such as world economic recession were not forecast. Some existing trends were expected to continue, including East-West *détente* and the expansion of the European Economic Community (EEC). On the other hand, future international politics were seen as unfolding in an increasingly unstable, complex, and perhaps confrontation-prone, multipolar system. Delphi participants forecast no major progress in the current round of multilateral trade talks, an increasing challenge by developing countries to the international economic status quo, continued opposition to Third World demand by the developed world, increased conflict between developing countries, proliferation of nuclear weapons, and a greater level of regional conflict.

Few changes

On Canada-U.S. trade questions, few major changes – either integrative or de-integrative – were expected. The development of a North American free-trade area, the mutual lowering of tariffs without a formal free-trade agreement, a significant relative increase in Canadian exports to the U.S., and institutionalized co-ordination or co-operation on economic policy were all judged to be improbable. So, too, were American proposals for bilateral trading preferences, arrangements for integrating particular industries or economic sectors (similar to the Auto Pact), and Canadian interest in or agreement to such arrangements. At the same time, no significant relative reduction in Canadian trade with the U.S. and no substantial changes in the nature of Canadian exports (towards a greater proportion of manufactured goods) were expected.

A number of possible conflicts on trade matters were identified. Delphi participants regarded as probable U.S. Government initiatives to correct balance-of-payments

problems, pressures to revise the Auto Pact and disputes over trade in agricultural products. They also forecast the increase development and use by Canada of collective or national marketing arrangement for certain goods and resources and "significant co-operation" by Canada with other primary-producing countries in pursuit of improved or stabilized international market conditions.

Forecasts on resource issues to a large extent paralleled those on general trade questions. Major American proposals for bilateral arrangements integrating continental resource sectors and for assured access to key Canadian raw materials were judged to be probable. However, Canadian agreement to such arrangements was regarded as improbable, as were significant restrictions on ore-mineral exports to the U.S. in order to conserve domestic supply and Federal Government initiatives to ensure 50-60 percent Canadian ownership of all resource industries. The Delphi panel regarded as probable a number of developments that might lead to conflict, including increased provincial nationalization of resource industries, federal initiatives to ensure 50 percent Canadian ownership of certain resource industries, and the establishment of a Canadian "National Resources Board" to regulate and/or coordinate resource-exploitation and marketing.

More sanguine

The outlook for energy issues was somewhat more sanguine. Despite an expectation among participants of bilateral difference over the pricing of natural-gas (but not oil exports, there was a consensus (a correct one, in hindsight) that the Canadian and American Governments would agree on a northern gas-pipeline, and that the decision to build the pipeline would not be put off until 1985. In general, the Delphi participants did not forecast restrictions on exports or imports of gas, coal or electricity. They reached no consensus on whether oil exports would be halted to conserve domestic supply, on whether there would be bilateral agreements on oil and/or gas "swaps", or on whether the Canadian Government would gear new development of oil and gas resources to Canadian energy needs only.

Forecasts of the industrial-policy area also suggested both little in the way of de-integrative measures and some likely sources of conflict. Major initiatives to discourage or impose conditions on U.S. capital were not expected, nor was effective action by the Foreign Investment Review Agency to reduce the extent of foreign

takeovers or federal initiatives to "buy-back" American-owned firms. Similarly, American measures to apply controls on exports of capital were judged improbable. A general bilateral understanding was expected concerning Canadian policies on new foreign-equity investment. On the other hand, U.S. opposition to measures aimed at increasing Canadian ownership was regarded as probable, as was continued opposition to regional-economic-expansion subsidies for export-oriented industries. The Canadian Government was also expected to attempt to counter poor branch-plant performance by greater involvement in industrial research and development. Perhaps more important were the forecasts that Canada would attempt to encourage raw-material processing through trading resources for access to foreign markets for processed goods, and would enter into joint-venture agreements with the EEC and Japan involving greater processing of Canadian exports.

At the political level, the Delphi participants believed there would be an increase in "mutual perceptions of differentiation" between the two countries and their respective policies, a considerably less sympathetic U.S. perception of the Canadian-American relation, and an increased U.S. tendency to link issues together in negotiations with Canada. The U.S. was not expected to become significantly protectionist or to withdraw into a "new isolationism". Similarly, Canada was not expected to become isolated economically or to adopt an inward perspective. The panel could come to no consensus on whether Canadian economic nationalist sentiments would grow considerably stronger or whether a separatist government would gain power in Quebec (although a majority thought the latter likely).

It is by no means certain that any firm, concrete conclusions can be drawn from these Delphi Exercise results. Although the participants were requested to, and to a certain extent did, provide justifications for their responses, the extent of (anonymous) "debate" about any particular development was limited. These forecasts thus remain relatively unsubstantiated consensus speculations. Nevertheless, their general tenor seemed clear. The general conclusion that was drawn was a pessimistic one with respect to the Third Option, namely that *over the coming decade the Canadian society and economy would probably be more, not less, integrated with those of the United States and the two governments would probably have more, not fewer, conflicts*. The conclusion was pessimistic in a dual sense; it implied that the net direction of Canadian-Ameri-

can relations in the mid-term future would be closer to that implied by the Second Option (closer integration) than the Third, and it denied the hope of the "options" paper for a more harmonious relation.

It is not difficult to find reasons why the mid-term future may indeed unfold in these directions. Third Option rhetoric aside, there appear to be few possible specific measures aimed at lessening Canada's dependence on the United States that do not involve significant costs of one kind or another, and thus that are not ultimately unattractive for a pragmatic leadership. First of all, the more effective the possible measure, the greater the likely American reaction. "We are also trying to get this message across," said American Ambassador Enders in 1976. "Canada can't simply unilaterally cut back on its relations with the United States and expect there won't be reaction from us." The message, it is safe to say, got across. Another cost, explicitly mentioned by former Ambassador Porter, is that of a general loss of American goodwill towards Canada. In addition, domestic groups and regional interests within Canada do and would oppose many measures – as, for example, the restricting of foreign investment. Even before Ottawa's calculations of costs and benefits had progressed very far in a particular situation, its belief in the law of anticipated reaction – already well-substantiated in Canadian-American relations by such examples as the 1963 link between the "Gordon Budget" and the U.S. Interest Equalization Tax – would generally be sufficient to kill many a prospective dependence-lessening measure.

On the other hand, the shelving of the Third Option will not mean the conscious pursuit – explicit or otherwise – of closer integration. Despite charges of opportunism by nationalists, the 1972 "options" paper was not mere pre-election posturing. There is considerable recognition in both political and bureaucratic circles of the problems, and even dangers, inherent in Canada's present dependence on the U.S. The events of 1963 and August 1971 paradoxically both confirmed for Canadian officials the need to anticipate U.S. reactions and led many to the belated realization that dependence was not only self-perpetuating and occasionally acutely uncomfortable but also self-exacerbating. This realization, coupled with a traditional diplomatic wariness regarding formal bilateral arrangements with the U.S., will render unlikely much Canadian interest in major possibilities for integration – as, for example, continental energy or resource schemes. Moreover, some of the possible integrative developments – but by no means all – would find little favour in the

Recognition of dangers inherent in Canada's dependence

American Congress. The idea of a Canada-U.S. free-trade area is a case in point. Yet another constraint is the Canadian public – or, more accurately, elements of the Canadian political culture. It is now quite clear that nationalism is still not a driving force in Canadian politics. And it is a truism that most Canadians believe this country should co-operate with the U.S. But it is an even longer-standing truism that there is a latent but powerful aversion among Canadians to actual or seeming American encroachment.

Greater conflict

There are also a number of reasons why greater conflict during the coming decade seems likely. The long-term trend in Canada-U.S. interactions during the 1960s and 1970s has been an increasing number of disputes and differences. To be sure, Canadian-American relations remain close and amicable by world standards. By comparison with the pattern of the 1950s, though, the points of friction have become more numerous.

In part greater conflict is due to the greater contact characteristic of a more interdependent world, and especially of that world's most interdependent pair of countries. In part it is also due to the decline of the Cold War, the loosening of alliance structures and the relaxation of constraints on smaller powers openly quarrelling with the super-powers. Soviet-American *détente*, increasing interdependence and scarcities of resources have also led to a change in the international agenda. Peace and security issues, – in which alliance solidarity was paramount, have given way to economic and other issues, in which national and sub-national interests preponderate. Moreover, the Canadian Government, like others, is becoming increasingly involved in what Jeanne Kirk Laux has called "the role of entrepreneur, merchant banker and trader"; to the extent that it remains more interventionist than the American Government, still other differences seem inevitable. Assuming that these trends are not reversed, the bilateral disagreements, frictions, and conflicts seem likely to increase.

Canadian-American relations will not, of course, unfold exactly as suggested by the Delphi results. There will, at the very least, be many surprises and unforeseen events. One might ask, though, whether recent events have not already outdated these forecasts, at least the one concerning increasing conflict. Certainly, one of the weaknesses of Delphi-type forecasting is that it is too much influenced by recent events and does not allow for shifts. (The same could be said of most forecasting methods, whether intuitive or quantitative.)

Is the present study a case of failing to foresee a reversing trend?

According to some observers, the coming to power of the Parti Québécois is the important factor behind the new co-operative shift in Canadian-American relations. The late 1970s "cold war" between Ottawa and Quebec City is indeed having much the same effect on at least the tone of Canada-U.S. relations as the late 1940s and 1950s Cold War between Moscow and Washington though for different reasons. The chief role of the Department of External Affairs in the national-unity debate is clearly, and understandably, to insure as sympathetic an observer to the south as possible. There is, therefore, little place for Third Option rhetoric, let alone de-integrative action. But federal concern for national unity does not fully explain the current co-operative tone.

Even without the PQ, the current stagnant Canadian economy and deteriorating balance of payments provide a powerful disincentive to the contemplation of the Third Option. Then, too, the fact that 1976 brought an American Presidential election and 1977 a new Administration (and a Democratic one at that) also helped to cause the shift. One of the cardinal premises of Canadian diplomacy is that Canada-U.S. relations must not become an issue in American elections, and the corollary is that they must also not become one of the issues that inevitably come to disturb a new President's "honeymoon" period. Considerations of U.S. domestic politics are thus one contributing factor in what appears to be the continuation of a cyclical pattern in the state of Canadian-American relations. Another factor, perhaps, is a general acceptance among officials of the need for more or less regular "cooling-off" periods.

Whether this cyclical pattern will prevail into the early 1980s will depend a good deal on the direction of developments involving both Ottawa and Quebec. It should be clear to any observer, however, that the sources of Canadian-American conflict have not disappeared. The differences have been muted; they have not been eradicated. In fact, within weeks of the Third Option's announced interment and the supposed restoration of harmony, some odd events had begun to occur: American farmers were picketing border crossings in an attempt to stop imports of Canadian beef; the Saskatchewan government was threatening to ignore a recommendation of the International Joint Commission that further work on the controversial Poplar River power project be postponed; the Carter Administration had partly reversed itself and announced that work would resume on sections of the even more contentious Garri-

*Greater contact
has led to
greater conflict*

on Diversion project. American protests were being voiced about an Ontario plan for a large new coal-fire power-plant that was to be situated across the border from a Minnesota wilderness-park area.

Prime Minister Trudeau and President Carter publicly disagreed during a NATO meeting on the nature of the situation in Africa, and, even more ominous, the bilateral boundary and fisheries negotiations were abruptly broken off and long-standing arrangements for mutual access to fishing-ones were cancelled by both countries. Meanwhile those much disputed West Coast

tankers had quietly begun plying B.C. waters — making a major oil-spill and a bilateral brawl simply a matter of time and the laws of probability. The inevitable battles were beginning over the spoils — in terms of jobs and material — from the northern gas pipeline. Voices were again being raised about the inequities of the 1965 Auto Pact. And so on. . . .

Almost in spite of the formidable presence of the PQ, and in spite of the rhetoric about a new spirit of co-operation, the hard realities of Canadian-American relations seem to be reasserting themselves.

Canadian-American relations

Water, water everywhere — but shortages are coming

by Robert James McGavin

Water is our most valuable resource; it sustains life. There is no substitute; it cannot be replaced. Yet it is one of the most abused and threatened of our resources. Last summer, as the energy problems of a harsh winter abated slightly and stocked grocery shelves and full granaries belied impending worldwide food-shortages, drought in the United States West and Midwest focused North American attention on water. Should such water-shortages continue to occur, water could soon occupy centre stage among U.S. domestic problems. If Canada does not examine and satisfactorily explain its water-resource situation and adequately state its position concerning this resource, water-supply problems could have a bad effect on Canadian relations with the United States.

Canada and the United States share many large river-basins that supply water for drinking, irrigation, industry and power. Slightly less than half the Canada-U.S. border lies along or across bodies of water; about two-thirds of Canada's people live within boundary-water basins. The Great Lakes/St Lawrence basin, which alone produces one-sixth of the national income of the United States, contains one-seventh of the U.S. population and four of the largest U.S. cities (Chicago, Detroit, Cleveland and Milwaukee). The Canadian part of the basin constitutes about 13 per cent of the land area of Canada; however, one-thirteenth of the basin, or 1 per cent of Canada's total

area, contains more than three-quarters of the country's industrial activity, two-thirds of its population and about one-third of the dollar value of Canadian agricultural production.


Co-operation

To date, co-operation between Canada and the United States on their common water problems has been exemplary. The cornerstone of this bilateral relation is the International Joint Commission, which was established under the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909. Basically, the IJC guarantees the water rights for both countries and imposes obligations with respect to water-use with a potential for transboundary damage. Its approval is required for any use, obstruction or diversion of boundary waters in one country that will affect the natural level or flow of the other's boundary waters, rivers flowing across the boundary or waters flowing from boundary waters. The IJC is also empowered to investigate and report on matters referred to it by either government.

*Guarantees
water rights
and imposes
obligations*

Mr McGavin is Head of the Press / Publications Program in the Canadian Embassy in Washington. He is an officer of the Trade Commissioner Service on secondment to the Department of External Affairs. The views expressed in this article are those of Mr McGavin.

In such cases, the reports of the Commission to the governments are not regarded as decisions either on the facts or on the law. In addition, disagreements between the two countries may be referred to the Commission for decision, provided that both countries consent.



The IJC can handle government-to-government problems; it cannot, however, be expected to eliminate those water problems that could result in the future from public misunderstanding by Americans or Canadians of each other's water problems and water-supply. After the 1973 Yom Kippur War and the line-ups for gasoline in the U.S., Canadians witnessed this type of misunderstanding in the energy field. Many Americans, unaware of Canada's diminishing supply of hydrocarbons, expected the "oil-rich blue-eyed Arabs of the North" to turn on the taps and supply the United States with energy. It took some time for Canada to get the message across that it did not have enough oil and gas to supply its own needs.

Canadians cannot say quite the same thing about water resources. Canada can claim 7 per cent of the world's land-mass, approximately 7.6 per cent of which is covered with fresh water. Canada, which has less than 1 per cent of the world's population, has rivers that discharge nearly 9 per cent of the world's renewable water-supply.

Not so abundant

Water resources in the U.S. are less abundant. The annual average precipitation of about 30 inches for conterminous states of the U.S. provides a usable stream flow with only about one-third reaching the sea. The remaining 20 inches evaporates or is used to nourish forests and crops, to cool industrial plants and to provide water for individual use. Alaska, as one might expect, is the most fortunate state; it accounts for about ten inches of the U.S. residual water available for consumption. The Eastern half of the

United States has a natural water-surplus; the Western half generally has a water-deficit. Most fresh water is taken from stream-flows, with the average annual runoff being about ten inches in the more humid one-third of the country but less than one inch in the more arid part. Areas in the upper Midwest and the Southwest already have severe water problems. Groundwater sources in the United States are plentiful, with withdrawals amounting to 260,000 million litres a day, or 8 per cent of the estimated discharge. However, not all the water is economically recoverable or usable without costly treatment.

Water-supply problems were recognized some time ago. In 1968, President Johnson informed the Congress that, after the first assessment of the nation's water-resources, he foresaw complex water problems. He noted that "rapid population growth and economic expansion foretell even more complex problems for the future". The 1968 Water Resources Council study concluded that, unless counter-measures were taken to reduce impending water problems, water-shortages would effect the pattern of economic activity in the United States. Specifically, water problems could mean a slow-down in the rate of increase in total economic activity in various regions; and major industries that withdraw or consume large quantities of water or add substantially to water-pollution could require greatly-increased supplies of water during the next 50 years.

The Water Resources Council, using a predicted growth-rate of 1.6 per cent a year from 1970, projected a U.S. population in 2020 of 468 million. In view of that population growth, it estimated that only three of the 18 federally-designated water regions on the United States mainland (New England, the Ohio Basin and the south Atlantic Gulf) would be able to live comfortably with their existing water-supplies by the year 2000 (and then only if they preserved water-purity).

Water-management

After promises made during the 1976 election campaign, President Carter has taken some steps towards managing this precious resource. His focus on water-projects and related concerns also served to highlight national water-resource needs. In a January 1978 five-day, seven-state Western United States tour, Vice-President Mondale discussed such items as acreage limits and rules governing federally-irrigated farms - thus indicating an Executive Branch awareness of the need for water-resource policies.

U.S. state governments are concerned primarily with private-property water and

and rights and related regulatory and property-taxation systems. Municipalities and other forms of local government continue to have major responsibility for domestic water-supply and -distribution systems. At the federal level, the Water Resources Council, composed of representatives of the major functional federal agencies concerned, operates under directives to encourage the conservation, development and use of the water and related land-resources on a comprehensive basis, involving the Federal Government, states, localities, private individuals, business enterprises and all others concerned. The Federal Government also has a mandate to study regional river-basin plans and programs in relation to the requirements of larger regions.

Competition for water is now creating tensions between American cities and regions:

Montana and Idaho are threatening to sue the State of Washington if it seeds Pacific Ocean clouds, contending that such action would steal water from the winds that might have carried it inland.

Communities in Connecticut and Western Massachusetts are fighting Boston over a plan to transport 72 million gallons of water a day from the Connecticut River. Opponents fear that the diversion will lower the Connecticut River to dangerous levels and cause environmental damage.

A legal battle is brewing over rights to the Colorado River, with claims by various groups exceeding the amount of water available. Indian tribes alone are claiming five million of the 14 million acre-feet that flow down the channel each year.

Environmentalists are opposing plans to transport coal by slurry pipelines and projects to produce oil from Rocky Mountain shale because these endeavours require vast amounts of water in one of the nation's most arid regions.

In many parts of the United States, water-shortages and water-restraints are already affecting economic activity. Garry Cobb, Acting Director of the U.S. Water Resources Council, has stated: "We're coming to an era of a conservation ethic in water-management that could change historic settlement and consumptive patterns". Charles Warren, Chairman of the President's Council on Environmental Quality, has suggested that water-shortages could change present population-growth patterns. Mobile Americans may have their style cramped as it becomes more important

to settle families or industries only where water is abundantly available on a regular basis.

Solutions

There are, of course, solutions to water problems – desalination, recycling, effective water re-use, water-conditioning and water-treatment, improved water-management, elaborate pipeline and transportation methods and even the towing of icebergs. These solutions may not be good enough. Knowing the population growth and the upper limit of the water-supply in the U.S., some Americans have suggested, and will continue to suggest, that water from Canada will be the ultimate solution. Some years ago, Ralph M. Parsons and Company of Los Angeles proposed the redirecting of 100 million acre-feet of water (which flows north to the Arctic) from Northwestern Canada to dryer parts of Canada, the United States and Mexico. Another scheme included the Great Replenishment and Northern Development, which would divert "unused" water-flow from James Bay into the Great Lakes for use by Canada and the United States. A third scheme was to re-route Peace River water in Alberta across the Prairies and into the United States. A fourth scheme was to redirect water from the Laird and Mackenzie Rivers southward via the Rocky Mountain trench to a large storage-area in the Centennial Valley of Southwestern Montana and from there to drier areas of the Western United States.

In all these schemes not only was there little consideration given to environmental



concerns but there was an underlying assumption that water was plentiful all year round and the only problem was one of transporting it. As water-supplies become more critical, pressure could well increase for Canada to provide the U.S. with water. Canada must act now to explain to all Americans that it cannot be expected to redirect billions of gallons of water southward. By presenting the facts in a clear, concise and

firm manner, Canada can counter ill feeling about its citizens as hewers of wood and hoarders of water.

First, though the water-supply in Canada is twice as large as in adjoining states of the U.S. and the *per capita* supply in Canada is about 20 times the *per capita* supply for adjacent parts of the United States, not all communities in Canada have enough water. This is owing to non-uniform distribution of precipitation and stream-flow, uneven population-distribution, the increase in water-contamination and faulty or inadequate distribution-systems. In Alberta, for instance, water is becoming an everyday topic of conversation and the province's supply situation is deteriorating to the point where it may not be in sufficient volume for the essential purposes of irrigation and industrial water-usage. Some observers, in fact, described the situation during the summer of 1977 as being "every bit as bad as the 'Dirty 30s' ". It must also be noted that two-thirds of the Canadian runoff flows northward, away from the regions where most Canadians reside. One-third of the total precipitation in Canada is in the form of snow and is held until the spring runoff because of evaporation. Only 50 to 60 per cent of the maximum possible water-supply in Canada is available as runoff and ground-water-supply drops during the freeze-up period. Canada must also take into consideration its population-growth and increasing demands by industry. With a projected population-growth of 45 per cent over the next 25 years, considerable pres-


sure will develop, in particular on the water resources of the St Lawrence Valley and the north shore of the lower Great Lakes area.

Secondly, Americans must understand that the water-taps are not turned on by merely contacting some department in Ottawa. The British North America Act of 1867 divided legislative powers between the central and the provincial governments. Both levels of government have legislative responsibilities in areas that directly or indirectly involve water-management. The Federal Government has power over marine navigation, sea-coast and inland fisheries, resources in the northern territories, and migratory birds. Its legislative responsibilities extend to interprovincial undertakings (such as canals, railways, pipelines, agriculture, trade, Indian and other federal lands and international boundary waters). Since the provinces own all natural resources within their borders, they have a primary role in water-management. Their governments have jurisdiction over property and local matters and have legislated extensively in the fields of water-supply, pollution-control, power-development, irrigation land-use and -development, recreation and natural resources. Basically, as owners of their water-resources, the ten provinces can authorize and license development, levy fees and regulate water-flow. Premier Lougheed of Alberta has already said that there will be no trade in fresh water between his Midwestern province and the states in the American Pacific Northwest.

Thirdly, any major adjustments t

Both levels of government have legislative responsibilities for water

Water supplies at the end of the century for the 18 water-resource regions on the U.S. mainland, according to preliminary data of the Water Resources Council :



water-basins can dramatically effect the environment – the extent and timing of water-flow changes, water-levels and associated water-qualities are critical to the survival of flora and fauna. In one way or another, Canadian water-resources as they exist during the year can be said to be spoken for.

Finally, any thought of exporting water should under no circumstances contain a price-tag. It must be remembered that, if we make the decision to export water, we can never turn it off – we are permanently committed.

Canada must develop broadly-based, comprehensive public-affairs initiatives to explain to Americans their water-resources, their demands, their real water-supplies

now and in the future, and their programs of water-management and water-resource development. To postpone this activity or to assume that Americans already know that Canada has limited water-resources could adversely affect the Canada-U.S. relation. If a crisis develops and Americans find themselves lining up for water as their crops and industries disappear, they will certainly wonder why some water cannot begin to flow south from that water well to the north. Functionaries in Ottawa and Washington will quickly understand Canada's situation, but will the effected American public? There is no reason why they should not. The existing Canadian-American relation is worth preserving – let us not let water get in the way.

Canadian-American relations

An American looks at Canada

By Donald E. Nuechterlein

Like many Americans, I took Canada for granted for many years. Part of the reason was that, viewed from Michigan in the 1930s, Ontario was closer to home than Ohio, and the bridge from Detroit to Windsor seemed more like a gateway to another state than a passage between sovereign nations.

Another reason was the wartime co-operation between these neighbours. After the outbreak of war in Europe in 1939, Prime Minister King and President Roosevelt got together and agreed on a continental defence arrangement that has continued to the present day. Following the war, the two countries continued this close co-operation and extended it to economic relations, cultural contacts and a vast exchange of tourists. Though some Americans were aware that French Canadians refused to be drafted for overseas duty during the Second World War, few of us appreciated the tensions that had long existed between English-speaking and French-speaking Canadians, dating back to 1759, when Britain defeated French forces at Quebec City and established its own colonial rule there.

During the 1950s and 1960s, Canada seemed like a vigorous, prosperous, self-confident and democratic ally and friend – a model of political stability in a world where this attribute was in short supply. In sum,

Canada presented no problems for Americans and consequently was taken for granted.

In 1968, both countries experienced significant political changes that resulted in some strains in their relations. President Lyndon Johnson decided not to seek re-election, and this set the stage for the return of the Republican Party to power in Washington, led by Richard Nixon, whose Administration was determined to follow a tougher policy both on defence commitments round the world and on trade relations with America's allies. In Canada, Pierre Elliott Trudeau was elected leader of the Liberal Party and Prime Minister of Canada. Three of his Government's aims were: (1) the accommodation of French-Canadian interests by English-speaking Canada in order to check

Donald Nuechterlein is Professor of International Affairs at the Federal Executive Institute, Charlottesville, Virginia. His books include Iceland, Reluctant Ally, Thailand and the Struggle for Southeast Asia, and U.S. National Interests in a Changing World. A forthcoming book, National Interests and Presidential Leadership (summer 1978), deals in part with the Quebec issue in U.S. foreign policy. The views expressed in this article are those of the author.

the growth of separatist sentiment in Quebec; (2) the fostering of an independent Canadian identity in order to curb the growing influence of American culture in English-speaking Canada; and (3) the protecting of the Canadian economy against foreign domination, particularly the buying-up of Canadian industry and resources by U.S. firms. Most Canadians were keenly aware of the changes that were taking place in the United States; but few Americans appreciated the significant changes that were occurring in Canada as the Federal Government sought to persuade Quebecers that they were equals in their own country and as Ottawa moved towards a more independent policy *vis-à-vis* the United States. As the Trudeau Government sought to reduce Quebec nationalism, it pursued a policy of strengthening Canadian nationalism.

Americans began to realize that all was not well north of the border when, in 1970, leftist terrorists espousing an independent Quebec used violent tactics in Montreal – including the kidnapping and assassination of a government official – to stir up separatist sentiment in the province. The Trudeau Government invoked emergency powers and put down the violence within a few days; but the episode was given wide publicity in the United States, especially on television, and many Americans became aware for the first time that their cities had no monopoly on terrorism by underground groups. However, the effective way in which Canadian authorities dealt with the terrorists led Americans to conclude that Quebec nationalism was the work of only a few fanatics and that the great majority of Quebecers opposed independence. Indeed, most Americans believed that the large majority of French-speakers were loyal Canadians who only wanted more autonomy for Quebec.

In 1971 a mild crisis occurred in Canadian-American relations when the U.S. Government imposed a surcharge on all foreign imports and suspended the settlement of international accounts in gold. Until August 15 of that year, Canada and the United States had had what came to be called a “special relationship”, which, in practical terms, meant that Canada was given preferential treatment in U.S. economic policy and trade matters. This time, however, the Nixon Administration refused to give Canada an exemption and the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, John Connolly, was widely criticized by Canadians for the insensitive way in which he dealt with their government officials on the issue. Though the surcharge was lifted before the end of the year, the “shocks” of August 1971

brought the special relation to an abrupt end and caused the Trudeau Government to adopt a much tougher policy towards the United States on a whole range of bilateral issues.

The frustration of the Canadian Government was illustrated in the fall of the year when a group of American federal executives visited Ottawa in search of a better understanding of Canada’s viewpoint. After some discussion of Ottawa’s recent problems with the U.S. Treasury Department, a senior Canadian official remarked with emotion: “If you Americans would just give Canada as much attention as you give Cambodia!” His point was clear and valid; the United States had become so absorbed in the problems of the world that it had neglected relations with its closest ally and its largest trading partner. It was also clear by the end of 1971 that a new kind of relation would take the place of the old easy, informal ties that had typified postwar relations.

Third Option

Canada’s view of what the new relation would be was contained in a long article that appeared under the name of Secretary of State for External Affairs Mitchell Sharp in the Autumn 1972 special issue of *International Perspectives*. Entitled “Canada U.S. Relations: Options for the Future”, this lucid exposition of Canada’s national interests *vis-à-vis* the United States listed three options Canada could adopt in its relations with its southern neighbour: One, Canada could “seek to maintain more or less its present relationship with the United States with a minimum of adjustments”. This option was rejected because Sharp believed that the “continental pull” meant that Canada would “have to run harder simply to stay in place” and that it would involve “a substantially reactive position on Canada’s part”. Two, Canada could “move deliberately toward closer integration with the United States”. This option was seen as to be a great threat “in terms of the Canadian identity”. Three, Canada could “pursue a comprehensive long-term strategy to develop and strengthen the Canadian economy and other aspects of its national life and in the process to reduce the present Canadian vulnerability”.

The Trudeau Government chose the Third Option. Mr. Sharp explained the new policy this way:

The basic aim of the third option would be, over time, to lessen the vulnerability of the Canadian economy to external factors, including, in particular, the impact of the United States and, in the process, to strengthen our capacity

John Connolly’s
insensitivity
widely criticized
by Canadians



CP Photo

U.S. Vice-President Walter Mondale visited Canada in January of this year. He is shown here with Mrs Mondale and with Deputy Prime Minister Allan MacEachen following his arrival in Ottawa. From Ottawa the Vice-President continued to Alberta for meetings with provincial leaders.

advance basic Canadian goals and develop a more confident sense of national identity.

From 1972 onward, Canada took a number of actions to implement the Third Option. An Investment Review Act passed Parliament and set up a screening process for all new foreign investment in Canada to insure that it would have a significant benefit for the country's economy. After the Arab oil embargo in 1973, Canada raised the price of oil exported to the United States to keep pace with the international price rise and announced that it would phase-out the export of crude oil. Ottawa antagonized American cattle-breeders by imposing stringent inspection standards on U.S. beef exports. Canada also showed a reluctance to enter into agreements with the United States to transport natural gas across Canada from the Arctic to the American Middle West, which began to experience fuel shortages in the mid-1970s. In sum, Americans were aware that Canada had adopted a tougher attitude in its economic relations with the United States, particularly in matters of energy policy. It was also apparent to some Americans that anti-Americanism was on the rise in certain parts of Canada, principally in Ontario – the province that had seemed to be the most like the United States, where economic relations

had been closest since the end of the Second World War.

Ottawa had clearly made progress between 1971 and 1976 towards achieving Mitchell Sharp's basic aim – "to lessen the vulnerability of the Canadian economy to external factors". But what about the second aim – "to strengthen our capacity to advance basic Canadian goals and develop a more confident sense of national identity"? Here the picture is not so clear; the Canadian economy has not done well in the past few years, and both unemployment and inflation are running higher than in the United States. Canada has not been as successful as it had hoped in opening the European Economic Community to Canadian exports, and the rate of foreign investment in Canada has slowed. More visible evidence of Canada's economic problems is the more than 10 percent decline in the Canadian dollar's value in relation to its American counterpart during the past two years.

Quebec election

A more basic reason why the object of developing "a more confident sense of national identity" was not achieved had nothing to do with the United States or any other external influence – it resulted from unexpected political developments in Quebec

in the fall of 1976, when the voters brought to power the Parti Québécois, an avowed separatist party whose leader, René Lévesque, campaigned on a reform platform rather than an outright independence line. This totally unexpected event sent shockwaves across Canada and completely changed the political picture in Ottawa. It also had an important effect on Canada's relations with the United States. Prime Minister Trudeau visited Washington in February 1977 and, in his address to a joint session of Congress, concentrated on the question of Canadian unity and the problem of Quebec. When President Carter was asked at a subsequent news conference whether there was much concern in the United States about Canada, he replied: "There's a great deal of concern in this country about the future of Canada." After describing how closely the two countries were linked, the President said:

My own personal preference would be that the commonwealth stay as it is and that there not be a separate Quebec province. But that's a decision for the Canadians to make and I would certainly make no private or public move to try to determine the outcome of that great debate.

Canada's internal problems thus became front-page news in the United States during 1977, and there is every likelihood that they will continue to attract attention in the American media. René Lévesque's visit to Paris in the fall of 1977 was prominently reported, including the warm reception he received from the President of France. The Quebec government's decision to make French the sole official language of the province was widely reported in the United States, including the protests of Quebec's non-French-speaking minority. Prime Minister Trudeau's New Year's Day interview with Canadian television personality Bruce Phillips was given front-page coverage in the *New York Times*. Trudeau warned that, if Quebec separatists resorted to "illegal" methods to achieve their ends, he would use force to deal with them just as he had done in 1970 when he invoked emergency powers. The idea that serious violence, and even civil war, could break out in Canada is slowly reaching the consciousness of informed Americans.

U.S. interests

The question thus arises: What opinion should Americans have regarding the Quebec issue? What U.S. interests are at stake in Canada and how will they be affected by the unfolding of events in Quebec and other provinces in the next several years? If Premier Lévesque proceeds with a referendum in Quebec in 1979 or 1980 and

violence erupts in its aftermath, how would this affect American thinking about Canada?

Without question, the United States has a huge stake in the "great debate" referred to by President Carter, for four reasons: (1) the defence of the United States is almost indistinguishable from the defence of Canada in the strategic sense; (2) Canada is by far the most important trading partner of the U.S. and accounts for more U.S. private investment than any other country; (3) Canada is an important contributor to the postwar world order established by the Western powers to keep the peace and promote international stability; (4) Canada shares with the United States a deep respect for human rights, democratic government and the dignity of the individual. It is therefore an important ideological partner in the struggle with dictatorships. If Canada were to be torn apart by internal dissension, it would be a severe blow to U.S. interests in North America and in the world.

In view of these interests, what policy should the United States follow if the government in Quebec decides to push its policy of separation from Canada? In my view, the United States could accept an independent Quebec if the separation were achieved through negotiations with Ottawa, either with or without an economic association between them. Prime Minister Trudeau has stated that he would not stand in the way if a large majority of Quebecers voted for independence. Presumably a negotiated separation would include some understanding that Quebec would honour existing treaties regarding the St Lawrence Seaway and would co-operate in the NORAD arrangements with Canada and the United States. In short, if Quebec showed that it would maintain good relations with Canada and the United States, the United States would grant recognition to the new state and welcome it as a neighbour.

But what would happen if only a bare majority of Quebec voters supported separation in a provincial referendum, or if a majority were reached only by counting the votes of French-speaking Quebecers? In this situation, Ottawa might refuse to negotiate with Quebec and Premier Lévesque might then move to a unilateral declaration of independence. In this situation, the U.S. attitude could be quite different. This would be particularly true if violence should break out in Quebec and the Trudeau Government decided to use force again to restore peace. In such a case, it is reasonable to conclude that Washington would give tacit support to Ottawa in dealing with an internal threat to Canadian security. If there should be danger

*United States
has huge stake
in great debate*

if an *external* threat, either diplomatic pressure on Ottawa or clandestine support for Quebec terrorists, then U.S. interests would be more directly threatened and it could be expected to take more forceful measures to prevent foreign interference in Canada. What should be apparent to all concerned is that U.S. interests in Canada are so vital that Washington could not afford to permit any situation to develop in Quebec that resembled the situation in Cuba in the early 1960s or in Chile in the early 1970s – any more than the Soviet Union could tolerate an unfriendly regime in Poland, or China could in North Vietnam or Laos. This is the reality, it seems to me, if a political confrontation should occur in Canada during the next few years between Quebec and the rest of that country.

A positive result of Canada's increasing difficulties at home has been the improvement of relations between Ottawa

and Washington. This is partly attributable to the good rapport that has been established between Prime Minister Trudeau and President Carter. Canada's economic problems have also been a factor, since Canadians are today more aware of the significance for their economic well-being of a prosperous U.S. economy. But the most important contributing factor is the community of interests that has been developing during the past year and a half as Washington and Ottawa, as well as the Canadian and American peoples, have come to realize that Quebec is a North American problem, not simply an internal Canadian issue. During 1977 and 1978, Americans have had to confront, and resolve, a deep emotional problem to the south, in Panama. In 1979 and 1980, Quebec may become an equally urgent issue, and it is to be hoped that it too will be resolved in a peaceful and friendly manner.

Ethiopia after the empire: a nation torn asunder

By Marc Parent

Before the Empire of the Negus fell, Ethiopia consisted of 14 provinces, but the Dergue in power at the beginning of 1978 controlled only half of these. Of the other seven provinces, Eritrea was struggling for independence, Begemdir, Tigre and Gojam were engaged in open war with the central military power and Harar, Sidamo and Bale were occupied by Somalia. The Addis Ababa government, with massive help from the U.S.S.R. and Cuba, is now in a secure position on the southern front after defeating the Somali troops in the Ogaden. The secession of Eritrea, however, remains a thorny problem. Those who are fighting for its independence are even more determined than the Somalis who fought in the Ogaden. There also remains the task of re-establishing normal life within the country (something that Ethiopians have not known since the revolution), with all that this implies.

The revolution manifested itself openly for the first time on September 12, 1974, when the Negus was arrested in his palace. The military junta thus succeeded without shedding any blood. However, since the new regime was a military dictatorship, opposition to it gradually developed and

became organized. Resistance appeared everywhere, passively in the Government – and even in some units of the army, – and actively among the people, especially students and trade unionists. Having gained some coherence, this internal opposition split into two main movements – the Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU) and the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP).

Though the EPRP and the EDU pose a direct threat to the central power, it is not likely that, by themselves, they will in the near future contribute to a reversal of the state of affairs in Ethiopia. However, assisted by external opposition from Eritrea and Somalia, these movements could have played a key role in the development of the situation in this region – and, indeed, in

Mr Parent is a freelance journalist and Director of Information for the Chomedey de Laval School Board in Montreal. He studied international relations at Ottawa University and at the University of Montreal. The views expressed in this article are those of Mr Parent.

other areas of the world. But the Soviet Union and Cuba intervened decisively; their support for the Ethiopian government prevented the country from disintegrating.

The conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia and the Eritrean problem were never mere border disputes. By virtue of its geographical position, Ethiopia controls access to the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, a major oil-route from the Persian Gulf to Europe. Interest in events in the Horn of Africa has therefore grown beyond the regional level. Since the stakes are so high, the parties concerned – Ethiopia and Eritrea, at least – have found ready allies among the major or regional powers in support of their causes. The situation was different for Somalia. Since it was the aggressor, and especially since it represented a potential threat to borders established in colonial times, it did not receive any major direct assistance.

Never a colony

The Ethiopian Empire was one of the few African countries that had never been colonized. Under the leadership of its monarchs, however, it had gained territory from some of its neighbours that had experienced colonial status. For example, following the very brief invasion and occupation of the Empire by Mussolini's forces during the Second World War, Haile Selassie decided that his Empire should have an outlet to the sea. He therefore sought Eritrea – a colonial possession of the defeated Italians – from the Allies.

In spite of organized Eritrean opposition and a plea to the United Nations by provincial authorities for help in preparing for Eritrean independence, Addis Ababa decided to put an end to the situation by force. Accordingly, in 1952, with the support of the British and (even more important) of the Americans, to whom the Emperor had promised the base at Kagnew (in the territory he was claiming), the Empire, under a federal arrangement, extended its boundaries to include Eritrea. At last Ethiopia possessed an outlet on the Red Sea.

Haile Selassie waited until all controversy over this *démarche* had died down and then, ten years after the formation of the federation, judging the time to be right, he simply annexed the province. Thus Eritrea became in 1962 the fourteenth province of the Ethiopian Empire.

This act of annexation was, however, to prove a source of endless conflict and created a real quagmire for the Ethiopian armed forces. Ethiopia had claimed a maritime province for itself in spite of strong Eritrean opposition but from the time of the annexation onward it had to fight to main-

tain the new territory. Despite 16 years of military occupation, mobilization of 40 per cent of the army and the expenditure of a great deal of money, successive Addis Ababa governments have not been able to impose any kind of military solution.

Eritrea, which was so persistent in its resistance to the imperial power, is fighting even more desperately against the revolutionary government and the Soviet and Cuban forces. Thus far the province seems to have been growing stronger, both in the field and in its alliances. Despite the numerical superiority of the Ethiopian forces, their new modern arms and the naval support they are receiving, they control only three major cities in the entire province – Asmara, the capital, and the ports of Massaua and Assab. Ninety-five per cent of the territory is in the hands of various liberation movements, which are now besieging Asmara and are in control of the outskirts of that city. The guerillas can move freely about the province, from the borders of the Sudan, their ally, to newly-independent Djibouti.

But will these advantages last much longer, when thousands of Cuban mercenaries are being transferred from the southern to the northern front in Eritrea? It is clear from their numbers, training and modern equipment – not to mention the support provided by Russian naval forces and planes flown by East European pilots – that Eritrea's chances of seceding have greatly diminished. However, the troops fighting for the Eritrean liberation fronts are far superior to those who fought in the Ogaden. They have more than 14 years' experience in guerilla warfare and in the tactics of attrition, and they know their territory perfectly. They have modern equipment and regular supplies and, above all, they have outside support. Conquering this province could, therefore, take longer and prove more costly than many people think.

Liberation movements

The liberation of Eritrean territory is mainly due to two large armed resistance movements – the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) – , which have a combined strength of 40,000 men. Both movements have undeniable local support and possess an excellent knowledge of the territory.

The ELF consists mainly of Moslems. Its recruiting, internal and external support and orientation are Arab. In recent years however, it has expanded to include Christians, Baalites and even Marxists, despite the fact that it claims to be conservative. Well-armed and mobile, the ELF units are active throughout Eritrea, and also in neigh-

*Annexation
a quagmire
for Ethiopian
armed forces*

pouring provinces, in support of the Democratic Union in its struggle against the central power.

Though the second movement, the EPLF, does not have extensive financial resources, it is by far the best organized of the liberation movements. This is largely because of its well-defined structure and its great ideological cohesion. Moreover, the People's Front has set up an internal infrastructure that the other movements lack. The EPLF does not wish merely to liberate Eritrea – it is constructing roads and setting up schools and hospitals. The movement claims to be nationalist and non-discriminatory; its members include Christians (who were its founders), Moslems and minority groups.

The hostility of the ELPF, which claims non-alignment and no particular allegiance, to the conservative Arab countries, which it accuses of being pro-West and strongly anti-Communist, has deprived it of considerable financial support. Its funds come mainly from Somalia, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Iraq and Syria.

Although these two liberation movements, with the support of armed forces and the people, now control almost all of Eritrea, there is a third movement, which does not yet have any military importance but could, in the near future, become a force to be reckoned with. Its strength lies mainly in the generosity of its foreign allies, Saudi Arabia and Libya, which, while they do not yet get along with each other, actively support the movement. It is possible that, under pressure from Saudi Arabia, this group of scattered forces might ally itself with the Eritrean Liberation Front. Thus united, the groups would have sufficient men, weapons and financial means to launch a campaign against the EPLF for control of the entire province. Although the two armed liberation movements are practising unity in order to advance their common cause, the alliance is undoubtedly only temporary – which is why each movement has a well-defined territory. In spite of this alliance of convenience, clashes sometimes occur between troops of the ELF and the EPLF. As independence seems to draw nearer and the prospect becomes more real, it is inevitable that the rivalry between the two will flare up again and that there will be another civil war like that of 1972-74. For the time being, however, the principles of solidarity and unity are being respected in order to confront the Cuban mercenaries, their country's new invaders.

Ogaden

Near the end of the nineteenth century, the Ethiopian Empire expanded under the lead-

ership of King Menelik. When the Somali Empire was partitioned by France, Britain and Italy, Menelik succeeded in imposing his designs on the colonial powers. As a result, Ethiopia was granted the Ogaden District – that is, the provinces of Harar and Bale and most of Sidamo. This boldness on Ethiopia's part was beneficial in the short run but was to prove a threat in the long run, for, though the provinces of the Somali Empire were separated, the spirit of unity remained strong. Now that the Republic has replaced the Empire and yesterday's weakness has given way to modern strength, the memory of partition has renewed hostility between revolutionary Ethiopia and socialist Somalia.

A number of years ago, the Soviet Union became interested in the small desert country of Somalia – especially on account of its strategic location. In an effort to establish an alliance that would assure it a foothold in this important part of the continent, Moscow gave Somalia every assistance in becoming a military power.

This new strength gave Somalia an opportunity to realize its dream of reviving the Somali Empire that had existed before partition and is now represented on Somalia's national flag by a white star with five points. Three of the points represent the Ogaden, Djibouti and the northern part of Kenya, which were claimed by the English when the Empire was split up.

The plan to reunite Somalia's lost provinces was historically and ethnically sound. Were not the three territories claimed part of the Somali Empire before partition? Were not most of the inhabitants of these areas Somalis, and were not their language and culture similar in every respect to those of the inhabitants of the existing Republic? All these pretexts were overridden, however, by one fundamental principle respected by all the African countries, which is written into the charter of the Organization of African Unity – the requirement that all the borders established in colonial times be respected when a country becomes independent. There is undoubtedly a certain amount of wisdom in this view of Africa's political, ethnic and cultural history. Nevertheless, the contradiction between respect for the old colonial borders and the legitimate desire to reunite divided ethnic groups has been the main source of instability throughout the continent since most African countries achieved independence.

However, once Somalia had the resources and capacity to rebuild the Empire, and circumstances permitted, it proceeded with this plan. The Somali government lent direct support to the guerilla forces of the

*Direct support
for guerillas
in the form of
equipment
and weapons*

Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF) in the form of weapons and various other kinds of equipment. Strengthened by the military training and modern weapons it had received from its former Soviet ally, the Somali army undertook to provide training and instructors for the WSLF. There is good reason to believe that the latter, of whom there were a significant number in the Ogaden District, were involved in combat with the Ethiopian armed forces from the outset of hostilities.

If Ethiopia had lost all three cities that controlled access to the southern provinces, it would probably have lost the provinces of the Ogaden to Somalia for good. In that event, the WSLF guerillas would have been in a position to spread out over the plains and threaten Addis Ababa directly. In addition, Djibouti would have been surrounded and cut off. Somalia would only have had to wait until the right time – that is, until France withdrew its protection – to seize the port. A third consequence of losing these cities in the Ogaden would have been that the WSLF forces could have joined up with the liberation movements of Eritrea and the provinces of the north, held by the Democratic Union, which would have isolated the capital even more. The Dergue, in spite of all its weapons and armed forces, would not have been able to reverse such a trend. This is why the Ethiopian Government was so anxious to receive Soviet and Cuban assistance, why its Eastern allies kept sending it massive quantities of arms and increasing numbers of advisers to protect their interests, and why they became directly involved in the conflict.

Several blitzes, led by Russians and based on a Soviet infrastructure, succeeded in routing the liberation forces and the regular Somali army in a matter of only a few days. After carefully scouting the territory, the Soviet and Cuban forces proceeded with an air-drop and surrounded Jijiga, thereby creating panic in the city and taking it over with ease. The first major thrust after the liberation of Jijiga was limited to the province of Harar. Encountering little resistance during this campaign, the Cuban troops drove the routed Somali troops back to the border. A second thrust, coinciding with the first, was aimed at taking the railway-line linking Addis Ababa to Djibouti. Once again, there was little resistance. The purpose of a third thrust, currently under way, is to eliminate any remnants of the Somali and WSLF forces in the provinces of Sidamo and Bale.

Changing alliances

It is interesting to analyse the alliances that have been formed in the Horn of Africa,

where the U.S.S.R. has sought to establish a secure position. It is also fascinating to consider how these alliances became reversed as the situation in Ethiopia developed.

Behind this regional conflict is the ever-present opposition between the East and the West. Whereas the U.S.S.R. has involved itself directly and unreservedly with its satellites and allies and provided each of the antagonists with arms, the West remained outside the conflict from the fall of the Empire until Somalia's defeat. Although the West is not directly involved, it is indirectly involved through the intermediation of regional allied powers.

In addition to these alliances between the major powers and the belligerent countries, there have been alliances between Ethiopia and Kenya, based on convenience, and alliances between the Arab world, Somalia and the liberation movements – and between Ethiopia and Israel –, which are based on emotion.

Since the Dergue was incapable of creating the economic, political and social conditions for normal life in a country it no longer controlled, it had to appeal for outside help to the Communists. This dependence on other countries has increased continuously since 1974, following the success of the internal and external resistance movements. Today, revolutionary Ethiopia depends on such assistance not only for arms and part of its fighting strength but also for food and the stability of its national economy.

Without a doubt, the Soviet Union is the leading player in the drama that is unfolding in this strategic region. By encouraging both parties for a certain time, Moscow hoped eventually to further its own interests. While the U.S.S.R. was Somalia's unconditional ally, it made that country many gifts and for 15 years provided it with various kinds of aid in return for port facilities and a missile-base at Berbera on the Gulf of Aden. It also trained the Somali army during this entire period, making it one of the most efficient and best-equipped in Africa. When, however, revolutionary Ethiopia asked for assistance, the Kremlin could not refuse.

While the Soviet Union was fully aware that the two countries were ancestral enemies, it nevertheless responded favourably to Ethiopia's request in the hope of being able to exercise firm control over both parties and lead them to a peace settlement – thus gaining a twofold benefit.

This plan of action seems, however, to have been more than the U.S.S.R. could follow. Because of Saudi pressure on Somalia, especially following the increase in

*Alliances
of convenience
and emotion*

oviet aid to Ethiopia, the Somali President, Siyad Barre, after numerous warnings, denounced the treaty of friendship with his country's traditional ally. As a consequence, all Russian and Cuban nationals on Somali soil were expelled. In addition, all Soviet rights to port facilities and to the base at Berbera were revoked. Mogadishu did not, however, go so far as to break diplomatic ties with Moscow; President Barre left himself a way out in case Somalia's fortunes changed, which they did.

After much hesitation, the Soviet Union made its choice between sparsely-populated Somalia and Ethiopia, with its 28 million inhabitants – and it has accepted the consequences. If Ethiopia emerges triumphant from its present troubles, Moscow could maintain a strategic position on the oil-route; in addition, Ethiopia would undoubtedly grant it a share of the mineral wealth – gold, cobalt, zinc, copper and lead – that lies beneath the Red Sea. These deposits, discovered only a few years ago, are estimated to be worth several billion dollars.

Misjudgment

Nevertheless, the Kremlin seems to have misjudged certain factors in its analysis of the East African situation. In order that the U.S.S.R. may be entitled to these riches, to port facilities and to a missile-base on the Red Sea, Eritrea must remain Ethiopian, and this does not seem likely, though, with the intervention of Cuban troops transferred from the Ogaden, there could be a different outcome. Furthermore, in its attempt to manipulate the two enemies, the

Soviet Union was faced with a quandary when the Somali President asked for an explanation of its assistance to Ethiopia. Moscow had to make a choice and, since it opted for Ethiopia, it lost not only its Berbera base and port facilities but also a faithful, well-trained and powerful ally.

Despite the rapid victory of the Cuban mercenaries in the Ogaden, the Soviet Union's new ally is not an immediate asset. It has a great deal of potential but, in view of the threat posed by well-organized and well-armed opposition inside the country, the Soviet and Cuban contingents will undoubtedly meet very strong resistance, which will have to be overcome before any benefit can be derived from this area.

To repossess the territory held by the secessionists and restore internal order, the Addis Ababa government has, to be sure, a large army, but one that is poorly trained. The army's crack units are still surrounded in Eritrean cities by liberation movements and are therefore of no assistance. Apart from the armed forces, the Dergue has set up people's militias consisting mainly of farmers, who are also poorly trained and not very reliable. The military junta relies mainly on Soviet and Cuban intervention to restore order in the country.

In spite of Ethiopia's unstable situation and the growing uncertainty regarding its future, the Soviet Union chose it over Somalia. This decision was based almost entirely on the size of Ethiopia's population, which, according to the Kremlin's calculations, would eventually rectify the situation with the help of substantial supplies of arms and



Wide World Photo

Guerrillas of the Western Somali Liberation Front search for snipers in a bombed-out Ethiopian commando headquarters.

advisers and, naturally, soldiers. The result was as Moscow had predicted. The U.S.S.R. emerged as the victor, and will undoubtedly receive a great deal in return for its assistance. However, it took a considerable risk. Another defeat after those suffered in Egypt, the Sudan, Somalia and North Yemen would have meant a complete rejection of Communism in this strategic part of the African continent. Ethiopia has, therefore, become a major Soviet base and stronghold in the area. That is the main reason why Moscow did not hesitate to commit itself heavily and to call in its allies to tip the military balance in favour of the Dergue.

United States

In view of the expanding Soviet influence in the Horn, the United States has re-evaluated its strategy and its assistance to Ethiopia. While Ethiopia was a faithful ally, the United States provided it with considerable aid. More than half the military aid of the U.S. and 20 per cent of its economic aid to the African nations – several billion dollars over a period of 20 years – went to the government of Haile Selassie.

After the revolution of October 1974, this assistance was reduced while the United States waited for the Dergue to give the country a new direction. When the Dergue swung more and more clearly toward socialism, especially after the execution of members of the royal family, of dignitaries and of imperial ministers, Washington suspended its assistance indefinitely. Under the Carter Administration, the United States chose to remain outside the conflict until Somalia was defeated. Then it took an official position – that of safeguarding Somalia's borders and offering assistance to both parties for their rebuilding efforts.

The role of defender of Western values and interests has been played mainly by Saudi Arabia but also by other conservative Arab countries, such as the Sudan, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates. This changing-of-the-guard, which mainly affects Eritrea, developed in the context of a regional Arab strategy aimed at making the Red Sea an "Arab lake". With its "petro-dollars", its strong anti-Communist convictions and its aim of bringing Islam to greater prominence, Saudi Arabia has been one of the most active of these countries. It is constantly increasing its loans and financial contributions to its allies, and is leading an all-out campaign for Eritrea's independence. Iran, another wealthy oil-exporting, anti-Communist country, is also playing an important role.

With respect to diplomatic relations, Saudi Arabia is the country that led the

Arab world to decide quickly to support and defend the cause of Eritrea, which is mainly Moslem. Somalia, the Sudan, Chad, Egypt and the Eritrean liberation movements owe most of the financial aid they have received for their military programs to Saudi Arabia.

Riyadh's sustained efforts resulted in the splitting-up of the U.S.S.R.'s alliances with Somalia, Egypt and the Sudan and very recently drew the Marxist Government of North Yemen into its orbit with a promise of \$300 million in aid and a million tons of crude oil. With its assets, Saudi Arabia has undeniably become a major power, capable of exerting direct force throughout the region.

Secondary alliances

In the middle of all this instability, Djibouti is fighting for survival. Though the French promised to protect this piece of territory, Somalia and Ethiopia are both eying it hungrily, hoping to annex it themselves.

Though Kenya stands outside the conflict, it was indirectly involved. The northern part of the country, which was given to Kenya by Britain when the Somali Empire was partitioned, is inhabited mainly by Somalis. Kenya felt threatened by Somalia's drive to expand, since the border provinces of Bale and Sidamo were occupied by the WSLF. It is mainly for this reason that the Nairobi government announced its solidarity with Addis Ababa and reinforced Kenya's borders. It appears, however, that Kenya did not wish to go any further, and that its solidarity with Ethiopia was little more than verbal, despite the interception of an Egyptian plane loaded with arms *en route* for Somalia.

The Organization of African Unity was powerless to stop the civil war in Ethiopia and the fighting between Ethiopia and Somalia. In spite of the repeated appeals of the OAU for a cease-fire and several mediation attempts, all parties continued to fight. It was only when Somalia first began to suffer defeat and the United States increasingly made its position known that the Organization began to play a mediating role through General Obasanjo of Nigeria. However, mediation would not have been possible if Ethiopia, in the elation of victory, had not taken a conciliatory attitude in response to strong pressure from its Soviet ally.

Though all African countries claim to respect the OAU's charter (which stipulates, among other things, that the borders established when the African countries were colonies are not to be contested by arms), none of them has intervened to save Ethiopia. Ethiopia was literally overwhelmed by offers of arms from friendly Communist and socialist countries, but for

help in the actual fighting – first in the Ogaden and now in Eritrea and the northern provinces – it could rely only on the growing commitment of the Cubans.

It is difficult to analyse Israel's role in this conflict because of its desire to remain in the background. Nevertheless, it supplied the Dergue's military regime with arms. It is impossible to say whether personnel – that is, military advisers – were, or are, working in the training-camps on the outskirts of the capital, where Ethiopian armed forces recruits and the people's militias are trained. It should be remembered, however, in the effort to understand Israel's position in this conflict, that it has suffered many setbacks in its African policy and that the Imperial Ethiopian Government was the only one not to sever diplomatic ties with Jerusalem. Its presence in Ethiopia may thus be no more than an expression of gratitude, but it might also be for the purpose of maintaining a base in Africa from which to renew old friendships on the continent at some time in the future.

Outlook

Although the swift resolution of the Ogaden drama quickly dashed President Barre's hopes of reuniting Somalia, the situation in Ethiopia is still far from normal.

Eritrea is still largely controlled by the various liberation movements. With the help of the Cuban troops, which number more than 17,000, and the support of Russian technicians, the situation of the Ethiopian armed forces – which have been besieged for years in the major cities – may improve. But it would be wrong to think that the conflict in Eritrea will end as quickly as that in the Ogaden, because too many factors – geographical, social and military – differentiate the two areas. Moreover, since the end of the conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia and the change in the theatre of operations, there has been a parallel change in the alliances and attitudes of certain countries. Libya, though it gave strong backing to the military junta against the Somali invasion, has always been an active supporter of the Eritrean cause, and the regional powers, especially Iran and Saudi Arabia, clearly do not want so important a part of the oil-route threatened by the Russians. It is mainly for these reasons that the Soviet-Cuban adventure in Eritrea will not be as easy as the Ogaden operation. If the Cuban mercenaries are victorious, they will certainly pay the price in men, weapons and prestige.

Ethiopia will obviously have to continue in a state of instability, repression and dependence on foreign countries for as many more years as it takes for all the



Wide World Photo

For decades Emperor Haile Selassie, "The Lion of Judah", ruled over the 40 tribal groups in Ethiopia. His overthrow was a prelude to the recent fighting.

internal opposition groups in Eritrea and the northern provinces to be completely eliminated. This could take a long time, for the northern region is particularly well suited to guerilla warfare. Events will undoubtedly unfold as they have done in Angola, where Cubans and soldiers of the MPLA are constantly harassed in the north and are caught up in a war against the elusive FLNA guerillas. The Cubans are now experiencing what the Americans went through in Vietnam.

Somalia is now trying to adjust to the aftermath of the war in the Ogaden, with all

the attendant feelings of popular dissatisfaction caused by defeat. However, the country is also facing an international dilemma. After being betrayed by the Soviet Union and deserted by the United States, where can Somalia turn for assistance in rebuilding its economy? Because it still offers geographical advantages in the Horn, the two super-powers have lost no time in trying to regain Mogadishu's favour by offering their assistance.

The Soviet Union is undoubtedly the winner of the first round; it has earned the boundless gratitude of a military regime that seemed doomed to collapse. After establishing a powerful base in Ethiopia, and especially after forming an almost unbroken chain of "friendly" countries along the east coast of Africa (Somalia is the sole exception), the Kremlin is now trying to secure the benefits that Eritrea could provide.

As for the United States, its limited verbal intervention at the last minute – though based entirely on good intentions and international law – did not win it many advantages in this strategic area. In fact the countries of the West have fared very poorly, considering that, following its successes in Angola, Mozambique and elsewhere, the U.S.S.R. has now established its presence in the Horn as well, without any response from the West. The American rather naive attempt to persuade the victorious Soviet and Cuban forces to leave in return for the withdrawal of the routed Somali troops illustrates the lack of coherence in United States policy towards Africa. The only African problem that seems to hold Washington's attention and to be considered a priority is the situation in southern Africa – not the expansion of Soviet influence throughout the entire continent.

Canada's continuing search for acceptable nuclear safeguards

By John J. Noble

Canada's involvement in nuclear research began with participation in the wartime "Manhattan Project" that led to the development of the atomic bomb. In the postwar period, however, Canadian efforts have been focused on the peaceful uses of atomic energy, primarily the generation of electricity and medical research and treatment. As a major supplier of uranium and as the developer and exporter of a sophisticated and highly-efficient reactor technology (CANDU), Canada has been thrust into a leading role in the diversion of nuclear material and technology from peaceful power-generation programs to the development of nuclear explosives.


Any country that develops or acquires from others the ability to irradiate fissionable material or generate electricity from

nuclear energy has the technical ability to develop nuclear weapons. The only additional ingredient required is the will to devote the necessary human and financial resources to this development. In 1968 Canada terminated its involvement in the nuclear-weapons programs of the United States and Britain by specifying that Canadian uranium could henceforth be used only for non-military purposes. More recently the problem faced by Canada and other nuclear-suppliers has been to minimize the risks of proliferation by developing means to ensure that states that do not have nuclear weapons but receive nuclear material, equipment and technology exclusively for energy generation or other peaceful purposes do not use what they have acquired to develop a nuclear-explosive capability.

Since the 1950s, there has been a generally-recognized international balance between the need to increase the availability of nuclear power as a reliable source of energy for peaceful purposes and the need to ensure that civilian nuclear-power programs are not used to produce material for explosive purposes. Two major international instruments were established to promote these twin aims: first, the Inter-

Mr Noble is Special Adviser, Safeguards, in the Commodity and Energy Policy Division of the Department of External Affairs. A graduate of Acadia University, he joined External Affairs in 1966 and has served in Dakar, Ankara and London, as well as Ottawa. The views expressed here are those of Mr Noble.

national Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), founded in 1957 to develop and administer nuclear safeguards and to promote access by member states to nuclear technology for peaceful uses, and, second, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which came into force in 1970. The IAEA developed a safeguards system in the 1960s to inhibit the use of nuclear material, equipment and technology to further any military purpose. Most nuclear-suppliers were prepared to forego bilateral safeguards in favour of the IAEA system. Canada first did so in 1966 through a three-party arrangement with Japan and the IAEA. In 1969 and 1971, IAEA safeguards were also applied to specific Canadian plants supplied to Pakistan and India.



The IAEA system had weaknesses. First, there was no obligation for the nuclear-supplier to make acceptance of the system by the recipient a condition of supply. Moreover, it did not apply to the whole of a recipient's nuclear activities. Since 1970, the NPT has sought to overcome the weaknesses of the IAEA system by:

- (1) facilitating to the fullest possible extent the exchange of technology for the peaceful uses of atomic energy;
- (2) requiring a commitment by all parties to the treaty not already possessing nuclear weapons not to acquire or develop them and to accept IAEA safeguards on all nuclear activities within their territories in order to verify compliance with this obligation (there was a corresponding commitment by parties already possessing nuclear weapons not to provide them to non-weapons states); and
- (3) committing the nuclear-weapon states parties to the treaty (Britain, the U.S., the U.S.S.R.) to work towards reducing their own weapons stockpiles.

Limitations

Although 102 countries have become parties to the treaty, the limitations on its success are illustrated by the non-participation of a number of key countries including France, China, India, Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Pakistan, Portugal, Israel, Indonesia and South Africa. The failure to

fulfil the expectations of some parties concerning increased access to nuclear technology, the lack of any reduction in existing nuclear stockpiles of weapons and the absence of stability resulting from a three-month denunciation provision in the treaty are further negative factors affecting the current effectiveness of the NPT regime.

The limitations of the treaty resulting from non-participation were brought sharply to the attention of the international community in 1974 by India's explosion of a nuclear device. At about the same time, the oil crisis accelerated the search by both developed and developing countries for alternative sources of energy. Consequently, the importance of the NPT commitment by nuclear-suppliers to facilitate access to nuclear technology was enhanced in the minds of energy-poor developing countries. Stringent safeguards, on the other hand, were regarded by some states as unnecessary and discriminatory obstacles to their access to much-needed nuclear energy.


The oil crisis heightened international awareness of the finite nature of the world's fossil-fuel resources. It also made large consumers of energy much more aware of the political and economic consequences of dependence upon foreign sources, thereby placing a premium on energy independence. These two factors combined to focus interest on the recovery and re-use of the plutonium produced in all nuclear-power reactors. Such re-use can increase several times the energy obtained from a given quantity of uranium. Increased emphasis was placed on a new generation of reactors, the "fast-breeder", which is fueled with plutonium and actually produces more plutonium than goes into the reactor as fuel. Since plutonium is a basic ingredient of nuclear weapons, these developments presented new and serious proliferation problems. The "plutonium economy" could result in the stockpiling of quantities of plutonium larger than those contained in the existing weapons-stockpiles of all nuclear-weapon states.

Indian explosion

The detonation of a nuclear device by India in May 1974 greatly complicated efforts to implement nuclear-energy programs. It created widespread uncertainty about the effectiveness of international arrangements to prevent proliferation. The international community's response to this challenge was slow to emerge, but Canadian public opinion at all levels was deeply disturbed that Canada's nuclear co-operation with India had been diverted to the development of an explosive capacity. The Indian

Government assured Canada that its explosion had been for peaceful purposes only and disclaimed any intention to develop nuclear weapons. However, the Canadian Government had made known some time in advance, at the highest political level, that it would regard the development of any explosive capability as contrary to the spirit of its nuclear co-operation with India. Because there is no practical distinction between nuclear explosives for peaceful and non-peaceful purposes, the development of any nuclear-explosive capability is considered contrary to the objective of nuclear non-proliferation.

The Canadian Government was among the first to react to the Indian explosion, by suspending nuclear co-operation with India and by reviewing and strengthening safeguards conditions for Canadian nuclear exports to all countries and calling on other suppliers to do likewise.



The policy announced by the Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources on December 20, 1974, reaffirmed Canada's intention to continue nuclear co-operation with other countries but placed safeguards conditions on that co-operation that were more comprehensive and more stringent than those required by any other supplier. Canada required a binding treaty assurance from the recipient country that all Canadian nuclear material (uranium), facilities (CANDU reactors, heavy-water plants, fuel-fabrication plants) and the technology associated with them, as well as any items or material produced in them, would be used exclusively for peaceful, non-explosive purposes. Binding assurance was also required that IAEA safeguards or, in the event the Agency was no longer in a position to carry them out, Canadian bilateral safeguards would apply for the lifetime of the items and material furnished by Canada. Canada also required its prior consent before items, material or technology of Canadian origin were transferred beyond the jurisdiction of the receiving country. Irradiated fuel could be reprocessed for plutonium extraction, uranium could be enriched above 20 per cent and plutonium and uranium enriched beyond 20 per cent could be stored only if Canada agreed that these operations were

being undertaken in such a way as not to create a proliferation risk. The policy also limited use of CIDA (Canadian International Development Agency) funds for future nuclear co-operation to countries that had ratified the NPT.

In deciding to renegotiate its nuclear co-operation agreements with Canada's nuclear customers, the Government gave effect to the new safeguards policy; nevertheless, it allowed shipments of uranium under supply contracts already approved to continue for one year pending completion of this renegotiation. The "grace period" was subsequently extended to two years.

The Government's re-examination of its safeguards policy did not stop with the 1974 announcement. There followed among suppliers a period of intensive discussion of the safeguards to be applied to nuclear exports. Although Canada was encountering difficulty in persuading other suppliers to upgrade their safeguards requirements and in securing the agreement of its nuclear customers (some of whom were major suppliers in their own right) to the terms of the 1974 policy, the Government announced at the end of 1976 a further evolution in Canadian safeguard policy. Its purpose was to ensure that Canada's nuclear co-operation with non-nuclear weapon states would be limited to those that had clearly committed themselves not to develop or acquire nuclear-explosive devices from any source. In December 1976, Don Jamieson, Secretary of State for External Affairs, announced that new contracts for shipments of Canadian material, equipment and technology would be authorized only to countries that, in addition to meeting the 1974 requirements, had either ratified the NPT or otherwise accepted "full-scope safeguards" – i.e., made a binding commitment to non-proliferation and acceptance of IAEA safeguards on their entire nuclear programs. The policy also stipulated that Canada would terminate nuclear shipment to any non-nuclear-weapon state that exploded a nuclear device. The new policy thus required a commitment not simply concerning the recipient's use of Canadian nuclear supplies but, more important, concerning the recipient's non-proliferation policy generally.

Uranium embargo

By the end of 1976, the Canadian Government had achieved only limited success in securing the acceptance by its nuclear customers of the 1974 policy in the form of revised bilateral safeguards agreements. New agreements were negotiated with certain countries, such as Argentina, South Korea, Spain and Finland and, early in

1977, with Sweden. However, Canada's major uranium customers, Japan and the European Economic Community, as well as Switzerland, had not accepted the conditions of the 1974 policy. The Government had already extended by a year the "grace period" it had allowed for renegotiation of the safeguards agreements. When new agreements still had not been concluded by the end of 1976, however, the Government decided to suspend, as of January 1, 1977, shipments of uranium to Japan, the EEC and Switzerland until such time as these purchasers accepted the 1974 requirements. In the absence of an upgraded safeguards agreement with the United States, shipments of uranium to that country for use in U.S. reactors were also subjected to restraints. In total, shipments worth approximately \$300 million were stopped, thereby demonstrating that Canada was prepared to pay a commercial price to secure compliance with its enhanced safeguards policy.

Canadian nuclear negotiators had their hands full throughout 1977 as they sought to secure acceptance of Canadian safeguards policy while minimizing any "spillover" of resentment at the embargo to other aspects of Canada's relations. In the U.S.A., the new Carter Administration had formulated a nuclear-safeguards policy very similar to Canada's and there were therefore no substantive differences with that country. In mid-November, pending the definition of new U.S. policy by Congress, Canada and the United States reached an interim agreement that fully met the 1974 policy requirements. Restraints on the shipment of Canadian uranium to the U.S. were removed at that time.

The EEC and Japan were the principal targets of Canadian diplomatic efforts, and during 1977 several rounds of negotiations were held with each of these important nuclear partners. The essential problem with the EEC was its great reluctance to accept Canada's right of prior consent to reprocessing of Canadian origin material. Though Canada had indicated that it was not opposed in principle to reprocessing, the Community considered that such a requirement would give Canada a veto over the right of member states to determine their energy policies and would seriously impair the Community's efforts to achieve as great a degree of energy self-sufficiency as possible.


Japan strongly resisted the acceptance of a system of double controls resulting from the fact that most Canadian uranium destined for Japan was first enriched in the United States, which therefore subjected the enriched uranium to U.S. safeguards in

addition to those imposed by Canada. Japan argued that Canada should accept U.S. control as fully meeting Canadian policy. However, the new Canadian policy made clear that Canadian control had to apply to all material of Canadian origin even if others attached their own safeguards requirements to the same material.

Discussions by Prime Minister Trudeau and Mr Jamieson with EEC and Japanese political leaders at the Downing Street "economic summit" in May 1977 did not resolve the outstanding issues. At the suggestion of President Carter, the "summit" session did, however, agree to proceed with an International Nuclear-Fuel-Cycle Evaluation (INFCE). This study is to examine the issue of reprocessing and the safeguards implications of the plutonium economy, the fundamental issue between Canada and the EEC. Negotiations between Mr Jamieson and his Japanese and EEC counterparts continued through June and July.


Compromise

Elements of a compromise with the EEC on reprocessing were identified in the July discussions between Prime Minister Trudeau and West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt. It was agreed that, in the light of the "summit" decision to consider the whole question of reprocessing in the INFCE and of EEC willingness to consult with Canada before reprocessing Canadian material, deliveries of sufficient amounts of Canadian uranium to meet current Community needs during the period of INFCE could be resumed if all other issues still outstanding in the negotiations were resolved. These included coverage of Canadian nuclear technology and the particular problems of deliveries of Canadian uranium to France, which was not an NPT signatory and had not at that time agreed to have IAEA safeguards apply to its civilian nuclear cycle.



In late November and early December, Mr Jamieson and Energy, Mines and Resources Minister Gillespie and their negotiating team worked out an agreement with EEC Energy Commissioner Brunner that fully met the 1974 policy requirements. Under the agreement, the EEC gave Canada a binding assurance with respect to the

peaceful non-explosive use of Canadian-supplied material, equipment or technology and of material of any origin produced in Canadian-designed or -supplied equipment, reaffirmed Canada's right to demand prior consent to the transfer of supplies of Canadian origin outside the Community, and recognized that all Canadian material, whether supplied directly or through a third country, was subject to the agreement. The settlement allowed France to enrich Canadian uranium for other countries but excluded Canadian uranium from use in French reactors until France accepted IAEA safeguards on its civil cycle. (France has since worked out such an agreement with the IAEA and, as soon as it is in force, France will be able to use Canadian uranium in its civilian reactors.)



An interim arrangement on reprocessing along the lines of the Trudeau-Schmidt formula was agreed to cover the period to the end of INFCE. The EEC will engage in consultations in depth with Canada before reprocessing material of Canadian origin. The reprocessing aspect of the agreement and the corresponding continuation of supply of Canadian uranium are linked to INFCE, and further negotiations must be held before the end of 1980 to agree on the conditions for reprocessing after that date. The Canada-EEC consultations on reprocessing will further Canadian understanding of the European requirement for reprocessing and provide Canada with firsthand evidence of the safeguarding of reprocessing plants.

The INFCE study is expected to result in a better understanding of the criteria that should be applied to the reprocessing of spent fuel. In so doing, it should facilitate the efforts of Canadian and EEC negotiators to agree upon more-permanent arrangements with respect to reprocessing.

Because responsibility for the transfer of nuclear technology rests with the member states rather than the Community, it was agreed that this element of Canadian safeguards policy would be the subject of bilateral agreements between Canada and those member states seeking to acquire Canadian nuclear technology.

Shipments of Canadian uranium to the

EEC were resumed upon conclusion of the agreement in December 1977.

Japanese interest

Following conclusion of the agreement with the U.S. and the EEC, Japan showed renewed interest in reaching an early settlement with Canada. With the establishment in the interim Canada-U.S. agreement of a mechanism minimizing the practical inconvenience of a double set of safeguards, Japan accepted the principle of double controls near the end of 1977 and a settlement was reached in Tokyo on January 26 during Mr Jamieson's visit to Japan. Uranium shipments were resumed on that date.

Canada had undertaken to offer Japan an agreement similar to any agreement with the EEC, bearing in mind that the 1959 agreement with Japan gave Canada prior consent regarding reprocessing, whereas the 1959 agreement with the EEC did not. Japan decided to continue to accept a requirement for prior Canadian consent to reprocessing and storage of plutonium and uranium enriched above 20 per cent in order to avoid the limitation on the quantities of uranium that could be shipped to "current needs" that is a consequence of the interim nature of the EEC agreement. The settlement with Japan is thus a long-term one, unlike the EEC agreement, which will require renegotiation by 1980 in the light of the results of INFCE. The Canada-Japan agreement may, therefore, serve as a model for future agreements between Canada and other supplier countries. The fact that it was possible for Canada to reach agreement with its major uranium customer – a country almost entirely dependent on external sources of energy supply – casts doubt upon the allegation by some countries, developed as well as developing, that Canadian safeguards requirements are an infringement on their sovereignty and their energy policies. The Canada-Japan agreement is a concrete demonstration that, where there is an unequivocal commitment to non-proliferation, Canadian safeguards policy does not represent any real impediment to a national energy program.

At the time of writing, Switzerland is the only Canadian nuclear customer with which no agreement has been reached to implement the 1974 policy. In the Swiss case, the problem is one particularly of assurances on the coverage of Canadian technology. The Swiss Government has indicated that it lacks the legislative authority to enforce the degree of control over retransfers of nuclear technology required by Canadian safeguards policy. A further

ound of negotiations with the Swiss is expected.

The recent settlements with the United States, the EEC and Japan have removed major constraints to uranium shipments but have not entirely resolved all outstanding safeguards issues. Agreements with the member states of the EEC wishing to purchase Canadian technology still have to be negotiated. More important, there are certain countries with which Canada is currently co-operating (Argentina, Spain) that meet the terms of the 1974 policy but not of the 1976 policy and are, therefore, not eligible for co-operation under new contracts. Argentina purchased a CANDU reactor before 1976 and is clearly interested in further purchases; however, these cannot take place unless Argentina either becomes a party to the NPT or otherwise accepts full-scope safeguards. The same applies to other potential nuclear customers.

Canada's nuclear co-operation with India was terminated and its co-operation with Pakistan suspended because neither country accepted the 1974 or 1976 policies; there is no indication that either country is likely to accept these policies in the near future.

On the multilateral front, Canada's initial efforts to respond to the uncertainties resulting from the Indian explosion centred on the Nuclear Suppliers Group. The group which now includes Britain, Canada, West Germany, France, Japan, the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R., Belgium, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden and Switzerland) has been meeting periodically in London during the past three years. It sought to agree upon the safeguards undertakings to be required respecting nuclear exports (including exports to other Group members) and, in doing so, to raise the level of international safeguards and remove the issue of safeguards as a subject of bargaining in the promotion of nuclear exports. Extensive and complex negotiations led to agreement on the nuclear-safeguards guidelines that were formally published by the IAEA in February of this year. The guidelines are similar to those of the 1974 Canadian policy, but do not cover reactor or fuel-fabrication technology and do not attach as much importance as does Canadian policy to prior-consent rights by the supplier with respect to reprocessing and storage of plutonium. Canada, therefore, regards the guidelines as a floor rather than a ceiling and continues to urge a number of modifications to improve their effectiveness. The most important of these are two basic elements of the 1976 Canadian policy: full-scope safeguards as a condition of supply and agreement on sanctions to be


applied in the event of non-compliance by a recipient.

The failure of the guidelines to require full-scope safeguards as a condition for supply and the application of sanctions for violation of safeguards undertakings represents a major shortcoming in the guidelines. Failure to agree upon these two elements limits the effectiveness of efforts by Canada and other equally-concerned suppliers to upgrade safeguards because it offers recipients the alternative of shopping among suppliers with less-stringent trade-off between non-proliferation and commercial interests. It is ultimately in the interest of the security of the world community that all suppliers insist on full-scope safeguards and effective sanctions against the violation of safeguards undertakings as essential elements of an effective international non-proliferation regime.

Most comprehensive

In the middle of 1978, Canadian safeguards policy is still the most comprehensive adopted by any nuclear-supplier. Recent U.S. legislation has incorporated similar requirements, but the necessary agreements to give effect to the legislation are not yet in existence. Australia has adopted a similar policy, which is to be reflected in agreements to be negotiated before it resumes uranium supplies in the early 1980s.

In its continuing efforts to promote an effective international non-proliferation regime, Canada has probably achieved as much as it is possible to achieve through the unilateral vehicle of its national safeguards policy. The only more stringent measures would be a ban on reprocessing of Canadian material or a total ban on the export of Canadian material, equipment and technology. While there is a body of opinion in Canada that would support such measures, it is doubtful that they would have a positive effect. Either ban would effectively cut Canada off from any real influence on the world of international nuclear co-operation and would consequently silence its voice in



those councils where an effective international non-proliferation system must be developed. Canada has both uranium and an efficient reactor technology, giving this country significant ability to influence the direction of international safeguards evolution provided it continues to participate in the international nuclear community by sharing its nuclear material and technology with other countries committed to non-proliferation.

There is a further limitation upon the effectiveness of a unilateral safeguards policy. When a supplier's national safeguards policy reaches a point at which a nuclear consumer state whose commitment to non-proliferation is not in doubt reason-

ably fears that controls imposed for non-proliferation purposes may be used to interfere with the recipient's national energy policies, doubts are raised about the security of energy supply. As a consequence, pressures increase upon the recipient to adopt new nuclear technologies that, on the basis of present knowledge, may involve greatly increased risks of proliferation. This indicates that there is a point at which a supplier's effort to achieve an effective international non-proliferation regime should shift its focus from the upgrading of national policy towards increased diplomatic effort to achieve international consensus among suppliers and recipients.

Reference Section

Canadian Foreign Relations

I. Recent Books

Canada and the Northern Rim; report from Conference, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, 31 March-April 2, 1977. Kingston: Centre for International Relations, Queen's University, 1977.
144 pp. (National Security Series, No. 6/77.)

Canada and the Inter-American Development Bank. Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank, 1978.
16 pp.

Canada and the United Nations in a changing world: report of a conference, Winnipeg, May 12-14, 1977. Ottawa: United Nations Association in Canada, 1977.
146 pp.

Canadian Council on International law. Bibliographie canadienne en droit international (1967-1977). Ottawa, 1978.
53 pp.

Drolet, Jean-Paul
Resource diplomacy: Canada's place in the world. Dumaesq-Smith Distinguished Lectureship. Wolfville, N.S.: Acadia University, 6 April 1978.
29 pp.

Drouin, Marie Josée, and B. Bruce-Briggs
Canada has a future. Prepared for the Hudson Institute of Canada. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1978.
282 pp.

Glen, Ron, and Charles Law
Critical choice: nuclear power in Canada, the issues behind the headlines. Toronto: Corpus, 1978.
268 pp.

Hutcheson, John

Dominance and dependency: liberalism and national policies in the North Atlantic triangle. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1978.
182 pp.

Mackenzie King: widening the debate. Edited by John English and J.O. Stubbs. Toronto: Macmillan, 1977.
253 pp.

McIntyre, Hugh C.

Uranium, nuclear power and Canada-U.S. energy relations. Montreal: Canadian-American Committee, 1978.
72 pp.

North-South Institute

World food and the Canadian "breadbasket" (Canada North-South; 1977-1978, 4). Ottawa: North-South Institute, 1978.
68 pp.

Operating in a changing Canada: a rich market, an uncertain future. New York: Business International Corporation, 1978.
167 pp. (Business International Research Report)

Ørvik, Nils

Canada and the European Community: report from Conference 13-15 October 1977. Kingston: Centre for International Relations, Queen's University, 1977.
225 pp. (Canada-Europe Series No. 1/77).

Rohmer, Richard

E.P. Taylor: the biography of Edward Plunket Taylor. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1978.
355 pp.

Rosenbluth, Gideon

The Canadian economy and disarmament. Rev. ed. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1978.
189 pp. (Carleton Library No. 113).

- St. John, Peter
Fireproof house to third option: studies in the theory and practice of Canadian foreign policy. Winnipeg: Dept. of Political Studies, University of Manitoba, 1977.
 650 pp.
- Tellier, Luc-Normand
Le Québec, état nordique. Montreal: Les Editions Quinze, 1977.
 231 pp.

II. Recent Articles

- Alper, Donald K., and Robert L. Monahan
 "Bill C-58 and the American Congress: the politics of retaliation." In *Canadian public policy* 4: 184-192, Spring 1978.
- Carty, Robert
 "Canada's 'Panama Canal'." In *Last Post* Vol. 6 No. 8 June 1978 pp. 14-17.
- Casey, Leo
 "Banking on apartheid." In *Last Post* Vol. 6 No. 8 June 1978 pp. 17-20.
- Charters, David A.
 "Five lost years: the mobile striking force 1946-1951." In *Canadian Reference Quarterly* 7:44-47 Spring 1978.
- John, Theodore
 "Canadian aid and trade in skim-milk powder: some recent issues." In *Canadian Public Policy* 4:213-226 Spring 1978.
- "Danson takes the first step." In *Canadian Shipping and Marine Engineering* Vol. 49 No. 6 p. 10-13 (Special staff report).
- Dobell, W.M.
 "Interdepartmental management in External Affairs." In *Canadian Public Administration* 21:83-102 Spring 1978.
- Dotto, Lydia
 "Canada's stake in the space shuttle." In *Canadian Business* 51:54-57 May 1978.
- Doxey, Margaret
 "Canada's international connections: the Canadian foreign policy review in review." In *Year Book of World Affairs* 1978. pp. 43-63.
- Eby, John C.
 "Canada and the Inter-American Development Bank." In *Canadian Banker and ICB Review* Vol. 85 No. 2 March-April 1978 pp. 7-14.
- Gauthier, Robert
 "Hello to arms!" In *Last Post* Vol. 6 No. 8 June 1978 pp. 29-33.
- Haldane, John
 "The 'neighbourhood' act rolls on." In *Last Post* Vol. 6 No. 7 April 1978 pp. 5-6.
- Kettle, John
 "Problems ahead for natural resources." In *Executive* 20:28-38 February 1978.
- Litvak, I.A. and C.J. Maule
 "The emerging challenge of Canadian direct investment abroad." In *Business Quarterly* 43:24-37 Spring 1978.
- Mergui, Raphael
 "Canada: les vents contraires." Supplement to *Jeune Afrique* No. 906 May 17 1978. pp. 39-78.
- Moravcik, Ivo
 "Canada's wheat exports to Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R.: review of a forecast." In *Canadian Slavonic Papers* 20:91-114 March 1978.
- Nulty, Peter
 "Canada goes after the energy in the tar sands." In *Fortune* 97:72-78 May 22, 1978.
- Schlegel, John P.
 "A successful alternative?: Canada and the European Community." In *Round Table* 67:55-64 January 1978.
- Spurgeon, David
 "Research at work against poverty." In *Report on Confederation* Vol. 1 No. 7 May 1978 pp. 11-12.
- Sarbakhikari, P., and C. Jecchinis
 "The nature of Canadian international development assistance." In *Iranian Review of International Relations* Spring/Summer 1977 9:143-155.
- Surette, Ralph
 "Les dents (multinationales) de la mer." In *L'actualité* Vol. 3 No. 6 June 1978 pp. 46-50.
- Urquhart, Ian
 "What GATT does over there, may hurt over here." In *Maclean's* 91:21-22 June 12, 1978.
- Valaskakis, Kimon
 "La CEE a-t-elle une politique cohérente vis-à-vis du Canada?" In *Etudes internationales* 9:126-136 March 1978.
- Ward, Peter, and Ann Rhodes
 "Canada needs you to fight with Belgian rifles, German tanks, Yankee planes and..." In *The Canadian* April 1, 1978 pp. 4-7.
- Wilson, W.A.
 "Diligence replaces negligence: opportunities, not irritants, in Canada-U.S. relations." In *Report on Confederation* Vol. 1 No. 7 May 1978 pp. 30-32.
- Wolfe, David A.
 "Economic growth and foreign investment: a perspective on Canadian economic policy, 1945-1957." In *Journal of Canadian studies* 13:3-20 Spring 1978.

Publications of the Department of External Affairs

The following are lists of the most recent publications of the Departmental Press Office and of the Information Services Division dealing with international affairs and Canadian foreign policy.

Press Releases, issued by the Departmental Press Office, Ottawa:

No. 34 (March 31, 1978) Review of Canada-U.S. Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement.

- No. 35 (April 3, 1978) Canada-Japan fisheries negotiations.
- No. 36 (April 5, 1978) Honorary Consul appointed to St Pierre and Miquelon.
- No. 37 (April 4, 1978) Canadian views on revised Garrison Diversion plan.
- No. 38 (April 6, 1978) Canada pledges \$1million to Commonwealth Youth Program.
- No. 39 (April 12, 1978) Canada-U.S. interim reciprocal fisheries agreement.
- No. 40 (April 17, 1978) Canadian members appointed to Permanent Court of Arbitration.
- No. 41 (April 20, 1978) Canada-U.S. agreement on leased properties at Argentia, Newfoundland.
- No. 42 (April 27, 1978) Protocol signed amending International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean.
- No. 43 (April 28, 1978) Notes for a speech by Minister of Supply and Services and Adviser on Francophone Affairs to the Secretary of State for External Affairs Jean-Pierre Goyer on the occasion of the twenty-eighth annual France-Canada Association Conference, Dijon, France, April 28 to May 1, 1978.
- No. 44 (April 28, 1978) Code of conduct concerning employment practices of Canadian companies operating in South Africa.
- No. 45 (April 28, 1978) Agreement signed by Canada and Japan on mutual fisheries relations.
- No. 46 (April 28, 1978) Diplomatic appointments – Lalande, Ambassador to Ivory Coast and concurrently to Mali, Niger and Upper Volta, and Williams, Consul General in Boston, U.S.A.
- No. 47 (May 1, 1978) Second meeting of Canada-Brazil Joint Economic Committee, Brasilia, April 25-27 – joint communiqué.
- No. 48 (May 3, 1978) Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO).
- No. 49 (May 5, 1978) Canada-France Joint Commission on Scientific Co-operation.
- No. 50 (May 12, 1978) Review of Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement.
- No. 51 (May 23, 1978) Canadian delegation to United Nations special session on disarmament.
- No. 52 (May 26, 1978) Visit by Dr Hildegard Hamm-Bruecher (F.R.G.).
- No. 53 (June 1, 1978) Canadian participation in Bologna Art Fair.
- No. 54 (June 2, 1978) Visit to Canada of Secretary-General of Council of Europe, June 6-7, 1978.
- No. 55 (June 12, 1978) OECD Council ministerial meeting and visit to Turkey and Cyprus.
- Press Releases* issued by the Departmental Press Office, Ottawa:
- No. 56 (June 13, 1978) Program of assistance to in-shore fishermen continues until October 1, 1978.
- No. 57 (June 15, 1978) New appointments to Board of Governors of International Development Research Centre.
- No. 58 (June 19, 1978) Canada-U.S. boundary negotiations – opening statement to June 19, 1978 meeting by Ambassador Marcel Cadieux, Canadian Negotiator for Maritime Boundaries.
- No. 59 (June 20, 1978) Visit to Canada of Saudi Arabian Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources, Sheikh Yamani, June 23-30, 1978.
- No. 60 (June 21, 1978) Summary of statement of June 20, 1978, by Lloyd Francis, M.P., at a annual conference of International Labour Organization, Geneva, June 7-28, 1978.
- No. 61 (June 23, 1978) Diplomatic appointments – Raymond C. Anderson to Los Angeles as Consul General; Miss Dorothy J. Armstrong Hungary as Ambassador; Mr James Barker Greece as Ambassador; Mr Geoffrey F. Bruto Kenya as High Commissioner and concurrently to Uganda; Mr Robert Cameron to Poland as Ambassador and concurrently German Democratic Republic; Mr Mich Gauvin to Morocco as Ambassador; Mr Robert Gayner to Iraq as Ambassador; Mr John Graham to Guyana as High Commissioner; Mr I Stewart Hay to Kuwait as Ambassador; Miss Irene Johnson to New Zealand as High Commissioner and concurrently to Fiji and Western Samoa; Mr Paul Laberge to Trinidad and Tobago as High Commissioner; Dr Julie Langer to Strasbourg as Consul General; Mr André Potvin to Marseilles as Consul General; Mr David Reece to Vienna as Ambassador of the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks; Mr J. Raymond Roy to Algeria as Ambassador; Mr William M. Wood to Costa Rica as Ambassador and concurrently to Honduras.
- No. 62 (June 23, 1978) Third Canada-Japan Consultation on Science and Technology.
- Reference Papers*, published by the Information Services Division, Ottawa:
- No. 86 (Revised April 1978) Canadian Co-operation in International Development.
- No. 93 (Revised August 1977) Canada's Contribution to the United Nations.
- Statements and Speeches*, published by the Information Services Division, Ottawa:
- No. 78/2 Canadian Foreign Policy: A 1978 Perspective. A speech by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Don Jamieson, to the Empire Club Toronto, March 2, 1978.
- No. 78/3 Canada Strengthens its Ties with the European Community. A speech by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Don Jamieson, at the opening of the second meeting of the Canada/European Community Joint Co-operation Committee, Ottawa, March 1978.
- No. 78/4 What Did the Belgrade Meeting Achieve? The closing Canadian statement, by the Honourable Norman Cafile Minister of State for Multiculturalism and Special Representative of the Secretary of State for External Affairs, to the meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Belgrade, March 9, 1978.

No. 78/6 Canada Supports a New Proposal for Namibian Independence. An intervention by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Don Jamieson, to the special session of the United Nations General Assembly on Namibia, New York, April 25, 1978.

No. 78/7 Disarmament: The Problem of Organizing the World Community. A speech by Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau to the United Nations General Assembly special session on disarmament, New York, May 26, 1978.

Treaty Information

Bilateral

Germany, Federal Republic of
Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany on Film Relations
Ottawa, May 30, 1978

International Development Association
Agreement dated March 8, 1978 between the Government of Canada and the International Development Association amending the Agreement dated April 22, 1977, between the same Parties, to provide for the Administration by the Association of Certain Funds to be made available by the Government for Specific Development Projects
Washington, March 8, 1978
In force March 8, 1978

Israel
Agreement on Film Relations between the Government of Canada and the Government of the State of Israel
Jerusalem, March 29, 1978

Japan
Parcel-Post Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of Japan
Tokyo, April 11, 1978

Agreement between Canada and Japan on Mutual Fisheries Relations
Tokyo, April 28, 1978
In force, April 28, 1978

Multilateral

U.S.A.
Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America (with attached Memorandum of Understanding) concerning Co-operation in the Development of Space Remote-Sensing for Global Crop Information
Washington, March 31 and April 10, 1978
In force April 10, 1978

Exchange of Notes concerning Commercial Development of an Area of the United States Naval Station, Argentia, Newfoundland
Ottawa, June 6, 1978
In force June 6, 1978

Protocol relating to an Amendment to Article 50(a) of the Convention of International Civil Aviation (Increase of Council Members)
Done at Montreal, October 16, 1974
Canada's Instrument of Ratification deposited
April 20, 1978


Protocol relating to an Amendment of the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago 1944) (Authentication of Russian text)
Done at Montreal, September 30, 1977
Canada's Instrument of Ratification deposited
April 20, 1978

Protocol amending the International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean
Signed at Tokyo, April 25, 1978

International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974
Done at London, November 1, 1974
Canada's Instrument of Accession deposited
May 8, 1978

Protocols for the Fourth Extension of the International Wheat Trade and Food Aid Conventions constituting the International Wheat Agreement, 1971
Done at Washington, April 26, 1978
Canada signed May 17, 1978
Canada's Instrument of Ratification deposited
May 31, 1978

Convention concerning the Employment of Women on Underground Work in Mines of all Kinds adopted by the Conference at its nineteenth Session, Geneva, 21 June 1935
Done at Geneva 21 June 1935
Entered into force May 30, 1937
Canada's Instrument of Ratification deposited
September 16, 1966
Entered into force for Canada September 16, 1966
Canada's Instrument of Denunciation deposited May 17, 1978



Canada
Post
Postage paid


Postes
Canada
Port payé

Third
class
K1A 0S7
OTTAWA

Troisième
classe
OTTAWA

If undelivered,
return cover only to:
DSS Printing Operations
Ottawa, K1A 0S7, Canada

En cas de non-livraison,
retourner cette couverture seulement au:
Ministère des Approvisionnements
et Services-Imprimerie
Ottawa, K1A 0S7, Canada



External Affairs
Canada

Affaires extérieures
Canada

ISSN 0381-4874

September / October 1978

International Perspectives

A journal of opinion on world affairs

A1
=A
-156

Economic stresses on the OECD

Appraisals of disarmament session

United Nations beyond idealism

French politics after defeat of Left

Safeguarding nuclear materials

Provincial priorities and foreign affairs

International Perspectives

Contents

September/October 1978

Economic stresses on the OECD / <i>Mike Henderson</i>	3
Appraisals of UN disarmament session	
The ratchet effect / <i>Norman Alcock</i>	8
Swords and plowshares / <i>W. Harriet Critchley</i>	8
Diagnosis and prescription / <i>William Epstein</i>	9
Disappointments and satisfactions / <i>Albert Legault</i>	9
Disarmament or disaster / <i>Murray Thomson</i>	9
The United Nations beyond idealism / <i>Hans Tabor</i>	15
French politics after defeat of Left / <i>André Donneur</i>	19
Safeguarding nuclear material / <i>Albert Legault</i>	24
Provincial priorities and foreign affairs / <i>Robert McLaren</i>	28
Book reviews	
Plumptre's three decades / <i>Arthur Blanchette</i>	31
Volume 12 of Documents / <i>Alison Taylor Hardy</i>	32
Letters to the Editor	34
Reference section	36

International Perspectives is issued bimonthly in English and French by the Department of External Affairs, Ottawa. Any material in this publication may be reproduced. Mention of *International Perspectives* as the source would be appreciated.

Published by authority of the
Secretary of State for External Affairs.

Authorized as third-class mail,
Post Office Department, Ottawa.

Subscription rates: Canada, \$4.00 a year, single copies \$1.00; other countries \$5.00 a year, single copies \$1.25. Remittances, payable to the Receiver General of Canada, should be sent to: Printing and Publishing, Supply & Services Canada, Ottawa, Ontario, K1A 0S9.

Editors:

Alex I. Inglis
Louis Balthazar

International Perspectives is a journal of opinion on Canada's role in the world and on current international questions. Its purpose is to stimulate discussion and interest in international affairs. It is not intended to reflect Canadian Government policy or perceptions. Indeed, the editors often seek to include material that expresses different or contrary views. The Department of External Affairs accepts no responsibility for the views expressed except where it is clearly stated that an article by a departmental officer is a statement of Government policy. All other articles contain a specific disclaimer of departmental responsibility for their contents.

Letters of comment on issues discussed in *International Perspectives* are welcome and will be considered for publication. Please address your correspondence to: International Perspectives, Department of External Affairs, L. B. Pearson Bldg., 125 Sussex Drive, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, K1A 0G1.

Current economic stresses strain the fabric of OECD

By Mike Henderson

It has become apparent to even the most of casual observer of the international economic system that the management of economic affairs among the advanced industrial market-economy states has fallen upon evil days. Despite periodical remedial action by the International Monetary Fund, currency fluctuations have destabilized trade patterns and fuelled inflation in many countries. Despite the efforts of donor nations through the World Bank, the United Nations itself and many regional-development banks, the income gap between the developed and developing countries continues to grow rapidly. In spite of the framework of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, major disputes on trade policy have risen between such economic giants as the United States and Japan. Finally, despite the macro-economic planning conducted through the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, the market-economy countries have not been able to pursue a consistent recovery-path from the recession years of 1974-75. The general economic picture in the world market economy is bleak; growth and profits are low, while inflation and unemployment levels are high.

Not surprisingly, hard times have placed strains on prevailing patterns of international co-operation. A good example of this is to be found in an examination of recent events within the OECD. Historically, the OECD has been an important instrument for its 24 member states, providing a forum in which they could present their national positions on a wide range of economic subjects, including growth, monetary, trade and development-assistance policies, in a relaxed, informal and confidential manner. The committees of the Organization have been forums for information-sharing and consultation, rather than settings for negotiation. Moreover, because the OECD does not have an operational role in world affairs, it has always been possible for its members to discuss any subject without concern either

about assuming a legal liability or about establishing a position they would feel constrained to defend. As a result, Organization discussions have always been characterized by informality, civility and unusual candour. According to many old OECD hands, both in the Secretariat and in various national delegations, the resultant atmosphere has been one to engender a spirit of moderation, compromise and even, on occasion, concession. There has been, it seems, a tendency not only to defend national interests but to consider the common good. Given growing economic interdependence, it has been assumed that the harmonization of national policies was the *sine qua non* of general prosperity and stability and everyone has behaved accordingly.

Changed mood

Inside observers of OECD affairs now agree that this situation, atmosphere, mood or "ambiance" – whatever one may wish to call it – has changed dramatically in the last few years. In many of the major committees of the Organization, discussions have now become debates, opinions have hardened into policy positions, and candid suggestions have in many cases been taken as blatant attacks. In short, the conduct of OECD affairs has become increasingly "politicized". Senior members of the Secretariat lament that few questions are dealt with as purely technical matters any longer. The prescriptions of economic theory have foundered on the rocks of national self-interest. Consideration of the "general good" has become increasingly rare. Indeed, some officials

Discussions have become debates

Professor Henderson teaches political science at Atkinson College, York University. While on sabbatical leave during the 1977-78 academic year, he was in Europe studying the OECD. The views expressed in this article are those of Professor Henderson.

see a reversion to attitudes that prevailed in multilateral talks before the Second World War. To what degree have attitudes changed? One cannot be definitive but a brief examination of recent events in the Economic Policy and Trade Committees of the OECD will give some indication of one of the most significant trends of our times.

The Economic Policy Committee is where senior national officials review broad economic problems of growth and stability. Its discussions have generally centred on what the Big Five intended to do in order to stimulate economic growth, to combat inflation and unemployment, and to maintain a reasonably healthy balance of trade and payments. It should be noted, however, that the EPC has performed different roles for different members. It has provided the major powers with an opportunity to explain to one another their current concerns and priorities in a frank and friendly way. For the middle and smaller powers it provided an opportunity to learn the short-term plans of the major powers, and, on occasion, a chance to attempt to influence those plans. It should be noted, however, that whether large or small countries were concerned, attempts to influence others were always characterized by nuances and subtleties of language calculated not to give offence. As one national delegate put it, persuasion was always as subdued as the gentle dripping of water upon stone. Effectiveness was invariably sought through persistence rather than pressure.

The whole picture changed during the November 1977 meetings. Several national delegations, most notably that of the United States, came prepared to urge the West German Government, in unequivocal terms, to take immediate measures to reinflate its economy both rapidly and significantly. Their arguments were based, it seems, on what is termed "the locomotive theory" of economic growth. Roughly, this theory holds that the U.S., German and Japanese economies are the "locomotives" of the international market-economy system, and that their growth-levels either accelerate or retard those of all other economies. In particular, it was argued that faster growth in the German economy was the prerequisite to pulling the weaker economies of Italy, Britain and France out of their economic doldrums. Some senior economists present went so far as to suggest that, unless the German authorities were prepared to accept a current-account deficit in 1978, the general balance-of-payments disequilibrium within the OECD group would persist.

The exact details of what occurred at these meetings are not known, but it was common knowledge in Paris that, by OECD standards, the proceedings were unusually heated. It seems that the German delegation came under strong pressure from numerous delegates – though not, it should be noted, from the Japanese who also expressed grave misgivings about the validity of the "locomotive" theory. What is known for a fact is that the German delegation did not react favourably to all the unsolicited advice about how to run its economy. In an unprecedented step, a senior West German official called a press conference immediately after the conclusion of the EPC meetings at which he categorically rejected the locomotive theory as oversimplified. He then emphasized that the primary concern of his Government was the reduction of domestic inflation, and expressed resentment that others should seek to determine Germany's domestic economic priorities.

What generated the intensity of response that resulted in this breach of the traditional confidentiality of OECD affairs? The immediate cause, it appears, was the operation of the new economic forecasting exercise that had been devised at the Downing Street "summit" in May. At that time, a decision had been made that the major economic states should submit their national growth-forecasts for the following year to the OECD Secretariat. This decision was endorsed by the OECD Council in June and national forecasts were received in due course. The West German Government submitted a projected growth-rate of 4 to 4.5 per cent which was just short of the 5 percent target recently endorsed at ministerial level. Subsequently, at the November meeting of the EPC, the German delegates outlined national measures to attain this rate. Other delegates, and many members of the Secretariat, were greatly disturbed by the presentation because, by their calculations, the measures outlined would result in a German growth-rate of barely 3 per cent. While it was understood that the German Government, for domestic political reasons, had to consider inflation as its principal economic problem, the attempt to disguise a significant shift in the policy priorities of that Government was considered by some as an outright act of deception. Resentment of this manoeuvre undoubtedly strengthened adherence to the tradition of candour in EPC talks, and the German position was strongly challenged. Unfortunately, it was difficult to question the German economic projections without bringing into question the integrity

*Opportunity
for powers
to explain
concerns
and priorities*

ty of the German delegates. For example, a query as to how one could expect a better than 4 percent growth-rate with a projected increase of real disposable income of only 2.5 per cent produced the embarrassment and chagrin that led to the public German retort.

Two aspects of the situation that arose out of the EPC talks disturbed insiders. First, the fact that the German delegation was placed in a position of having to defend established policy was regarded as unfortunate, since such a situation ran counter to the tradition of free-wheeling discussions in which differences of opinion were never considered as matters of disagreement on policy. As the forecasting exercise necessitates the assumption of policy positions, many observers feel that it should be abandoned forthwith or the value of the EPC as a "talk-shop" could disappear. Even more disturbing to some participants was the fact that, during these meetings, the defence of national interests no longer seemed to be tempered by a consciousness of the international interest. As the struggle for comparative advantage in a difficult situation became more undisguised, the predisposition at least to consider the common good became submerged, if not temporarily lost. Some observers even perceived the re-emergence of autarkic tendencies reminiscent of the Twenties and Thirties.

Trade area

A deterioration in the ability of the market-economy states to harmonize their policies is also discernible in the area of trade. Historically, the Trade Committee of the OECD has reflected a high degree of consensus among members on the desirability of the expansion of world trade on a multilateral, non-discriminatory basis. On trade matters, the OECD countries have always appeared to maintain a common front in rejecting protectionist or "beggary-neighbour" policies. Symbolic of this unanimity was the adoption of the Trade Pledge at ministerial level in May 1974 at a time of mild recession. This declaration, which is of considerable psychological importance but is not legally binding, expresses the determination of member governments "to avoid recourse to unilateral measures, of either a general or a specific nature, to restrict imports or having recourse to similar measures on other current account transactions". The official premise of OECD trade activity is, therefore, that unilateral trade or other measures designed to deal with current-account problems would in all probability

be both self-defeating and have a depressing effect on the world economy.

The impression of a consensus on trade matters is somewhat deceptive, for the members of the Trade Committee are divided on some very fundamental issues. Of greatest significance is the fact that, while everyone in theory is in favour of freer trade, the trend is clearly towards what the French have called "organized trade" – a euphemism for selective protectionism and market-sharing agreements. Thus one finds that the Americans, Canadians and Australasians continually press for freer trade in agricultural products, but the European Economic Community members of the OECD will have none of it. It took The Nine many years of hard bargaining to establish an internal agreement on agricultural trade, and they have no wish to see the whole matter reopened to accommodate external interests. For their part, the Americans, while championing freer trade, have placed restrictions on imports of such commodities as textiles, footwear, electronic equipment and steel products. The unilateral decision of the U.S. Government to assign an arbitrary floor-price to steel imports was, to understate the point, a source of some concern to the Japanese. The latter, in turn, continue to protect the domestic market for their secondary manufacturers, much to the chagrin of the Americans, who wish to eliminate their sizeable bilateral-trade deficit with Japan.

It would be a grave distortion of reality to suggest that all these trade problems are thrashed out *in camera* at meetings of the OECD – they are not. In fact, the Trade Committee is in a state of temporary suspension for as long as the Multilateral Trade Negotiations continue in Geneva. However, the OECD has proved a useful institutional framework for the conclusion of sectoral trade agreements. The OECD Council's Working Party (No. 6) on Shipbuilding has managed to work out a production-quota agreement acceptable both to the Japanese and to the members of the EEC. As a result, a mutually-disadvantageous price war due to overproduction of ship tonnage has been avoided. Similarly, when overproduction of steel threatened to disrupt existing market patterns, Emile van Lennep, Secretary-General of the OECD, set up an *ad hoc* group to study the global steel situation. By the ineluctable law of large organizations, the group became a standing committee, which is currently seeking to work out a long-term market-sharing agreement between the major steel-producers. While the Trade Committee is not directly concerned with

*Institutional
framework
for conclusion
of sectoral
agreements*

these agreements, it cannot ignore the obvious reversals of its publicly-announced objectives.

Another interesting development, more central to the interests of the Trade Committee, is the evolution of the EEC countries as a "bloc agent". Many non-EEC members of the Committee are concerned that the value of the Committee as a forum for open and frank discussions of trade patterns, problems and prospects has already been lessened. Discussions in this committee, like those in the EPC, are becoming increasingly formalized. For example, let us assume that, in the course of trade discussions, the Canadian representative suggests a new way of dealing with textile imports from less-developed countries. More likely than not, the meeting will then adjourn while the EEC-

country representatives meet with the permanent representative of the EEC Commission to the OECD to attempt to work out a coordinated response to the Canadian suggestion. If no agreement can be worked out in the EEC caucus, then the Commission representative, speaking on behalf of the Community as a whole, will express a negative reaction to the suggestion. Any subsequent variations on the Canadian proposals made by other non-Common-Market states will be subject to a similar procedure. While everyone agrees that the members of the EEC are contractually bound by the terms of the Treaty of Rome to speak with one voice on matters of external trade, the loss of flexibility in Trade Committee proceedings is considered regrettable. Moreover, at least one major delegation fears that the problem

Commonwealth Games



CP Photo

From the procession of the Queen and Prince Philip with their sons Andrew and Edward for the official opening on August 3 to the exuberant dancing of the competitors on the field at the closing on August 12, Edmonton was host to the Eleventh Commonwealth Games and the best athletes the Commonwealth could muster. At the end of the Games, Canada came under criticism for trying too hard. Canadians won 45 gold, 31 silver and 33 bronze medals. During the Games, however, there was little but praise for the athletes. Graham Smith of Edmonton (*above left*) wears the six gold medals he won in swimming events. Canada's first gold medal came in the women's gymnastics. Monica Goermann of Winnipeg on the balance beam (*above right*) was the team's top scorer.

may well be compounded if The Nine become ten, or 12 with the possible admissions of Spain, Portugal and Greece – all OECD members – into the EEC. In this case, one suspects that the unvoiced concern over the emergence of the powerful EEC bloc has less to do with procedural consequences than with a dramatic shift of influence on trade questions within the OECD.

Of what importance to the average Canadian are these changes in an international organization based in Paris? Very little in and of themselves, one suspects. However, as indicators of a growing failure in international economic co-operation they are critical. On two subjects the international economists interviewed at the OECD were virtually unanimous. They predicted the beginning of a global reces-

sion for the market-economy countries in 1979. For Canada, with a highly-penetrated economy and heavy dependence on foreign trade, the short-term prospects are, therefore, particularly bleak. Secondly, it was constantly reiterated that present problems within the OECD are in all probability only temporary phenomena. The prevailing opinion was that the atmosphere at the OECD would improve as soon as economic prosperity and stability returned. However, there is little cause for optimism in this assumption, for the same veteran observers of the world's economic stage expressed a firm belief that there was little prospect for sustained economic recovery so long as present national attitudes persisted. It is enough to make one ponder seriously the meanings of the word "temporary".



Appraisals from consultants to the Canadian delegation

Editor's note: The United Nations Special Session on Disarmament was held in New York from May 23 to July 1, 1978. The Canadian delegation, led by Don Jamieson, consisted, in addition to regular diplomatic representatives and parliamentarians, of five consultants drawn from outside the Government. The consultants were: Dr Norman Alcock, President of the Canadian Peace Research Institute, Dr W. Harriet Critchley of the Institute of International Relations, University of British Columbia, Dr William Epstein, Visiting Professor at Carleton University, Special Fellow at UNITAR and former Director of the Disarmament Division of the UN Secretariat, Dr Albert Legault, Professor of Political Science, Laval University, and Director General of the Quebec Centre of International Relations, and Mr Murray Thomson of the Canadian Council for International Co-operation, Ottawa, and Education Secretary of "Project Ploughshares". *International Perspectives* invited each of these five consultants to write brief appraisals of the special session. No attempt was made to co-ordinate the approaches adopted by the authors. As a result there is some overlap in the five articles. Nonetheless the result is five different perspectives on the special session and the problems of security and disarmament. The next issue of *International Perspectives* will continue the discussion of these and related problems with articles by George Ignatieff, King Gordon and Marcel Merle.

The ratchet effect

By Norman Alcock

Let me begin with the good news. The men and women at the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament – delegates and Secretariat alike – are in my opinion among the world's best people. With a very few (conspicuous) exceptions, they are not self-serving – just the opposite; they are public servants in the finest sense. Steadily, persistently and patiently (often incredibly patiently) they worked for disarmament. Moreover, a machinery is emerging at the United Nations that in time – with some small but important changes – could become a fledgling world government. Blocs (like political parties) caucus regularly together, a single working language has developed (English), which speeds up the exchange of ideas, and above all, a graciousness – even elegance – of style marks the negotiating debates. It is exciting to watch.

Now for the bad news – disarmament hasn't a

chance. This observation is for me the single most devastating finding of my five weeks stay in New York.

Why? Because of the "ratchet effect", in fact because of "ratchet effects" of the *first kind* and of the *second kind* – but let me explain. Centuries of military experience have determined that for maximum security a nation and its allies should have military forces superior to, or at least equal to, those of its neighbour and allies. According to this balance-of-power idea, not only is one's neighbour less likely to attack because of one's superior force but, if one is provoked to fight a war, one is also more likely to win. Thus it is always legitimate to increase one's own forces, unilaterally and when convenient. It is not all right to decrease your forces, however, unless you can at the same time be assured that your neighbour's forces will be going down too.

(continued on page 9)

Swords and plowshares

By W. Harriet Critchley

They shall beat their swords into plowshares and their spears into pruning-hooks; nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more.

Isaiah 2:4

When men resort to arms, it is not that they love peace the less, but that they love their kind of peace the more.

St Augustine, City of God, 19,12

The tenth special session of the United Nations was history's most representative international disarmament conference to date, in terms of the number of participating states and non-governmental organizations, and it was probably the best-prepared. Scores of ideas and draft contributions were submitted, combined and modified during the months of preparatory committee meetings. Many talented and experienced diplomats from all regions of the world dedicated long hours of effort to producing the draft document that was to form

the basis for deliberations during the session.

The document itself was rather long, and formally complex. It addressed a wide range of arms-limitation and disarmament issues, including: suggestions for a declaration on disarmament objectives and priorities; measures that could be taken, as precursors to further disarmament, to strengthen international security and build confidence among states; ways to promote education about disarmament and to train more people in proficiency for arms-limitation negotiations; a list of disarmament issues, such as the putative link between disarmament and socio-economic development, which will require further study before they can be shaped into specific proposals. For many of the professional diplomats, the crucial part of the draft document (indeed the special session proceedings) was a section containing

(continued on page 9)

Diagnosis and prescription

By William Epstein

The United Nations Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD) was called on the initiative of the non-aligned countries, which were dissatisfied with the lack of progress on disarmament and feared that the spiralling arms race (now costing \$400 billion a year) could lead to a nuclear war and, even without war, would frustrate their hopes of achieving a new international economic order. The session was not a plenipotentiary conference convened to agree on specific treaties or concrete measures, but was intended as a means of reawakening interest and stimulating real progress on disarmament. The purpose of UNSSOD was to diagnose the nature of the disease of the arms race and prescribe for its treatment and cure.

It was no small accomplishment for 149 nations, with deep divergencies in their perceptions of the world and of their security requirements and with conflicting

approaches to arms limitation and disarmament, to reach consensus on a Final Document containing a detailed declaration of goals, priorities and principles, an elaborate program of action, and new or improved machinery for achieving it.

The main achievement of the special session was the agreement reached on the machinery for deliberating and negotiating disarmament. The agreement included three main points – that the Geneva Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD), which functioned outside the UN under U.S. and Soviet co-chairmen, would be replaced by a new negotiating body that would be closely linked to the United Nations. The co-chairmanship of the CCD, which had led to charges of American-Soviet domination, was replaced by a chairmanship rotating on a monthly basis among

(continued on page 11)

Disappointments and satisfactions

By Albert Legault

For over a month, 119 countries and agencies met in New York in a special session of the United Nations General Assembly to discuss disarmament. As in 1945 before this same body, the main items on the agenda concerned nuclear disarmament and reduction in what are known as conventional weapons. As in the League of Nations and at the Hague Conference, nations continued to seek ways of putting an end to the arms race, which now gobbles up an amount that will soon reach 400 billion every year.

What about the results of these discussions? They are disappointing in some respects and satisfying in others. Disappointing because the states did not feel at all bound to reduce their military expenditures. Disappointing because the final document and the statements accompanying it did not constitute a disarmament plan but instead contained broad guidelines on the principles

that should govern future disarmament. And disappointing because the final document had to be stripped of most of its binding clauses in order to provide a common denominator for all.

But it is satisfying to see member countries continue to prefer words to weapons; so long as the guns are silent the virtues of diplomacy can continue to work. It is satisfying because there was general agreement that a new negotiating organ, the Disarmament Committee, should be created – a step that will mark the return to the negotiating table of France and China, neither of which has taken part in recent major negotiations on disarmament, the first by choice and the second for historical reasons. And it is satisfying because now the United Nations will have its own Disarmament Commission. As opposed to the Disarma-

(continued on page 13)

Disarmament or disaster

By Murray Thomson

During the final days of the six-week United Nations Special Session on Disarmament, two tired diplomats approached the escalator that leads up to the United Nations General Assembly Hall. "Well," said one to the other, "what do you think it's going to be, disarmament or disaster?"

The hard either-or choice put by the question did, indeed, reflect the essential problem facing the delegates. Every single one of the 120 representatives who spoke during the opening three-week debate had agreed that the arms race was either too expensive (at \$400 billion a year), too destructive of the economy, too wasteful of human and natural resources, or too damaging of social values and relations to be tolerated much longer. Almost all speakers called it a threat to human survival.

These conclusions were re-emphasized in the talks

given by 30 representatives of non-governmental organizations and peace-research institutes, by the UN Secretary-General and by the heads of four UN Specialized Agencies.

The last three weeks of the special session were a fascinating exercise in consensus-building, a process that eventually produced a Final Document of 129 paragraphs. (Only Albania rejected the consensus by which the Final Document was adopted).

Most participants, I believe, found the special session to be both an encouraging and discouraging experience. For me, the encouraging aspects included the following:

– The *speeches*. Despite their number, length and repetitiveness, the speeches generally were of a high intellectual calibre. They were given by top decision-

(continued on page 14)

The ratchet effect

(continued from page 8)

Disarmament, therefore, is always difficult, slow and protracted and disarmament negotiators are put at an impossible disadvantage. While armers (North Atlantic Treaty Organization or Warsaw Pact) go two steps forward, disarmers can at best only go one step back. This "ratchet effect" – the relative ease of going in one direction and difficulty or impossibility of going in reverse – is the central problem faced at this special session. It is, of course, not new. It has been the central problem at every disarmament conference throughout history. The ratchet effect of the first kind is the heart of every arms race.

SALT trouble

But while genuine disarmers at the special session were experiencing difficulty in going downward, genuine disarmers at the SALT talks were also having trouble – owing to the ratchet effect of the second kind, a phenomenon brought to my attention by Jane M.O. Sharp

in an article in *Humanity Calls* (June 1978). According to Sharp, it is much easier for both parties in these bilateral talks to level off by bringing the inferior force levels *up* than it is to bring the superior force levels *down*. Once again, this reaction is rooted in military history.

So what hope is there if nations cannot easily go in reverse? This seemingly impossible task may be easier than we think because the rules of war have changed. For nuclear powers, the ratchet has in fact been removed, but few leaders recognize this fact. The old idea of a balance of power no longer applies to two nations when both are armed with nuclear weapons. For them balance of power is an obsolete notion. "Everything," Albert Einstein said of the nuclear age, "has changed but our way of thinking."

Whether the military balance is exact or not makes no difference when both sides have second-strike capability and the enormous "overkill" capability that that implies. Let me give a hypothetical example. Assume that one of the nuclear powers, in good faith, makes five consecutive reductions in its nuclear

capability of 10 per cent each year, while the other power consistently cheats. Would the resultant 71 per cent disparity in tactical "nukes", or 71 per cent disparity in the number of strategic silos, make any real difference to deterrence? Or in the subsequent ability to fight a nuclear war? Yet the above case is an extreme example – five years of unilateral disarmament and zero verification.

Balance-of-power theory, however, still has validity for nations that can only defend themselves with conventional arms and therefore must be prepared to fight a conventional war. For these countries the ratchet effect still applies – and disarmament may be an illusory goal. It is the two superpowers, therefore, that need to be challenged on the whole idea of balance of power. It is they that must take the big, decisive and unilateral steps to start the disarmament process. But if, by a determined effort of will, such leadership is shown, it is my firm belief, as a result of observing the special session, that the other nations will not lag far behind.

Swords and plowshares

(continued from page 8)

proposals on organizational means to promote more effective multilateral disarmament deliberations and negotiations. Other diplomats, observers and interested members of the public concentrated their attention on the part that dealt with immediate, short-term measures for halting and reversing the arms race. This section included suggestions for methods of nuclear disarmament – comprehensive test-ban, strategic-arms limitation, pledges on non-use of nuclear weapons, creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace, strengthening of non-proliferation regimes – as well as methods for limitations on other weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons. In short, the document contained an impressive roster of issues for discussion, but most of it was entangled in a maze of square brackets (to denote areas of disagreement and alternative formulations).

During the first five weeks of the six-week session, the document grew in length, complexity and number of brackets. Delegates began to despair of achieving an agreement on any meaningful statement of long-range disarmament goals, short-term arms-limitation measures, or organizational arrangements for future multilateral negotiations. Then, in the final week, a combination of deadline-induced, almost round-the-clock discussions and skilfully-applied pressure by respected, experienced individuals succeeded in producing a clear text that incorporated all the issues outlined above. Although the final text – with its vague wording, awkward syntax and repetitious phrasing – gave much evidence of the effect of deadline pressures and the difficulty in reaching consensus on many items, its adoption was accompanied by a mixture of relief, self-congratulatory surprise and even euphoria. The two potential disasters – of failing to achieve a consensus on *any* final document and of producing a document in

which the lack of consensus on *all* substantive matters was patent – had been averted.

In addition, and more positively, there was the general feeling that the special session had several modest accomplishments to its credit: a list of issues was compiled as a guide to future arms-control and disarmament deliberations; two nuclear powers – France and the People's Republic of China – that had shunned participation in previous deliberations on nuclear-arm control took an active role in the proceedings; an improved multilateral negotiating structure was created; the merit of the UN organizational system as a forum for broadly-multilateral discussions of major world issues was vindicated; and, of those people who had access to the news media that covered the session, some gave at least fleeting thought to the peace and security problems of the contemporary world.

On reflection, there is one other result that, while it appears to be equally modest at first glance, could in the long run, be the speci-

session's most significant legacy. During the preparatory meetings and the deliberations at the session, there emerged an increasing realization that the vital, often contradictory, link between peace and security must be faced squarely and dealt with seriously if deliberations on arms control and disarmament are to move beyond the stage of exercises in rhetoric. The realization did not develop directly and coherently. Its many facets appeared in a piecemeal fashion and a perception of the meaning of the whole came more in a manner reminiscent of a pointillist painting or collage. Several examples may serve to illustrate the point.

Participants and observers repeatedly heard statements or drafting language that in effect stated: "Your armaments are dangerous to world peace, therefore you should disarm; but *our* armaments are necessary for our security and self-defence, they are not (as) dangerous to world peace, and therefore should not be included in the deliberations". As non-aligned, neutral and aligned nations alike made these statements, the cumulative effect was an education in sobering reality as it related to such issues as non-proliferation, non-use of nuclear-weapons declarations, conventional weapons or arms-transfer limitations. For many, this experience in articulating their own views, learning of others' views and debating the priorities and different perspectives on arms control and disarmament in a multilateral forum may have engendered a more sophisticated appreciation of the complexity of world peace and security issues.

In the first weeks of the session, numerous commentators and observers noted the irony of a situation in which some heads of state, heads of government and senior ministers spoke about disarmament in New York and then proceeded to Washington to discuss ways of increasing the military capability of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Some commentators, however, went on to observe that such itineraries were neither exercises in hypocrisy nor regrettable coincidences but useful and timely reminders that responsible leaders must deal with the real world how-

ever much they might hope for and work to change that world in the direction of peace. Their activities were personal testimonies to one aspect of the contradictory nature of the link between peace and security.

Other intrusions upon the special session deliberations – the war in Zaire, animosities in the Middle East and Cyprus, for example, served as reminders that peace through disarmament is by no means a universal priority – food or justice or freedom are far more important goals for many people in the world. Peace and disarmament are often antithetical to those goals. Even among those who attach the highest priority to peace, there are some whose situations and circumstances are such that the goal will best be achieved by maintaining or improving their military capabilities rather than by limiting or abolishing them. These may have been hard realities for disarmament advocates to face but, to the extent that they were acknowledged at the special session rather than ignored or dismissed, the deliberations inched closer to long-term significance.

Another facet was evident in some of the ideas and proposals put forth in various formal speeches. The Canadian notion of "suffocation" of the arms race by slowing the technologically-induced momentum of arms research and production, the French idea of restricting *surarmament* as a preliminary measure for regional arms limitation, and some of the roles proposed for non-nuclear-weapon states in nuclear-arms control negotiations, are examples of ideas – informed by a careful appreciation of reality – that warrant further examination, elaboration and discussion.

More than 40 years separate the two most recent world conferences on disarmament. While it is not unusual to describe the embarrassingly modest results of previous conferences and to dismiss the UN special session as following that tradition, such a dismissal may be a serious error. The context of multilateral arms-limitation deliberations has changed in many ways since 1932. As the number of states has multiplied dramatically, so have the sources of tension and conflict against which arms are perceived as

the necessary remedy. As scientific and technological knowledge has grown at an exponential rate, so have the sources of arms-production, the means for producing arms and the varieties of arms. As the context has become much more complex, the need to deal with the realities behind the various contemporary arms races becomes more pressing.

While it is true that no swords will be beaten into plowshares as a direct result of the UN special session, what may be accomplished in a world-wide deliberation on extremely sensitive and complex issues appears to be more than the pessimists expected. To the extent that the vital, often contradictory link between peace and security is recognized and becomes the centre-piece of future deliberations, the special session, as a first step in this direction, has made a substantial contribution. St. Augustine identified the problem some 15 centuries ago. The United Nations Special Session on Disarmament showed that the problem posed by Augustine had to be solved before Isaiah's vision could become reality. ■

Diagnosis and prescription

(continued from page 9)

all the members (as in the Security Council). The CCD's membership will consist of the current 31 members plus six to eight new members, including China. It was also agreed that the new committee, like the old CCD, would conduct its work by consensus rather than by vote.

In addition, it was decided that there would be two deliberative bodies, each comprising the full membership of the United Nations. The First Committee of the General Assembly, which now carries out the annual task of review and appraisal of disarmament work, would deal exclusively with disarmament. The Disarmament Commission would follow up the work of the special session and make recommendations on a comprehensive program of disarmament. This latter body would meet between sessions of the General Assembly and would enable those countries that were not members of the negotiating commit-

tee to make their contribution to the disarmament process. Disarmament problems would thus be dealt with on an uninterrupted, year-round basis.

France and China, which had not in the last 20 years participated in the disarmament work, both played an active role at the special session. France indicated its readiness to join in the negotiations. Even China, which had never before done more than repeat routine criticism of the two superpowers (especially the Soviet Union), took an active part in the deliberations of the session and hinted that it might soon also participate in the negotiations. Both France and China, however, made it clear that they would continue nuclear testing and the building-up of their nuclear arsenals in order to reduce the gap between them and the nuclear super-powers. Hence, as pointed out privately by some observers, France's participation in the negotiating body may set back the negotiations by two or three years, and China's by five to ten years. But it is clearly necessary to involve all the nuclear powers in the disarmament efforts. The sooner they become involved the sooner will the world be able to come to grips with all of the problems in a substantial way rather than in piecemeal efforts to deal with limited steps.

The mere fact of the holding of the session and of the necessity of preparing for it stimulated governments to think more seriously about the problems and to come up with new ideas and some modest but important actions. The Soviet Union and France, for example, announced their signature of the relative protocols to the Treaty of Tlatelolco and Argentina announced its ratification of the treaty. Thus important steps were taken to complete the treaty and a new impetus was given to the idea of nuclear-free zones and to a regional legal approach to non-proliferation.

In addition, in support of the idea of non-proliferation, the U.S.S.R., the U.S. and Britain gave some qualified assurances that they would not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states. Although these assurances were regarded as inadequate by the non-nuclear powers, they were an indica-

tion that the nuclear powers were at least becoming conscious of the need to provide security assurances to states that would forego the acquisition of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union also made a step forward in Brezhnev's announcement on April 25 that it would never use nuclear weapons except in case of aggression against itself or its allies by another *nuclear power*. This was a somewhat less restrictive pledge than that of the United States, which had undertaken not to use nuclear weapons except in case of aggression against itself or its allies by any state, whether nuclear or non-nuclear.

Awareness heightened

The session heightened awareness of the increasing threat to survival posed by ever-growing arsenals and arms technology. It also enhanced world consciousness that the condition of the developing world must be very substantially improved and that there was an inescapable link between disarmament and development, as well as between disarmament and international security.

Greater emphasis was given to the role of the United Nations, and to the expansion of information and educational activities. It was decided that an advisory board should be created to help the Secretary-General with disarmament studies, that non-governmental organizations should be given a larger role and that the United Nations Centre for Disarmament should be strengthened.

Owing to the impossibility of overcoming the deep divisions between the opposing points of view, the program of action was less comprehensive and specific than many delegations would have liked. The Declaration did, however, emphasize that "highest priority" must be given to nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war. It also expressed the conviction that the world must "proceed to disarmament or face annihilation". In addition, the program did set out a considerable list of nuclear-disarmament measures. For the first time in the postwar disarmament efforts, specific calls were made for the reduction of conventional arms (which consume the largest part of military budgets) and limitations on their international transfer.

Another important positive result of the session was the flood of new ideas and proposals that were presented. While these cannot be translated into immediate action, they will generate new currents of activity, including study, debate and the identification of possible areas of agreement that are bound to benefit the disarmament process.

One of the important new ideas suggested was the "strategy of suffocation" of the strategic arms race between the super-powers, and indeed of all nuclear powers, proposed by Prime Minister Trudeau in order to arrest the nuclear-arms race in the laboratory. The integrated four-point strategy included: (1) a comprehensive test ban to prevent the development of nuclear explosive devices; (2) a ban on "the flight testing of all new strategic delivery vehicles", which "would complement the ban on the testing of warheads" (this was the first time that any country had officially proposed such a ban which is essential to the halting of the technological arms race); (3) a ban on all production of fissionable material for weapons purposes; and (4) an agreement to limit and then progressively to reduce military spending on new strategic nuclear-weapons systems.

The Canadian initiative attracted wide interest and was supported by several countries, though there was no immediate response from any nuclear-weapon state. It will undoubtedly be studied carefully, and more will be heard about it in the future.

New initiatives

More than two dozen initiatives (including the Canadian one and variations of more long-standing proposals), which were too novel to be included in the program of action, were listed as items for further study and will be transmitted to all bodies dealing with disarmament. It is also, of course, possible that some will be presented again (and perhaps approved) at the forthcoming thirty-third regular session of the General Assembly. Among the more important of these initiatives are the following:

— the Indian proposals for an absolute ban on the use of nuclear weapons and for a moratorium on further testing of nuclear weapons;

- the various French proposals for studies on (a) an international satellite-monitoring agency, (b) an international institute for disarmament research, and (c) the creation of an international disarmament fund for development to be financed by a sort of tax on military spending;
- the Soviet proposals for a complete "freeze" on the quantitative and qualitative build-up of both nuclear and conventional weapons;
- the U.S. proposals for the provision of monitoring equipment and sensors for border surveillance and the creation of a United Nations peacekeeping reserve force;
- the proposals by the Netherlands, Sri Lanka and others for studies of the possibility of establishing an international disarmament organization or authority;
- the appeal of the Secretary-General for countries to divert one-tenth of 1 per cent of their military budgets for the purpose of disarmament efforts.

Finally, the decision to hold a second special session (probably in 1981 or 1982) will provide an opportunity to review the progress made and to revise the program of action and the machinery established. It will also provide some stimulus to greater efforts in the meantime and help keep the momentum going.

Negative side

On the negative side was the failure of Presidents Carter and Brezhnev to attend the session, provide any effective leadership or make any major new proposals. Nor did they report any substantial agreement on a comprehensive test ban or in the SALT negotiations. In fact, the impression was widespread at the session that the two super-powers were dragging their feet on both substance and machinery.

While the active participation of France and China in the special session was welcomed, their announced desire to narrow the gap between them and the two super-powers led to their adopting rigid stances against a nuclear test-ban and limitations on the nuclear-arms race.

There was also a negative reaction at the Assembly and among the public to the holding during the session of a NATO summit meeting in Washington, where agreement

was announced on a long-term program to *increase* armaments.

Apart from the announcement by Canada of its previous decision to remove all nuclear weapons from Canadian forces and territory, and the announcement by Iran that (in response to the appeal of the Secretary-General) it was diverting \$7 million from its military expenditures as a gift to UNICEF, there were no announcements or any national unilateral actions to limit or reduce armaments or military expenditures.

Finally, one of the most disappointing aspects of the special session was the very poor coverage and absence of reporting about it by the public press and other media. While both governmental and non-governmental interest and participation were very high, the public had almost no way of knowing what was happening at the session. Only the *Disarmament Times*, published daily during the session by a group of non-governmental organizations, provided a source of continuous information and opinion about the proceedings. Perhaps the lack of interest by the media was in part due to the absence of fireworks and the fact that most of the time of the session was devoted to the rather dull work of reconciling conflicting texts in numerous private drafting groups.

It is rather early to make a definitive assessment of the special session. While the results were not as good as they ought to have been, they were certainly more encouraging than many observers had expected. On balance, they were very definitely on the positive side. For the first time, the entire world community had been able to agree on a detailed work plan for comprehensive disarmament.

The feared confrontation between the non-aligned and the two super-powers and their allies did not materialize. On the contrary, a real dialogue developed between the non-aligned countries and the heavily-armed ones and between the non-nuclear and the nuclear powers. The high-level diplomacy led to a serious and constructive debate on all aspects of disarmament and to a consensus that, if it did not satisfy everyone, at least provided an agreed program of action and more

effective machinery for implementing it. The disarmament process received a new impetus and new opportunities were created for real progress. Whether advantage is taken of these opportunities, only time and the second special session will tell.

Disappointments and satisfactions

(continued from page 9)

ment Committee, which will be an organ of negotiation, the Commission will have an incentive and deliberative role and will include all the UN member states.

"What a plethora of committees and organs!" some will exclaim. Others will remark "plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose". Both comments are partly right and partly wrong. Partly right because, as was explained above, the items on the disarmament agenda have scarcely changed since 1945; partly wrong because the international community can neither ignore the unreasonable amounts being spent on arms nor remain silent in the face of the absurd escalation of the arms race. The voice of international morality does make itself heard through the medium of these 119 states and agencies meeting in special session.

This, of course, does not help a great deal in a world in which, too often, the law of the jungle wins out over the elementary principles of international justice. However, there is no better remedy than to remind ourselves that there is a way out - the way of disarmament.

Although the remedy is quite simple, administering it is a much more delicate operation. The position of the West in matters of security and disarmament has always been that there can be no *détente* without security. Canada, in the position put forward by its Prime Minister, speaking on May 26, 1978, before the tenth special session of the General Assembly, favoured a policy of gradually cutting off the life blood of the arms race. Four basic proposals were put forward with this policy in mind. The first called for a total ban on nuclear testing; the second for a cessation of ballistic flight tests for strategic

missiles; the third for a cessation of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes; and the fourth for a gradual limitation of military budgets.

These proposals are found, in a different form, in the final document approved by the United Nations General Assembly. On the whole, the Canadian document indicated a desire to be realistic. It was based on many intra-, inter- and para-departmental consultations. It was a document prepared with the greatest care, reflecting a variety of opinions. Significantly, Prime Minister Trudeau was undeniably one of the five most respected speakers at the United Nations. This is testimony both to the Prime Minister's personality and to Canada's prestige in the United Nations. Could this effort have been improved upon, been more original? Did France, for example, not submit more incisive and more innovative proposals – specifically, the proposal for an international satellite agency?

In fact, this latter proposal was seen by all to be premature.

Disarmament or disaster

(continued from page 9)

makers – sometimes eloquently and occasionally wittily. Their combined message was simply that the arms race must go.

– The *attitudes* of the representatives. Generally good-natured, they avoided acrimony for the most part, despite the existence of strong regional conflicts and animosities. Many of the representatives appeared to be very hard-working, as did the members of UN Secretariat. The procedural role played by some (notably Ambassadors De Rosas and Garcis Robles) was often brilliant.

– The *universality* of the session. Though some populations were not represented, e.g. the people of South Africa, the special session, from the first meetings of its preparatory committee, was truly “the largest, most representative disarmament gathering ever convened”.

– Adoption of the *Final Document*. The agreements on a Declaration of Principles, Program of Action and

Nevertheless, France had an attentive audience, especially following the acceptance, after amendments and the presentation of counter-proposals by Britain, of its proposal to broaden the base of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (which will be replaced by the new Disarmament Committee) and to do away with the U.S.-Soviet co-chairmanship.

Although the consultation in Canada was carried out on a national scale, one wonders if Canada might have been able to make more forceful proposals by consulting its allies, the neutral powers and many Third World countries more closely. This question remains unanswered. It could no doubt be the subject of more extensive studies, for the processes of formulating major international policies must be taken beyond our national borders. Perhaps it is because in the past some believed that Canada's calling was an international one that it is now approaching a new crossroads. ■

New Machinery and a continuing process for governments, non-governmental organizations and the UN, are a great accomplishment, which should be the basis for action at all levels in the months and years ahead.

Acceptance of NGOs and the need for disarmament research and education. The acceptance by the UN of an important role for NGOs – during the preparatory meetings, the special session and the months ahead – was reflected by proposals in the Final Document for mobilizing world public opinion by means of disarmament research, training and education.

There were, however, discouraging aspects. These included the following five points:

– No *breakthrough* achieved either in nuclear or conventional disarmament. Nor was there any sign that such a breakthrough was on the horizon: the arms race continues and increases in scope and tempo.

– The *inadequate processes* available to the special session for

generating anything resembling a breakthrough. The necessity of “receiving instructions from home”, or following the general rules of the General Assembly, of accommodating a very large body of people without adequate management, planning and steering mechanisms, all militated against major accomplishments.

– The *rigidity* reflected in the views of many representatives, particularly those of the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R. and China, concerning the causes of the arms race. Great difficulty was experienced by representatives in admitting national error or guilt. Almost all delegations demonstrated an inability or unwillingness to give away anything very substantial in the bargaining sessions. The U.S. and U.S.S.R. had most to give and yet offered least. In consequence, they continue to bear most responsibility for the continuing arms race – but all of us, in our insistence on “modernization”, contribute to that process.

– Poor coverage by the world's *media* and little clamour by people generally for greater coverage of the six weeks. The almost complete absence of women speakers (one out of 120) was also noticeable.

– The *world's climate* was not conducive to a successful special session in the early summer of 1978. Huge build-ups by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Pact (or *vice versa*), the absence of the heads of government of the “Big Two” and the continuing conflicts in the Middle East, Latin America, Asia and Africa all made the task of the special session extremely difficult.

Once again on the positive side, however, are the final document's suggestions for follow-up by governments, non-governmental organizations and the United Nations. These include:

– studies of disarmament and development (Paragraphs 92 and 93):

– study of disarmament and international security (Paragraph 95):

– disarmament education and peace studies, especially publicity for the final document (Paragraphs 98, 99 and 104):

– Disarmament Week, 24-30 October (Paragraph 100):

initiatives by the UN Educational

Scientific and Cultural Organization, culminating in a 1980 World Congress on Disarmament Education (Paragraphs 101 and 105).

The UN has initiated and is carrying forward the studies linking disarmament and development and disarmament and international security. Ambassador Thorsson, chairman of the Nordic Proposal Working Group, has welcomed parallel studies at the national

level. In Canada these could be undertaken by Canadian universities, or by agencies concerned with international development, with the encouragement of the Department of External Affairs.

Similarly, the Canadian Commission for UNESCO would be a natural mechanism for involving Canadian teachers and adult educators in helping to implement Paragraphs 101 and 105 or the Final

Document. More specific educational efforts, such as the widespread publicizing of the Final Document itself, could be carried out by the UN in Canada and other NGOs, with the collaboration of the Department of External Affairs. Discussion of these and other initiatives might be included in the consultative process that was initiated by the Department of External Affairs in January of this year. ■

Stepping beyond idealism to see the United Nations

• Hans Tabor

Apart from the cynics, the worst enemies of the United Nations are often its warmest friends. One can hold up the ideal of the United Nations. The conclusion will be negative – that the organization has failed. But one should not judge results on the basis of the ideal situation. One has to consider the world as it is – not as we should like it to be – and to look at the UN as the mirror of the world that we live in, a world that is created by and for human beings and thus immensely unpredictable. When one takes that view, the judgment will be much more positive – that the United Nations has managed quite well.

Proposals have been made at the UN to improve procedure, to restore the vitality of open debate and to concentrate on shorter and more practical resolutions. It is possible that, within the foreseeable future, we may have restricted ministerial meetings of the Security Council and informal gatherings of its members not prompted by any concrete issue. However, there is reason to remember that earlier international organizations, in particular the League of Nations, did not fail because of structural or inherent political frailties but rather because the member countries were not willing to honour their responsibilities. As a representative of the Soviet Union once so rightly stated: "There is no reason for revision of the UN Charter; the important issue is that every member lives up to its rules".

We have heard a great deal lately of the "tyranny of the majority" at the United Nations and of the resolutions that express views of the "new" majority. Among other things, however, the "new" majority has mentioned that those countries that to-day are worried about the functioning of the General Assembly are the same countries that previously had a majority that they used to their own advantage. It has also been pointed out that the old majority was instrumental in setting up and formulating the rules of the United Nations based on its own set of values.

Certainly, one should be cautious in talking of the tyranny of the majority. It may be argued that tyranny is exercised rather by those countries that do not implement what the majority has decided. Decisions in the Security Council, and use of the veto, could be termed the tyranny of the minority. But, though negotiations often occur, it is fair to say that, in cases that appeal to the heart, the majority gives only limited consideration to other member countries' positions. No doubt, this has

*Caution
in talking
of tyranny
of majority*

Mr Tabor is the Ambassador of Denmark in Canada. A former Foreign Minister of Denmark, he has also served twice as his country's permanent representative to the United Nations. In July 1967, he was President of the United Nations Security Council. The views expressed here are those of Mr Tabor.

always been the case. It is, however, wrong and meaningless to be deeply attached to a text without regard to the prospects for its implementation. If there is to be any hope of respect for the UN, it is desirable that the efforts made in the organization should be more consonant with reality. There is to-day hardly any other road to take than that of negotiation and reasonable consideration of a politically and economically strong minority, so that the process of decision reflects the existing balance of power in the world. Otherwise, the adoption of a resolution will often be an empty victory and the immediate euphoria followed by a serious hangover. I am convinced that more harm than good has been done by the attempt to practice international politics in disregard of the real power structures.

No war

Some give the organization credit for the fact that there has not been a global war since 1945. Without arguing against this result, it must be admitted that some devastating uprisings have occurred where the resolution has had more to do with great-power interest than with the action of the UN. It should not be overlooked that UN peacekeeping operations have usually not been possible until a truce has been arranged by the major contenders. Further, when a dispute is brought before the UN, the Security Council may be paralysed if the states with a veto have different sympathies. Equally, in some cases – as, for instance, Vietnam and Cuba – great-power disagreement may make it impossible to take the question before the Security Council. This negative result may also occur – as, for instance, in the conflict in the Horn of Africa – because a regional organization is preferred to the internationalization of the problem. Thus UN peacekeeping operations are possible only when the matter is brought before the organization, the super-powers are in agreement and the parties directly involved find such operations to be in their interest.

In several cases, however, the UN has been successful. As a result, and due to the general disgust at the horror of war, peacekeeping operations have been surrounded by considerable, and not entirely harmless, idealism. This can lead a well-meaning opinion to pose more demands, which the power conditions in the world do not permit.

No doubt it is always desirable that solutions be found to those problems that are the background to any given quarrel. In this area, the UN has failed entirely.

The setting-up of a UN peacekeeping force has a tendency to be a "sleeping cushion" for the parties directly involved, while the background problems remain untackled.

Some countries have stressed the necessity that more should be done concerning the peacemaking functions of the UN, and have even left the impression that suggestions in this respect would be forthcoming. However, nothing has happened. This is not surprising. In order to be considered neutral, countries sending peacekeeping troops have usually refrained from announcing any attitude against the parties directly involved; thus they are precluded from a peacemaking role in spite of the intimate knowledge they might have acquired. Indeed, to some degree, they become a part of the very problem that needs solution. The development of the peacemaking function of the United Nations is further hampered by the fact that the Security Council can be paralyzed by a veto exercised not on the merits of the case but on the calculation of the interests of the veto-holding power. No country is willing to submit its case to the United Nations so long as voting takes place without sufficient regard to the merits of its case.

The fact that at present there is no good solution to the problem of peacemaking should not lead to the conclusion that peacekeeping is superfluous. A country participating in peacekeeping operations, however, should raise no false expectations about the final outcome of the conflict. It should also fully inform the public of the likely expenditure of a sometimes lengthy UN action.

In this connection, however, one could consider whether the Security Council, or a group of its members, should be trying to put forward peacemaking proposals. In Namibia, where the pressure from the international community was great, the Western group on the Security Council were able to bring forth an acceptable formula for a solution. Perhaps a similar procedure could also be effective in areas such as Cyprus, where the pressure is not so apparent.

Little change

In examining the United Nations today, one has to note that hardly any change has occurred in the global attitude of the super-powers. From the point of view of the United Nations, *détente* has not become an independent expression but is only an integral part of the continuing power struggle between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Other countries can operate only within the framework set primarily by the two,

which the Final Act, adopted in Helsinki, is an expression.

It may appear that the Western view of human rights, and especially the American "campaign", could be considered a time-bomb under the Soviet system. It is, after all, only possible to liberalize up to a certain point a system based upon control; otherwise the system will crumble. The Soviet Union of to-day, however, is different from that of Stalin, and *détente* is a process that demands patience. It should also be borne in mind that *détente* has economic and social aspects. In these, we of the West are open to – and accept – criticism.

I do not, however, want to go into a discussion of the relative weight of economic liberties and political rights. It may be dangerous to mix the two sets of values and to subject views of morality to tactical considerations. The realization of both will to a large extent depend on circumstances, the level of development and the form of government and society.

The style and tenets of democracy as we know it are not possible all over the world – at least in the short run. Yet, in attempting to relate to others our own kind of democracy, we should not sacrifice the qualities of freedom and openness that are its hallmark. With the adoption of the Final Act, we have an obligation to express our views. Yet many Westerners have become so afraid of calling problems by their real names that they risk dying in agony. They avoid calling a spade a spade in order not to embarrass. Our comprehension and understanding of the view of other countries should never develop into a mere desire to please, nor become a mere reflection of commercial motives. After all, a country may be measured by what it accepts or tolerates.

The United Nations exists because it was created in harmony with the values treasured by the West. These values are not the primary concern of the present majority, which has its own interpretation of the goals of the organization. We have, in my view, reached a point where a kind of "regional United Nations" and interest groupings of different kinds under the umbrella of the Charter seem, if not formally then factually, to represent a new way of collaboration.

Regional economic UN organizations exist already – as, for instance, the Economic Commission for Europe – and it may be worth while to revitalize them, if only for the sake of trade co-operation between East and West. In any event, both politically and economically the United Nations might fruitfully set up regional

groupings to prepare the further work of the organization. In accordance with the principle of universality, such groupings should discuss only and elaborate regional matters and in this way complement, and not substitute for, the United Nations.

This does not mean that it is crucial how the UN machinery is organized. The very essence will, for a long time to come, remain the policy and purpose of the member countries. But one must never lose sight of the goal of advancement. This is not to compromise one's ideals, but rather to seek to have them realized in a complicated world, according to existing political realities.

Much has been achieved through the little-publicized work done by the special organs of the UN system. The very existence of the United Nations influences the attitude of governments. Participation in the organization and its agencies affects political leaders and their officials and thus the process of decision; the United Nations exercises a softening role by making countries refrain from actions and manifestations or change them, because states take into consideration the expected international reaction at the United Nations.

Therefore, one should not judge the results achieved by the United Nations on the basis of the ideal situation. The organization is far from the last step in humanity's journey to the ideal state. No country is able to fulfil all its goals without interfering in the rights of others. Compromises are necessary. The increasing interdependence of the world and the polarization of ideologies render more important than ever the existence of an international organization such as the United Nations. We should not be discouraged or dispirited by obstacles, disappointments or frustrations.

There is no reason to be astonished if the UN itself is not the hearth for important economic and commercial solutions. The outstanding economic problem is the relation between North and South. Extensive economic assistance has been channelled through the UN to the developing countries without great inconvenience for the industrialized world. Basically, the purpose has been to secure political stability without sacrificing one's own privileges. However, the important thing cannot be the aid itself – although it is necessary in one form or another and should be at least 0.7 per cent of the gross national product at the end of this decade. The essential thing is that the developing countries become less economically dependent.

What can be achieved by the developing countries through a "New International Economic Order" is very limited if they themselves are not prepared to undertake discipline and reform, and adopt change with regard to both production and birth control. Nor is there any guarantee that a greater say in international economic affairs will lead to a reasonable distribution of income between the different developing countries and to a higher standard of living for the poorest within the individual developing country.

Since the countries of the world are highly interdependent, the timing of requests by developing countries is most important. It would also be wise to concentrate demands on fewer items instead of exerting pressure on all sorts of questions. It cannot be in the interest of developing countries to have the passage to a new economic order take place in such an abrupt way that it results in disturbances of the international economy, which would also hurt them.

It may be argued that the Western market system and Western political ideology are on trial in a considerable part of the world. Communism appeals to a human being who is starving and looking for a place to sleep. In this situation it is not appropriate to talk about political democracy. Without great difficulty, a parallel can be made between the Marxist class struggle and the efforts of the poorer populations to increase their material well-being. Thus poverty is explained as a result of the exploitation by the imperialistic powers and the inequalities of capitalism. The poorer peoples thereby are given priority in the class struggle and are motivated to improve their conditions, developments that are welcomed by the Communists and understandable to the poor.

There is certainly a valid point here, but I do not find the arguments convincing. When the developing countries, in the context of the North-South dialogue, e.g. in UNCTAD, attack the West in particular, the main reason is that they are dependent on trade with the Western world, and on its growth, to a much larger degree than on trade with the East. The newly-independent countries in Africa want to be themselves without interference and without involvement in the ideological fight between East and West. They do not want to have their material well-being effaced in this way. To a certain degree a differentiation is taking place in the dialogues or competition between East and West and North and South. Apart from food, the developing countries want advanced

technology and capital. I should not be surprised if many of their leaders, after contact with the Eastern system, come to the conclusion that only the Western industrialized countries are able to fulfil their wishes.

But the Western world will have to widen its own values, especially that of equality, to include the position between East and West and North and South. Apart from food, the developing countries want advanced technology and capital. I should not be surprised if many of their leaders, after contact with the Eastern system, come to the developing countries. Otherwise, the discussions in the UN and its Specialized Agencies will be futile.

If it is found undesirable to have poorer populations tempted – at least in the short run – by a Communistic *cul-de-sac*, it may also be necessary for the Western industrialized world to set a desirable example, putting its own house in order through national and international efforts. It does not inspire the wholehearted confidence of the Third World to find that, simultaneously with the increasing international co-operation in trade and currencies, individual Western countries are trying to solve their own economic problems on the basis of theories that were formulated for a society that was entirely different from today's. Nor does it inspire confidence to see these attempted solutions, in spite of economic summit meetings, being applied more or less in isolation.

In order to improve the market system and stabilize democracy – which, in practice, have proved more effective than any other approach – it has become a social necessity to introduce a balancing factor in Western societies. Personally, I believe that an incomes policy in one form or another is indispensable; but an income policy will in the long run hardly be possible without a new line of thinking that gives wage-earners a more active role. It goes without saying that the Communists will be in opposition to such a policy, because it tends to avoid a polarization of wage-earners and business and because its purpose is to stabilize Western development and to improve the condition of employees. But, in their own interest, the defenders of democracy ought to realize the importance of wage-earners' obtaining more participation in decision-making, a larger degree of involvement and responsibility, and co-ownership. Perhaps the internal threat to democracy is the most serious, and it may be rewarding to make our societies and manner of life more worthy of defence and security.

I am also convinced that a country's interest is not well served if it pursues a traditional foreign policy in international organizations such as the United Nations. Rather, a diplomatic line has to be developed that is structured and fashioned to function specifically in multilateral organizations. The requirements are quite different from those of bilateral diplomacy, both with regard to practice and to environment. The diplomats have hardly been recruited to meet the demands of multilateralism. A new recruitment and further education are needed. International solutions, of course, will also mean that external representatives will take on an increased importance in their own countries – not because they will force a greater consideration for foreign countries or their governments, or because they might wish to have a greater role in determining policy, but because the policy-makers will be using their services abroad to extend their countries' internal measures. For that to happen, policy-makers will have to rely to a large extent on their external representative.

Trends

Within the United Nations, the two super-powers are experiencing increasing difficulty when they try to dominate the members of the different groups of countries. This is partly due to the fact that ideologies in the UN have a waning

importance in relation to blatant national interests. But, just as it seems natural to-day for countries to show greater independence in foreign policy, so also it is evident that neither of the super-powers will accept the neglect of their vital interests in the world organization. It is my experience in the United Nations, and especially from my time as President of the Security Council in June 1967 during the six-day war in the Middle East, that, in general, only the two super-powers can achieve what is possible within political realities. Only when the two super-powers are in agreement can the UN play a decisive role.

But I also learnt that a smaller country is not prevented from having potential influence. Thus, because the super-powers agree on certain fundamental principles, a smaller country can, in addition to being a mediator, act independently within certain limits and, with tact and patience, influence the development of events. Apart from its geographical position, I believe, a smaller country with a good name is able to do this to some degree because the super-powers have their own reputation to take care of. This is the more relevant in an international organization like the United Nations, where individual ability often plays a greater role than in many bilateral relations. This implies, of course, that the smaller country has well-based arguments and the necessary moral strength.

Outlook for French politics after the defeat of the Left

By André P. Donneur

All eyes were turned toward France on the evening of last March 12. The most interested observers were France's partners in the European Community, beginning with West Germany. The results of the French legislative elections, the first round of which were held that evening, would have a crucial effect on the equilibrium of the pan-European system and even the entire international system.

Although the most conservative polls predicted that the French Left would obtain 53 per cent of the votes in the first round of the elections and a majority of

seats in the second if the Communist and Socialist Parties ordered a reciprocal withdrawal of their candidates in favour of the candidates who won the most votes for the Left, neither of these predictions came true. In the first round, the Left – including the Far Left – obtained only slightly more than 50 per cent of the votes and, in the second, despite the agreement for reciprocal withdrawal, the Left ended up with 90 seats fewer than the Right.

What happened was an error in forecasting, due, on the one hand, to a survey technique that failed to take into account

the many undecided and "discreet" voters (those who were unwilling to reply) and, on the other, to purely numerical calculations based on reported allegiances rather than on an evaluation of political activities that were highly disconcerting for the voters of the Centre, who cast the determining ballots in any pluralist democracy.

It can, in fact, be said that the Left had virtually lost the elections as early as September 23, 1977. The breakup of the Union that night was followed from September to December by a virulent Communist Party campaign aimed at crushing the Socialist Party militants. From January until the eve of the elections in March, the Communist Party's campaign was directed at Socialist supporters, its keynote being sounded by a slogan hammered out by *L'Humanité*, the organ of the French Communist Party (PCF): "Vote Communist on March 12 for agreement on the 13th and victory on the 19th". In the autumn campaign directed at the Socialist militants and in the winter campaign that focused on the voters, the intention of the Communists was to generate pressure from its base and then from its voters to force the Socialist Party (PS) to subscribe to a "good", "up-to-date" common program of government.

During the first phase, while the campaign against the militants was in progress, the PS refused to budge, to the surprise of the PCF leadership. With François Mitterrand as its general, the PS held its ground. Attempts by CERES, its "maximalist" wing, to bend the party line and have the PS make a few concessions to the PCF failed.

Fringe voters

The winter campaign was directed at the fringe voters situated on the borderline between the Communist and Socialist Parties. Its purpose was to take from the PS

Professor Donneur teaches at the University of Quebec at Montreal, and holds the position of associate director of studies at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en sciences sociales in Paris for the 1978-79 academic year. His work is in the fields of Canadian foreign policy and international socialism. He is the author of Histoire de l'Union des partis socialistes and of numerous articles on relations between socialist and Communist parties. He was a keen observer of the French political scene while resident in Paris last winter at the Maison des Sciences de l'Homme in Paris under the Canada Council-CNRS exchange program. The views expressed in this article are those of the author.

the voters who had deserted the PCF since the Socialist Party resolutely began in 1972 to implement with the PCF a program of extensive reforms in the French economy and in French society. This manoeuvre was successful. Not that the Communist Party obtained a higher percentage of votes than in the legislative elections of 1973 — in fact, it declined from 21.3 to 20.6 per cent — but it forced the Socialist Party to move its campaign further to the left to win the voters on the fringes of the two parties, and thereby lose the 3 per cent of the voters at the centre that the Socialists needed to gain victory. These voters were frightened, and after some hesitation finally gave their allegiance to the parties of the Union pour la démocratie française (UDF).

This union of parties supporting President Giscard d'Estaing registered a notable electoral score of 21.5 per cent. Made up of the Republicans (the President's party), the Social Democrats (with their Christian Democrat orientation), and the right-wing Radicals (liberal), the UDF was able to achieve two objectives: it made possible the electoral victory of the Right by winning the votes of the Socialist Party's centrist supporters, and, by obtaining 21.5 per cent of the votes, it lessened the influence within the rightist majority of the Gaullists in Mr Chirac's Rassemblement pour la République (RPR).

These elections have left France with four political "families" practically equal in voter strength: the conservatives of the RPR (22.6 per cent of the votes); the liberals of the UDF (21.5 per cent); the democratic socialists of the PS (22.6 per cent); and the PCF's Communists (20.6 per cent). Because those who voted Left in the first round did so with less consistency in the second round than those who cast their ballots for the Right, and because the electoral map displayed certain distortions the two families of the Right came out stronger — the RPR's conservatives won 148 seats, the UDF's liberals 137, the socialists 104 and the Communists 86.

Double polarization

The French political picture is complicated by the fact that the Right-Left division is not the only basis of political differentiation. There is another type of polarization which for lack of a better term we shall call "open-closed". Those on the "closed" side are the conservatives of the RPR and — the Communists. Both these parties are isolationist: the PCF's economic program for example, would lead to autarky and, in concrete terms, to the withdrawal of France from the European Common Market.

Communists intended to generate pressure on Socialists



Wide World Photos

The failure of the Communist and Socialist Parties to come together denied the Left its chance of victory in the March 1978 French elections. Socialist leader François Mitterrand (left) and Communist leader Georges Marchais (right) are shown voting their separate ways during the first round of balloting.

et. Moreover, both parties have launched "buy French" campaigns. Both are in favour of a purely French striking force and of what is called an "all-directional" defence. They are strongly opposed to close co-operation between France and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, although in principle they are willing to have France belong to the Atlantic Alliance. Both parties seek to champion groups in society that are on the decline: small businessmen, small farmers, the least-skilled members of the working class and industries that are in difficulty (textiles, coal mining, steel). These parties also stand for authoritarian values and for law and order.

The socialists and liberals, on the other hand, are strongly in favour of an open-door attitude towards Europe and the Atlantic Alliance, attentive to ecological problems but in favour of introducing the latest technology and of competition in industry. These parties are competing with one another at the centre of the political chessboard for the various strata comprising the ambitious, dynamic middle and upper classes of French society, a society that during the Fifties, Sixties and Seventies underwent profound changes that have not been noticed by many observers who are perpetuating the myths of the "closed society" and "the French sickness".

The supposedly surprising results of the March 1978 legislative elections can be explained much more easily if one lays aside the myths that pervade what is written about French society and if one considers not only the Left-Right duality but also the "open-closed" dimension. The binominal, majority, two-ballot method of

voting favours a Left-Right polarization by forcing conservatives and liberals, on the one hand, and socialists and Communists, on the other, to form alliances, at least for electoral purposes. The "open-closed" dimension cannot have political expression; it would be impossible for the Socialist Party, a fragile and recently-formed coalition consisting of various democratic-socialist elements, to conclude an alliance with the liberals without falling apart. This was why President Giscard d'Estaing, who has clearly perceived the double polarization in French politics (Left-Right and "open-closed") was in favour of adopting a proportional method of voting that would have enabled the Socialist Party to do without the Communist alliance. But in this he was, and still is, opposed by the RPR, headed by Jacques Chirac, the authoritarian Mayor of Paris, who, in his efforts to maintain his influence on the Government, stands only to gain if the Socialist Party has no alternative to an alliance – even a limited one – with the Communist Party. The RPR can count on the tacit complicity of the Communist Party, which officially claims to favour proportional voting but is vigorously opposed to a plan that would deprive it of a first-rate means of bringing pressure to bear on the Socialist Party.

The victory of the conservative-liberal coalition in the legislative elections of March 12 and 19 last has therefore given the Government headed by Prime Minister Raymond Barre a renewed term of office. The UDF (the pivot of the Government coalition) demonstrated its strength by getting Jacques Chaban-Delmas elected to the Presidency of the National Assembly in

place of Edgar Faure, the official candidate of the conservative RPR and outgoing President of the Assembly. The Prime Minister intends to continue with his somewhat unpopular economic policy of "true pricing", which has already resulted in a rise in rates for industries such as textiles and steel, and in which the dairy farmers and cattle-raisers are having difficulty keeping up with the competition from their Dutch and Danish partners in the European Community. The priority given by the Barre Government to making the French economy more competitive could give rise to social unrest.

Whether it wants to or not, Mr Chirac's RPR must support the Barre Government, in which it has a number of ministers. It is clear that Mr Chirac, who keeps a tight rein on his party, has his eye on the Presidency of the French Republic. Under the Constitution, the Presidential elections must be held in 1981. If President Giscard d'Estaing, who has emerged from the recent legislative elections as the clear winner, is able, through the Prime Ministers he designates and by his own actions, to maintain his present image, he will be re-elected without difficulty, and Mr Chirac will not even consider running. He would declare his candidacy only if France were to experience serious difficulties, for then Mr Chirac, who cultivates an image of authority and order, could present himself as the saviour of France and the last resort in the old Gaullist and Bonapartist tradition.

A shaken party

The picture of the Communists presented to readers of *Le Monde* is one of a party severely shaken. The articles in this daily by historian Jean Ellenstein and philosopher Louis Althusser, both eminent members of the Party, and the scathing letters by intellectuals to *Le Monde* and other newspapers, seem to be indicative of critical "right-wing" and "left-wing" currents within the PCF at this post-election juncture. Such minor rumblings of discontent pose no serious threat, however, since the party leadership is keeping the situation well in hand by practising "democratic centralism" – that is, by excluding from the decision-making process the lower levels of the party (cells, sections, federations). Requests from local units are filtered through successive levels before getting to the top (secretariat, "politburo", Central Committee). At the same time, they are obliged to carry out decisions handed down through the hierarchy.

After the elections, there were indeed animated discussions in numerous cells

(the Party's basic level), particularly concerning the rather undiplomatic way of announcing the Party's new policy decisions – for example, the statement by Secretary-General George Marchais in favour of a complete striking force and an "all-directional" military policy – and the style of relations with the Socialist Party. After enjoying full favour, the latter suddenly became, in the eyes of the Communist leaders, intrinsically perverse and a carrier of all the evils of the "bourgeois poison".

But these criticisms, except in a few cells of intellectuals, did not call into question the basic direction in which the Party – above all, its leadership – was headed. Even if changes were made in the leadership, this would not settle the question of the internal operation or the ends of the Communist Party. During the election campaign, which, paradoxically, was directed essentially against the Socialists, the Communist Party showed that it was still essentially non-democratic. Maintaining its hegemony over the organized sector of the working class through the Confédération générale du travail (CGT) and holding the positions it has gained in factories and municipalities are more important to it than playing second fiddle in a Government headed and dominated by socialism.

On the whole, the Communist Party achieved what it set out to do. It lost only 1 per cent of the popular vote, while the Socialist Party made no large gains and only 2 per cent ahead. In the Chamber of Deputies, the Socialists gained only a small number of seats (15, compared to the Communists' 13). Above all, the Socialists, shaken by the defeat, do not have the strength to challenge the Communists for position of dominance. At a meeting on April 25, the Communist Party's Central Committee – of which Ellenstein is a member – unanimously approved the policy of Marchais. The Party will continue to work even harder towards "the union of the people of France", a vast coalition with adherents from all levels of the population (apart from the handful of "big monopolistic capitalists").

Losers

Paradoxically, the Socialist Party, which gained most votes, appears to have been the loser in these elections. It went up from 19.3 per cent in 1973 to 22.6 per cent in 1978, and its tiny ally, the Mouvement démocratique et radical de gauche, advanced from 1.4 per cent in 1973 to 2.1 per cent in 1978. But the Socialist Party's ambitions and expectations were such that this result, which

*Candidacy
of Chirac
will depend
on Giscard's
successes*

translates into only 104 seats (as compared with 89 in 1973) out of 491 in the National Assembly, seemed like a defeat.

After a period of discouragement following the breakup of the Union of the Left during the night of September 22, 1977, the Socialist Party's militants found new hope when the opinion polls showed – without counting the undecided voters and those who refused to answer – that their party had 26 per cent of the intended votes. Imaginations ran wild when this percentage rose even higher. Some militants, and even some leaders (but not, it must be pointed out, the very cautious François Mitterand and his entourage), went so far as to foretell a situation in which the Socialist Party would be strong enough (with over 30 per cent of the votes) to govern by itself.

The actual results were hard to take. The look of defeat on the face of François Mitterand on the night of the first round typified the disappointment felt. When all the results were in, the Socialist Party began to draw some lessons from its defeat – the magnitude of which in seats most was surprising. There were 90 seats separating majority and opposition. But, above all, some of the Party's outstanding candidates were beaten, even in the first round, following a violent campaign directed against them by the Communist Party; this was the case with Gilles Martinet and Pierre Bérégovoy, both members of the Socialist Party's secretariat.

Dilemmas

The Socialist Party is faced with a number of dilemmas. It built its entire strategy on the Union of the Left, in which the Communist Party is no longer interested unless it can dictate the terms. In addition, François Mitterand has emerged from this defeat with a loser's image, having already failed to win in the Presidential elections of 1965 and 1974 and, as coalition and later Party leader, having lost the legislative elections of 1967, 1968 and 1973. Finally, the defeat has revived dissension within the composite assembly of 160,000 adherents called the Socialist Party.

However, one must not exaggerate the extent of these difficulties and see the Socialist Party as already falling apart. In the first place, Mitterand has decided to remain at the head of the Party for the next three or four years. He has also clearly indicated that he is not the only possible choice as candidate for a future Presidential election, and has even named Pierre Mauroy and Michel Rocard as possible

candidates. Rocard, who is very popular among the French people and among a number of militants at the base of the Socialist Party, has not yet succeeded in gaining the sympathy of those comprising the Party machinery. They suspect him of being a technocrat, despite his statements in favour of management by employees in business, which they see as a façade. The Party *cadres* definitely prefer Pierre Mauroy, who is the Mayor of Lille and the son of working-class parents. He acquired solid organizational abilities while working for the SFIO, the main forerunner of the current Socialist Party. But Mauroy has not attracted nearly as much public popularity.

A joint effort by these two men, with Mr Mauroy heading the Party and Rocard running as Presidential candidate, would be the logical solution for the Socialist Party. Mitterand could then remain as a sort of arbiter and sage, as did Léon Blum after the Second World War. And Mitterand, who would like to be seen in a favourable historical light, might find this role appealing. As for the "maximalist" CERES minority, it has emerged from the voting divided, having lost some of the young, ambitious technocrats among its members who did not appreciate the dogmatism of Didier Motchane, the CERES theoretician. Its ambitious leader, Jean-Pierre Chevènement, is more flexible and might throw in his lot with the leadership of the Socialists when the time is right. But for now the Socialists are building their strength, as they must do, especially among the working class, where they are in competition with the Communist Party. They are drawing up a new and original program, while proclaiming their adherence to the Union of the Left. However, this Union could not be rebuilt on a common program but solely on a platform of strictly electoral objectives.

Among governments and among transnational corporations there was satisfaction with the results of the French elections. This was true even in the Soviet Union, which would not have been happy to see the Socialists at the head of France's Government, diplomacy and defence. As for the European Community, it has been strengthened by the elections. Not only did the Government coalition win, but within the majority and within the opposition the elements favourable to interaction with Western Europe gained the most ground. These remarks also apply to all the countries with coasts on the Atlantic, and to Canada in particular.

Governments and transnationals were satisfied with results

Arrangements and techniques to safeguard nuclear material

By Albert Legault

Sherlock Holmes has often been referred to as an amateur detective with an incredible nose for finding things out. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna, like Holmes, is involved in detection and surveillance, but there are major differences between them. The first is that the Agency's inspectors are professionals in every sense of the word. There is no room for amateurs where nuclear energy is concerned. A second difference is that the IAEA does not, strictly speaking, have any real power of investigation. The control that exists is owing to the fact that countries voluntarily agree to place their nuclear programs under the Agency's safeguards.

The origin and nature of the nuclear safeguards program, which is periodically discussed by the press, governments and observers, should be underlined. Nuclear safeguards are nothing but a set of legal provisions created because of the need to meet man's nuclear-energy requirements while preventing the diversion of nuclear material to uncontrolled military uses. The signing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968 (it came into effect in 1970) marked the beginning of an international system of nuclear safeguards.

Although both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon states may be parties to the treaty, the obligations to be fulfilled by these two categories of country are different, and this makes the treaty discriminatory – in two respects. First, it affirms nuclear inequality between countries. Nuclear-weapon states agree in the treaty not to give – by any means whatever, directly or indirectly – nuclear

weapons to another country that does not already have its own nuclear arsenal.

Discriminatory

Secondly, the treaty is discriminatory in its safeguards provisions. Non-nuclear states that are party to the treaty agree to place their nuclear programs under IAEA safeguards in order to demonstrate their good faith. Nuclear-weapon countries, on the other hand, are under no obligation to do the same. Nothing prevents them however, from voluntarily placing all or part of their civil nuclear facilities under IAEA control. The United States took this opportunity to make an offer of so-called "voluntary submission" to the IAEA, as did Britain. It is within the realm of possibility that France will take the same course, but at present there is no indication that the Soviet Union intends to make such a move even though it is a member of the Agency and was the first to insist on strict control for others.

Although the NPT gave the Agency an important role, it was, in fact, already involved in the implementation of nuclear safeguards. The Agency has, since before 1968, been providing technical assistance in the form of fellowships, promotion of pure and applied research and the transfer of nuclear material. Before the United Nations accepted the NPT in 1968, the Agency was already implementing international safeguards under agreements concluded with more than 20 countries.

Article III of the NPT stipulates that the terms and conditions for implementing the safeguards required for a non-nuclear-weapon state would apply to "all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere". In other words, the entire nuclear-fuel cycle of a non-nuclear-weapon state signatory to the treaty is placed under the Agency's control. Paragraph 4 of this article specifies that countries must conclude an agreement with the Agency in order

Dr Legault is professor of political science at Laval University and Director-General of the Quebec Centre of International Relations. A specialist in strategic studies, he has previously contributed articles to International Perspectives on MBFR, on Cyprus and on nuclear policy. The views expressed in this article are those of the author.

satisfy the requirements regarding control procedures.

The procedure for implementing nuclear safeguards under the NPT has often been long and arduous. It can be broken down into the following stages. The application of safeguards presupposes that the country has signed the NPT and has ratified it in compliance with its national legislation. The third stage, which is the most delicate and difficult, is the signing of an agreement with the Agency. The form and content of such an agreement were refined after long negotiations within the Agency. They can be found in Information Circular 153 (INFCIRC/153), which was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors and serves as a model for the negotiation of agreements. These individual agreements involve two major conditions.

First, the country and the Agency must agree on "subsidiary arrangements", to which only members of the Board of Governors have access. Secondly, "facility attachments" have to be filled out, giving detailed plans of each facility placed under the Agency's safeguards.

Like the 100 or so other signatories to the NPT, Canada has concluded an agreement whereby its nuclear facilities are periodically checked by the Agency's inspectors. The Canadian facilities covered by safeguards or containing material monitored by the Agency may be divided into three categories:

- Category A) research reactors and critical facilities;
- Category B) nuclear-power stations;
- Category C) fuel-fabrication plants.

The Agency's 1976 annual report provided the following information on Canadian nuclear facilities under its control.

Category A

Name	Site	Capacity in Mw (thermal)
CHRX	Chalk River, Ontario	30
CHRU	Chalk River, Ontario	125
CHR-1	Pinawa, Manitoba	60
McMaster	Hamilton, Ontario	2.5
Lowpoke	University of Toronto	0.00
Lowpoke	Ottawa, Ontario	0.02
CHTR	Chalk River, Ontario	0.00
CHED-2	Chalk River, Ontario	0.00
CHCEP	Chalk River, Ontario	0.00
Lowpoke	Dalhousie University, Nova Scotia	0.02
Lowpoke	Ecole Polytechnique, Quebec	0.02

Category B

Name	Site	Capacity in Mw (electric)
Pickering	(4 reactors) Pickering, Ontario	4 x 540
NPDR	Rolphon, Ontario	22
Gentilly	Gentilly, Quebec	250
PGS	Kincardine, Ontario	208
Ducru GS	Tiverton, Ontario	4 x 788

Category C

Name	Site
CNLF Fuel Fabrication Plant	Chalk River, Ontario
Canadian General Electric Fuel Fabrication Plant	Peterborough, Ontario
Canadian General Electric Pelletizing Plant	Toronto, Ontario
Westinghouse Fuel Fabrication Plant	Port Hope, Ontario
Eloradio Nuclear Limited	Port Hope, Ontario
Westinghouse Fuel Fabrication Plant	Varennnes, Quebec.

In 1975, 170 nuclear reactors were in operation throughout the world. About two-thirds of these were located in non-nuclear-weapon countries. By the end of 1976, the number of facilities in these three categories monitored by the Agency had risen to more than 300. According to the Agency's 1976 annual report, the quantities of nuclear material covered by safeguards were as follows: 14,553 kilograms of plutonium; 2,979 kilograms of uranium-235 with more than 20 percent enrichment; 1,337,763 kilograms of uranium with less than 20 percent enrichment; and 5,336 tons of slightly-enriched uranium. This gives an indication of the importance and extent of the safeguards applied by the Agency.

As already noted, the nuclear safeguards arising from the NPT apply to raw materials and all fissionable products — in other words, to the entire nuclear-fuel cycle. Before the NPT came into effect, a number of countries had concluded nuclear co-operation agreements with each other. It is now common practice for the Agency's safeguards to complement those that supplier countries required of recipients in the earlier bilateral agreements. Moreover, a number of countries still co-operate in the area of nuclear development with states that have not signed the NPT, and so co-operation agreements take the form of trilateral agreements to which the Agency is a party in order to ensure that the safeguards are applied and respected. If the recipient country later signs the NPT, the provisions of the trilateral agreement are in many cases suspended and the recipient country falls under the NPT nuclear-safeguards system.

A number of countries, though they are not signatories to the NPT, have agreed to the application of safeguards to some of their nuclear facilities. As indicated in the Agency's 1976 annual report, only five countries without nuclear weapons or major nuclear facilities are as yet uncovered by the Agency's safeguards, and even in these countries several facilities are, in fact, operating under them.

Because of the increase in nuclear co-operation and the transfer of technology, the interpretation to be given to Paragraph 2, Article III, of the NPT had to be considered very seriously. In it, the countries that are parties to the treaty agree not to supply "equipment or material specially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material" to any non-nuclear-weapon country unless these materials or products are subject to the Agency's

safeguards. In the second quarter of 1974, a group of member countries began unofficial consultations on this subject. The explosion of a nuclear device by India in May 1974 came at the right time to underline how important it was to clarify the above provision as soon as possible.

Suppliers group

In June 1975 a number of countries called the Nuclear Suppliers Group met in London. The group consisted of Belgium, Britain, Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Sweden, Switzerland, the United States and the Soviet Union. The purpose of this meeting was to discuss the most appropriate way of defining the principles of moderation to which supplier countries should adhere in matters of technological transfer.

In a document dated September 21, 1977, and made public at the beginning of 1978 (in the March-April 1978 issue of *Survival*), the supplier countries agreed on a set of guidelines to govern the implementation of their policy on the export of nuclear materials. They also drew up a basic "trigger" list of the items to which safeguards would automatically be applied in the event of transfer. This basic list includes entire reactors, several components required to manufacture nuclear fuel or build nuclear reactors or uranium enrichment plants, and a number of important materials such as heavy water and nuclear-quality graphite, which are indispensable for the operation of certain types of reactor.

These provisions are also aimed at protecting supplier countries against the possibility that recipient countries might reproduce transferred technology by their own means or export it to a third party. The control measures (upon which agreement by the supplier countries took several years of consultation) will become part of the International Atomic Energy Agency's safeguards. In this way the Agency will, hopes, be able gradually to exert sufficient pressure to ensure that certain countries will eventually place all their nuclear activities under its control.

Monitoring

The main monitoring methods used by the IAEA are material accountancy, containment and surveillance. The Agency does not concern itself with the activities at facilities as such but with the location and flow of nuclear materials. The territory monitored is divided into material-balance areas (MBAs). Key-measurement points

*Some agreement
to application
of safeguards
by non-signatories*

KMPs) are set up within these areas to facilitate accurate and reliable measurement of the flow of nuclear material at the beginning, at the end and during the process involved.

Material-balance areas can encompass one or more facilities. One facility may consist of several MBAs, depending on its type, size and importance. This information and all administrative details are generally determined when "subsidiary arrangements" and "facility attachments" are drawn up by the Agency and the country agreeing to safeguards.

The NPT safeguards agreement requires that countries develop and implement an accurate and complete national material-accountancy system for all their nuclear operations. Generally, the more effective and detailed these national systems are, the less time the Agency has to spend on actual inspection. Containment and surveillance include the installation of locks, seals and other devices, as well as permanent or periodic surveillance by technical means such as cameras, television and other forms of optical surveillance.

The Agency has developed its own technical manuals, which serve as a guide for its inspectors. An entire volume deals with statistical concepts and techniques. The frequency of inspections depends on the types of activity concerned. For example, the interval between inspections for MBAs located outside facilities is different from that for reactors or stores under seal, and there is yet another frequency-rate for facilities using plutonium or uranium, or uranium with more than 5 percent enrichment. The minimum period of notification for the last-mentioned category, including reactors, is 24 hours. No notice has to be given in the case of random sampling. The Agency can require special checks to be carried out if it feels that the information it has received is not sufficient to enable it to fulfil its responsibilities.

In 1976 alone, the Agency carried out 55 inspections in 40 countries. About \$4,400,000, or 18.6 per cent, of the Agency's regular budget was spent on these operations. The 35 or so industrialized countries that are members of the Agency provide 95 per cent of its budget, while more than 70 developing countries contribute the remaining 5 per cent.

As mentioned earlier, INFCIRC/153 defines the form and content of agreements. Article 28 of this document specifies that the object of safeguards is "the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material . . . and the deterrence of such diversion by the risk of

early detection". The Agency has already spent several years and a great deal of effort trying to determine what is meant by "significant quantities" and "risk of early detection". The question of interpretation is one of the difficulties the Agency is currently experiencing in trying to negotiate a definitive agreement with EURATOM.

Monitoring procedures for light-water and research reactors were established to the satisfaction of all Agency members. However, some difficulties remain regarding slightly-enriched fuel-fabrication plants, reprocessing plants (the absolute uncertainty is at least ten times greater than the amount of plutonium required to build an atomic bomb), and a number of uranium-enrichment plants.

The Agency has a standing advisory committee to assist it in carrying out its tasks. In 1976, this committee produced its first assessment of the implementation of the nuclear-safeguards system, entitled *Special Safeguards Implementation Report*. On the basis of this document, the Agency's Director-General made various recommendations to the Board of Governors, especially on the interpretation of quantitative data collected by inspectors and on standards that might foster greater trust and thereby prevent nuclear materials from being used for military purposes.

Because of the extent of current monitoring operations, a great deal of effort is being devoted to standardizing the terms and conditions and techniques for implementing safeguards. Considerable sums are being spent on increasing cost-effectiveness. Improved optical-surveillance devices, automation of data-processing and standardization of the way accounting data on material balance are presented are some of the factors that will raise the quality of monitoring operations over the long term and thus increase the certainty that contractual obligations will be fulfilled.

In the final analysis, however, the obligatory nature of safeguards is worth only as much as a country's willingness to respect them.

Our mistake

The last part of the first paragraph of John Noble's article on nuclear safeguards in the July/August issue should have read: "Canada has been thrust into a leading role in the development of international arrangements designed to prevent the diversion of nuclear material and technology from peaceful power-generation programs to the development of nuclear explosives."

Management of foreign affairs reflects provincial priorities

The case of Saskatchewan

By Robert I. McLaren

During the last 15 years, the role of the Canadian provincial governments in international affairs has become more and more thoroughly documented. This documentation has usually been done from a legal-constitutional perspective of examining what the provinces are entitled to do by law, or from a functional perspective of naming the functions that they do perform. There is, however, another perspective that should also be adopted – the managerial perspective of how the provinces actually carry out these functions. This last approach has the advantage of indicating the real importance of international affairs to the individual province.

International affairs is a set of relations. These relations may in time form a structure, but they do not exist for themselves alone. They exist, rather, to deal with substantive matters such as food, energy sources, credit, human welfare. Since provincial governments are largely organized on the basis of these substantive areas, the result is the major management problem for the conduct of international affairs. Should the government centralize its international activities in one department, requiring it both to co-ordinate the programs of the separate substantive departments and to develop governmental policy? Or should the government decentralize its international activities, allowing each substantive department to administer its own international programs and to develop policy for its area under guidelines from the Cabinet?

Since 1909, the Federal Government of Canada has adopted the first of these two models and centralized its international activities in the Department of External Affairs. Of course, this does not mean that

there are no further problems as a result of this approach. Other federal departments also have overseas responsibilities, a fact that creates a constant need for co-ordination and the avoidance of duplication. What it does mean is that international activities have been perceived as having reached a level of importance that requires the development of a cadre of centrally located specialists to deal with them.

The governments of Alberta and Quebec have also reached this conclusion, but, by and large, the other provinces have not. The government of Saskatchewan provides an example of the non-centralized approach. It has no central machinery, where one can locate the co-ordinated management of the province's international affairs. The decentralized structure that the province has acquired has not been obtained through an explicit decision by the Cabinet; it exists rather because departmental interactions have grown until each department has, on its own initiative, made the decision to locate its international activity with some one person. The results of this "organizing by default" can be examined under the headings of planning, organizing, staffing and evaluating – four perpetually important managerial processes.

There is no apparent general policy that governs the international activities of Saskatchewan public servants. As each project arises for the two public servants in the Intergovernmental Affairs Unit of the Executive Council (or Cabinet), a department that might be expected to co-ordinate the activities of all the other departments in this area, they prepare background material in order to brief the minister involved. International relations, however, consume only 5 per cent of the time and thus have far less priority than federal-provincial or interprovincial relations. In the other departments, it is the same – *ad hoc*, specific-purpose, project-by-project. No matter how important trans-border and international relations are becoming to the provinces, at least of provincial government, that of Saskatchewan

Dr McLaren is Associate Professor of Administration at the University of Regina, Saskatchewan. He has studied the management techniques of the government of Saskatchewan. The views expressed here are those of Professor McLaren.

van, has not yet adopted a unified approach or perspective on the area.

This absence of a general perspective is reflected in the type of planning undertaken within the individual departments. Long-term planning is non-existent. One year in advance is the longest period for any department, the Trade Development Branch of the Department of Industry and Commerce, the Marketing and Economics Branch of the Department of Agriculture, and the Tourism Development Branch of the Department of Tourism and Renewable Resources. Unlike other units, these three branches do not react to outside stimuli so much as they create their own initiatives in marketing. The Department of Finance, in preparing the Government's annual budget, could also be said to plan for a year ahead; however, the budgeted estimate for the matching-grants program, a fund to match the money raised for international development projects by Saskatchewan volunteer agencies, is always based on the total raised in the preceding year, not the amount expected to be raised in the budget year. For the other departments, reacting to outside stimuli is the rule not the exception. In the Department of Agriculture, trade (marketing) is planned for the year ahead, but aid projects are strictly a reaction to crises; the Department of Health supplies information to other governments when the latter request it; the Department of Continuing Education helps build schools in developing countries – when requested. The other departments likewise react rather than act, and are further examples of these types. One justification that might be offered for this approach is that Saskatchewan's international affairs tend to be mainly economic (i.e. buying and selling), not cultural, and therefore must react to situations rather than be governed by some general perspective and plan.

No patterns

At the same time, however, the "ad hoc" nature of the planning means that there are no patterns governing who is consulted or informed. Each department has one person in charge of whatever planning is done, and this person may be assisted by one or two others in actually preparing the work. The ministers of the departments are informed of what the department is planning, but the Intergovernmental Affairs Unit of the Executive Council may or may not be informed in turn, so there is little opportunity for regular co-ordination. The main result of all of this is difficult to estimate. There are occasional situations where co-ordination at the ministerial level would prevent duplication and thus promote more efficient use of

resources, but these situations occur only infrequently. In promoting trade, there is some conflict with the federal Departments of External Affairs and Industry, Trade and Commerce, and some within Saskatchewan between Agriculture, Industry and Commerce, and a Crown corporation – Saskatchewan Trading Corporation –, but nothing that cannot be resolved through discussion. In summary, as of 1978, the government of Saskatchewan does not see international affairs as of such importance that it is necessary to plan in a comprehensive manner for the interactions that will be forced upon it by others. As situations and problems arise, the government defines its level of response.

This approach to planning is reflected in the organizing for international affairs within departments. Most departments do not have a specific international affairs section. Usually, one official in each department has the responsibility for international matters, but, since this official is unlikely to spend more than 5 per cent of his time on these questions, his *raison d'être* in the department is primarily domestic. International activities are usually projects, but even these do not include a formal, horizontal mechanism for co-operating with others, or with other departments, as "project-matrix management" might suggest. The only exceptions are the three branches whose marketing activities require full-year planning, and the Protocol Office. Even here, however, though they are organized on a permanent basis that will allow them to handle international matters, they are not organized on an international basis. For example, the Marketing and Economics Branch of the Department of Agriculture is organized by commodity areas (livestock, poultry and eggs, and special crops); each of these has some international activity but most of its work is of domestic.

Staffing

The third managerial process to be discussed deals with staffing. The public servants chosen to handle the department's international activities are rarely appointed because they have worked abroad or because they have studied international affairs at university. A few have some international experience, but it is usually not the reason they believe they were given their present positions. The dominant attitude in staffing is that the provincial government requires functional specialists, such as macro-economists or agricultural marketers, rather than people with an international background. International affairs is seen as a semi-diplomatic activity involving tact and commu-

nication—qualities, it is believed, that can only be developed, not taught. When public servants are given leave for further education, it is not to increase their international knowledge but to develop a functional specialty. In short, without a general Saskatchewan perspective on the international area, there is apparently no impetus for the public service to use the staffing process to increase the government's ability and capacity to cope with international pressures.

The last management process to be examined is that of evaluating activities. The project nature of most international activity means that there is no regular evaluation except for the annual review by the government's Budget Bureau, which is also the only outside body that does any evaluating. However, because international activity is usually only a minor part of an official's job, this evaluation is not considered to be of major importance.

Basis of evaluation

Within the provincial departments, evaluation appears to be on the basis of whether or not projects are successful. Criteria against which to evaluate projects do not exist in any formal sense. As long as ministers are not embarrassed, citizens do not complain, one or two new ideas are obtained from the international contract, or data and statistics are generated, it appears that the activity is considered to be a success. Corrective action is not normally possible, and the only people informed of such activities are an official's immediate superiors.

The management perspective has thus revealed that we need to go into greater detail than hitherto with respect to the international activities of provincial governments. The functional perspective, listing such activities as education, welfare, energy, imputes a possible equality and a significance to each function that may or may not square with reality. All functions are not of equal importance, either within a particular provincial government or between provincial governments. Since there is always a variety of ways that a government can organize itself to perform the functions it chooses, it is necessary to examine the actual organization and its manage-

ment processes before reliable conclusions can be drawn.

It must be remembered that this article has dealt strictly with Saskatchewan government departments and not with the province's Crown corporations. The production and distribution activities of the latter can be expected to be managed differently especially when the international activity is much greater than 5 per cent of its operations. For example, the newly-formed Potash Corporation of Saskatchewan has planned its activities on the basis of both short- and long-range forecasts of world supply and demand, has organized itself for its international activity through locating its main sales office in Atlanta and the majority of its warehouses throughout the United States, has hired staff familiar with international marketing, and has its operations evaluated externally by its annual profits earned round the world. The "profit environment" of Crown corporations is quite distinct from the environment of government departments, whose international activities were the subject of this essay.

The "*ad hoc*cracy" of the Saskatchewan government approach leads to the conclusion that it is one thing to say that the Canadian provinces are involved in international affairs but quite another to say that this is a significant matter to the individual province. In the particular example of the government of Saskatchewan international activities can be said to cost approximately \$2 million a year. This would appear to be a sizeable amount of money whose expenditure should be carefully planned and regulated. However, it is only one-sixth of 1 per cent of the government annual budget, and over five-eighths of it a lump-sum payment to the matching grants program. This means that only one-sixteenth of 1 per cent of the government Saskatchewan's annual budget supports the international activity of its public servants. Just how high a profile the international affairs of Saskatchewan should have is, of course, a matter for debate. At the moment the Saskatchewan government has chosen to leave international affairs largely to the federal Department of External Affairs. This is probably the decision of most other Canadian provincial governments as well.

Plumptre's three decades

by Arthur Blanchette

Wynne Plumptre's *Three Decades of Decision: Canada and the World Monetary System, 1944-75* is a jewel of a book. Written in a crisp, attractive style, it studies a group of complex subjects such as foreign exchange, the balance of payments and related international financial problems with clarity, even elegance.

In his introduction, Plumptre raises the question "whether it is really possible to produce, on a subject that is often considered to be recondite and obscure, a book that will be useful". He has more than succeeded. His book can be commended to expert and layman alike, both of whom will derive pleasure and profit from its pages. Considering the problems facing the Canadian dollar today, the work is most timely.)

Three Decades of Decision concentrates on two main subjects, each of which is closely intertwined with the other. The first is a history of the evolution of the Canadian dollar since the 1930's, with good clear explanations of its upward and downward movements over the decades. The titles of his chapters about the dollar marshal its vicissitudes in an order both coherent and easy to remember: "The Search for a Defensible Dollar, 1945-1949"; "A Floating Dollar, Buoyant Years: 1950-1956"; "A Floating Dollar, Cross Purposes: 1957-1962"; "A Fixed Rate Revisited, 1962-1970, including the New Float of 1970". This side of the book also provides an excellent account of the international economic climate in which the Canadian dollar evolved, in particular Canada's financial relations with Britain and the United States. As a result, his volume encapsulates much of Canada's international economic policy since the Second World War.

Mr. Blanchette is Ambassador and Permanent Observer of Canada to the Organization of American States. The views expressed here are those of Mr. Blanchette.

His treatment of the United States is extremely knowledgeable. He served in Washington for many years and knew his way around its financial corridors. His analyses of United States policies often benefit from this insider's point of view. While he does not take a pro-American line as such in his treatment of Canadian relations with the United States, his views on Canada's early postwar relations with the United States, which did much to set the pattern of the future, can hardly be called revisionist. In his own words:

It is true, and it was true at the time, that the new international institutions, largely fashioned in Washington, were designed to serve the international interests of the United States. The charge that they could in many respects be considered as the creatures of American "capitalist imperialism" can in a sense be accepted. It does not follow, however, that their establishment and operation were contrary to Canadian interests as perceived at the time or subsequently by Canadian Governments or Canadians generally. The kind of postwar world the Americans, in collaboration with the British, were attempting to build was one that was in large measure well adapted to Canadian requirements, and as a result of Canadian efforts the adaptation was improved.

In this connection it is interesting to note that he agrees in part (p. 84) with the views of Professors Granatstein and Cuff on the pattern of "exemptionalism" formalized during the Second World War, though he does not accept the substance of their interpretation.

The second subject on which he concentrates is the International Monetary Fund and other international financial or economic institutions such as the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development — their origins and evolution, the conditions out of which they emerged and that they were designed to correct, the many financial problems they

have been called upon to deal with, including the IMF's struggle with the current breakdown of the Par-Value System. He also describes Canada's role in helping to bring the IMF into being and its ensuing relation with the Fund, where we had for a while the reputation of being something of a maverick in the foreign-exchange sector. He tells this part of his story engagingly and with many personal recollections, having been involved in Canadian relations with the IMF for many years.

Three Decades of Decision comes equipped with a particularly good series of statistical charts, graphs and reference tables, which add much to its value as a research tool.

Wynne Plumptre died last June. He had for some time been gathering material for three further volumes on Canada's postwar international economic policy. It

was his hope to be able to present a comprehensive analysis of this fundamental subject. The three volumes were to have dealt with trade, aid and economic relations with the United States, including American investments in Canada. He would also have analysed the origin and evolution of the multilateral trade, tariff and related institutions and arrangements, as well as Canada's role in helping to create them and its subsequent relations with them. Alas – it was not given to him to complete this work, the more's the pity. On the basis of the excellence of *Three Decades of Decision*, Canadian scholarship has suffered a severe loss.

Plumptre, A.F.W. *Three decades of decision: Canada and the World Monetary System, 1944-75*. Toronto, McClelland and Stewart, 1977.

Book Review

Volume 12 of Documents on Canadian External Relations

By Alison Taylor Hardy

Volume 12 of *Documents on Canadian External Relations* was published by the Historical Division of the Department of External Affairs late in 1977. It covers the year 1946, and is the ninth volume to be published in the series. Volume 1 was edited within the department by a number of people. The experience with that volume, however, led to the decision that succeeding volumes should be edited by resident historians from the academic community. Donald M. Page came from the University of Saskatchewan several years ago to work on Volume 12. He has since joined the Department as Deputy Head of the Historical Division. Volume 9,

on the closing days of 1941 and on the period 1942-43, is expected to appear within a year. Volumes 10 and 11, on the events of 1944 and 1945, will be published later.

The editors of Volume 1 had noted in their introduction that source materials for that volume were more "fugitive and fragmentary than will later be the case". Material for the year 1946 was so extensive that it was decided that each subsequent year would probably require a volume to itself. Donald M. Page is now working on Volume 13, covering the year 1947.

The increase of the documentation in the immediate postwar period reflects the rapid growth of the Department of External Affairs. The amount would undoubtedly have been larger if several factors had not influenced developments. One was the establishment of the United Nations organization in New York, a proximity that made the use of the telephone or short visit feasible. Another was the similarity in their thinking of the senior officials, particularly

Miss Hardy recently retired from the Department of External Affairs, which she joined in 1945. During her years in the Department, she served in Rio de Janeiro, New York and Washington, as well as in Ottawa. The views expressed here are those of the author.

ster B. Pearson, Norman Robertson and
ume Wrong, who liked to discuss policy
ally and consequently put less down on
per than they might otherwise have done.
he reopening of posts and the establish-
ent of new ones have added an additional
ervoir of material and a wider exchange
views.

I joined the Department in September
45 and left Ottawa for the Canadian
bassy in Rio de Janeiro in mid-Decem-
e. Nonetheless, distant though I was from
e scene of the main events of 1946 and
dest as my position then was, the reading
Volume 12 has made me feel that I have
an a participant in living history. A 30-
ur period of "confidentiality" having
elaced the original 50-year period, all
se who were in the Department in 1946
a now be participants. Probably this is
y Volume 12 is of more interest to me
on the other eight volumes I have looked
ough, even though earlier letters or
moranda have occasionally caught my
ention.

The editor of the 1946 material states
is introduction, as had previous editors,
at the selection of material has been
rely his own responsibility. Selection is a
ective process, commented the editor of
ume 5. It probably is but, to a simple
eder like myself, the result is quite happy.
e McKenzie King had referred to Canada on
1, 1943, as a world power. It is as a
sig middle power that Canada is shown in
i postwar year – anxious to re-establish
s international commercial and trade
eltions, so important to the Canadian
economy, but uncertain whether it really
ised to take action on issues in inter-
tional forums that really did not concern
any of Canada's actions on those that
were taken multilaterally, particularly
re its resources could help other coun-
es. Canada's ascent to the status of middle
r may have been caused partly by its
icipation, with the great powers, in the
tablishment of a United Nations commis-
on atomic questions.

As in previous volumes, each chapter
Volume 12 opens a new subject, starting
pologically as early in 1946 as neces-
y. As this was a year when there were
arfers of the top officials, the reader may
abit confused. Lester B. Pearson, who
ad been Canadian Ambassador to the
ied States, returned in October to re-
ac Norman Robertson as Under-Secret-
y of State for External Affairs. Robertson
to London as Canadian High Commis-
ion, replacing Vincent Massey, who had
tuned to Canada in May. Also in October,
um Wrong, who had been the Associate
nd-Secretary of State for External Af-

fairs, left for Washington as Canadian
Ambassador. Fortunately, the editor has
included two charts, one on the organization
and personnel at headquarters and the
other on posts and personnel abroad. A
selection of photographs is also included as
part of the historical record.

There was one other major change in
1946. In 1912, three years after the begin-
ning of External Affairs, the Prime Minister
of the day, Sir Robert Borden, assumed the
additional portfolio of External Affairs. It
was only in September 1946 that a separate
head of the Department was ap-
pointed – Louis St Laurent, then Minister of
Justice.

There are several memoranda in Vol-
ume 12 about the pros and cons of ap-
pointing a separate Minister for the
Department. There is much discussion
today of the "right" of the Canadian public
to access to government information. In
1976, Canada acceded to the UN Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. This covenant provides for the right
of everyone "to receive and impart infor-
mation". It also adds that the exercise of
these rights carries with it special duties
and responsibilities. Policy memoranda that
put, in the dictionary definition, "a sum-
mary of the grounds for or against an ac-
tion" – often ending up with advice for or
against the various alternatives – would lose
their value if they had to become instantly
accessible to the general public. Premature
disclosure, before policy can be decided
upon, can be hampering to the most astute
official. The confidential nature of many of
the External Affairs memoranda adds to
their value.

It is probably the policy memoranda in
the various volumes that will have the most
interest for me, enabling me to note the
influences that bear on the proposed alter-
natives or on the final decisions. We are only
one of several countries that publish a series
of foreign policy documents, and it would be
an interesting study to read the 1946 mate-
rial from the British Foreign and Common-
wealth Office or the U.S. State Department.

In May 1969, Prime Minister Trudeau
announced in the House of Commons a
policy of transferring to the Public Archives
from the Cabinet Secretariat and from
departments and agencies of government
records that were more than 30 years old, so
that they could be made available to the
public under the normal rules of access in
force in the Public Archives. Annual trans-
fers were to be made in subsequent years.
The Prime Minister also suggested that, for
records less than 30 years old in the custody
of departments and agencies, controlled
access might be permitted in special cases.

Cabinet and Cabinet committee documents were still to remain confidential for 30 years.

When Volume 1 appeared in 1967, the Honourable Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs at that time, referred in the preface to the "continuing threads" of the foreign policy of a country, representing the ideals as well as the interests of its people. There are many of these threads in Volume 12, indicated by the repetition of some of the chapter headings used in earlier volumes: Conduct of External Relations, Imperial (later Commonwealth) Relations, Relations with the United States (including boundary, territorial and fisheries questions), and Relations with Individual Countries.

When both the United States and Canada extended their fisheries jurisdictions 200 miles from their respective coasts last year, it was understood that negotiations would have to take place regarding certain parts of the maritime boundaries on both the Atlantic and Pacific coasts. Special

negotiators were appointed and work was begun. Good use has been made of the volumes, as well as the files, but the two governments did not feel bound by past developments and wanted a fresh start on the problem, moving from a legal basis to a negotiating one.

Consideration has been given to lessening the period of confidentiality. Perhaps we need a certain distance from the events of 1946 to understand them better. As with the U.S. and Canadian Governments, we recognize that Volume 12 reflects only the history of its time. It is not an immutable basis for future policies but the report of one more step in Canada's development from colony to nation.

Canada. Department of External Affairs
Documents on Canadian external relations. Volume 12, 1946. Edited by
Donald M. Page. Ottawa: 1977.

Letters to the Editor

Human rights . . .

Sir,

I was pleased that your July/August issue was in large part devoted to human rights and that it was an issue in international relations and I would like to take the opportunity to comment on this subject.

Geoffrey Pearson asked what governments could do about the actions of other governments that violate human rights flagrantly and persistently, and offered as one suggestion the greater use of commissions of fact-finding and enquiry.

I would certainly endorse such a suggestion; it is a pity that it was made, however, with no reference to the International Labour Organization. Mr Pearson mentions the 1919 establishment of the ILO in his second paragraph, but it seems to have quickly been relegated to historical interest.

This is unfortunate, given that the ILO is the one working instrument available to states that can, and have, satisfied the dictum that: "Without facts, judgments are rendered suspect".

The report of the Fact-Finding and Conciliation Commission on Freedom of Association in Chile and the report of the commission appointed to examine the observance by Chile of ILO Conventions I and III, both published by the ILO in 1975, not only stand as examples of what Mr Pearson suggests but must be credited with doing a great deal to contribute to the deserved erosion of the perception of the Pinochet regime in many countries and among many governments.

A further illustration relates also to the articles which follow Mr Pearson's. Prior to the opening of the Belgrade review, the Canadian Labour Congress was pleased to be able to let the Secretary of State for External Affairs know that many Western trade union movements felt that their governments must utilize the work of the ILO during the review.

Mr Jamieson assured the Congress that the Canadian delegation was to be provided with copies of the report of the ILO Committee on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, which "contains some important information th

will be relevant to the discussions at Belgrade".

Mr Pearson makes other suggestions, though perhaps he does not offer them as such, and from his list there is one very serious omission.

In this country – and I cannot imagine it to be unique in this respect – there are a great number of groups concerned with various aspects of the human rights issue. Some are single-cause, very short-term phenomena, and others are now important social institutions. If a government is serious about human rights, it could institute a policy of encouraging the work of such groups, which could well benefit from greater receptivity on the part of government, at the very least, and from more positive assistance, without forfeiting their essential internal dynamism.

John Harker,
Director, International Affairs,
Canadian Labour Congress
Ottawa.

A brick

S,

I fear for the success of our negotiations with the United States if Page 14 of the March/April issue is indicative of the state of knowledge of fisheries in External Affairs.

The photograph is of a troller, not a gill-netter (and not a trawler). Gill-netters do not, if ever, fish open waters, while trollers do. And off the Queen Charlottes is open water (include Hecate Strait).

Incidentally, on Page 15, why would the picture show fish being put back into a fish-boat – or do they catch them in buckets in the first place?

Perhaps a week or two for our negotiators on board a fishing vessel on each coast might help, or are these errors atypical?

Walter D. Young
Victoria, B.C.

Editor's note: The errors were editorial rather than diplomatic. Fortunately the negotiations with the United States are diplomatic rather than editorial.

. . . and a bouquet

S,

Congratulations – I have been receiving *International Perspectives* since moving to Düsseldorf from Ottawa in January 1977. It is interesting, useful reading.

As a former editor of the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce magazine *Canada Commerce*, who has watched with dismay as it has become increasingly a mishmash for the politicians (elected and otherwise) in that department, I urge you to resist any efforts to turn your publication into a similar waste of paper.

Do keep up the good work; Lord knows, there is too little of that being done in Ottawa these days. To be fair, I have to admit it is difficult for public servants to take initiatives when the policy-makers seem to have great and increasing difficulty making up their minds. But we can always hope that your efforts will inspire others.

David Magee,
Düsseldorf.

Sir,

I had not intended to reply to Mr Klette's intemperate attack on my article on the CCMS that you published recently. I took comfort in the fact that the analysis that moved the Secretary of the Committee to such a desperate defence must either be correct in all particulars or uncomfortably close to the truth in most. Nor do I intend to respond in depth. Anyone familiar with the Committee will see through the semantic misinterpretations and obfuscatory argumentation Mr Klette chose as the basis of his defence. Furthermore, your intelligent reader will recognize the ploy he uses to defend a difficult position – an unwarranted attack on my integrity and credibility.

I fail to understand this sudden sensitivity on the part of the Secretary. The information on which my conclusions were based was provided by dozens of people in Brussels and national capitals responsible for CCMS affairs. Over the seven years in which I have been involved with the Committee, not one of them has maintained that it could not be improved in some respect or other. Furthermore, many of the Committee's deficiencies have been documented elsewhere and earlier and have not provoked such an unjustified response. (See, for example, the *International Journal*, Spring, 1974). Finally, I consider myself a friend, not an enemy, of the CCMS, and I remain convinced that the constructive criticism of people such as myself does the Committee more of a service than the blind allegiance of persons such as Mr Klette.

Patrick Kyba,
University of Guelph,
Ontario.

Reference Section

Canadian Foreign Relations

I. Recent Books

Bothwell, Robert

Pearson: his life and world. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1978.
223 pp.

Canada. Parliament. Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs

Canada-United States relations. Vol. II: *Canada's trade relations with the United States.* Ottawa, 1978.
158 pp.

Canada at Belgrade: extracts from speeches and interventions by Canada at the Belgrade meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. Ottawa: Department of External Affairs, 1978.
100 pp.

Conseil Economique du Canada.

Pour un commun avenir: une étude des relations entre le Canada et les pays en développement. Ottawa, 1978.
171 pp.

Dorion-Robitaille, Yolande

Captain J.E. Bernier's contribution to Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic. Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1978.
110 pp.

Economic Council of Canada

For a common future: a study of Canada's relations with developing countries. Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1978.
158 pp.

Helleiner, Gerald

Raw material processing in developing countries and reductions in the Canadian tariff. International Paper III. Economic Council of Canada, 1978.
187 pp.

Jacomy-Millette, Anne Marie

Francophonie et commonwealth: mythe et réalité? Laval University, Centre québécois

relations internationales, 1978.
288 pp. (Choix 9)

Lester B. Pearson Conference on the Canada-United States Relationship, 4th, Niagara Institute, 1976.

Canadian cultural nationalism. Janice L. Murray, editor. New York: Published for the Canadian Institute of International Affairs and the Council on Foreign Relations by New York University Press, 1977.
139 pp.

MacLaren, Roy

Canadians on the Nile 1882-1898. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1978.
184 pp.

Mead, Walter J.

Transporting natural gas from the Arctic: the alternative systems. Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1977.
111 pp.

Ritter, Archibald

Conflict and coincidence of Canadian and less developed country interests in international trade in primary commodities. Discussion Paper 109. Economic Council of Canada, 1978.
193 pp.

Symposium on Canada and world food.

Proceedings. Sponsored by the Royal Society of Canada and the Agricultural Institute of Canada. Ottawa: August 22-24, 1978.
Various paging.

II. Recent Articles

Allan, James H.

"The future of peacekeeping for Canada." In *Canadian Defence Quarterly* 8:30-36 Summer 1978.

Baker, Donald N.

"Quebec on French minds." In *Queen's Quarterly* 85: 249-264 Summer 1978.

Collison, Robert

"The unsentimental lovers: our shaky liaison with the U.S. economy." In *Saturday Night* Vol. 93 No. 6 July/August 1978 Pp. 17-23.

Cullen, Dallas

"Towards the development of a Canadian-American scale: a research note." In *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 11: 409-418 June 1978.

Fairley, H. Scott

"Fisheries jurisdiction and the Atlantic salmon: fact and law from a Canadian point of view." In *Dalhousie Law Journal* 4: 609-646 May 1978.

Furcha, E.J.

"Let them eat bullets." In *United Church Observer* June 1978. Pp. 20-23.

Ghent, Jocelyn Maynard

"Science, technology, and Trudeau's foreign policy." In *Behind the Headlines* Vol. 36 No. 5 1978. 16pp.

Globerman, S.

"Canadian science policy and technological sovereignty." In *Canadian Public Policy* 4: 34-35 Winter 1978.

Holmes, John W.

"The CIIA and Canadian foreign policy: hits and myths." Address to the CIIA at its Fiftieth Jubilee Banquet, Toronto, June 10, 1978.
15 pp.

Ichikawa, Akira

"Canadian-U.S. news flow: the continuing asymmetry." In *Canadian Journal of Communications* Vol. 5 No. 1 Summer 1978.
Pp. 8-18.

Johannson, P.R.

"British Columbia's relations with the United States." In *Canadian Public Administration* 21: 212-233 Summer 1978.

Kates, M. Josef

"Toward international technological interdependence." Science Council of Canada, 1978.
np.

Lentner, Howard

"Canadian separatism and its implications for the United States." In *Orbis* 22: 375-393 Summer 1978.

Meyer, Herbert E.

"Business wins one in Canada." In *Fortune* Vol. 97 No. 13 July 3, 1978. Pp. 84-85.

Nuechterlein, Donald E.

"Quebec independence: is it coming?" In *Foreign Service Journal* Vol. 55 No. 7 July 1978. Pp. 9-13.

Roach, E. Hugh

"The commodities question: towards a common fund - rhetoric or reality." In *Behind the Headlines* Vol. 36 No. 6 June 1978. 27 pp.

Swanson, Roger Frank

"The Ford interlude and the U.S.-Canadian relationship." In *American Review of Canadian Studies* 8: 3-17 Spring 1978.

"Trudeau and foreign policy." In *International Journal* Vol. 33 No. 2 Spring 1978.

Contents: "The impact of Prime Minister Trudeau on foreign policy", by H. von Riekhoff; "Foreign policy decision-making in the Trudeau government: promise and performance", by J.J. Kirton; "Defence and foreign policy in the 1970s: the demise of the Trudeau doctrine", by R.B. Byers; "Canada and the functional agencies: the NIEO's challenge, Trudeau's response", by James P. Sewell; "Provincial international activities", by P.R. Johannson; "Foreign policy for Canadians and the Third Option paper: assessments", by Donald C. Story, Gerald Wright, G.K. Helleiner, Garth Stevenson; "Four views from abroad", by William Diebold, Jr., Romesh Thapar, Takayuki Okuma, Robert Held.

"Vermont and Quebec: two centuries of history."

In *Vermont History* 44: 65-128 Spring 1976.

Wagner, J. Richard, and Daniel J. O'Neil

"The Gouzenko affair and the civility syndrome." In *American Review of Canadian Studies* 8: 31-42 Spring 1978.

Walker, John R.
"Policy by purchase." In *Report on Confederation* Vol. 1 No. 8 July/August 1978. Pp. 19-21.

Warren, J.H.
"Canada's role in the GATT negotiations." In *Canadian Business Review* Vol. 5 No. 2 Spring 1978. Pp. 36-41.

Williams, Sharon A.
"The Polish art treasures in Canada, 1940-60." In *Canadian Yearbook of International Law* Vol. 15 1977. Pp. 146-172.

Wright, Gerald
"NATO in the New International Order." In *Behind the Headlines* Vol. 36 No. 4 April 1978. 27 pp.

Publications of the Department of External Affairs

The following lists consist of the most recent publications of the Departmental Press Office and the Information Services Division dealing with international affairs and Canadian foreign policy.

Press Releases, issued by the Departmental Press Office:

No. 63 (July 5, 1978) Intergovernmental meeting of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development on vocational education and training.

No. 64 (July 7, 1978) Canada-U.S. negotiations on maritime boundaries.

No. 65 (July 7, 1978) Diplomatic relations between Canada and the Solomon Islands.

No. 66 (July 7, 1978) Canadian diplomat declared *persona non grata* in Baghdad.

No. 67 (July 7, 1978) Trials of Soviet dissidents.

No. 68 (July 13, 1978) Headquarters Office of Adviser on Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs created.

No. 69 (July 19, 1978) Claims against German Democratic Republic.

No. 70 (July 28, 1978) Canada concludes fisheries talks with European Economic Community.

No. 71 (August 3, 1978) Diplomatic appointments: Berghusch as High Commissioner in Tanzania and concurrently to Seychelles and Mauritius; Black as Deputy Under-Secretary for Security and Intelligence Affairs in Ottawa; Buick as Ambassador to Chile; Burney as Ambassador to Republic of Korea; Chrétien as Ambassador to Zaire; Duguay as Ambassador to Cameroon; Francis as High Commissioner to Malaysia; Shannon as Minister responsible for Economic Affairs, Canadian Embassy, Washington; Sharpe as Consul General in Seattle; Smith as Co-ordinator for Development Policy in Ottawa.

No. 72 (August 18, 1978) Canadian delegation resumed seventh session of Third UN Law of the Sea Conference, New York.

No. 73 (August 21, 1978) Canada-Japan nuclear protocol signed.

No. 74 (August 31, 1978) Canadian appointed to OECD post.

No. 75 (September 11, 1978) Headquarters appointments: Couvrette as Chief of Protocol; Doyle as Deputy Chief of Protocol.

No. 76 (September 13, 1978) Appointment of Mauri Cutler as Press Spokesman and Director Press Office, Ottawa.

No. 77 (September 15, 1978) Human rights situation in Democratic Kampuchea.

No. 78 (September 22, 1978) Secretary of State for External Affairs to address thirty-third session of UN General Assembly.

No. 79 (September 25, 1978) Diplomatic appointments: Small as Ambassador to Pakistan; T as Head of Mission of Canada to the European Communities, Brussels; Hart as Co-ordinator for Issues related to Privacy Legislation and Regulations governing Conflict of Interest, Ottawa.

No. 80 (September 25, 1978) Participation of SSEA in thirty-third regular session of UN General Assembly.

No. 81 (September 28, 1978) Portuguese law concerning indemnification for nationalized property.

No. 82 (September 29, 1978) Canadian Government end program for the return to eligible former owners of property vested in the Custodian during Second World War.

No. 83 (September 29, 1978) Canada accepts proposal for technical co-operation with People's Republic of China.

No. 84 (September 29, 1978) Canada holds talks in Ottawa with European Community.

Statements and Speeches, published by the Information Services Division:

No. 78/8 Canada in the News. A speech to the Académie diplomatique internationale in Paris, May 23, 1978, by the Canadian Ambassador to France, His Excellency Gérard Pelletier.

No. 78/9 Canada and the Commonwealth. An address that appeared in the *Edmonton Journal* on August 3, 1978, under the signature of the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Don Jamieson.

No. 78/10 Canada-U.S. Fisheries Relations. A statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Don Jamieson, in the House of Commons, Ottawa, on July 27, 1978.

No. 78/11 The OECD Considers a Concerted anti-inflation Program. A statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Don Jamieson, at the Council of Ministers meeting in Paris, June 14, 1978.

Treaty Information

Bilateral

El Salvador

Development Loan Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Republic of El Salvador
San Salvador, February 15, 1978
In force February 15, 1978

Finland

Treaty between Canada and Finland concerning Extradition
Helsinki, June 21, 1978

German Federal Republic

Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany on Film Relations
Ottawa, May 30, 1978
In force August 16, 1978

Japan

Protocol amending the Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of Japan for Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, signed at Ottawa, July 2, 1959
Tokyo, August 22, 1978

Korea

Convention between Canada and the Republic of Korea for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income
Seoul, February 10, 1978

Malawi

Exchange of Notes constituting an Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Republic of Malawi relating to Canadian Investments in Malawi insured by the Government of Canada through its Agent, the Export Development Corporation
Blantyre, September 15, 1978
In force September 15, 1978

Romania

Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Socialist Republic of Romania for Co-operation in the Development and Application of Atomic Energy for Peaceful Purposes
Ottawa, October 24, 1977
Instruments of Ratification exchanged June 14, 1978
In force June 14, 1978

United Kingdom

Convention between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital Gains
London, September 8, 1978

Agreement between Canada and the United Kingdom for the avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Duties on the Estates of Deceased Persons

London, June 5, 1946

In Force November 6, 1946

Terminated September 30, 1978

United States of America

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America amending the Agreement on Principles applicable to the Northern Natural Gas Pipeline signed September 20, 1977
Washington, June 6, 1978
In force June 6, 1978

Treaty between Canada and the United States of America on the Execution of Penal Sentences
Washington, March 2, 1977
Instruments of Ratification exchanged July 19, 1978
In force July 19, 1978

Western Samoa


Exchange of Notes constituting an Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Independent State of Western Samoa relating to Canadian Investments in Western Samoa insured by the Government of Canada through its Agent, the Export Development Corporation
New York, September 29, 1978
In force September 29, 1978

Multilateral

Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness
Done at New York, August 30, 1961
Entered into force December 13, 1975
Canada's Instrument of Accession deposited July 17, 1978
Enters into force for Canada October 15, 1978

Convention Providing a Uniform Law on the Form of an International Will
Done at Washington, October 26, 1973
Canada's Instrument of Accession deposited January 24, 1977
Entered into force February 9, 1978

(In accordance with provisions of Article XIV, this Convention was extended to the Provinces of Manitoba and Newfoundland on Canada's accession, January 24, 1977, to the Province of Ontario on March 15, 1978, to be effective September 15, 1978, and to the Province of Alberta on June 1, 1978, to be effective December 1, 1978.)



If undelivered,
return cover only to:
DSS Printing Operations
Ottawa, K1A 0S7, Canada

En cas de non-livraison,
retourner cette couverture seulement au:
Ministère des Approvisionnements
et Services-Imprimerie
Ottawa, K1A 0S7, Canada



External Affairs
Canada

Affaires extérieures
Canada

ISSN 0381-4874

November/December 1978

CAI
EA
-156

International Perspectives

A journal of opinion on world affairs

NATO, nuclears and Canada's interests

Aspects of the disarmament session

The state of Canada-U.S. relations

U.S. foreign policy at mid-term

What are human rights?

Report on the Bonn summit meeting

International Perspectives

Contents

November/December 1978

Things military

NATO, nuclears and Canada's interests/ <i>George Ignatieff</i>	3
Saying farewell to arms/ <i>Marcel Merle</i>	10
Development, security and UN special session/ <i>King Gordon</i>	14

The United States and Canada

North American <i>détente</i> at mid-term/ <i>Stephen Handelman</i>	19
IJC and the Garrison Diversion/ <i>Kim Richard Nossal</i>	22
U.S. foreign policy at mid-term/ <i>Howard H. Lentner</i>	26

What are human rights?/ <i>M. D. Copithorne</i>	30
---	----

Report on the Bonn summit/ <i>Richard Gwyn</i>	33
--	----

Haiti from one Duvalier to another/ <i>Renaud Bernardin</i>	37
---	----

Reference section	41
-------------------	----

International Perspectives is issued bimonthly in English and French by the Department of External Affairs, Ottawa. Any material in this publication may be reproduced. Mention of *International Perspectives* as the source would be appreciated.

Published by authority of the
Secretary of State for External Affairs.

Authorized as third-class mail,
Post Office Department, Ottawa.

Subscription rates: Canada, \$4.00 a year
single copies \$1.00; other countries
\$5.00 a year, single copies \$1.25.
Remittances, payable to the Receiver
General of Canada, should be sent to:
Printing and Publishing,
Supply & Services Canada,
Ottawa, Ontario, K1A 0S9.

Editors:
Alex I. Inglis
Louis Balthazar

International Perspectives is a journal of opinion on Canada's role in the world and on current international questions. Its purpose is to stimulate discussion and interest in international affairs. It is not intended to reflect Canadian Government policy or perceptions. Indeed, the editors often seek to include material that expresses different or contrary views. The Department of External Affairs accepts no responsibility for the views expressed except where it is clearly stated that an article by a departmental officer is a statement of Government policy. All other articles contain a specific disclaimer of departmental responsibility for their contents.

Letters of comment on issues discussed in *International Perspectives* are welcome and will be considered for publication. Please address your correspondence to: International Perspectives, Department of External Affairs, L. B. Pearson Bldg., 125 Sussex Drive, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, K1A 0G1.

NATO, nuclear weapons and Canada's interests

by George Ignatieff

While reading Escott Reid's excellent book on the making of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, I began to wonder whether the original emphasis placed by Canada on political and economic co-operation within the alliance had not been sacrificed to the counsels of the industrial-military complex. Had NATO become primarily a military machine?

This speculation is supported when one considers the contrast between the pious declarations of the United Nations General Session on Disarmament and the concurrent decision of the North Atlantic Council to authorize another substantial build-up of NATO military strength. Admittedly, the Soviets share the same belief in running ever faster to remain in the same place. Consequently, NATO and the Warsaw Pact act as complementary agents, inflating each other's military budgets and stockpiling incredible destructive capacities.

As the former Canadian Permanent Representative at NATO, the United Nations and the Geneva Disarmament Conference, I had direct experience of this see-saw escalation of military strength, with which no arms-control talks ever seem to be able to keep up. The unfortunate consequence is that the costs of defence increase more than the degree of security. The arms-manufacturers are the only winners.

NATO will remain a necessity so long as Soviet power is deployed in Central Europe. The military resources of Western Europe alone are not enough; they require the all-important transatlantic guarantee. Canada definitely has a role to play; it should be expected to make a fair contribution to the insurance against aggression provided by the United States.

Moreover, as I know from personal experience, Canadians have every reason to feel confidence in the Canadian military forces serving at home and abroad. This article is concerned with the process of planning the Canadian contribution to NATO, and in NATO planning itself. The question in my mind is the extent to

which military planning can or should be divorced from considerations of political, economic and psychological factors that influence foreign policy.

Not limited

The Canadian participants in the making of the North Atlantic Treaty realized that the strategic thinking in the alliance should not be restricted to a purely military point of view. At the signing of the treaty on April 4, 1949, Lester B. Pearson, one of its architects, said: "This treaty, though born of fear and frustration, must, however, lead to positive social, economic and political achievements if it is to live — achievements which will extend beyond the time of the emergency which gave it birth or the geographical area which it now includes."

As Reid recalls in his book, the main opposition to this point of view came from the British, who feared that any new transatlantic machinery might duplicate arrangements already in existence in Europe, like the Organization for European Economic Co-operation. There were those, like Gladwyn Jebb, who were already drawing attention to a possible inconsistency between the conception of an Atlantic Community in which the United States would inevitably be the predominant partner and the idea of a European Community in which it was hoped that Britain and France might once again assume their prewar role as leaders of a Western coalition.

Thus, on September 2, 1948, at a meeting in Washington, D.C., Jebb quoted

British feared duplication of European arrangements

Mr Ignatieff is Provost of Trinity College, University of Toronto. He served in the Department of External Affairs from 1940 until his retirement in 1972. At various stages of his career he represented Canada at the United Nations, at NATO, at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva and on the Security Council. The views expressed in this article are those of Mr Ignatieff.

Acheson
recognized
insufficiency
of military
approach
to strategy

Ernest Bevin, then British Foreign Secretary, as follows: "The emphasis being placed in these talks on the establishment of machinery for the solution of common economic and cultural problems . . . might inject considerable confusion in the international picture and slow the progress of the European nations toward union which they all believe is so essential." The Americans, on the other hand, supported the notion embodied in Article 2 of the Treaty that NATO should be a political and not simply a military mechanism. Even Dean Acheson, who created difficulties for us over Article 2 because of his apprehension about the effect on the passage of the North Atlantic Treaty through the Senate, recognized that a military approach to strategic planning was insufficient.

In his *Power and Diplomacy*, written in November 1957, Acheson left no doubt where he stood on this point:

To know less or be less prepared than our opponents could bring disaster. But this does not answer the question of where our interest lies, nor can this be decided from what is sometimes called a "purely military point of view". This phrase is not synonymous with the best military opinion. It usually means a point of view which assumes the willingness and ability of a population to fight, and be prepared to fight, without concern for any consequences except those which it is hoped to inflict upon the enemy. It describes a method of attempting to exclude political and psychological factors from a calculation. In choice of strategy and weapons, no method is more erroneous or disastrous, since the excluded factors have a profound effect upon the political cohesion of a coalition.

If this line of reasoning had been followed by Acheson's successors, the alliance of which the U.S. had been the leader from the outset would not have been subjected to such severe strains and such increasing militarization of its policies. Instead, leadership passed to the Dulles brothers, who ran the State Department and the CIA under Eisenhower. The fracturing of the Communist monolithic structure had already begun with Tito's break from Moscow, but it was not until the Seventies, after its costly defeat in Vietnam, that the U.S. learnt that it could not, as Leonard Mosley puts it, "singlehandedly roll back the Soviet armies in Eastern Europe, restore Chiang Kai-shek to mainland China or keep Ho Chi Minh out of South Vietnam".

Unilateralism, based upon divergent interpretations of the strategy of our ad-

versaries, naturally put increasing strain on the political cohesion of the alliance. Pearson writes in his memoirs: "The difficulty of co-ordinating policy through NATO in defence matters, when decision-making power rested in the hands of one member, was most clearly shown in nuclear matters." In a talk with John Foster Dulles in Paris in December 1955, Pearson urged two things: "First, by continuous consultation keep our policies in alignment, especially if the political situation should deteriorate and, secondly, agree, if possible, on 'alert' procedures so that the military would know what had to be done in an emergency."

Pearson perception

It is interesting that Pearson had already perceived the vital change wrought in Canadian security problems by the advent of nuclear weapons and the increasing efficient methods of delivery by rocket missiles, submarines and bombers. He writes in his memoirs:

As I saw it, with the threat of nuclear bombs (and later missiles), defence of the North American Arctic became much a part of the Alliance's responsibility as the defence of Europe. The Treaty was, after all, more than European and I believed that the North American sector should be considered an integral part of the North Atlantic defence structure. Any continental command should be an alliance responsibility. It seemed to me, for example, that Norwegian contingents should operate in our Arctic just as Canadian forces occasionally took part in exercises in Norway. Canada's contribution to Arctic defence, therefore, should be accepted on the same basis as her contribution to overseas defence.

This was not to be. Instead, as John Gellner put it in a *Globe and Mail* article last June:

At the end of the fifties . . . Canada accepted the strike role for the air component of its NATO forces in central Europe. 'Strike' in NATO parlance means attack with nuclear weapons. The idea then propounded at SACEUR headquarters was that a limited war on the continent could be fought with both conventional and tactical nuclear weapons and, even more preposterous, that the latter could be carried by strategic aircraft parked unprotected in time of peace on huge airfields the location of which were well known to the potential enemy. Fortunately, this mission was abandoned in 1972, but not before a considerable amount of time and effort

fort and at least \$2 billion were wasted in preparing for it. Yet, independent analysis in 1959 would have shown — as it did to some unofficial analysts who were not listened to — that this mission made as little sense then as it did 13 years later.

Attention remained focused exclusively on Canada's role in the defence of Central Europe, with somewhat indecisive experiments at shifting our attention northwards to support the defence of the NATO northern flank in Norway. Meanwhile, in the Arctic, a variety of defence tasks still awaits our attention. John Bellner points out the need for "Arctic surveillance . . . [and] the asserting of sovereignty in territorial waters and of control over the economic zone that extends 200 miles out to sea". Nonetheless, our NATO role remains focused on the central front in Europe and on keeping open the transatlantic lanes along which troop reinforcements and supplies from Canada would supposedly be transported.

Pearson was the first NATO foreign minister to visit the Soviet Union after the death of Stalin. In his discussions with Khrushchov, at which I was present, his perception of the consequences of nuclear weapons for Canada's security was confirmed. Khrushchov agreed with Pearson that "no one wanted war in the nuclear age" but stressed that, in the event of world war, "the results would be infinitely worse than the last" and that this time Canada would not be geographically secure".

If these words are to be taken seriously, as I believe they should be, then NATO should stop developing nuclear-weapon systems mainly on the basis of purely military considerations in disregard of the intolerably high risks of nuclear escalation. Considering the profound consequences of lowering the threshold between nuclear and conventional weapons, it is to be hoped that Prime Minister Trudeau's opposition to the neutron bomb will prevail against the military strategists, who are reported as favouring this "valuable addition to the Western European arsenal". He stated that nuclear weapons should be retained as a deterrent — for strategic purposes only.

Suez

From a political standpoint, the disastrous effects of unilateral action by the NATO allies on the cohesion of the alliance was exposed by the Suez crisis. Pearson writes: "By 1956, in fact, I was losing hope that NATO would evolve beyond an alliance for defence; and even there I was begin-

ning to have doubts about its future." These doubts were triggered by the disarray among the principal allies after each took different positions on Nasser's decision to nationalize the Canal. Before the British and the French decided to join Israel in military action against Egypt, Pearson had tried to impress upon the British the desirability of having the whole Suez question considered in the NATO Council. After all, the strategic importance of Suez to NATO's southern flank had always been self-evident. Nasser, moreover, had appealed openly to the Soviet Union for help for the Aswan project after being turned down by the Western allies.

According to Pearson, London refused on the grounds that India had a key role in the dispute and was known to oppose military pacts. Canada was not privy to Anglo-French military plans and the ultimate employment of force without consultation strained the alliance; the United States publicly dissociated itself from Britain and France at the United Nations. The allies were only extricated from their embarrassment by Pearson's diplomatic skill. His initiative to establish a United Nations peacekeeping force permitted the peaceful withdrawal of the Anglo-French forces.

The United States Government had, in the meantime, begun "to think of Egypt as a threat to the Dulles policy of containment of Soviet Russia, rather than as a people struggling to be free of British imperialism", while Nasser was irritated by Dulles's "passion for surrounding the Communist bloc with a ring of mini-NATOs". Matters came to a head over the Aswan High Dam, the core of Nasser's great design for accelerating the economic development of his country. The withdrawal of British and American support for the project displayed a remarkable short-sightedness in evaluating the relative powers of rampant nationalism and dormant Communism in the Middle East.

The strains on NATO imposed by the Suez crisis led, in March 1956, to an appeal to Pearson to join a Committee of Three, composed of himself, Lange of Norway and Martino of Italy. The Committee's terms of reference were to "advise the Council on the ways and means to improve and extend NATO co-operation into non-military fields and to develop greater unity within the Atlantic Community." The committee was dubbed "the Three Wise Men". Since I was a member of his staff, Pearson referred to me as "the little wise guy".

The committee drafted a question-

*Withdrawal
of support
from Aswan
High Dam
shortsighted*

naire and invited member governments and their representatives to discuss their replies individually. Representative questions were: "What do we really mean by 'political consultation'? What is [sic] the extent and purpose; should it be carried on through the permanent members of the Council or through Ministers? Is it merely an exchange of information, or to co-ordinate foreign policies and seek agreement on a common policy? Should consultation extend to problems outside the NATO area? How can European integration be brought about so that it will strengthen rather than weaken the Atlantic ties?"

Dulles pledged full support and co-operation, naming Senator Walter George, a much-respected octogenarian, as the American contact with the committee. Pearson records, however, that it was easier to ask the questions than to secure convincing answers from the allies, especially Dulles: "He assured me that, in respect of consultation, the United States 'would be willing to go as far as any country *with comparable responsibilities*' . . . even further". The responsibilities of the U.S., the leader of the alliance, were clearly not comparable to those of the lesser NATO partners. This Delphic reply hardly advanced matters.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the committee's original draft report was largely the work of the Canadian delegation, especially of Pearson himself. Still in pursuit of the Holy Grail of Article 2, we were left much to our own devices to draw up the ground-rules for trying to ensure the better cohesion of the coalition through regular consultation on political and economic policy.

In addition to suggesting ground-rules for political consultation, especially in advance of policy commitments affecting other members of the alliance, the Council adopted certain proposals of a procedural character. The Secretary-General of NATO was to become the permanent chairman of the Council and to assume responsibility for the organization of its agenda. Political counsellors of the permanent mission were to meet weekly, before Council meetings, to prepare the ground for consultation.

On the question of economic consultation, we ran into strong opposition from the European members. They were against duplication of existing machinery or any weakening of the conception of the European Community that was now gaining acceptance.

Thus Canada became what Trudeau has referred to as the "bed-mate" of the

United States "elephant", to share for better or for worse the pressures of continentalism. As far as our European partners were concerned, they were officially committed under the Treaty of Rome to the pursuit of unity. We have had to use our military contribution to NATO as a bargaining chip to retain some kind of consultative status in relation to the OEEC.

Historic fact

The growing militarization of NATO is a historic fact. Escott Reid, in an essay in honour of Pearson, cites "Chip" Bohlen, one of the greatest American diplomats of the postwar era, in support of this truth. Bohlen traced NATO's militarization through several developments: the Korean War, the rearmament of Western Germany, the inclusion of Greece, Turkey and Western Germany in the alliance, and the creation of an integrated NATO military structure under an American Supreme Commander. Reid concludes that the result was "the metamorphosis of the North Atlantic Alliance into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. . . . With these developments, the chances of the North Atlantic Alliance providing a starting-point for economic and political unification of the North Atlantic community became remote."

Indeed it did. Unfortunately, NATO also became afflicted with a form of "tunnel vision" in its strategic planning. There was first of all the focus on the rearmament of West Germany and its inclusion in the alliance. Perhaps the association of NATO with the reconciliation between those old enemies, France and Germany, was justified. The rearmament of West Germany, however, also provided the fulcrum by means of which military leverage could be exerted against Soviet power in Europe, using the countervailing military power of the United States.

There was no doubt about the reaction of the Soviet leaders to this historic development. During his Soviet visit in October 1955, Pearson asked Khrushchev to clarify the Soviet attitude to the German problem. "His reply," Pearson writes, "could not have been more categorical: 'so long as the Paris agreements exist and Germany remains in NATO we shall do everything possible to prevent the reunification of Germany.'" My personal recollection of this conversation is that Khrushchev spent more time on NATO and the consequences of its admission of West Germany than on any other question. He insisted that the combination of the industrial-technological power of the United States and the military

Draft report of committee largely the work of Canadian delegation

traditions and prowess of the Germans constituted an unacceptable threat to the security of the Soviet Union.

It was no surprise that, until Chancellor Willy Brandt initiated his Ostpolitik, NATO faced a constant pressure on Berlin in particular and West Germany in general. The Soviet Union proceeded to consolidate its military hold over the buffer area at the expense of the liberty of the peoples of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and East Germany. A stalemate to this reciprocating "push-comes-to-shove" strategy in Europe was recognized in the accords at Helsinki, at least as far as the territorial status quo dividing Europe was concerned. There was, however, no accompanying Soviet recognition of the human rights and liberties of its subject peoples at home or in the Soviet-occupied countries. Soviet leaders claim that the siege mentality cultivated mutually by NATO and the Warsaw Pact justifies their position.

The leading powers of NATO and the Warsaw Pact now represent two overlapping global military powers pursuing conflicting global policies in a dynamic setting of Third World instability. It follows that this overlapping of imperial power cannot be resolved within the limits of a regional military alliance like NATO.

Moreover, now that the Dulles model of a monolithic "world Communist threat" has been shattered by the open breach with China and with most of the Communist parties of Europe, political and economic aspects of alliance strategy can be ignored even less than before. As far as the U.S. is concerned, a new multipolar competition has been added to the old bipolar confrontation across the Iron Curtain in Europe. In the last few years, developments among Third World countries and the stupendous rise in oil prices engineered by the OPEC governments have emphasized the link between economic co-operation and security as never before. The link between the prosperity of the Western world and the stability of the Third World, which Pearson recognized in 1955, is now more evident than ever.

According to a recent article in the *New York Times*:

[United States] exports to developing countries are more important than United States exports to the EEC, Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union and China combined. Over 20% of United States direct investment goes to the Third World; the rate of return is double that of investments in the developed countries. . . . Debt, food, add to them the commodity prices and trade

barriers, not to mention a host of political questions ranging from the law of the sea to Cuban troops in Africa, and it is all too obvious that, in good times and bad, the interests of the Third World and the West are bound with hoops of steel.

Are these "hoops of steel" taken sufficiently into account in planning Canada's position in NATO? Gellner rightly states: "Membership in a defence alliance such as NATO implies co-operation, and this in turn calls for adjustment to a common strategic concept. It does not mean that a member is absolved from doing his own strategic thinking and whenever this is necessary, his own defence planning."

Gone are the day of the Fifties and early Sixties, when General Charles Foulkes, as Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff, relied on "Brad" and "Rad" (General Omar Bradley and Admiral Radford) of the Pentagon to pass on through the "old-boy network" of strict confidentiality suggestions about what Canada should do in its defence planning. In 1955, Pearson and Prime Minister St Laurent requested of the then Minister of National Defence, Ralph Campney, that there should be joint planning with External Affairs in order to work out the implications of the complexities of the nuclear-missile age. These appeals were studiously ignored by General Foulkes on the grounds that it might cut off U.S. intelligence if "egg-heads" from External Affairs were allowed to share confidential advice received from the Pentagon.

No excuse

Now that Canada, in matters of defence relations, ranks below West Germany, Japan, Saudi Arabia and Iran so far as the U.S. is concerned, there is no excuse for any refusal to be weaned away from dependence on the Pentagon. Moreover, we now risk having our decisions influenced unduly by our European allies. For them, the bipolar confrontation remains of primary concern. They do not wish to have the traditional Canadian participation in the "Watch on the Rhine" suffer any weakening that might prejudice the American guarantee of European security.

In the post-Korean period of the re-equipment of the Canadian armed forces, dependence on Pentagon influence caused us to make some costly mistakes. The greatest of these was accepting a strike role for the air component of our NATO forces in Central Europe — albeit without the nuclear ammunition to enable us to do more than go through the motions of practising for such a role. We also purchased

*Bipolar
confrontation
primary concern
of Europeans*

other weapons equally unsuitable for use without the necessary nuclear ammunition, such as the *Honest John* and *Bomarc*, and without the required sanction of the Government on the acquisition of nuclear weapons.

We are now engaged in the most extensive re-equipment process since these mistaken efforts of the Fifties and Sixties. Are we about to repeat this kind of error by failing to clarify the role of our forces first and then deciding precisely what equipment most suits the role? Gellner, who once served in the Department of National Defence and is thus familiar with its kind of planning procedures, expressed his fears as follows:

There is a distinct danger now that Canada should be caught again just as it was almost 20 years ago, only this time an error would be even more expensive. For a change, what is involved is Canada's maritime contribution to NATO. At present, Canada's equipment-procurement policy is predicated on a stated NATO requirement for keeping open in time of war the transatlantic lanes along which troop reinforcements and supplies would supposedly move in huge quantities, just as in World War II.

Preparing for the previous war is one of the characteristics of planning from a purely military standpoint. Convoys of the Second World War type are not probable in the nuclear war of the future. That is why the Americans are building up reserve stocks of other kinds of military hardware in Europe. Why should Canadians not be doing the same thing, rather than opting for expensive anti-submarine naval vessels and aircraft for convoy and anti-submarine warfare missions? As for purchases of tanks, aircraft and other conventional hardware, which have to be updated from time to time, one wonders whether we are making the most of this opportunity to achieve the much needed standardization of equipment in NATO. If Canada were to accept a standard of equipment in which some of its European allies were specializing, such as tanks, why should these allies not reciprocate by accepting Canadian standards for equipment in which Canada specializes, such as STOL (short-takeoff-and-landing) aircraft or hardware best suited to northern climates?

Harriet Critchley's recent article in *International Perspectives* suggests ways in which the Canadian maritime forces' role in Atlantic defence under NATO might be integrated with the relevant commitments under various aspects of Canada's foreign and defence policy. As

a regional maritime power, Canada has special interest in the assertion of domestic jurisdiction and enforcement rights as a coastal state as well as a maritime trading partner and an ocean alliance partner in NATO. All these needs could be related to Canada's responsibilities in its NATO maritime role. Certainly, the U.S., Britain and France have failed to set Canada a good example in putting NATO requirements first.

I recognize that maintaining a balance among these various considerations becomes more rather than less difficult with the growing complexities of the interdependent world society created by the industrial age. Obviously, the proper functioning of this world society requires the kind of strengthened global institution the United Nations was intended to develop. In the absence of such a world order guaranteeing the prevention of war, regional coalitions like NATO are necessary. But even in existing circumstances NATO must be based on a certain minimum of consensus. There must be agreement not only about its military strategy but also about its policy objectives, in order to retain cohesion among its members and to continue to command the support of public opinion that bears an increasing financial burden as well as a military risk.

At the making of NATO, its Canadian founders recognized that Western democracies were vulnerable to more than military power — to economic crises, to political division, to cultural dissent. They tried, therefore, to provide, in Article 19 and through normal diplomacy, a process for consultation including periodic parliamentary conferences and public debate. Again and again, the Western democracies have shown creative flexibility in overcoming their weaknesses at critical moments on the road to their main goal and in maintaining their security without prejudice to their humanist goals.

Communist ideology, on the other hand, has turned out to be a form of idolatry of the national state, expressed through military and political power. Communism as practised in the Soviet Union has also proved incompatible with the creation of a world order demanding a certain concession of national sovereignty in the common interest of survival and prosperity. It has undoubtedly been effective as an engine of national modernization and national power, however, as such has increasingly yielded to the temptation of militarization coupled with imperialism. The arguments now raging among Communists of different persuasions

*Improbability
of convoys
in nuclear war*

sions only serve to point up the paradoxical nature of the Communist balance-sheet.

Western mistakes

The Western powers have already made repeated mistakes in dealing with the changing Communist threat and have paid the penalty — by yielding Eastern Europe to Soviet military occupation at the end of the Second World War, by allowing themselves to become divided in dealing with the explosive developments in the Middle East, and by becoming divided again over how to deal with China and Southeast Asia, especially over the tragic intervention of the U.S. in Vietnam.

With this experience of the dangers of separating the political-economic dimensions of security from the military dimensions, there should no longer be any question that more NATO consultation is needed on such matters as the headlong rush of the arms race. Militarization is no defence against itself. Ultimately, it risks the use of the increasingly destructive mechanisms that are being accumulated and stockpiled ready for a nuclear Armageddon.

It is not reassuring in this connection to read the view of nuclear war of the U.S. Presidential Security Adviser, as recorded by Elizabeth Drew in the *New Yorker*:

I asked Brzezinski then about something I'd read that he had said in an interview. He had said that the proposition that a nuclear war would mean the end of humanity was 'baloney'. He replied: 'It's inaccurate thinking to say that the use of nuclear weapons would be the end of the human race. That's an egocentric thought. Of course it's horrendous to contemplate, but in strictly statistical terms, if the United States used all of its arsenal on the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union used all of its against the United States, it would not be the end of humanity. That's egocentric. There are other people on the earth.'

There are indeed! But it so happens that Canadians, as Khrushchov reminded Pearson, would not escape the effects of nuclear war in our own homeland, because unfortunately we are situated between the nuclear giants. This fact makes rational thought vital to any Canadian military decision. No one else is going to do our thinking for us and we shall have no one

else to thank if we are directly involved in the irrational consequences of purely military thinking.

It is thus essential that the best brains we can assemble systematically review political as well as military trends. This spring, in Toronto, the Canadian Pugwash Group organized such a review under the leadership of Professor John Polanyi. The consensus was that we could avoid war only if we could observe "a deep restraint in reliance on nuclear weaponry of any sort". As nuclear weapons become more intimately woven into military plans and developments in NATO, the chances increase that they will actually be used at a moment of great international crisis.

In a letter to *The Globe and Mail* last March 28, I suggested the need for joint defence and foreign-policy planning. I also proposed that these plans should be reviewed by an Advisory Board on Canadian Defence Policy, which would make an annual report to Parliament. This is not a new idea. I put it forward in an essay entitled "Canadian Aims and Perspectives in the Negotiation of International Agreements on Arms Control and Disarmament" at the time of my retirement from the foreign service. I wrote that piece as I write this article, trying to reconcile my Jekyll-and-Hyde experience of having engaged in military planning at NATO and in peacemaking and peacekeeping at the United Nations.

Quoting Disraeli that "ignorance never settles any question", I pleaded — and still plead — that Canadians should have a right to know more about the rationale of their defence policy, commitments and equipment proposals, since they bear the consequences of serious error or miscalculation. This knowledge is especially important at a time when weapons of mass destruction have become part of the standard weaponry of the alliance to which Canada belongs, as well as part of the armoury of its totalitarian adversary. Efforts by the United States and the Soviet Union to control and preserve their tremendously destructive power by a mixture of diplomacy and arms control are matched by their determination to extend their spheres of influence further and further. I suggest that Canadians, in these circumstances, should have more influence in determining defence policy, matching concerns for security with concerns for survival.

*Canadians
have right
to know more
about rationale
of defence policy*

Can the world bring itself to say farewell to arms?

A footnote to the special session

By Marcel Merle

At the beginning of last July, the curtain fell on the special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Those who had attended had heard some fine speeches, noted some interesting proposals, developed a "consensus" that had immediately been repudiated by certain countries, adopted resolutions that were not binding and, above all, altered the composition and working rules of the agencies responsible for continuing to study the problem of disarmament. Then every representative returned to his arsenal, to his balance of external claims and liabilities, to the safety of his borders or his supplies, as though the scene that had been enacted for some weeks in New York had been only an intermission.

Optimists will no doubt claim that a process has been started. Pessimists will see all the commotion as, at best, merely one of the ways an endangered society tries to exorcise the evil that threatens or, at worst, merely the homage of vice to virtue. Realists will simply observe that the community of nations, assembled in the largest of the international organizations, is not yet ready to say farewell to arms.

But it is not enough to bemoan the blindness of a world embarked on a suicide course. We must know why — above all where arms are concerned — the common interest does not succeed in prevailing over what each nation considers to be its individual interest. If the problem of disarmament seems to be a vicious circle, it is because the human spirit, confronted with the realities of society, finds itself unable,

on the one hand, to discover the means to attain the desired end and, on the other, to distinguish between cause and effect.

Is disarmament necessary? Is it necessary to put an end to the accumulation of weapons and use the money thus saved to improve the lot of humanity?

When the problem is posed in these terms, there is obviously only one answer for any reasonable person. Moreover, the stark figures are more eloquent than any speech on the subject. A report to the Assembly of the Western European Union on June 20, 1978, put it bluntly:

World military expenditure for 1978 is estimated at \$400 billion, the share of the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries making up 70 per cent of this and that of the Third World, including China, 1 per cent. The largest increase in expenditure over the last ten years was in the Third World countries, excluding China; their share of total world expenditure rose from 6 per cent to 14 per cent. On the other hand, according to the estimates, the expenditure of the two military blocs has remained roughly constant in real value, but as a proportion of world expenditure it has decreased from 80 per cent to 70 per cent. In 1976, total world military expenditure was estimated at \$325 billion — the same as world expenditure on health and more than expenditure on education. In absolute value and at constant price world military expenditure has increased by 13 per cent over the last ten years and 77 per cent over the last 20 years.

If we add to this picture the fact that annual expenditure on arms is 14 times as great as expenditure on aid to developing countries and approximately three times as great as the debt contracted by the latter with industrialized countries, one thing becomes clear: the production of means of destruction must be prohibited immediately and the funds released used for humanitarian activities such as the development of the emerging countries, the improvement of health and education.

Community of nations not yet ready to abandon armaments

Professor Merle teaches political science at the Sorbonne and at the Institut d'études politiques de Paris and the Ecole nationale d'administration. He is vice-president of the International Political Science Association and has written widely on international affairs. The views expressed here are those of Professor Merle.

and the reduction of social inequalities. Rare are the delegations with the audacity publicly to reject these aims, the only well-known exception being that of China, whose representative stated coldly that we should not place our hopes for world peace in disarmament.

But, though it is easy to agree on the reasons for disarmament, difficulties arise the moment one looks for ways and means of achieving this aim. To know how is much more important and difficult than to know why. Yet this problem would be relatively easy to solve if somewhere in the world there were an authority with the legal right and the physical ability to disarm — others. Since there is no such authority, disarmament can be brought about only through an agreement based on the free consent of the parties concerned, which means, in effect, that some must be willing voluntarily to renounce the advantages they already have, and the others those they hope to attain. There is a whole series of obstacles to such agreement, in which politics and technology are closely intertwined.

No equal footing

In the first place, the parties are not, at the outset, on an equal footing with respect to strength. As a result, there is no general or uniform solution that can adequately solve the problem of disarmament. If the status quo were maintained (and this would in itself be an improvement over the continuous increase in expenditure and the growing powers of destruction), inequalities considered by many observers to be sources of tension and reasons for conflict would be consolidated. A proportional reduction of forces or funds would have the same drawback, and it would also encounter the problem of the differences in actual situations: arms reduction cannot be achieved in the same way in the nuclear-weapons states and the countries that base their defence on conventional arms alone. Finally, the present balance of forces differs considerably from one region to another, so that the same measure would have opposite results depending on where it was introduced; in Latin America or Africa, the abolition of nuclear arms could have a stabilizing effect, because it would be a means of limiting intervention by the great powers, while the abolition of nuclear arms in Europe would immediately alter the balance in favour of the one of the two camps with an overwhelming superiority in conventional forces.

Since it is impossible to proceed in a general and uniform way, negotiation must

take the more effective but less spectacular route of sectional or regional compromise, at the risk of disappointing the public, which often confuses compromise with surrender of principles and caution with failure to act. Even at this more modest level, difficulties remain. The nuclear powers obviously hope to retain their advantage — which is, however, challenged by others. But, among the nuclear powers, the smaller ones like France and China are opposed to the super-powers on the matter of experimentation with new devices, for they fear that a total test ban would confirm once and for all the superiority now enjoyed by the United States and the Soviet Union.

The commitments these two nations have made to one another with respect to the limitation of certain types of weapon have had the effect of encouraging research on and development of new arms (such as the neutron bomb). Each time one difficulty is solved, another appears.

Assuming that these difficult problems of balance could be solved — in other words, that a rate of limitation or reduction, if not destruction, of arms might be found for each sector or region —, there would still be a number of sensitive problems to work out, notably control and the transfer of funds.

No country will agree to disarm unless it is assured that its rivals will abide by their commitments. Fortunately, technology comes to the rescue of politics in this area. The use of observation satellites makes it possible to circumvent, at least in part, the obstacles connected with the entry of control missions into foreign territory. But the solution is not perfect, since at present these satellites are in the possession and under the control of the two super-powers. Thus it is clear why the President of France proposed the formation of a control-satellite agency. But where, if not in the two great powers, would this agency find the technicians, equipment and capital necessary to create a satellite-control network? The question is all the more important because such an agency, if it ever came to be established, would potentially be an international authority capable of supervising the military activities of individual nations. Here, too, the decisive question of means has been evaded by the proposal of an intermediate end.

*Satellites
circumvent
obstacles of
control missions*

Development funds?

The same is even truer with respect to the allocation to development of the funds freed should military expenditure be reduced. This very generous idea was brought up many times at the United Nations

*Unlikelihood
of diversion
of saving
to development*

special session, and President Giscard d'Estaing even suggested the creation of a special disarmament fund. However, economic experts do not have many illusions on this point. A moment of thought reveals the difficulties inherent in such an undertaking; assuming that military expenditure were, in fact, reduced, why would the funds made available automatically be earmarked for development? Rather, pressure from taxpayers and public opinion in general in each country would lead to the use of the funds thus saved to improve national standards of living — to fight unemployment, increase health and education budgets and so on — unless the desire for more consumer goods meant that they were simply diverted to production and marketing channels. On a national scale, only a government capable of withstanding the temptation to seek voter popularity could succeed, especially in a period of recession, in allocating to the development of other countries funds that might be used to improve the domestic situation. It is even less likely that transfer operations presided over by a new international agency would be successful. Furthermore, a sort of negative tax on the savings achieved through disarmament would tend to discourage any efforts in that direction. Once again, the idea is appealing, but it is still concerned with ends and does not provide the means of altering behaviour.

Thus, the fact that the special session was disappointing should be no cause for surprise. Apart from a few resolutions that cynics might characterize as pious wishes, the implication being that they will have no effect, the only concrete result lies in the creation of a committee on disarmament to replace the Geneva Conference, which will make it possible to satisfy both the Third World countries, hostile to the co-chairmanship of the two super-powers, and France, which will now be able to take its place at the negotiating table once again without losing face.

When basic progress is impossible, people often take refuge in procedural questions, giving a new agency the responsibility for studying the problems they have been unable or unwilling to resolve. But, if this is what happened here, is it not because the international community is still mistaking effects for causes?

Cause and effect

That the accumulation of arms is wasteful and a source of insecurity all honest men are willing to agree. As early as the first peace conference at The Hague in 1899, the delegates stated in the final document that limiting the current burden of military

expenditure in the world was most desirable in the interests of the physical and moral well-being of humanity. Although the size of the problem has changed since the beginning of the century, its nature has not.

But is the struggle for disarmament really significant as long as the roots of the problem are not touched? What would one say about the services of a doctor who fought a dangerous infection merely by treating the symptoms — by temporarily bringing down the fever, for example — without attempting to treat the cause of the illness?

Yet that is the procedure followed by our modern sorcerers' apprentices in the guise of politicians or political experts. Certainly the accumulation of arms is in itself dangerous, since it is a continuous temptation to irresponsible adventurers. But the danger is not in proportion to the quantity of weapons accumulated. Every one knows that there are already enough to destroy, several times over, every human life on the planet. That is the symptom rather than the cause of the basic problem, for there is every likelihood that the arms race will continue and that a more and more dangerous balance will be sought so long as the causes of international disorder have not been eradicated. Minor violence continues to break out in the world every day, using minor weapons but nevertheless with deadly results, wherever there are unsettled conflicts.

The real struggle, then, for disarmament is the fight to eradicate the cause of the arms race and the arms trade. Obviously, the two things are related, but they cannot necessarily be remedied in the same way.

The arms race is born of fear. It is because governments distrust the intentions of their neighbours, and even more those of their rivals, that they attempt to guarantee security through military strength. Stocks of arms would rapidly disappear if confidence could be re-established or (more properly) established between nations. Unfortunately, trust cannot be legislated, and it is utopian to suggest that it can be produced to order. Rather, an attempt should be made to create an atmosphere in which confidence might be reborn. This is a huge and unending task. It involves not only taking stock of existing conflicts but also detecting those that are smouldering beneath the surface; above all, it involves putting an end to such conflicts by destroying their roots. Conflicts arise because of injustice, domination, violation of individual or collective rights, inequality among men or social and na-




onal groups. Taking away men's arms without removing from their heads and their hearts the causes of violence is as lasting in its effects as catching a shadow or writing on water.

There is nothing, of course, to prevent us from envisaging ways of reducing military expenditure that might at least have the symbolic value of goodwill gestures and contribute towards the creation of a climate of trust, without which the whole enterprise is doomed to failure. But, once again, the real danger lies less in the accumulation of arms than in the reasons that lead men to manufacture and then use them.

Arms trade

The arms trade raises yet other problems. It accelerates the arms race on its own; to the extent that it contributes to the spread of weapons, it is an additional unsettling factor. In this respect, it is even more dangerous than the arms race involving the super-powers, since it increases the number of those with access to military force in areas where power is so fragile and unstable that there is no guarantee that arms will not be used. When this problem is raised, the Chinese reply that it is indispensable for the Third World to arm itself in order to be able to combat the supremacy of the great powers; if this is the case, however, it is difficult to understand why those same great powers are the main purveyors of arms.

The arms trade does have its own logic, which is more closely related to profit than to fear. The sale of arms appears in the first place to be a commercial necessity, to write off the cost of the investment made in manufacturing arms for national defence. The buyers thus partially help to finance the arming of the industrialized countries. In the second place, the arms trade has become a valuable source of funds at a time when the *nouveaux riches* prefer to buy tanks or supersonic airplanes rather than jewellery or perfume. Even though it is clear that the arms race is suicidal for the industrialized countries, collusion between petroleum suppliers and arms manufacturers has become a basic element in the security of the former and the trade balance of the latter. In this respect, there is no point in denouncing a clandestine international gun-running conspiracy. Governments themselves openly organize this trade with the complicity of companies in search of profits — and in some cases of trade unions interested in maintaining jobs and wages. Finally, the arms trade is an important source of political influence. It creates in the buyer a



Anyone for Salt?

long-lasting dependence on technology, parts and instructors from the supplying country.

The arms trade thus justifies itself, quite apart from any immediate concern for security. It has become assimilated with other industrial, commercial and monetary activities to the extent that, if it were suddenly stopped, it would have a devastating effect on the economic and social stability of the countries that de-

pend on it. Thus, to work towards disarmament, it is not sufficient to fight for the establishment of a better international order. The conditions on which the present prosperity of certain countries, both capitalist and socialist, is based will have to be called into question. This means a further reduction in the forecasts of the amount of money that might be transferred as a result of savings from disarmament. Countries that found themselves obliged to convert a particularly profitable part of their industrial activities would undoubtedly be little disposed to increase, at the same time, their contribution to development.

There is as much confusion between causes and effects as there is difficulty in finding the means to attain the desired end. The scourge of arms is not a sort of

skin complaint that can be cleared up by a small surgical operation. It is more like a kind of leukemia affecting the whole international system. Only a transfusion could cure the patient. But, in the absence of a donor of new blood, we must rely on men's wisdom alone to secrete the antibodies vital to the survival of the species. They will not be found in the remedies of charlatans, anxious to sell magical recipes, but rather in a concerted effort to make a thorough examination of the organism to diagnose the disease. That is why the French proposal to create a world disarmament research institute should be taken seriously. Even if it had served only to clear the way for such research, the United Nations special session would not have been in vain.

Of things military

Development and security and the UN special session

By King Gordon

It is tempting to say: "Just another pious United Nations declaration." More words on paper — 10,000 of them. But do they spell "Disarmament"? Do they halt the arms race? Do they make nuclear war less likely?

But that is not what the commentators and editors who reported on the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament and the Declaration and Program of Action it adopted were saying. They did not speak of a major breakthrough. How could they, with the SALT II nego-

tiations stalled and a bloc of delegates breaking away from the UN meeting in New York so that they could decide in Washington that the NATO armaments had to be increased? But in general they spoke, as the *Ottawa Citizen* did, of "modest progress" and "an earnest beginning" of efforts to slow down, and eventually end, the arms race.

It is interesting to meditate on why commentators and critics did not write off this special session. My first thought is that when you bring yourself to shut out everything else and look hard at the arms race — now computed at \$400 billion a year — and study the continuing build up of the nuclear arsenal, you catch the tolling of a distant bell. It is no longer enough to rely on the wisdom and *détente* of the two super-powers who bear responsibility for maintaining this uneasily balanced system of deterrence within which all of us are imprisoned as hostages. We begin to feel that, since the fate of all mankind is threatened, the problem of disarmament, the avoidance of nuclear war and the establishment of a basis for security other than the threat of mas-

Mr Gordon is Senior Adviser for University Relations at the International Development Research Centre. For 12 years, he served with the UN Secretariat and was connected with peacekeeping operations in the Middle East and the Congo. He is a past president of the United Nations Association of Canada and a current member of the North American Council of the International Peace Academy. The views expressed in this article are those of Mr Gordon.

ive violence is a problem for us all, for all states, for all peoples. As the preamble to the Declaration states with unusual directness: "The time has therefore come to put an end to this situation".

Of course, there is some pious rhetoric in the Declaration. Deep feelings, deep convictions, are apt to be articulated in rhetorical language, as we are reminded when, after two centuries, we read the Declaration of the Rights of Man or the Declaration of Independence. Today's authors felt as deep a concern about the condition of man, even if their rhetoric did not achieve the same literary excellence as their eighteenth-century predecessors, and the historical situation out of which their Declaration arose holds more portent for the fate of mankind than the evolutionary seismic upheavals out of which two democracies were born.

When one moves from the Declaration to the Program of Action in the special session's final document, one is struck by the down-to-earth appraisal of existing military and security realities and the clearly-delineated steps for controlling the march of events. For example, Paragraph 45 reads:

Priorities in disarmament negotiations shall be: nuclear weapons; other weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons; conventional weapons, including any which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or have indiscriminate effects; and reduction of armed forces.

Five paragraphs later we have a description of a program of measures for nuclear disarmament as a first priority, concerning which negotiations should be initiated without delay:

The achievement of nuclear disarmament will require urgent negotiation of agreements at appropriate stages and with adequate measures of verification satisfactory to the states concerned for:

cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapon systems;

cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, and the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes;

a comprehensive, phased program with agreed time-frames, whenever feasible, for progressive and balanced reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, leading to their ultimate and complete elimination at the earliest possible time.

The Program of Action lists the succession of necessary steps, to some extent in order of priority, though nothing is suggested that might block concurrent action — a comprehensive test-ban treaty, satisfactory conclusion of SALT II "followed promptly by further strategic arms negotiations", strengthened guarantees of the security of non-nuclear states, recognition and extension of nuclear-free zones, strengthened measures to ensure against nuclear proliferation, a brake on scientific research to produce new types and new systems of weapons, strengthened provisions for the disarmament of the seabed and outer space, reduction of conventional armaments, and the limitation and phased reduction of armed forces.

There are other things in the Program of Action that relate it to important happenings in the contemporary world. The Secretary-General is asked to conduct studies on the connection between the arms race — and disarmament — and the economic development of the Third World. Resources saved through cuts in armaments should be made available for Third World development. There is a continuing awareness of "the powerful current of opinion" that led to the holding of the special session and the need for the wide dissemination of information on disarmament and for public education. The United Nations and national governments, as well as international and national non-governmental organizations, are urged to do their part. We have come a long way from the bland assumption that the two great nuclear powers have the exclusive right to pursue their leisurely and balanced approach to disarmament and the limitation and eventual eradication of nuclear weapons.

This same new emphasis carries over into the changes in the machinery for deliberation and negotiation through which the Program of Action will be carried out. Though the changes seem slight, they are important.

To begin with, the United Nations, as representing all states and the interests of all states, is given the central role in the sphere of disarmament. A Disarmament Commission representative of all member states is to be the principal deliberative body, which will report on the implementation of the Program of Action to the General Assembly.

But for purposes of negotiation a smaller body is needed and the existing Committee on Disarmament is retained in slightly-enlarged form; its membership will include the nuclear powers and 32 to 35 non-nuclear states. Three changes are

Resources should be made available to Third World development

made in its procedure: the Committee is brought closer to the UN system by having the Secretary-General name its secretary; the chairmanship will rotate every month among all members and no longer be preempted by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.; and all plenary sessions will be open to the public. One immediate effect of the changes is that France has indicated its intention of resuming its place on the Committee.

So far so good. We have a tidy, logical plan of action, backed by the consensus of the nations of the world. All we need is the political will to implement the plan so that we can move gradually but inevitably towards a disarmed and secure world.

Unfortunately, it is not quite as simple as that. A more careful study of the final document of the special session reveals it as a mirror of the cross-currents of thought and practice in an anxious and divided world, conscious of the threat of nuclear disaster but torn between new perceptions of the implications of an interdependent world community and adherence to traditional ideas of security based on armed force.

For example, in the very first sentence of the introduction to the Declaration we read:

Attainment of the objective of security, which is an inseparable element of peace, has always been one of the most profound aspirations of humanity. States have for a long time sought to maintain their security through the possession of arms. Admittedly their survival has, in certain cases, effectively depended on whether they could count on appropriate means of defence. Yet the accumulation of weapons, particularly nuclear weapons, today constitutes much more a threat than a protection for the future of mankind.

Clausewitz would likely have approved the statement. A century and a half ago he wrote:

... war is not merely a political act but a political instrument.

... war is only a continuation of state policy by other means.

War, therefore, as an instrument of policy must have specific ends, based on certain limitations. But nuclear war knows no such limitations, either in the massive destruction it inflicts on the enemy or invites in inevitable retaliation on the initiator of the first strike. As an extension of state policy aimed at guaranteeing security, war in its ultimate contemporary form has lost its meaning.

The logic of this position has been fudged by developments since the Second

World War. The concurrent build-up of nuclear armaments by the two superpowers spurred on by the strategic prescriptions of the Cold War led to a new doctrine of deterrence, according to which the tacit abandonment of nuclear war as a possible extension of foreign policy depended on the very certainty of massive retaliation on the first user of nuclear weapons. But the validity of the doctrine depended on the preservation of a fragile balance of constantly-shifting estimates of strategic parity or superiority.

Moreover, similar considerations of balance and parity dominated the deployment of armed forces and conventional arms by the opposing military alliances in Eastern Europe. The traditional notion of "security" based on juxtaposed armed might is accepted as a necessary consideration in phased disarmament and reduction of armed forces even after it has been discarded as no longer relevant in the nuclear-arms race. The idea is put forward in the Declaration (Paragraphs 19, 22, 29) as well as later in the Program of Action (Paragraphs 81-83). For example, we read in Paragraph 22:

Together with negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures, negotiations should be carried out on the balanced reduction of armed forces and of conventional armaments, *based on the principle of undiminished security of the parties* with a view to enhancing stability at a lower military level, *taking into account the need of all states to protect their security.* [author's italics]

In this "Catch 22" situation, a military policy-maker is likely to include in his estimates of balance — whether at the strategic or tactical level, whether in the case of nuclear or conventional weapons — the equipment in his own pipeline as well as that presumed to be in his adversary's. And this does not contribute to the international atmosphere of trust and confidence that, it is generally agreed, is necessary for a dynamic policy of disarmament.

Prime Minister Trudeau raised this issue very pointedly in his presentation to the special session:

What particularly concerns me is the technological impulse that continues to lie behind the development of strategic nuclear weapons. It is, after all, in the laboratories that the nuclear-arms race begins.

The new technologies can require a decade or more to take a weapon system from research and development to production and eventual deployment. What this means is that national policies are

preempted for long periods ahead.

And then, perceptively, in a statement that is almost a paraphrase of Clausewitz, he says:

In such a situation, there is a risk that foreign policy can become a servant of defence policy, which is not the natural order of policy-making.

This serious tendency is acknowledged in the final document of the special session on no fewer than three occasions. Under the Program of Action, in Paragraph 77, it is stated:

In order to help prevent a qualitative arms race, and so that scientific and technological achievements may ultimately be used solely for peaceful purposes, effective measures should be taken to avoid the danger and prevent the emergence of new weapons of mass destruction based on new scientific principles and achievements.

I suppose it is natural that the Declaration and Program of Action should contain inconsistencies and apparent contradictions. It is one thing to take an overview of the contemporary situation and say that the acquisition of more and more sophisticated weapons in the arms race buys less and not more security. It is quite another thing, if you are a negotiator, to establish a mutually-acceptable formula for arms reduction in an international situation in which the atmosphere is deteriorating and the prospects for *détente* darkening.

What is needed as a complement to the disarmament program and process is the strengthening of an alternative set of procedures and institutions on which security may rest. Here is another more or less convincing argument that runs through the United Nations document. It shows up in a variety of forms.

As one might expect, the most conventional is the assertion that, as an alternative to the use of arms in the settlement of disputes, all member states reaffirm their commitment to the Charter of the United Nations and "their obligation strictly to observe its principles as well as other relevant and generally accepted principles of international law relating to the maintenance of international peace and security". In at least one case, reference is made to the principles of collective security and collective action that can "effectively deter or suppress any threat or use of arms in violation of the purposes and principles of the United Nations".

In a nuclear age, the military connotation of collective action against an aggressor or would-be aggressor is generally considered as inappropriate and is now

superseded by the advocacy of what Dag Hammarskjöld described as "preventive diplomacy".

This latter emphasis is repeatedly made in the Declaration and Program of Action. Paragraph 34 in the Declaration has one of the most comprehensive statements:

Disarmament, relaxation of international tension, respect for self-determination and national independence, the peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the strengthening of international peace and security are directly related to each other. Progress in any one of these spheres has a beneficial effect on all of them; in turn, failure in one sphere has a negative effect on others.

And again, in Paragraph 58:

All states should actively participate in efforts to bring about conditions in international relations among states in which a code of peaceful conduct of nations in international affairs could be agreed and which would preclude the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

The Secretary-General is asked to bring together a group of experts to continue the study of the interrelations between disarmament and international security, taking into account proposals submitted to the special session by individual countries, and to report to the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly in 1979. One such proposal, submitted by a group of mainly Western countries, including Canada, deals with the "strengthening of the security role of the United Nations in the peaceful settlement of disputes and peacekeeping," and another, submitted by the United States, concerns "the establishment of a United Nations Peacekeeping Reserve made up of national contingents trained in United Nations peacekeeping methods and earmarked by their governments for United Nations duty".

It is, perhaps, appropriate to interject that the International Peace Academy, a non-governmental organization, composed of former officers of UN peacekeeping forces, academics with special familiarity with international affairs, and government officials acting in a private capacity, is devoting conferences and seminars to study and training in peacemaking and peacekeeping methods. A high-level conference on peacekeeping on a permanent basis is being planned for Ottawa in the summer of 1979.

Peace and security, however, rest on more than strengthened institutions for peaceful settlement of disputes and peace-

*Secretary-General
to report
to Assembly
in 1979*

keeping. The promotion of economic and social development, with special reference to the needs of the people of the Third World, the achievement of progress towards a new international order, have to do with providing a stable base for a just international society on which peace and friendly relations among nations will rest. This is a recurrent theme in the Declaration and Program of Action. It is often stated in direct relation to the waste of human and material resources in the spiralling arms race. As we have already noted, provision is made to use resources saved through arms reduction to benefit Third World development.

But the imperative for co-operative action to promote a new international economic order can stand by itself. It may be assisted by savings on arms expenditures, just as it may be inhibited through the extravagant wastage of the arms race. The promotion of a juster order is itself a contribution to international security, just as the failure to promote such an order leads to tension and strain and conflict. The very contrast between those states, particularly the developed states, that are contributing to arms and those that are contributing to development is indicative of the serious distortion of values that renders our international society dangerously unstable.

On the other hand, the more insistent demand for a more equitable international order put forward by the developing nations introduces a strong element of hope. Barbara Ward, Lady Jackson, has reminded us that it resembles the popular pressure for social justice in nineteenth-century England, which resulted in the transformation of the new industrial society and the emergence of new laws and institutions to ensure a measure of equity and the guarantee of human rights. The force of law was placed behind social as well as political security.

Students of international relations are apt to draw a sharp distinction between national societies and what is sometimes called the international society. In a national society, the right of private violence has been eliminated under law, and it is the existence of the rule of law, expressed in multiple institutions, ordinances and regulations, which guarantees the citizen security and the right of self-fulfilment. In international society the right of violence on the part of the state (though recently called into question) is considered necessary to protect the security of the state and its citizens.

We have noticed that, in the very opening paragraph of the preamble to the United Nations declaration on disarmament,

the opinion was advanced that, in a nuclear age, the accumulation of weapons constituted "much more of a threat than a protection for the future of mankind". But throughout the text of the Declaration and Program of Action we have also noticed the persistence of the traditional belief in the connection between arms and security. The prevalent policy of the super-powers is founded on this belief, even if there is now some evidence that they are prepared to carry out what they conceive to be their responsibilities at a lower level of armament.

Concerned about this situation as raising obstacles to the carrying-out of the Program of Action aimed at the eventual elimination of nuclear and conventional arms, the special session in its final document called for actions complementary to measures for arms reductions that would assist in the process. These included: a new affirmation of the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations repudiating the use of force; measures to ease international tension; strengthened institutions and procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes and the placing of peacekeeping on a permanent basis; and the promotion of a more stable world order by assisting in the economic and social development of Third World peoples.

What was lacking, however, was the identification of these and similar measures as the process of building international practice and international law, which — as in national societies — must provide the ultimate guarantee of security. In his book *The Growth of World Law*, Dr Percy E. Corbett, a distinguished authority on international law, traces the process of "law in the making" in contemporary world society as mankind grapples with the problems of an emergent international community, including the problems of security in a nuclear age. This is more than wishful thinking. Through the ages, men and nations have been architects of new societies that would meet their needs and guarantee their survival under drastically altered and threatening conditions.

It is a pity that the special session, in its final document, spent so much time on the techniques and mechanisms of disarmament and not more time on the political, economic and law-making decisions that could progressively bring into being an alternative system of security under law. However, as the final document states, the special session "marks not the end but rather the beginning of a new phase of the efforts of the United Nations in the field of disarmament". We have some guidance in the Declaration and the Program of Action,

*Distortion
of values
renders society
dangerously
unstable*

in the plans for studies and educational activity, and in the advocacy of political action. And probably enough time — if we stop occasionally and listen for the tolling of that distant bell.

At the entrance to the council room in the Palais des Nations in Geneva, where the Committee on Disarmament holds its sessions, there is engraved on the wall a statement by Lord Robert Cecil in the days of the League of Nations: "The nations of

the world must disarm — or perish".

About the same time in 1929, as Prime Minister Trudeau recalled to the delegates at the special session, Salvador de Madariaga, representative of Republican Spain and an eloquent advocate of disarmament, was saying disarmament was "really a problem of the organization of the world community". Mr Trudeau added: "In the larger sense of the word, history has proved him right."

Carter at mid-term

North American *détente*— but the hard issues remain

By Stephen Handelman

Probably nothing is so infuriating to Canadian nationalists as the present state of relations between the United States and Canada. As President Jimmy Carter reaches his mid-term mark, a comfortable feeling of good will has submerged the fractious quarrelling of recent years. "Maturity" is the latest code-word diplomats use to describe the relation. But, more than anything else, the word seems to reflect a decision not to tackle too much at once on the bargaining table while each side wrestles with its own domestic problems.

Like flowers opening in the warmth of the sun, Canadians have responded to the friendly Carter Administration with a relaxed approach to bilateral problems. The resulting breathing space has created an apparent *détente* in North America. In a period that has seen recurring economic troubles and a relapse into Cold War attitudes, the two nations appear to have drawn closer together for comfort against the storm.

Is the calm misleading? The \$60 billion in two-way trade continues to make each country the other's largest trading partner. But Canada's lagging economy continues to be plagued by a mounting balance-of-payments deficit with its neighbour to the south. Both countries have reaffirmed their common defence of principles, ranging from freer world trade

to the strengthening of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Yet the quiet back-room bargaining in international forums, ranging from the Geneva Multilateral Trade Negotiations to law-of-the-sea talks, has been intense — and occasionally bitter.

There has been no lack of effort to keep things running smoothly. High-level visitors to Canada in the last 12 months have included Vice-President Walter Mondale (who can boast of having ancestors in Ontario, and recently concluded: "Right now, I feel good about relations with Canada"), U.S. Treasury Secretary Michael Blumenthal and Health Education and Welfare Secretary Joseph Califano. The U.S. Embassy in Ottawa, once a diplomatic backwater, is now filled with purposeful, upward-striving diplomats.

The External Affairs Department has responded in kind. A separate Bureau of United States Affairs, with a staff of 14, has been created out of the former Western Hemisphere Division. A \$15,000

Mr Handelman is a reporter with the Ottawa Bureau of the Toronto Star. A native of New York City, he joined the Star in 1974 and has written extensively on international affairs, specializing in Latin America and U.S.-Canadian issues. The views expressed here are those of Mr Handelman.

image-boosting booklet, for wide dissemination in U.S. schools and libraries, explains the differences between the two countries. When a Russian satellite fell out of the skies over the Northwest Territories, Mr Trudeau's then foreign-affairs adviser, Ivan Head, was awakened by a call from Zbigniew Brzezinski to set in motion a mammoth multimillion-dollar joint recovery operation in the Far North.

The personal good fellowship between Mr Carter and Mr Trudeau is real, but their combined front against the problems plaguing North America and the world is not always as solid as it appears — precisely because many of the internal problems of Canada can be traced to the underlying strains of the relation.

Adrift

The powerful force exerted by the nationalism of the early 1970s on Canadian politics is now adrift in the wake caused by inflation and high unemployment. But, while the general economic malaise has slightly lowered the profile of American investment here, Canadian public policy is still preoccupied with developing a manufacturing and resource-processing base in the American shadow.

Fears about the long- and short-term stability of Confederation have also added new strains to this relation.

Quebec separatism has largely supplanted domestic preoccupation with American activities, but it has also made Canadians uncomfortably aware of the impact Americans can have even when they do nothing. U.S. investment in Quebec has not appreciably declined since the November 15, 1976, election of the Parti Québécois government. However, the fear that an international loss of confidence would have a nation-wide impact propelled Mr Trudeau and members of his Cabinet into a series of reassuring trips south of the border last spring.

The third cause for strain after economic development and Quebec separatism is a new regionalism on both sides of the border. The situation is most obvious when Canadians watch promises made by the Carter Administration being undercut by the lobbying of border-state U.S. Congressmen. The American mood of protectionism, seen in measures ranging from anti-dumping legislation to tax reform on business reductions, threatens to have devastating effects on Canada — almost by accident.

Section 602 of the U.S. Tax Reform Act of 1977 sharply reduced the number of tax deductions businessmen were eligible to claim for business trips abroad. A

reform-minded Carter was out to restrain high-living expense-accounts, but he may also ruin the Canadian convention industry. Canada argued for an exemption from the provisions, claiming the measure would cost as much as \$200 million in lost convention business, adding even more to the nearly \$1-billion annual tourism deficit Ottawa holds with the U.S.

U.S. policy-makers barely had time to offer sympathy before they were deluged by lobbyists from their television industry, who argued that Canada's Bill C-58, deleting U.S. commercials from trans-border stations, was costing them millions in lost business. Though Canadians insisted that C-58 was a cultural, not an economic, move, one American Congressman responded drily that Canada was paying "a lot for principle".

Decentralizing forces across Canada — fuelled by reaction to Quebec — have blurred the differences between regional and national issues in bilateral bargaining. Fishermen in British Columbia found themselves declared "off-limits" on U.S. salmon fisheries off the coast of Washington because of Washington State court settlements with native Indians and differing standards on conservation. A bad situation turned worse when Canadians complained Americans were over-fishing on both the West and East Coasts in an effort to stack the odds in upcoming fish-quota agreements. Both countries, which were trying to come to grips with the implications of their new 200-mile territorial limits, found themselves overtaken by events.

On June 2, Canada banned all U.S. commercial fishing in its territorial waters. Two days later, the U.S. followed suit. The resulting "fish war" captured the jokes and the headlines of early summer.

The mechanism for negotiation that had already been established to develop new fishing-quota agreements and a maritime-boundary treaty between the two nations was used to cool things down. Ambassadors Marcel Cadieux of Canada and Lloyd Cutler of the United States put the dispute at the top of their agenda for maritime talks in Ottawa on June 19. Canada's move — intended to provoke a short-term settlement on the narrow issue of fishing quotas — won regional support. But it could have quickly flared into an unmanageable crisis (Canadian sports fishing in U.S. waters threatened to become affected by the U.S. ban) if Cadieux and Cutler had not managed to press it back into the framework of negotiations for a long-term maritime treaty.

*Separatism
has supplanted
preoccupation
with American
activities*

Other issues are not as simply bargained down. The "Ford affair", which broke into the open weeks later, demonstrated the fragility of such long-standing bilateral agreements as the Auto Pact when regional issues are heated up.

The request by the Ford Motor Company for a \$75-million subsidy to open a new engine-assembly plant in Windsor, Ontario, could not be dealt with in government-to-government negotiations.

Canada, which has been running a deficit for most of the last 12 years under the automotive agreement, hoped things would finally turn its way when the "Big Three" auto firms announced that they had increased their ten-year investment plans to \$55 billion. Officials of both countries insist the pact is working well, but they admit an increasing amount of new auto business is being lured to Southern U.S. "sunbelt" states by attractive packages of cheap labour and tax advantages.

It was in that atmosphere that Ottawa originally agreed to tack on an extra \$30 million to convince Ford that it was good economics to build its \$533-million plant — with an estimated 2,600 new jobs — in Ontario. But Ford claimed it needed \$75 million in order to make the Windsor site competitive with another projected site, in Lima, Ohio.

The situation drove Ottawa head-on into a quarrel with the Ontario government, as the "feds" offered to split the cost half-and-half. Ontario claimed it should pay only one-third of the cost, arguing that similar arrangements had been worked out in the financing of a General Motors plant near Montreal under the terms of the Department of Regional Economic Expansion.

The spectacle of the Federal Government, a province and a state squabbling, with one another over the activities of a multinational firm raises issues too complicated to be discussed at length here. Nevertheless, it poses obvious problems for the future, even as Canada undertakes to begin another exhaustive review of the Auto Pact.

A show of bargaining strength by Canada triggers a corresponding show of strength by the U.S. Canadians can expect that, over the next decade, "maturity" in the relation will come to mean something quite different from what it means now.

New tensions

Three areas, in particular, are likely to be the source of new tensions: the interrelations of unemployment and changing

investment patterns, the drive for an equitable sharing of continental resources and transnational problems related to the development of new technology.

Some of the signs are already with us. The Ford case shows how sensitive both countries are to actions affecting industrial expansion and job creation. Canadians worry that anti-dumping legislation against low-priced zinc imports (directed primarily against Japan) will wreak havoc in the Canadian zinc industry. Americans are anxious about a flood of New Brunswick potatoes into Maine and the prospect of a Canadian chicken-marketing board.

Hidden among the issues behind the "fish war" was a crucial problem affecting good relations between the two countries: how to share the continent's vast mineral and metal resources as North America works towards increased energy self-sufficiency.

Maritime negotiators are wading their way through a maze of conflicting claims on rights to offshore hydro-carbon exploitation, particularly in the rich Georges Bank area off the East Coast. The area holds an estimated 530 million barrels of oil and 3.5 trillion cubic feet of natural gas.

The \$10-billion gas pipeline across Canadian territory from Alaska is perhaps the outstanding example to date of how the two countries can plan a joint project. Yet it may be a unique instance of co-operation that cannot be repeated.

Canadians are concerned about the prospect that future technology from the United States will be stopped at the border. A 1977 amendment to the U.S. Export Administration Act was inspired by U.S. labour to study the effect of the technology drain on domestic employment. In the widening community of interest between the U.S. and Canada, diplomats are likely to find the old forms of the "special relation" are inadequate.

Pollution is one such issue that cannot be confined to one side of a border. Ottawa worries that increasing sulphur-dioxide emissions from U.S. plants are carrying air-pollution across the border and threatening the health of Canadians. Twenty-four million tons of sulphur-dioxide emissions were measured in Canada — an estimated 20 million of which came from the United States. By 1990, the emissions could increase as much as 20 per cent. Whose standards apply to whom?

U.S. border states have their own grudges. Amendments to the U.S. Clean Air Act have stiffened pollution-controls on power-plants, but the standards are much higher than those for Canadian

Canadians concerned that technology may be stopped at the border

plants. Minnesota claims Ontario is polluting its wilderness area with a Hydro coal-fired generating-plant in Atikokan. A similar plant in Saskatchewan on the East Poplar River has enraged Montana residents.

Extraterritorial

The last major flashpoint in U.S.-Canadian relations is potentially the biggest source of trouble: the question of extraterritorial application of domestic laws. A current U.S. anti-trust case naming Canada as a member of an "illegal" uranium cartel suggests the disturbing possibility of federal officials being forced to

testify in a U.S. court. Canada has rejected such extraterritoriality, as it has stoutly insisted in the past that Canadian subsidiaries of U.S. firms who strike deals with Cuba cannot be held to violate the U.S. Trading with the Enemy Act.

As a truculent Congress moves into the final two years of the Carter Presidency, the "mature" relation with Canada will be tested by a series of issues. And as Canada steers its way through its most difficult constitutional crisis, capped with a Quebec referendum, federal-provincial unity at the bargaining table could turn out to be an illusion. In that case, today's lull stands the chance of becoming a minor historical footnote.

IJC at age seventy

International Joint Commission and the Garrison Diversion

By Kim Richard Nossal

It has now been 70 years since the Canadian and American Governments signed the Boundary Waters Treaty regulating the binational management of waters shared by the two countries. In the intervening years, both the 1909 treaty and the International Joint Commission (IJC), which was set up to oversee the treaty's provisions, have often been praised by political leaders in both countries as exemplary means of conducting international relations. Though few observers have been as immodest as Mackenzie King, who claimed in 1923 that the IJC was "the New World answer to Old World queries as to the most effective methods of adjusting international differences", most contemporary political and academic assessments have been equally sanguine.

A 1976 Canadian Senate committee report on Canadian-American relations

noted that the IJC had had a "most notable record of achievement" — only four of 98 cases had the six IJC commissioners been unable to reach agreement on a problem referred to them. A further measure of the Commission's success has been the tendency of the governments in Ottawa and Washington to listen to its recommendations: in the past 70 years, Article X of the treaty, providing for binding arbitration, has never been used. The IJC's recommendations, Kal Holsinger and T. A. Levy suggested in a 1974 article, "pretty well establish the parameter within which policy-makers at all levels of government will subsequently operate".

The premise underlying these optimistic assessments is that the willingness of the federal governments in Ottawa and Washington is the key to the IJC's success. As an official of Environment Canada said at a seminar on Canadian-American natural-resource issues at the University of New Hampshire in 1975, the IJC "is viable only as long as the two governments which created the system both want it to work". The focus of this conventional interpretation is on the executive branch

Dr Nossal is an assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario. The views expressed in this article are those of Professor Nossal.

in each federal government – the Canadian Cabinet and the U.S. Presidency. What this focus tends to overlook, however, are the other governmental agents in each country that can vitiate executive willingness to make the IJC work.

Provincial resource

In Canada, the proprietors of water resources are the provincial governments, whose willingness to provide the Commission with technical co-operation is as crucial to the IJC's work as federal involvement. There has, on occasion, been a parting of the ways between the federal and provincial governments (British Columbia's policy on the Columbia River in the 1950s and Saskatchewan's tiff with the IJC in 1978 over the Poplar River power project are two such cases), but on the whole the record of provincial co-operation has been creditable – if only, perhaps, because there are statutory constraints to provincial freedom of manoeuvre on transboundary questions. The Canada Water Act provides for federal-provincial consultation on water-management, and gives the Federal Government the power to undertake research on any waters in Canada. Similarly, the International Rivers Improvement Act requires the provincial governments to apply to the federal Minister of the Environment for licensing before undertakings on international waterways can proceed.

In the United States, the separation of powers renders legislative desire to make the IJC work as important as the willingness of the President and his executive departments. The power of appropriation given to Congress provides a separate source of foreign-policy-making influence within the U.S. Government that is quite independent of the executive. The decisions taken in appropriation committees can – and do – channel policy in directions not at all desired by the President or his Cabinet. There are options open to the White House in the face of a recalcitrant Congress, such as the veto or impoundment, but there is a limit on how far the President can pursue a policy opposed by a large part of the legislature.

Garrison

An illustration of how the Congress can have an impact on the course of Canadian-American relations is provided by the Garrison Diversion Unit in North Dakota. Approved by Congress in 1965 after many years of North Dakotan pressure on the Federal Government, the GDU is a multimillion-dollar irrigation scheme to provide water to semi-arid

lands in the northern and southeastern areas of the state.

As originally proposed, the Garrison Diversion was designed to pump Missouri River waters over the Continental Divide. Canals would channel the water into a reservoir formed by the Lonetree and Wintering Dams, and from there to land in north and southeast North Dakota. The water used for irrigation would run off into the Souris and Red Rivers, which flow north into Manitoba.

The expected change in both quantity and quality of water flowing across the 49th Parallel as a result of Garrison was a source of concern to Manitoba municipalities, fishermen and farmers; it was feared that increased flows would exacerbate flooding, that irrigation waters would carry more sediment, saline and minerals, and that waters from the Missouri River basin would bring new species of fish and plant life into the Hudson Bay drainage basin, disrupting commercial fishing in Manitoba.

As a result of the concern expressed in Manitoba, the Canadian Government began to seek assurances from the U.S. Government in 1969, shortly after construction had begun on the Diversion, that Garrison would not contravene Article IV of the Boundary Waters Treaty, which prohibits transboundary pollution "to the injury of health or property".

Because initial meetings between Canadian and American officials proved inconclusive, the Canadian Government asked the U.S. Government, in October 1973, to impose a moratorium on construction of the parts of the project that would affect Canada. In its reply, the U.S. promised that none of the controversial aspects of the GDU would be started until Canadian concerns were met. Washington assured Ottawa that it would meet its obligations under the 1909 treaty.

However, these assurances did not satisfy Ottawa. Further meetings of officials, in August 1974 and January 1975, ended in an impasse. The Congress was continuing to appropriate funds for Garrison, and construction and expropriation of land was continuing in North Dakota. This, together with persistent pressure from Progressive Conservative Members of Parliament from Manitoba in the House of Commons, prompted the Canadian Government to urge Washington to send the matter to the International Joint Commission.

By October 1975, both governments had agreed on a joint reference, which asked the IJC to report on the "transboundary implications" of the GDU. The

Construction moratorium requested by Canada

Commission established a study board, which held public hearings in November in North Dakota and Manitoba. Because of the amount of technical information to be analysed, the board's report was not released until January 1977. The board concluded that, though Garrison would provide "potential benefits" to Canada, it would also have "adverse impacts" on water-use in Manitoba.

Public hearings

After receiving the board's report, the IJC itself held public hearings in both Canada and the United States. In August 1977, the Commission unanimously came to the same conclusion as the board. Garrison, the IJC's final report stated flatly, "unquestionably would have caused pollution to Canada". However, by the time the IJC report appeared, it had been overtaken to some extent by events in Washington.

In 1976, while the study board was completing its investigations, and after Congress had appropriated further funds for Garrison for the fiscal year 1977, the Department of External Affairs had despatched a diplomatic note to the State Department in October, requesting that the U.S. impose a moratorium on construction of Lonetree Dam.

It was not until after the inauguration of Jimmy Carter in January 1977 and the installation of an environmentally-minded Secretary of the Interior, Cecil Andrus, that the Canadian Government received a reply to its October 1976 note. On February 18, Carter called a halt to construction of Lonetree Reservoir, deftly removing a thorny irritant from Canadian-American relations days before Prime Minister Trudeau arrived in Washington for talks with the President and a historic address to Congress.

Two months later, the White House announced that, as a cost-cutting measure, a large number of water projects throughout the United States were to be cancelled or substantially modified. The Garrison Diversion Unit was one project that was to be modified. Mr Carter's April 1977 "hit list" (as it quickly came to be called in Washington) angered a large number of Congressmen whose constituencies or states were affected by the cuts, and the President's announcement encountered stiff opposition on Capitol Hill.

The public-works subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, which is responsible for federal spending on water projects, responded by reporting an appropriation bill for fiscal 1978 (H.R. 7553) that restored all but one of the

projects. On the floor of the House of Representatives, backers of the Administration proposal tried to amend H.R. 7553 when it was debated. The amendment to eliminate the restored projects failed by only 24 votes, strengthening the Administration's hand considerably, for it showed that it would be difficult to muster the necessary two-thirds majority to overturn a potential Presidential veto of the bill.

As a result, the Senate Appropriations Committee trod more warily. The chairman of the public works subcommittee, Senator John Stennis (D, Mississippi), steered a compromise that dropped only nine projects through his subcommittee, the full Appropriations Committee, and the Senate floor.

Although, when it was reported, H.R. 7553 did not eliminate funding for the Garrison project, it did restrict the funds for the parts of the GDU that would affect Canada. The deliberations of the IJC proved to be of some importance in the decision of the House of Representatives; its Appropriations Committee report stated that it did "not want to prejudice the recommendations of the Commission" by appropriating funds for parts of the Garrison project on which the IJC would comment in its final report.

On the other hand, the Senate Appropriations Committee refused to endorse this position. The Senate Committee argued that, because the matter had been referred to the IJC for recommendations, it would expect to see "the full considered report, views, judgments and recommendations of the IJC" before restricting funding for the GDU. The Committee rejected President Carter's suggestions that Garrison be modified in advance of the IJC report as "not warranted".

The differing positions of the Senate and House Appropriations Committees can be explained by the fact that Canada appears to have few "friends at court" on the Senate Committee. Both Milton Young (R, North Dakota) and Quentin Burdick (D, North Dakota) are members of the Committee's public-works subcommittee, and have long been vigorous supporters of Garrison. In addition, Young is the ranking minority member of the full Appropriations Committee, a post of not inconsiderable influence.

Equally important, two border-state senators, Warren Magnuson (D, Washington) and Richard Schweiker (R, Pennsylvania) were members of the Committee, the latter also a member of the public-works subcommittee. Both had strongly opposed an amendment to the U.S. Tax Reform Act that would have granted tax

*Construction
of Lonetree
reservoir
halted*

exemptions to Americans holding conventions in Canada, during a Senate debate in April 1977. Both senators had cited Canada's Bill C-58, which had rescinded tax exemptions for Canadians advertising on U.S. border TV stations, as reasons for their opposition. Neither objected to the Committee proposal that Garrison funds be deleted prior to the IJC report.

As it turned out, most of the \$18 million appropriated by H.R. 7553 had to be deferred while the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, an agency of the Department of the Interior, formulated modified plans for the Garrison project, as a result of a lawsuit that had been brought against the Secretary of the Interior by the National Audubon Society in 1976. In May 1977, Carter's Interior Secretary reached an out-of-court settlement with the Audubon Society that provided that no further construction would take place on Garrison before an environmental-impact statement was prepared by the Bureau of Reclamation and the entire project re-submitted to Congress by the Interior Department. A revised scheme, eliminating the more contentious aspects of the project and meeting most of the IJC recommendations, was submitted to Congress early in 1978.

The separation of powers in Washington has always been a potential source of disruption in Canadian-American relations. Congressional powers of appropriation, in particular, continue to play an important role in shaping the course of relations between the two countries in a number of issue areas. The role of Congress on the Garrison Diversion Unit suggests that, in environmental relations between the two countries, particular attention must be paid to the legislative branch in Washington.

Congress continued to appropriate funds for Garrison construction well after the first expression of Canadian concern that the project would cause transboundary pollution. Not unnaturally, Congressmen are disinclined to subordinate domestic interests to foreign concerns of their own accord. But at the same time, when the IJC's role in Garrison became more visible in 1977, the House of Representatives refused to embroil Garrison in the larger struggle with President Carter over the future of water projects. This is a welcome indication that the IJC's proceedings, far from being ignored by the House, assumed some importance in this case.

In the Senate, where the membership is smaller, the tenure more fixed, the atmosphere "clubbier", the IJC's role was

not ignored by senators on the Appropriations Committee, but there was less generosity, and they preferred to put the onus on the IJC to demonstrate why their pattern of appropriation should be changed. If this attitude can be attributed to the presence of both North Dakota senators on the committee, together with two others who were unhappy with Canadian tax policy, what emerges as important in this case is the degree of commitment by the Senate Committee to weigh the IJC recommendations when they were released.

The issues dealt with by the IJC — transboundary pollution, present or anticipated — usually spring from parochial concerns, generally peripheral to the grand design of national policy. But where there are issues of local importance, there are also the elected representatives of the people, eager to demonstrate to constituents that their concerns do not go unheard at the federal level. In Washington, the elected representatives have an independent source of policy-making power to ensure that local programs are protected. In the case of the Garrison Diversion Unit, Congress demonstrated its willingness to consider the deliberations of the IJC. The continued readiness of Congressional appropriations committees to accord both attention and importance to the IJC, particularly when the constituency interests of Congressmen are directly involved, will help to ensure the continued success of the Commission's work.

Gremlins attack

Somewhere between proofreading the galleys, which were correct, and sending the page-proofs to the printer, the gremlins attacked our September/October issue. The result was an incomprehensible paragraph in the article on the United Nations by Hans Tabor. The first full paragraph in the second column of Page 18 should have read as follows:

But the Western world will have to widen its own values, especially that of equality, to include the poorer countries. The West will have to show an increase in the will to diminish the disparities in the standards of living and will have to realize that it is more than regrettable for the world economy to have continued underactivity in the developing countries. Otherwise, the discussions in the UN and its Specialized Agencies will be futile.

United States foreign policy needs constancy and consensus

By Howard H. Lentner

The approaching mid-point of the Administration's term of office provides an occasion for assessing President Carter's foreign policy. Although one might draw up a balance-sheet of gains and losses, a more productive approach is to apply to discrete issues the general criterion of whether Carter has contributed to a new American foreign-policy consensus that will survive his term of office.

American foreign policy has never been remarkable for its constancy and consistency, but during the Cold War years there was a public consensus that gave support to the general direction, if not the details, of foreign policy. That consensus was shattered by the Vietnam war. As this conflict drew to a close, President Nixon, with the assistance of Henry Kissinger, developed some new directions for American foreign policy, notably *détente* with the Soviet Union and normalization of relations with China; but he failed to achieve a consensus, in large part because his style was one of commanding deference for unilateral and surprise-laden Presidential action.

In reaction against Nixon's style — as well as the substance of super-power collaboration to achieve world order — President Carter has tried to discover new directions. The most apparent of these have been his espousal of human rights, the renewed emphasis on allied collaboration in the economic realm, and opposition to nuclear proliferation. There are, however, a number of signs that indicate that Carter has not yet been able to achieve a foreign-policy consensus. Until it is achieved, United States foreign policy is unlikely to have the constancy that will attract and maintain the support of allies

and enable the United States to exercise effective leadership in the world.

President Carter came to the White House as an outsider. While there was a kind of fresh appeal in this fact, there were also liabilities that have had their effects on foreign policy. In general, it may be said that the inexperience of Carter led to a number of mistakes. The human-rights campaign was initiated with a naiveté that had important repercussions for *détente*, as well as for certain allied relations. The Carter opposition to nuclear proliferation was conducted, in the case of West German reactor sales to Brazil, without real understanding of the issue, and led to tension with two allies.

After nearly two years in office, there is more experience and more sophistication, but the lack of control and clear direction is also evident. Besides, these problems are made more severe by an eroding popularity recorded by public-opinion polls. To try to predict whether it is likely that President Carter will be able to contribute to the development of a new American foreign-policy consensus, it will be useful to examine the obstacles that stand in the way of such a development and the implements that Carter has to work with in that direction.

Formidable obstacle

One of the most formidable obstacles to the achievement of a consensus is the uncertain state of the international system. During the Cold War, when a consensus prevailed, Americans generally had a clear conception of a bipolar structure in the international system that, despite qualifications, was reasonably accurate for many years. With the international system in flux as it is today, however, Americans are uncertain what kind of structure it has. There have been a number of attempts to describe the system, but each has been shown to be flawed.

The pentagonal system of Nixon's state of the world messages has been demonstrated, particularly by Stanley

Nixon failed to achieve consensus

Dr Lentner is a Professor of Political Science at Baruch College and the Graduate School, City University of New York. The views expressed here are those of Professor Lentner.



Wide World Photo

A three-cornered handshake on September 18, 1978, followed the announcement of the agreement that had been reached at Camp David.

Ioffmann, to be neither accurate as description nor desirable as a vision. President Carter drew heavily on the ideas of the Trilateral Commission, but these too have been shown to be inadequate. The metaphor of a triangle uniting the United States, Europe and Japan is doubly impaired by the absence of a side connecting Europe and Japan and by the absence of European unity. Moreover, trilateralism leaves out the "Second" and "Third Worlds." While it has become commonplace to invoke the notion of interdependence, no analytical construct has emerged that would accurately describe the system structure in terms that would command widespread understanding. None of these candidates for a general description of the international system structure even attempts to account for the agitating issue of Cuban intervention in Africa. Moreover, Carter himself demonstrated considerable ineptitude last summer in claiming Cuban intervention in Shaba Province, Zaire, without being able to provide conclusive evidence in response to sceptics in the United States and to Fidel Castro's denials.

Economic disarray

Added to the difficulties of conceptually grasping the structure of the international system is the disarray in international economics — huge trade imbalances, monetary chaos exemplified by the fall of the dollar, and the uncertainties in the bargaining over a new international economic order. The economic "summit" conferences of the "trilateral" countries have demonstrated a style of collaboration but

not a co-ordination of substantive policies to deal with "stagflation". The real decline in the price of oil for the United States resulting from the decline in the value the dollar appears to be an unintended consequence, whose advantages are offset by continuing international economic disarray and dwindling confidence in the ability of the U.S. to manage its own economy.

If the fluidity of the international system itself is an obstacle to the development of a foreign-policy consensus, there are also domestic American barriers that present difficulties. The debate over the Panama Canal treaties has shown not only the emotional fracturing of the American people in dealing with the rest of the world but also the obstacles to the conduct of a coherent foreign policy caused by the structure of the American Government. With Congress intent upon sharing in foreign-policy decision-making, foreign policy becomes an instrument of domestic politics.

Moreover, there appear to be deeper and more persistent cleavages in public opinion concerning American foreign policy. In the summer 1977 issue of *International Journal*, James N. Rosenau and Ole R. Holsti reported the results of their survey of the "attentive public". Their study showed the persistence of the cleavage in opinion that had opened up during the Vietnam war. This cleavage is particularly likely to be manifested during the Senate's consideration of a new SALT accord.

In such circumstances, the President himself is an important influence. Pres-

ident Carter brought to office a set of values and beliefs that have led him to attack a wide variety of problems. His values are those that grow out of and nourish democracy. He is dedicated to openness in government, efficiency in administration, and liberal humanitarianism abroad. He is an economic conservative, but in him is a strain of populism that seeks reform. He is ambitious to be a "great" President without leading his country in war.

Some of these values are specially pertinent to foreign policy. As Alexis de Tocqueville pointed out in his *Democracy in America*, democratic values are the enemy of effectiveness in foreign policy. In particular, the democratic virtues of openness and debate are the enemies of the foreign-policy virtues of secrecy and dispatch. Carter's dedication to debate within his Administration — for example, between Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance and National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski over whether to "link" other issues to the SALT negotiations — and his tolerance for the outspokenness of United Nations Ambassador Andrew Young give the appearance of disarray. This appearance makes it more difficult for Carter to engender support.

Framework

One of the most useful instruments that the President could develop to create a new consensus would be a conceptual framework — that is, an intellectual construct that performs three critical functions: (1) it brings about consistency between a country's values and political institutions, on the one hand, and the international system, on the other; (2) it provides a coherent set of guidelines for foreign-policy decisions; and (3) it makes foreign policy serve to give a sense of purpose to the nation.

The development of a conceptual framework cannot be the work of one man, particularly a President who is too busy to labour over careful analysis. Identification and analysis of problems has to come largely from the governmental and academic bureaucracies. Moreover, the generation of a consensus based on a conceptual framework is partly the work of executive-branch officials and Congressional leaders, but the shaping of a conceptual framework is, finally and foremost, the business of the President.

In his attempts to reorient American foreign policy, President Carter has not yet met the tests of creating an adequate conceptual framework. The centrepiece of his drive for reorientation was the human-

rights initiative. There are plenty of ambiguities and contradictions in this, but it has performed one of the functions of a conceptual framework — it has restored to the American people a sense of purpose in foreign policy. It has failed, however, either to provide a coherent set of guidelines for decision-making or to deal realistically with the international system. Beyond human rights, President Carter has sought to re-emphasize alliance cohesion and to set his Administration apart from its immediate predecessors by removing *détente* from first place in foreign-policy priorities.

The Carter Administration has developed other specific objectives: non-proliferation; a commitment to bringing about change in Southern Africa, specifically by endorsing a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa and by working for internationally-approved settlements in Rhodesia and Namibia; withdrawal of troops from Korea; pursuit of a general settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict through the Geneva Conference; and a coherent energy policy. The resultant flurry of activity is not guided by a clear sense of purpose and a set of priorities that will generate a new foreign-policy consensus. Moreover, much of the President's rhetoric shows more effectiveness at symbol manipulation than careful analysis.

Presidential skill

The development of a consensus rests not only on conceptual clarity but also on the President's skills. Carter's outstanding skill is his sensitivity to the electorate at the symbolic level. This sensitivity provided him with his ticket for the journey from Plains, Georgia, to Washington, D.C. For electoral purposes, this is a tremendous strength. For foreign policy it may be a weakness. Symbols can become a substitute for analysis and for the grubby work of persuasion and bargaining.

There are a number of areas where Carter's treatment of issues at the symbolic level is more in evidence than his command of them at the analytic level. The human-rights campaign may thus be characterized, as may the non-proliferation policy. His symbolic handling of energy problems was a fizzle. Moreover, there are both apparent and impending problems connected with the human rights campaign. By staking out a public position in denying that Anatoly Shcharansky was a spy but having no effective means of preventing his conviction by Soviet authorities, Carter displayed an inherent weakness of his position. In the

future, as pointed out by Sandra Vogel-gesang in the July 1978 *Foreign Affairs*, it is likely that the inability and unwillingness of the American people to pay the costs of effective means to promote human rights will lead to disillusionment.

Despite his sensitivity to symbols, Carter does not have the skill to use symbols in arousing the nation. He clearly does not command the rhetorical skill to arouse people to follow him. His skill in lobbying Congress has grown, as witnessed by his victories on the issues of Panama and Middle Eastern plane sales, but they are not sufficient, as the impasse on his energy legislation indicates.

Carter has an underlying stubbornness and integrity, but he has also demonstrated a capacity to learn. He modified somewhat his human-rights campaign to make it more compatible with realities in the international environment. He adapted to the Sadat initiatives in the Middle East, and his diplomacy in the Horn of Africa showed signs of adeptness. On Namibia, too, there has been success. Diplomatic successes have tended to come in areas that have not become, through Presidential rhetoric, infused with symbolism. In the near future, the Carter Administration is likely to attempt to resolve the issue of Taiwan with the Chinese Government. While there are difficult substantive problems involved, it may be that Carter's ability to gain support for whatever solution he comes to may rest on his refraining from burdening the policy with symbolism. Unfortunately, the "playing-the-China-card" rhetoric that has become popular in Washington is not a hopeful sign.

Middle East

The area where Carter has demonstrated adeptness and serious resolve is his Middle East diplomacy. Early in his Administration, he demonstrated initiative in his quest for a renewal of the Geneva Conference and by bringing the Palestinian issue into the public arena for debate. That initiative was wrested from him by President Sadat, and the United States lost control in Middle East diplomacy until Carter arranged and conducted the serious top-level conference at Camp David last September. While regaining the initiative, Carter gave up the sound principle used in his 1977 policy of including all of the interested parties in Middle East negotiations.

There are problems of political style that are also pertinent to developing a foreign-policy consensus. President Carter's style is one in which, sometimes after

careful thought and less often off-the-cuff, he stakes out a position, gets out in front on the issue, and then attempts to gather support. There is a private quality to the deliberations that lead him to positions. It is impossible to operate in the American political system without bargaining, but Carter's style pushes the bargaining into the public arena, where it often gives him the appearance of weakness. Thus, when Carter finds it necessary to compromise or to deal in trade-offs for support, he publicly changes his position, or he issues an apology.

This style has two effects that do not portend success for developing a new foreign-policy consensus. First, it creates space for a great deal of extrinsic public debate, such as that over the Panama Canal treaties, that leads to the appearance of disarray in American foreign policy and more animosity and confusion than is necessary. If the President had sought the advice of the Senate during the negotiating stage of the treaties, it might have been possible to avoid the embarrassment of a parade of Senators to Panama negotiating their reservations with General Torrijos.

The public bargaining style has also tended to encourage division in American society. Specifically, President Carter shares at least part of the burden of the alienation of the American Jewish community that supports Israel. His style has helped to put him into a position in which, if he stands firm, the cleft in the American public will broaden, and, if he relents, he will appear to be weak.

What, then, are the prospects for the early development of a new American consensus on foreign policy? President Carter's pragmatism may bring about a rough adaptation between American aspirations and the realities of the rest of the world, but that does not necessarily mean coherence and constancy. His learning capacity may enable him to improve marginally his skills and style, but these are characteristics of the man that are unlikely to change in any fundamental sense. It is highly unlikely that President Carter will become an inspiring orator.

It seems unlikely, therefore, that a new American foreign-policy consensus will develop in this Administration. Without constancy, American foreign policy will continue to be unpredictable. It will also be subject to sharp international debate, and it is very likely to be discontinuous when the next president is elected, for, without consensus, foreign policy has no fixed guidelines for continuity.

*Bargaining
has tended
to encourage
division
in society*

What are human rights?

By M. D. Copithorne

Human rights have suddenly emerged on the centre stage of international affairs. The political context in which this has occurred is clear enough, but it is much less certain what these rights entail. Their origins can be traced back to the historic movements for freedom and equality as well as to the inspiration provided by the great religions and philosophies of the world that affirm the dignity and worth of the individual.

The earliest efforts to resist absolute rule gave rise to the barest of civil liberties, which in time evolved into a system of rights by which the individual could resist government and private coercion. The development continues today, reflecting the dynamic nature of the relation between state and individual, towards the fulfilment of the needs of the individual and the realization of his personality. This process, indeed the whole development of human rights, has been uneven. Different social organizations and cultural traditions have produced many varieties of historical experience. The question is whether these divergent experiences have yet led to general recognition of basic universal values reflecting the essential dignity of man.

The Western tradition of civil liberties is bound up with the emergence of its democratic forms of government. Englishmen trace their freedom back to the Magna Carta and to the Bill of Rights of 1689. It was a system generally thought able to keep pace with the demands of the governed for protection against legal and administrative encroachments upon what were considered the rights and liberties of free men under the common law.

United States and French experience took what seemed a different turn. The Declaration of Independence reflected the heady influence of the boldest thinkers of the age. The central importance of the

rights of the individual to the philosophical basis of the American political system was most eloquently expressed at the beginning of the Declaration: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness, that to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the Governed . . ." It was a revolutionary view of the purpose of government and the status of the individual, and some urged that it needed to be more precisely spelt out. Madison, in particular, argued that political truths enunciated in a solemn manner in a bill of rights would acquire "the character of fundamental maxims of free government and as they become incorporated with the national sentiment, counteract the impulses of interest and passion". It was debated and finally decided that the best hope of dissuading the governors from depriving those they governed of their civil liberties lay in the enshrinement of fundamental rights in the Constitution. Over the years, through constitutional amendment and judicial interpretation, these provisions became the corpus of United States civil rights that serve to express the ideals of an open, free and pluralistic society.

The French tradition dates from *La Déclaration des Droits de l'Homme* of 1789 and the subsequent *Déclaration* of 1795. The radical ideas flourishing in the revolutionary atmosphere on both sides of the Atlantic nourished each other. The Declaration of 1789 sets out a number of individual rights and clothes them in a political philosophy: "*Le but de toute association politique est la conservation des droits naturels et imprescriptible de l'homme. Ces droits sont: la liberté, la propriété, la sûreté et la résistance à l'oppression.*"

Canadian experience

The Canadian experience was different. The adequacy of Canada's common law inheritance was not seriously questioned until the Second World War, and even then much of the debate focused on constitutional aspects. The issues were

Civil liberties bound together with emergence of democratic government

Mr Copithorne is Legal Adviser and Director-General of the Bureau of Legal Affairs in the Department of External Affairs. He has served abroad in Indo-China, Iran, Malaysia and China. The views expressed in this article are those of the author.

whether civil liberties were better protected through a bill of rights or under the common law, how this protection could be related to the distribution of legislative powers, and the degree of entrenchment such rights should receive in any new constitutional arrangement.

The debate on the first issue ended with the enactment of the 1960 Canadian Bill of Rights, entitled "An Act for the Recognition and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms". The preamble states: "The Parliament of Canada, affirming that the Canadian nation is founded upon principles that acknowledge the supremacy of God, the dignity and worth of the human person and the position of the family in a society of free men and free institutions; Affirming also that men and institutions remain free only when freedom is founded upon respect for moral and spiritual values and the rule of law, and being desirous of enshrining these principles and the human rights and fundamental freedoms derived from them, in a Bill of Rights which shall effect the respect of Parliament for its constitutional authority and which shall ensure the protection of these rights and freedoms in Canada."

The treatment of the Bill of Rights in the courts, characterized by some as one of "benign neglect", and the continuing demands for a new Canadian Constitution suggested that the 1960 bill might not be the last word on the formal recognition of human rights in Canada. In 1968, coinciding with International Human Rights Year, the Government published proposals for a constitutionally-entrenched Canadian Charter of Human Rights. The ensuing debate focused increasingly on other aspects of constitutional reform, and the initiative came to a halt with the defeat of the Victoria proposals in 1971.

In 1978, the Government launched new constitutional proposals that constitute a "Canadian Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms" replacing the 1960 Bill of Rights. The new instrument has a different ring to it, the preamble declaring the Charter to be "founded on the conviction and belief, affirmed by this Act, that in a free and democratic society there are certain rights and freedoms which must be assured to all of the people of that society as well as to people within society individually and as members of particular groups, and which must, if they are to endure, be incapable of being alienated by the ordinary exercise of such legislation or other authority as may be conferred by law on its respective institutions of government".

Human rights have an ill-defined status in the hierarchy of legal standards, with the result that there continues to be debate about their jurisprudential underpinnings. One approach, growing out of the seventeenth century's emphasis on mankind's common human nature and its egalitarian implications, conceives human rights in naturalist terms — that is, a set of minimum inalienable rights inhering in man by virtue of his being man. Authority for "a higher law" is found in theological or metaphysical absolutes. The problem is that only a legal order can recognize and protect such rights.

Another approach, historical or anthropological in nature, focuses on specific demands at a given time in particular societies. It emphasizes the uniqueness of each society within its own cultural and environmental variables, thus suggesting a highly particular or nationalistic quality at the expense of common human values. The approach of the positivists is to confine rights to those accorded by a state at a particular time within an organized coercive system. They would deny a place for values detached from specific political and ethical beliefs. Again, the result is a strong emphasis on the sovereignty of nation states and a marked resistance to the idea that individuals can be appropriate subjects as well as objects of international law. The Marxist approach, born in response to the often exploitive quality of early industrial society, was initially intensely concerned with human dignity. The Russian revolutionaries gave a priority of rights to the working class and added the right to work, to a fair wage and to social security. In its present form, Communist theory has human rights appertaining to the collectivity, usually the nation state, at the expense of the individual.

*Emphasis
on sovereignty
of nation states*

Generality

Human rights have traditionally been expressed in a high degree of generality, and their definition is usually a composite of shifting elements of legislative, executive and judicial consensus. In the drafting of the International Human Rights Covenants there was a sharp division between those who argued for brief clauses of a general nature and those who argued for substantial precision. The first view prevailed, generally because of the difficulty of setting out the scope and substance of rights in any detail in a comprehensive document intended to attract the widest support among states. Thus, having committed themselves to the general principles, states were to be allowed substantial

discretion in formulating the rights in accordance with their particular circumstances. Rather than attempting a definition of slavery, the covenants provide simply that no one shall be held in slavery. The question of admissible limitations posed another problem, for so many were put forward that they threatened to detract from the rights to be protected. In the discussion on the right to liberty and security of person, for example, some 30 limitations were suggested, and it became evident that it was better to provide simply that no one should be subject to arbitrary arrest or detention.

A right in its jurisprudential sense is an interest, claim or advantage that is legally recognized and protected and implies a corresponding duty on the part of others. In other words, a right is a legal conception, while a human right is one that inheres in the human individual. In the interest of analysis and orderly discussion, many attempts have been made to classify human rights. One such system uses four categories: political (or civil) liberties (or rights), including the traditional freedoms of association, assembly, speech, press, conscience and religion; economic liberties, including the rights to property and not to be deprived thereof without due compensation, the freedom of contract, and the right to withhold one's labour; legal liberties, including freedom from arbitrary arrest, a right to a fair hearing, protection of an independent judiciary, and access to counsel; and, finally, egalitarian liberties, including the right to employment, accommodation, education, etc., without discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion or economic circumstances. However, this and other attempts to classify rights are not without difficulty, and there is a growing opinion that classification serves only the purpose of analytical convenience.

In both British and American traditions, the definition of political liberties has focused on the search for the reach and limit of these freedoms, and particularly the necessity of reconciling them with potentially conflicting liberties and other social values. The accommodation of this conflict is an inherent and continuing part of the human-rights process. A number of tests have emerged — for example, United States courts will consider whether there is “a clear and present danger” that the action complained of will bring about results the legislature has determined to forestall. The common law has a test of compliance with “the public welfare”. It also has specific limits on the freedom of speech — namely the offences of defama-

tion, blasphemy, sedition and censorship. Sedition is perhaps the most critical of these tests, and it has generally been held that words become seditious when the intent is to advocate or incite others to violence, public disorder or unlawful conduct against the state. Religious liberty has been interpreted as being essentially freedom of religious thought and expression, not extending to conduct that violates the criminal law, offends public morals or interferes with the legitimate exercise of the police power for the protection of public safety and health.

Economic liberties have emerged only in the twentieth century, partly, no doubt, from the recognition that equality before the law is likely to affect adversely the poor more often than the rich and that the enforcement of some rights may have the effect of perpetuating inequalities. It was often argued that it was more important to guarantee basic personal liberties rather than those concerned with the shifting processes of economic and social organization. Gradually, economic liberties came to be seen as directly related to the social and political well-being of society. It proved even more difficult, however, to formulate economic rights than it had civil and political rights, and it is often concluded that the conception will not readily be turned into legally-enforceable values. This conclusion is reflected in the United Nations Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which declares that such rights are for gradual implementation.

Rule of law

There is another dimension to the articulation of human rights: the requirement that the regulation of an individual's rights be subject to “the rule of law” or “due process of law” or be “in accordance with the law of the land”. In its simplest form, due process of law is a complex of procedural safeguards designed to protect the individual from arbitrary acts of government. Its origins go back to Magna Carta. By the seventeenth century, criteria had emerged for judging the acts of the executive and of the judiciary itself.

The requirement for “due process” was included in the French Declaration of 1789, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and the Canadian Bill of Rights. The notion embodies the belief that man should be ruled by laws and not by man. Today, in its procedural sense, it seems to include three essential elements: (a) the individual's right to a meaningful day in court to challenge the exercise of judicial or ad-

Classification serves only analytical convenience

ministrative decisions against his interests; (b) equality before the law of both individuals and officials, including the full independence of the court; and (c) the recognition that judicial remedies need to be rationally justified in terms of both general principles and the particular situation.

International level

Given the uncertain nature and content of human rights in most nation states and the wide diversity of national experience, the difficulty of establishing consensus at the international level is, clearly, profound. Nevertheless, with faltering steps, nation states have been able to agree on joint action as they have come to perceive a need to enhance the dignity of the individual. In the nineteenth century, there was agreement on anti-slavery arrangements, and subsequently on arrangements to protect the rights of minorities. The First World War served to "raise the consciousness" of the world community, but it was the spread of education and rapid means of communication, and most strikingly the flagrant violations of human dignity in the Second World War, that precipitated demands for a broad recognition of basic human values.

The United Nations Charter, fol-

lowed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, set out common standards for human society that have become so widely recognized nationally and internationally that they may well now form part of the customary law of nations. The difficulties in converting them into a decent world order have been all too evident. The balance between the government, the group and the individual has yet to be struck, as has the balance between the universal and the particular, and the balance between political and civil and economic and social rights. The search for accommodation becomes more intense. In the words of McDougal, Lasswell and Chen, different peoples, in different parts of the world, conditioned by varying cultural traditions, assert fundamental demands in many different nuances of institutional practice and modality, but there is an overriding insistence, transcending all cultures and climes, upon the greater production and wider distribution of all basic values, with increasing recognition that a world public order of human dignity can tolerate wide differences in the specific practices by which values are shaped and shared so long as all demands and practices are effectively appraised and accommodated in terms of a common interest.

Report on the Bonn summit: a need for world-management

By Richard Gwyn

Shortly before the Bonn economic "summit" meeting began, Arthur Okun, former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers to the President of the United States, remarked that the meeting was doomed to succeed".

Okun was prescient. When all else is said and done, Bonn was bound to be a success of a sort for the simple reason that failure was unthinkable. Chancellor Helmut Schmidt described the stakes thus: "Only if we avoid a crash can we hope for recovery."

In the months before Bonn, talk about a crash had become popular. Only a handful of Western countries — Japan, Germany, Switzerland — seemed to have discovered how to cure themselves of a half-decade of "stagflation", and even in these countries there was no assurance

that the remedy was permanent. Almost everywhere else, high unemployment, high inflation (on the rise again in the U.S., and therefore likely to be exported elsewhere) and slow economic growth seemed to be intractable. Everywhere, *sauve qui*

Mr Gwyn is nationally-syndicated Ottawa columnist for the Toronto Star. He has worked for United Press International, Maclean Hunter, Time Magazine and the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. Between 1968 and 1975, he worked for the Government, first as Executive Assistant to Postmaster-General Eric Kearns and then as Director-General of Socio-economic Planning, Department of Communications. The views expressed in this article are those of the author.

peut protectionism was on the rise, imperilling international trade. Most important, in terms of its impact upon public morale and upon business confidence, the entire international currency system seemed to be spinning out of control. Prime Minister Fukuda declared that the state of international economies reminded him of those that preceded the Second World War. Less alarmist but still alarming was the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development report handed to the seven Western leaders shortly before they met at Bonn, and later made public. The OECD calculated that the average gross national product growth of its 24 member countries would be just $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent in 1978 or a full 1 per cent below the minimum needed to halt the growth in unemployment. For 1979, the OECD forecast a GNP growth-rate reduced to $3\frac{1}{4}$ per cent as a consequence of a slow-down in the United States.

The seven leaders — or seven and a half if you count the contribution of Roy Jenkins, the President of the European Economic Community (EEC) — thus arrived at Bonn determined to succeed, or at the very least not to be seen to have failed. By avoiding dissension and by finding formulae for the final communique that concealed their differences, they did indeed avoid failure. Hence, in logic, they must be credited with a success. Certainly the seven acted at their closing press conference as though they were genuinely convinced that they had succeeded.

About the dimensions of this success, subsequent opinions differed. *The Economist* gave one low cheer ("The summiteers at Bonn got to the top of a small foothill and did not fall off. Quite.") and one loud boo ("As an organ for world economic management, the seven-strong summit cabinet is hopeless and helpless"). In *Newsweek Magazine*, though, Theo Sommer, editor-in-chief of *Die Zeit*, waxed lyrical: "Hail to the chiefs. . . . The system of co-operation has been strengthened, and not only in the economic field [as] the promise by the U.S. and Canada to be reliable suppliers of nuclear fuel proves. . . . German-U.S. relations are back to normal, Europe is on the move, and tri-lateralism has turned out to be a realistic concept."

By the acid test of the behaviour, post-Bonn, of financiers and of businessmen, it seems clear that *The Economist* was far closer to the truth than Sommers. Within a month of the Bonn spectacular, the U.S. dollar had broken through the 200-yen barrier and had dropped by close to 10 per cent relative to the yen. the

D-Mark and the Swiss franc. Further, the U.S. Congress was as reluctant to pass President Carter's energy package as it had been before Bonn, thus ensuring that the immediate cause of currency instability would continue. Lastly, the prospects for a substantial agreement to conclude the GATT talks at Geneva seem even more remote as this is written than they were pre-Bonn.

Yet the reasons for the editor-in-chief of *Die Zeit's* euphoria are easy to identify and are well-founded; it was unmistakably a resounding political success — for West Germany. Schmidt dominated the conference, in part because he happened to be chairman, but even more because he led the Western world's healthiest and best-managed economy and because his own forceful personality captured the imagination of a Western public hungering for self-confident leadership. For the first time since the war, West Germany played a commanding political role at a major meeting of Western nations. (Schmidt was the key personality at the EEC Bremen "summit" a fortnight earlier, but achieved this in the absence of the U.S.). West Germany's emergence at Bonn as a fully-accepted political, as well as a by-now familiar economic power, constitutes a transformation of the Western balance of power of incalculable political as well as psychological proportions.

Bonn, therefore, has to be viewed from two related but separate perspectives: as an exercise in international economic management and as an exercise in political dynamics.

The economic achievements of Bonn are all familiar. President Carter committed himself, again, to reducing oil imports by $2\frac{1}{2}$ million barrels a day by 1985, and to moving U.S. oil prices to world levels. Prime Minister Fukuda pledged a GNP growth increase of 7 per cent in 1978 and the limitation of Japan's trade surplus, in "volume", to last year's level. Schmidt promised a reflationary package of 13 million D-Marks, and indeed, a fortnight later, telegraphed his six colleagues: "I have delivered on my promise". The other four participants essentially promised to do what they were already doing, or trying to do — in Canada's case, to raise economic growth by "up to 5 per cent".

In addition, the seven-man group charged its representatives at Geneva to "conclude successfully the detailed negotiations by December 15, 1978". The final communique also declared further that: "The further development of nuclear energy is indispensable, and the slippage

Differences
concealed
in final
communique



C. P. Photo

Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau and U.S. President Carter are joined in discussion by their host Helmut Schmidt during the July meeting in Bonn. The "Seven" will meet again in Tokyo next summer.

in the execution of nuclear power programs must be reversed." Lastly, the group established for the first time a review mechanism: representatives from the seven countries are scheduled to meet in December to check on each others' progress, and to report back to their leaders.

The list of accomplishments does seem to be a considerable one. Further, as Prime Minister Callaghan put it at the closing press conference: "The whole is greater than the sum of its parts". The combined effect of all these measures should result in reduced protectionism, expanded trade, an attack on unemployment without an incentive to inflation, and a general tone of reassurance that could produce currency stability.

Few of these beneficent results have happened. Such a judgment could be dismissed as premature — except that continued currency instability already marks Bonn as an economic failure.

To ask What Went Wrong? is to ask the wrong question. A better question to ask is What Didn't Go Right?

In part, advance expectations were unrealistic. Bonn was never intended to be "an organ for world economic management" as the *Economist* described it. Bonn is simply the latest evolutionary model in a process that began three years ago at Rambouillet with a vague, futuristic seminar among, at that time, six world leaders. The present seven may dominate the West, but they cannot speak for it — still less for the rest of the world. Their sessions do not constitute an institution but an occasion out of which the most

important product is never going to be binding treaties or detailed plans of action, but rather intangibles like, at Bonn, the restoration of good personal relations between Carter and Schmidt.

In one instance, the seven did indeed demonstrate that their whole was larger than the sum of its parts. The resolution on airplane hijacking constituted, for all of them, a singular achievement, and for Canada a definite diplomatic triumph. Prime Minister Trudeau advanced the idea; External Affairs Minister Don Jamieson and a small group of officials translated it into practical terms, and then successfully negotiated these with the other delegations.

In adopting a firm, clear, innovative — and wholly unexpected — stand on hijacking, the seven leaders were performing as politicians can do when they are performing at their best. Yet, contrarily, this very achievement ensured that they would do less than their best on the economic issues that were their first priority. In effect, for a day and a half at the conference the seven leaders allowed themselves to be less bold on economic matters than they would otherwise have been, and ought to have been, because they knew that the final communique would justify itself by containing a bold statement about hijacking.

By no means were all of the economic debates among the seven conducted in "diplomatese". Carter asked some tough — and, by all accounts, exceptionally well-informed — questions about the proposed European "zone of currency stability".

Seven leaders performing as politicians on hijacking

Fukuda bluntly blamed most of the West's economic troubles on the collapse of the U.S. dollar.

Yet, in view of the magnitude of the problems involved, the economic debates between the leaders and the decisions that flowed from these lacked decisiveness and daring.

West Germany's pledge to reflate its economy in the expectation of creating larger markets for other nations is one example. In fact, West German authorities hold no faith whatever in Keynesian pump-priming, as opposed to structural reform. West Germany's contribution to what Prime Minister Trudeau called "a poker game" was thus a chip that the West Germans themselves didn't take seriously.

Another example is the treatment at Bonn of the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) talks. After an apparently desultory debate, the group dredged up the blandest language possible: "We agreed (a year ago) to give a new impetus to the Tokyo Round. Our negotiators have fulfilled that commitment." A slap on the back, in other words, rather than a push to secure, from France and Japan, concessions on agricultural products that might in turn persuade the U.S. Congress to approve whatever agreement is actually reached at Geneva.

A last example is provided by the U.S. oil deficit, which, among all topics, provoked the most attention before, during and after Bonn. The case advanced by Europe and Japan is that the U.S. oil deficit causes the U.S. trade deficit, which causes the U.S. dollar to decline, which causes international currency instability and trade uncertainty. In fact, this entire argument is questionable. Imports of finished goods, from Europe and Japan, account for a larger share of the U.S. trade deficit than do imports of oil. Furthermore, even if the end consequence of U.S. energy imports is a devalued dollar, this benefits rather than damages Europe and Japan by lowering the cost of their own oil imports, which are priced in U.S. dollars. The real issue, never debated at Bonn, is whether the U.S. is deliberately importing cheap oil today so that tomorrow it will be able to use its hoarded-up domestic oil while its trade rivals compete frantically for Middle East oil, which by then will be dwindling in quantity and escalating in price.

In essence, therefore, the seven functioned like politicians anxious to get along with each other, rather than as economists determined to pursue each problem to its final conclusion. To expect politicians to do much more may be naive; it is equally

naive, however, to suppose that, given the magnitude of the West's economic malaise, timid half-solutions will make the slightest difference.

If Bonn has made little or no difference to our economic state, does it therefore deserve to be labelled a failure? No. The meeting still merits the title of a semi-success. Advance forecasts that the seven would be ripped apart by arguments over who was to blame and who should do what proved to be unfounded. The seven did get along as individuals, which is useful, and as a group, in the instance of the hijacking resolution. They did bargain with what they believed at the time to be a creative compromise. Except that we now know it was a compromise put together at close to the lowest common denominator among the seven.

Tokyo is next. The real success at Bonn may have been to show what will have to be done at Tokyo. Either the seven will have to reorganize themselves into a true "organ for world economic management" or they will have to recognize that annual meetings of this kind are no more than get-togethers — pleasant, and useful, but not, in the end, of any particular importance.

*GATT talks
dressed up
in blandest
language possible*

Coming in our next issue

David Wright, who is Counsellor (Economic) at the Canadian Embassy in Tokyo, writes about the future of growth in advanced societies. He discusses the Kondratieff conclusion that there are 50-year cycles in the performance of Western economies. If that model holds true, industrialized countries may have entered the downward curve of such a long-term cycle.

Measuring the change in Haiti from one Duvalier to another

By Renaud Bernardin

In April 1971, after naming his son to succeed him as "President for life" of the Republic, François Duvalier died in his bed. For 14 years he had imposed an unrelentingly cruel dictatorship on Haiti. A popular uprising was expected, and in order to prevent it the United States sent warships on patrol just outside Haitian territorial waters. The uprising did not take place. Brought to power by his father, Jean-Claude Duvalier held on to it with the help of the American State Department, and the U.S. Ambassador, Clinton Knox, became known as the power behind the throne. The official and clandestine masters of the state skilfully proceeded to mollify and dupe public opinion by building a propaganda campaign round the "liberalization" and "openness" of the new regime. The Government is now changing its tune; "Jean-Claudisme" is the new catchword on everybody's lips. By changing its name, has "Duvalierism" simply donned a new mask, or has it actually undergone a transformation?

Observers of François Duvalier's Government usually stressed only its dictatorial exercise of power. No serious effort was made to penetrate the reality behind the nightmarish, exotic and folklorist image of Haiti that Graham Greene's novel *The Comedians* projected round the world. This pessimistic view of the Haitian situation, fostered by charitable organizations in their attempts to alleviate the effects of Government waste and corruption, masked the efforts by the Haitian people to free themselves from Duvalier's bloody tyranny. Instead of taking account of the

strong desire for change underlying this unequal struggle, commentators merely lamented the revolting consequences of the dictatorship.

At the time of Duvalier's death, Haiti was known only for the horrible crimes of the *Tontons Macoutes* and its deplorable economic situation — it was the only country in the western hemisphere rated among the world's 25 poorest nations. François Duvalier was a psychological obstacle to large-scale international aid, for it was a matter of record that his Government suffered from unbridled corruption and that he allocated more funds to the machinery of repression than to the departments of health, education and agriculture combined. As a result, other governments shied away from too close an involvement.

Although the horror of tyranny had caused isolation, Duvalier ensured that his country continued to play the role of producer and supplier of raw materials and consumer of industrial goods — the role assigned to the entire Third World in the international division of production activities. He had no desire whatever to break with the liberal West. This was well understood by the defenders of the Haitian status quo, who though they would have preferred a more honourable associate, were nevertheless satisfied with a reliable ally. Duvalier was initially given emergency assistance to remain in power, then a little more help so as to obviate any threats of changing political allegiance. Finally, studies were undertaken, and their conclusions would have justified the massive aid he was clamouring for.

His death came at the right moment and helped to consolidate a government that, though clearly reprehensible, was considered by many to represent stability in the Caribbean area, which had already been shaken by the death of Trujillo, the 1965 intervention of the U.S. Marines in the Dominican Republic, and the establishment of assertive, nationalist governments in Trinidad and Tobago and in Jamaica. Jean-Claude Duvalier was con-

*No desire
to break
with West*

Professor Bernardin teaches in the field of International Relations at the Collège de l'Université de Montréal and is a research associate of the Centre québécois de relations internationales. He has published a number of articles dealing with the problems of the Third World. The views expressed here are those of the author.

sidered particularly worthy of confidence because, from his first press conference, he adopted the same militant anti-Communist position as his father. Those who saw the shadow of Fidel Castro and the hand of Moscow behind all nationalist movements in Latin America were reassured.

Psychological ploy

In this perspective, liberalization was seen merely as a psychological ploy aimed at projecting a new image of the Duvalier Government abroad and giving credibility, at home, to the idea of "change in continuity", in order to make the Government of Jean-Claude acceptable to all. The youth of the head of state was a key selling-point, since he could be represented as a symbol of hope and renewal.

Initially the operation opened the way for an influx of foreign capital. François Duvalier's stormy nationalism and his extremely bad reputation abroad had deterred foreign investors, who were uneasy, not about the tyrant himself, but about the climate of uncertainty he caused. On the other hand, Jean-Claude Duvalier, through his Government's "diplomatic availability" and *laissez-faire* approach, practised an "open-door" policy that found its clearest expression in the establishment of commercial banks and assembly plants.

The enhancement of Haiti's international image through liberalization also entailed modernization of the machinery of repression, which gave the Government, pressured to some extent by public groups, the opportunity to make a conciliatory gesture and temporarily do without the rather conspicuous *Tontons Macoutes*. They have since gone back on duty. At the same time, the army increased its firepower, trained its anti-guerrilla corps, learned modern close-combat techniques, and increased its attack capacity to an unparalleled level. In this connection, the 1975 resumption of foreign military assistance gave official sanction to a clandestine and unofficial trade that had continued in spite of the Kennedy embargo.

Notwithstanding the refinement of the machinery of repression, certain significant signs of resistance have appeared in Haiti. In the social sphere, particular note should be taken of demonstrations by farmers who, shouting "Down with famine!", have seized undistributed stocks of food provided by international relief organizations and of the turbulence of others whose land has been expropriated, as well as of disturbances by assembly-plant workers demanding back pay and wage-increases and of a paralysing strike by public-transportation drivers. In the political sphere, men-

tion should be made of the release of 105 political prisoners in September 1977, of the creation of a human-rights league, and of the efforts by certain journalists to regain control of their professional association and to produce politically-independent publications.

This outburst of political activity does not mean that the Government of Haiti wishes to revise the doctrinal and ideological tenets on which its power rests or to abandon its autocratic treatment of the Haitian people. Concessions were wrung from the Duvalier dictatorship after a long, hard and bitter struggle. The battle for an "independent press" merits special attention.

The press

Although Jean-Claude Duvalier has renounced neither his father's doctrine nor his methods, he has nonetheless undertaken to create a new political image for himself. To this end, he tolerated the operation, in the capital, of two weekly publications and a radio station the content of which made them stand out from the others. Though they did not initiate truly democratic debate, they made veiled criticisms of the previous Duvalier regime and, through allusions to other governments, such as Franco's in Spain and Salazar's in Portugal and the current Nicaraguan regime under Somoza, they criticized the present Government of Haiti as well. Furthermore, this new impetus persists in this fringe element of the press, in spite of the "disappearance" of a radio announcer, the assassination of a reporter for the weekly *Petit Samedi Soir*, and an attempt on the life of Pastor Nérée, editor of *Hebdo Jeune Presse*, which is not being printed because the conditions required for the production of an independent publication are lacking. The movement has also had to endure censure meted out to isolated journalists or editorial staffs, as well as police strong-arm sessions at which a single journalist might confront 17 policemen.

The Government faces the dilemma that it cannot be openly repressive without destroying the fiction of liberalization it is itself fabricating. The regime reaps political benefits from the desire for independence felt by a section of the press — benefits that are particularly valuable because the journalists know the limits of the state's tolerance, having paid the price for overstepping them. This so-called independent press never discusses, for example, the possibility of a political alternative — every thing must happen "within the framework of the present system". At the very most it calls for a dialogue involving all Haitians.

able to provide men, ideas and expertise in order to bring about some improvement in the country's socio-economic situation 'within the framework of the present system'. It glosses over the responsibility that should be borne by the present leaders or the economic regression that took place in Haiti under François Duvalier and for Haiti's being unofficially placed under trusteeship by international financing agencies and bilateral development-aid programs. It is also silent about the limitations inherent in all activities undertaken within the framework of the present system".

Yet the very existence of such a press indicates that a crack has appeared in the new mask of Duvalierism. Haiti seems to be entering a period of self-expression. A certain number of intellectuals and journalists are trying, within the limits of the prevailing autocracy, to discard the traditional flattery and obsequiousness of the Haitian press. They are not yet calling a spade a spade, or putting the spotlight on all the situations that should be exposed, but at least they have convictions and, while making it clear that they do not speak for an opposition party, they refuse to act as mouthpieces and buttresses of the Duvalier political philosophy. This is certainly very little in the way of progress. However, in the recent history of the Haitian press, it is definitely something new. Until now, such murmurings have succeeded only in echoing the louder, more insistent voices of the working classes. They do not yet reflect the interests and aims of all those who, in various ways, are harmed by Duvalierism. Consequently, while neither overestimating nor underestimating these complaints, efforts should be made to strengthen and amplify them, so as to give new impetus to public expression of opinions by all Haitian groups interested in changing a Government that is attempting to become a permanent institution.

An ideological struggle was waged within the governing clan after the death of François Duvalier. Certain supporters, the tyrant's abettors in crime, were removed. A team of technocrats, judging that their hour had come, began to dream of reorganizing the public service, modernizing the machinery of government and the economic infrastructure and developing the capacity for absorbing and utilizing international aid flowing into Haiti. This group was quickly disillusioned and its members either resigned, accepted exile heightened by an ambassadorship, or were dragged before the courts on questionable charges. Meanwhile, the hawks of the

regime returned to power.

The period since the death of François Duvalier has also been characterized by a fierce battle among industrialized countries to win control of the Haitian market through international aid. Consumer products will be sold to the privileged class, which has considerable purchasing power. The demonstration effect operates particularly well in that it is strengthened by tourism. The underprivileged exploited groups will also become a market through "tied" aid — more bluntly, they will provide a pretext for dumping surplus goods in Haiti, sending in contract-hungry transport companies, and employing co-operants attracted by the wonderful climate, the opportunity to gain experience and additional earnings.

In this context, the institutionalization of Jean-Claude Duvalier's regime is becoming a necessity. Seven years have passed since his father's demise. The young boy no longer mouths texts he is given to read. He now has an objective: "My father," repeats the occupant of the Presidential palace, "led the political revolution. I shall lead the economic revolution." In the meantime, he is trying to make a "first name" for himself, and a new "ism" is emerging in Haitian politics: "Jean-Claudisme". He is losing interest in being a symbol of Duvalierist power that François Duvalier's supporters had to fall in line with, in spite of their differences, in order to continue running the country; his intention is to exercise effective Presidential authority. He still talks about liberalizing the regime established by his father, but his chief aim is to institutionalize "Jean-Claudisme", his own brand of government.

*Intention
to exercise
effective
authority*

Institutionalization

The institutionalization of "Jean-Claudisme" presupposes a doctrine, appropriate institutions, and a complete change of Government personnel. In Port-au-Prince, the doctrine is being defined, the institutions are being established, and the Government personnel are being recruited. This is taking place on two distinct levels, and within the "framework of the country's present political structures". Its first aim, therefore, is not to undermine that bastion of power, the "Presidency for life". No social program other than that of the Duvaliers may be developed, and groups attempting to promote such programs are outlawed or exiled, regardless of their political orientation. The operation now under way is only the corollary of the process of legitimizing hereditary power in a country that, according to its consti-

tution, is a republic and should elect its leader by universal suffrage. The possibility of assuming power is denied even to Duvalierists if they are not members of the Duvalier family. The Duvaliers, having simply confiscated power, mete out favours or punishment as they wish. Nothing prevents Jean-Claude Duvalier from some day naming his offspring, if ever he has any, to succeed him. The "Presidency for life" stands in the way of any change in Haitian political institutions.

The movement to institutionalize "Jean-Claudisme" does not aim to include farmers and workers — the country's most underprivileged and exploited groups — in decision-making processes. The community-development councils and co-operatives — in fact, all the agencies established with international assistance — are generally controlled by the same *élite*. The Haitian farmer has a new "leader", but his situation remains unchanged. This control constitutes another bastion of despotism that must be destroyed if Haitians are to realize their potential for self-development instead of living in a perpetual state of mendicancy in a country placed, *de facto*, under international trusteeship.

All the laws prohibiting political parties, labour organizations and the practical exercise of democratic rights are still in effect. All the police methods invented by the supporters of François Duvalier still flourish under his son's Government. Arbitrary arrests, torture and violations of human rights are still occurring in Haiti. The institutionalization of "Jean-Claudisme" will mean the establishment of despotism and of a strange version of democracy and human rights.

It would be a mistake to believe that the violence of the Duvaliers is a tragic fact of life, which must be accepted. Some feel that Haitians are not made for democracy. Others maintain that a solution to the crucial problems of illiteracy, disease, hunger and slums can be found only through the establishment and maintenance of a dictatorship, euphemistically described as "strong government". This error implies acceptance, in the case of Haiti and, accordingly, of similar societies,

of a level of autocracy below which the violence of the governing classes would be considered tolerable. Any political methods not exceeding this level would be condoned, since the nations concerned do not have a democratic tradition. Naturally, those involved — in this case the Haitians — cannot support such a notion, implying, as it does, that there are two kinds of men: "human beings" in the full sense of the term and sub-humans. Such a postulate could initially undermine and then destroy the need for legitimate governments in states where institutional democracy was already established. Democracy is fragile and can be jeopardized by an acceptance of possible compromise, when human rights, and especially the right to life, are disregarded.

Doomed

In any event, "Jean-Claudisme" is doomed to failure, in spite of outside support. The current operation will not enable the regime to enlarge its popular base to the point of winning a national consensus. It merely affords wealthy businessmen and landowners an opportunity to reaffirm their loyalty to a team that allows them to amass wealth. It gives a fraction of the lower middle class a unique opportunity to rationalize its support of a regime whose capacity to adjust to the national and international situation is reinforced by the very weakness of the opposition.

However, this operation offers no alternative to the workers, farmers, young people and other progressive forces who refuse to participate in the destruction of the country. For them, the future lies only in changing the country's socio-economic structures. The machinery of repression can frustrate their claims for a time, but it cannot thwart them forever. The Haitian Government is tossing the people from the myth of liberalization to that of "Jean-Claudisme". Demonstration of popular discontent, spontaneous strikes, demands for higher wages and the labour movement's attempts to reorganize show that the working class is not duped by the regime's propaganda.

Reference Section

Canadian Foreign Relations

Recent Books

Dudley, Leonard, and Claude Montmarquette
The supply of Canadian foreign aid: explanation and evaluation. Ottawa: Economic Council of Canada, 1978. 153 pp.

Leaps, Leo
Operation Morninglight: terror in our skies, the true story of Cosmos 954. New York: Paddington Press, 1978. 208 pp.

Leepak, H. P., and G. K. Vachon
A strategic and economic analysis of Canadian national interests in Latin America. Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1978. 105 pp. (ORAE Extramural Paper No. 2).

North-South Institute
Commodity trade: test case for a new economic order. (Canada North-South; 1977-1978, 3). Ottawa: North-South Institute, 1978. 100 pp.

Petersburg, Peter
Lester Pearson and the dream of unity. Toronto: Doubleday, 1978. 456 pp.

Swanson, Roger Frank
Intergovernmental perspectives on the Canada-U.S. relationship. New York: New York University Press, 1978. 278 pp.

Recent Articles

Anderson, Betsy
 "Canada joins the big leagues in bank-rolling Chile's junta." In *Last Post* November 1978. Pp. 16-18.

Battie, Clayton E.
 "Preparations for peacekeeping at the national and international level." In *Canadian Defence Quarterly* 8:26-29 Autumn 1978.

"Canada-U.S. relations: co-operation and dispute settlement in the North American context." In *Canada-United States Law Journal* 1:1-169 Summer 1978.
 (Joint proceedings Canadian Council on International Law, sixth annual conference 1977, and Canada-United States Law Institute, first annual conference 1977)

Cados, Robert
 "Yankee doodle dandies." In *Last Post* September 1978. Pp. 14-19.

Chudy, Jane
 "Why Canadian business is not getting more World Bank contracts." In *Development Directions* August/September 1978. Pp. 22-25.

Cohen, Maxwell
 "Thou shalt not pollute: the International Joint Commission at 70." In *Report on Confederation* October 1978. Pp. 19-21.

Drolet, Jean-Paul
 "Resource diplomacy in a Canadian perspective." In *Resources Policy* 4:189-193 September 1978.

Endrst, Jeff
 "UN writing a code of conduct for transnationals." In *Development Directions* August/September 1978. Pp. 17-19.

Fairley, H. Scott
 "Private remedies for transboundary injury in Canada and the United States: constraints upon having to sue where you can collect." In *Ottawa Law Review* 10:253-272 1978.

Gellner, John
 "Strategic analysis in Canada." In *International Journal* 33:493-505 Summer 1978.

Hillmer, Norman
 "Defence and ideology: the Anglo-Canadian military 'alliance' in the 1930s." In *International Journal* 33:588-612 Summer 1978.

Johnson, Barbara, and Frank Langdon
 "The impact of the Law of the Sea Conference upon the Pacific region: Part 1." In *Pacific Affairs* 51:5-23 Spring 1978.

Kapur, Ashok
 "The Canada-India nuclear negotiations: some hypotheses and lessons." In *World Today* 34:311-320 August 1978.

Kettle, John
 "The U.S. in our future." In *Executive* August 1978. Pp. 24-45.

McGillivray, Don
 "The pact that binds." In *Report on Confederation* October 1978. Pp. 8-11.

Malkin, Ben
 "The debate over untying Canada's aid funds." In *Development Directions* August/September 1978. Pp. 12-16.

Roy, Patricia E.
 "The soldiers Canada didn't want: her Chinese and Japanese citizens." In *Canadian Historical Review* 59:341-358 September 1978.

Woodcock, George
 "The mirror of Narcissus." In *Saturday Night* September 1978. Pp. 27-39.

Publications of the Department of External Affairs

The publications listed below are concerned with international affairs and Canadian foreign policy.

Press Releases, issued by the Departmental Press Office:

- No. 85 (October 4, 1978) Investment-protection agreement with Western Samoa.
- No. 86 (October 4, 1978) Situation in Lebanon.
- No. 87 (October 10, 1978) Australian Foreign Minister to visit Ottawa.
- No. 88 (October 11, 1978) Secretary of State for External Affairs to visit southern Africa.
- No. 89 (October 12, 1978) Canada signs air-transport agreement with Haiti.
- No. 90 (October 19, 1978) Advisory Committee on Academic Relations.
- No. 91 (October 19, 1978) Canadian delegation to twentieth session of UNESCO General Conference.
- No. 92 (October 19, 1978) Information on obtaining of passports during interrupted postal service.
- No. 93 (October 19, 1978) Joint statement by Government of South Africa and Western members of UN Security Council.
- No. 94 (October 19, 1978) Unilateral statement by foreign ministers of Western members of the UN Security Council concerning relation between fixed date for election and maintenance of effective fire-power.
- No. 95 (October 24, 1978) Canada signs new Convention on Future Multilateral Co-operation in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries.
- No. 96 (October 26, 1978) Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs to visit Canada.
- No. 97 (October 27, 1978) Bureau of International Cultural Relations and Bureau of Information created in Department of External Affairs.
- No. 98 (November 3, 1978) Canada to be represented at Dominican independence celebration by Acting High Commissioner in Trinidad and Tobago.
- No. 99 (November 3, 1978) Canada to continue participating in UN Emergency Force in Middle East until mid-1979.
- No. 100 (November 6, 1978) Visit to Canada of U.S. Secretary of State.
- No. 101 (November 6, 1978) Tutankhamon treasures to be shown in Toronto November-December 1979.
- No. 102 (November 21, 1978) Summary of statement by departmental Adviser on Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs to First Committee of thirty-third regular session of UN General Assembly.

No. 103 (November 20, 1978) Canada signs treaty with Romania.

No. 104 (November 22, 1978) Canada and U.S. sign revised Great Lakes water-quality agreement.

Treaty Information

Bilateral

Egypt, Arab Republic of

Protocol between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt concerning the Exhibition of the Treasures of Tutankhamon

Cairo, November 6, 1978

In force, November 6, 1978

Haiti

Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of Haiti on Air Transport

Ottawa, October 12, 1978

In force provisionally October 12, 1978

Japan

Parcel Post Agreement between Canada and Japan

Tokyo, April 11, 1978

In force October 1, 1978

Morocco

Convention between the Government of Canada and the Government of Morocco for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital

Ottawa, December 22, 1975

Instruments of Ratification exchanged November 9, 1978

In force November 9, 1978

Poland

Protocol amending the Long-Term Grain Agreement between Canada and Poland

Ottawa, November 27, 1978

In force November 27, 1978

Romania

Convention between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Socialist Republic of Romania for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital

Ottawa, November 20, 1978

Sweden

Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of Sweden for Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy

Stockholm, September 11, 1962

Instruments of Ratification exchanged December 6, 1962

In force, December 6, 1962

Terminated November 17, 1978

Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of Sweden

concerning the Uses of Nuclear Material, Equipment, Facilities and Information transferred between Canada and Sweden

New York, September 27, 1977

Instruments of Ratification exchanged November 17, 1978

In force November 17, 1978

United States of America

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America concerning the Employment of Two Data Link Transmitters of Connecting Cable in the Bed of the St Mary's River in Ontario

Ottawa, September 29 and October 16, 1978

In force October 16, 1978

Agreement between Canada and the United States of America on Great Lakes Water Quality, 1978

Ottawa, November 22, 1978

In force November 22, 1978

Multilateral

Statute of International Centre for Study of Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property — Rome Centre

Adopted at New Delhi, November-December 1956; revised April 24, 1963, and April 14-17, 1969

Entered into force May 10, 1958

Canada's Instrument of Accession deposited November 7, 1978

Entered into force for Canada November 7, 1978

Convention on Future Multilateral Co-operation in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries
Signed Ottawa, October 24, 1978

Index 1978

Africa

Current unrest, May/June, p. 44, Shaw
Ethiopian conflict, Jul./Aug., p. 35, Parent
South African press, Jan./Feb., p. 3, Young;
May/June, p. 51 (*letter*), Pearce; May/
June, p. 51 (*letter*), Steward

Association of Southeast Asian Nations

Canada and ASEAN, Mar./Apr., p. 28, Small

Bonn "summit" meeting *see* External Affairs

Brazil

Relations with Canada, May/June, p. 13, Guy

Britain

Chances of economic recovery, May/June, p. 14, Keegan

Canadian studies abroad

Canadian academics abroad, Jan./Feb., p. 19 (*box*)

Communism

"Eurocommunism" in France, Italy and Spain, Jan./Feb., p. 26, Donneur & MacLeod

Cyprus *see* United Nations

Denmark

Relations with Canada, May/June, p. 39, Painchaud

Disarmament

UN special session on, May/June, p. 30, Skinner; Sept./Oct., p. 8, Alcock; Sept./Oct., p. 8, Critchley; Sept./Oct., p. 9, Epstein; Sept./Oct., p. 9, Legault; Sept./Oct., p. 9, Thomson; Nov./Dec., p. 10, Merle; Nov./Dec., p. 14, Gordon

U.S.-Soviet talks on, May/June, p. 35, Ranger

Ethiopia *see* Africa

External Affairs

Bonn "summit" meeting, Nov./Dec., p. 33, Gwyn

Documents on, Vol. 12 (*review*), Sept./Oct., p. 32, Hardy

Public influence on foreign policy, May/June, p. 21, Page

Provincial interest in, Sept./Oct., p. 28, McLaren

Responsible government and, May/June, p. 26, Stairs

U.S. foreign policy, Nov./Dec., p. 26, Lentner

Fisheries *see* International law

France (*see also* Communism)

Political situation after defeat of Left, Sept./Oct., p. 19, Legault

Garrison Diversion Unit *see* United States/Canada relations

Haiti

Since elder Duvalier, Nov./Dec., p. 37, Bernardin

Human rights

Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Jul./Aug., p. 16, Best; Jul./Aug., p. 19, Skilling

General discussion of, Nov./Dec., p. 30, Copithorne

Human rights and *détente*, Jul./Aug., p. 12, Bromke

International aspects, Jul./Aug., p. 9, Pearson

Role of International Labour Organization, Sept./Oct., p. 34 (*letter*) Harker

Women's rights, Jan./Feb., p. 20, Bird

International Joint Commission *see* United States/Canada relations

International law

Extended fisheries zones, Mar./Apr., p. 12, Munro

Law-of-the-sea talks, Jan./Feb., p. 33, Mawhinney

Maritime forces and sea law, Mar./Apr., p. 3, Critchley

Maritime pollution, Mar./Apr., p. 8, M'Gonigle & Zacher

Italy *see* Communism

Jerusalem *see* Middle East

Law of the sea *see* International law

Lebanon *see* Middle East

Middle East (*see also* United Nations)

Canadian votes on, May/June, p. 9,
Grossman

Jerusalem settlement question, Mar./Apr.,
p. 18, George; Mar./Apr., p. 24, Lucy

Lebanon situation, Jan./Feb., p. 8, Liebich

Sadat visit to Israel, Mar./Apr., p. 32, Vigny

Multinational corporations

Limitations on sovereignty, Mar./Apr., p. 36
(*letter*), Shier

Natural resources

Who controls them? Mar./Apr., p. 50
(*letter*), Delbridge

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Committee on the Challenge of Modern
Society, Jan./Feb., p. 40 (*letter*), Klette;
Sept./Oct., p. 36 (*letter*), Kyba

Non-military aspects of, Nov./Dec., p. 3,
Ignatieff

Nuclear arms (*see also* Disarmament)

Canada's sales policy "moralistic", Jan./
Feb., p. 16, Wilson

Safeguards, Jul./Aug., p. 42, Noble; Sept./
Oct., p. 24, Legault

Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development

Economic stresses on, Sept./Oct., p. 1,
Henderson

Plumptre, Wynne (author)

"Three Decades of Decision", Sept./Oct.,
p. 31 (*review*), Blanchette

Pollution *see* International law

Robertson, Norman

Memorial, Jul./Aug., p. 3, LePan

Round-table tribute, Jul./Aug., p. 6 (*box*)

South Africa *see* Africa

Spain *see* Communism

United Nations (*see also* Disarmament and
Middle East)

Realities of, Sept./Oct., p. 15, Tabor

Thirty-second session, General Assembly,
May/June, p. 3, Francis

United States/Canada relations

Alaska pipeline negotiations, Jan./Feb.,
p. 12, Peacock

American view of Canada, Jul./Aug., p. 2,
Nuechterlein


Garrison Diversion Unit problem, Nov./
Dec., p. 22, Nossal

"Delphi Exercise", Jul./Aug., p. 23, Muntz

North American *détente*, Nov./Dec., p. 1,
Handleman

Water problems, Jul./Aug., p. 27, McGav

U.S.S.R. *see* Disarmament



If undelivered,
return cover only to:
DSS Printing Operations
Ottawa, K1A 0S7, Canada

En cas de non-livraison,
retourner cette couverture seulement au:
Ministère des Approvisionnements
et Services-Imprimerie
Ottawa, K1A 0S7, Canada



External Affairs **Affaires extérieures**
Canada **Canada**

ISSN 0381-4874

January/February 1978

International Perspectives

A journal of opinion on world affairs

271
LA
I56

READERSHIP
SURVEY

Peacekeeping in Lebanon

Economic growth in advanced societies

Future of Canada-France relations

Yugoslav ambivalence towards détente

Comprehensive test ban negotiations

READERSHIP SURVEY

Contents

January/February 1979

Peacekeeping in Lebanon/ <i>Henry Wiseman</i>	3
World economy	
Future of growth in advanced societies/ <i>David S. Wright</i>	8
How Ottawa views Third World/ <i>P. V. Lyon,</i> <i>R. B. Byers & D. Leyton-Brown</i>	11
Future of Canada-France relations/ <i>Neil B. Bishop</i>	16
Eastern Europe	
Yugoslav ambivalence towards détente/ <i>Francine Friedman</i>	19
Hungarian minority in Romania/ <i>Paul Pilisi</i>	24
Test ban negotiations/ <i>Ashok Kapur</i>	29
Book review	
Goldmann's <i>Jewish Paradox</i> by <i>Sidney Freifeld</i>	33
Reference Section	35

International Perspectives is issued bimonthly in English and French by the Department of External Affairs, Ottawa. Any material in this publication may be reproduced. Mention of *International Perspectives* as the source would be appreciated.

Published by authority of the
Secretary of State for External Affairs.

Authorized as third-class mail,
Post Office Department, Ottawa.

Subscription rates: Canada, \$4.00 a year; single copies \$1.00; other countries \$5.00 a year, single copies \$1.25. Remittances, payable to the Receiver General of Canada, should be sent to: Canadian Government Printing Office, Ottawa, Ontario, K1A 0S9.

Editors:

Alex I. Inglis
Louis Balthazar

International Perspectives is a journal of opinion on Canada's role in the world and on current international questions. Its purpose is to stimulate discussion and interest in international affairs. It is not intended to reflect Canadian Government policy or perceptions. Indeed, the editors often seek to include material that expresses different or contrary views. The Department of External Affairs accepts no responsibility for the views expressed except where it is clearly stated that an article by a departmental officer is a statement of Government policy. All other articles contain a specific disclaimer of departmental responsibility for their contents.

Letters of comment on issues discussed in *International Perspectives* are welcome and will be considered for publication. Please address your correspondence to: International Perspectives, Department of External Affairs, L. B. Pearson Bldg., 125 Sussex Drive, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, K1A 0G1.

Lebanon: the latest example of UN peacekeeping action

By Henry Wiseman

The swift establishment of the United Nations interim force for southern Lebanon, UNIFIL, on March 19, 1978, in response to Lebanon's charge of "naked aggression" by Israel, marks a further extension in the complexity and the mandated responsibilities of United Nations peacekeeping. An instrument that had been overtaxed in the Congo, abused in Cyprus and actually expelled from the Sinai, peacekeeping was nonetheless reintroduced in the Sinai and the Golan Heights in 1973, and has now been thrust into the Lebanese crisis. Though subject to its special failings and seldom free of criticism, peacekeeping has been effective as a component of the broader United Nations commitment to the maintenance of international peace and security.

Since UNIFIL has only recently completed its first authorized life-span of six months and since the general situation in Lebanon remains so volatile, no current treatment can do it adequate justice. Nevertheless, its unique mandate, its activities and, as we shall argue, its considerable success to date provide some basis for comparison with other operations and, in general, sufficient evidence of the growing effectiveness and legitimacy of United Nations peacekeeping.

In May 1958, widespread revolt broke out in Lebanon. In June, responding to the claim by President Camille Chamoun of massive, illegal and unprovoked intervention in the affairs of Lebanon by the United Arab Republic (Egypt and Syria), the Security Council established the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon, UNOGIL, by a vote of ten to none, with the U.S.S.R. abstaining. Its function was to ensure that there would be no illegal infiltration of personnel or arms across the Lebanese borders and, to this end, the Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjöld, defined its role as limited strictly to observation. Its size was estab-

lished at 550, contributed by 20 nations, and its total cost was approximately \$5 million, apportioned as part of the regular budget. It had a life-span of only six months, during which time it was able to provide little evidence of the suspected infiltration. Nonetheless, its presence did help to shore up the pro-Western government of President Chamoun. However, when that government was further threatened by a pro-Nasser *coup* in Iraq, Chamoun requested military aid from the United States. In July 1958, 14,000 Marines were landed in Lebanon to stabilize the situation. Simultaneously, British forces entered Jordan. UNOGIL, though outwardly compromised by this action, was held to its original mandate. Directed by a General Assembly resolution to make "such practical arrangements" as would facilitate the withdrawal of U.S. and British troops from Lebanon and Jordan, the Secretary-General did increase the strength of UNOGIL. For this and other reasons, stability was quickly restored, foreign troops were withdrawn by early November and one month later UNOGIL was disbanded.

However, since UNOGIL had failed to confirm the immediate cause of its own creation and had been subjected to controversy on account of the U.S. military presence, which deadlocked the Security Council and moved the issue to the General Assembly, its political justification was clouded. Coming so soon after the Suez crisis of 1956, it bore the stigma of Western intervention.

Broader scope

Though there are striking parallels between the events of 1958 and 1978, UNIFIL is much broader in scope and significance. In escalated reprisal for a Palestinian commando raid on Tel Aviv that killed 35 persons and wounded 70, Israel launched a determined invasion of southern Lebanon designed to root out Palestinian liberation forces from the area between its border with Lebanon and the Litani River. The action resulted in casualties on all sides and caused a stream of 250,000 hapless refugees to flee northward towards Beirut, beyond the immediate

Stability quickly restored

Dr Wiseman teaches political science at the University of Guelph. He was made peacekeeping his principal field of research. The views expressed here are those of Dr Wiseman.

battle area. The Israeli purpose was largely accomplished. However, the already chaotic and inflammable situation in Lebanon, involving an ineffectual central government, civil war between Christian, Moslem and Palestinian forces in and around Beirut and a forcibly interventionist Syrian army of 30,000 men acting as a Pan-Arab peacekeeping force, was made even more explosive by Israel's action. It also threatened direct confrontation between Syrian and Israeli forces.

Denying any responsibility for the Palestinian commando operation, Lebanon brought the issue to the attention of the Secretary-General on March 15 and on March 17 called for an emergency meeting of the Security Council. Israel, charging "continuous acts of terror and violence", did the same. A meeting of the Security Council in which Lebanon, several other Arab states, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israel were invited to participate, was called immediately into session.

UNIFIL mandate

In the highly-charged atmosphere, the debate was characterized by rhetoric, propaganda, charge and counter-charge. Even so, the draft resolution submitted by the United States was adopted by a vote of 12 in favour, with Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union abstaining and China, which was opposed to the idea of peacekeeping, not participating in the vote. Resolution 425 called on Israel "immediately to cease its military action against Lebanese territorial integrity and withdraw forthwith . . . [and decided] to establish immediately under its authority a United Nations interim force for southern Lebanon for the purpose of confirming the withdrawal of Israeli forces, restoring international peace and security and assisting the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in this area". Though it charged Israel with aggression and was unwilling to agree that UN troops be given functions "not proper to them in regard to the transfer of effective authority in that region to the Government of Lebanon", the Soviet Union did not veto the resolution, on the grounds of the support it had received from Lebanon and other Arab states.

The mandate was further defined and elaborated by the Secretary-General's report, which was adopted as Resolution 426. The size of the force was set at 4,000. The operational guidelines adopted were those for the two peacekeeping forces in the Middle East — the United Nations Emergency Force in the Sinai (UNEF)

and the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force on the Golan Heights (UNDOF) —, with the renunciation of force except in self-defence, which included "resistance to attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties under the mandate". The expenses of the force were established as expenses of the organization under Article 17, Paragraph 2, in the amount of \$54 million. Following the pattern of UNEF and UNDOF, the General Assembly assessed the member states, from the most-developed to the least-developed, in amounts of descending order.

Effectively, UNIFIL was charged with the formidable task of intervening in a critical situation, both domestic and international. It was introduced into the area before the establishment of a ceasefire, which it had to ensure and confirm. It was to supervise the withdrawal of Israeli forces and ensure the absence of hostilities over a densely-populated area of 450 square miles. UNIFIL is far more than a force interposed between the two parties that have agreed in advance to the general objectives of a peacekeeping mandate. Domestic Lebanese politics, the instability of the Government, the actions of the PLO and the support it receives from friendly states, the strength of the Christian forces and the support they receive from Israel, the purposes and actions of the powerful Syrian military presence in Lebanon and the persistent civil war that involves all parties on the battleground — all these are factors affecting the outcome of UNIFIL's mandate in southern Lebanon. It must, therefore, engage in sensitive political negotiations with both state and non-state actors that are subject to erratic and volatile political and military behaviour. The scene is reminiscent of the Congo in 1960-1965. Since the successful operation of UNIFIL cannot but contribute to the Israeli objective of ridding southern Lebanon of forces hostile to Israel, the difficulty of the UN in steering a neutral course is patent.

All this UNIFIL was called upon to accomplish under circumstances in which the U.S.S.R. disagreed with the transfer of effective authority to the Government of Lebanon, which, if carried out, would have eliminated the PLO from the area it had used as a staging-ground for raids in Israel. The Soviet Union also expressed grave reservations about paying its assessment for the force, and closely monitored the activities of the Secretary-General to ensure that all would be done with the approval of the Security Council. The Secretary-General was forced to act with

great care and with sensitivity to every political nuance. For example, because of Arab objections and undoubted Soviet concurrence, his observation of March 19 to the Security Council that UNIFIL should prevent "unauthorized armed persons" from entering the zone of UNIFIL competence was altered to read "to ensure the peaceful character of the area of operations, and to that end control movement into and out of the zone". The issue of what forces should be allowed or denied entry proved a continuing source of difficulty for UNIFIL.

Deployment

In the interests of speed and efficiency, the Secretary-General drew, as in previous cases, on the resources of existing peacekeeping operations. Advance organizational and logistic personnel (Canadian, Swedish and Iranian) drawn from UNTSO (the UN Truce Supervisory Organization), UNEF and UNDOF, arrived within days under the interim command of Major-General E. A. Erskine, the Chief of Staff of UNTSO. In addition, offers of troops were accepted from France, Nepal and Norway; these advance units arrived by March 23. The unsolicited French offer is particularly significant. The five permanent members had been specifically excluded from UNEF and UNDOF, though the Soviet Union had, at that time, proposed such participation. This time France, which helped to found the state of Lebanon, reported that it considered it a "moral duty" to contribute "in order to preserve the territorial integrity of Lebanon". As in all cases of composition, approval by the members of the Security Council was requested and granted. The U.S.S.R. may have opposed French participation, but there is no evidence that it raised any objection. In any event, this arrangement added considerable weight and purpose to the UN presence in the area. France, and later Norway, agreed to supply the crucial element of any UN peacekeeping force — that is, logistics. Canada also agreed, after initial reluctance, to supply a communications unit of about 117 men for a period not exceeding six months. Its logistic capabilities were already stretched to the limit because of continuing participation in UNFICYP (the UN Force in Cyprus), UNEF and UNDOF. The Canadian contingent was, in fact, withdrawn after six months, the first time Canada had adhered to a declared intention of putting a time-limit on its participation in a UN peacekeeping venture.

From the very first days of the oper-

ation, the complexity, sensitivity and danger of the situation became apparent. Israel issued a cease-fire order on March 19, two days after Resolution 425, but received an uncertain reply from the PLO. (As reported in the *New York Times* of March 22, "if they stop bombarding us, we will not respond by shelling them, but behind their lines everything is fair game".) But the PLO was not the only source of trouble. The first units to arrive from Canada, France, Iran and Sweden were sent immediately to the Tyre area, along the Litani River, and also to the temporary UN headquarters at Nagoura, close to the Israeli border. Those that were dispatched from UNDOF, and had to cross the border from Israel, were met with threats from right-wing Christian militia under the command of Major Saad Haddad. However, they were later allowed to pass.

Then, on March 24, the French contingent ran into trouble as it entered Tyre. The PLO, which occupied the base, did not prevent the entry, but they refused to leave themselves. There were numerous skirmishes and, on March 29, UNIFIL suffered its first casualty when a Swedish vehicle hit a land-mine. Nevertheless, as the strength of UNIFIL approached 3,000 by mid-April with the arrival of units from Nepal and Norway, and reached its projected complement of 4,000 with the arrival of Senegalese and Nigerian troops at the end of April, Lieutenant-General Ensio Siilasvuo, Coordinator of United Nations Peacekeeping in the Middle East, began to implement his plan to push the deployment of UN troops south of the Litani River with each successive withdrawal of Israeli forces.

But the troubles continued. In the first days of May, French and Senegalese units came under fire at the western end of the line near Tyre, suffering several dead and wounded, as they tried to prevent infiltration of armed Palestinians and left-wing Moslems. At the eastern end of the line round Marjayoun, the Norwegian unit took the view that it had no right to stop the movement in and out of its area of local armed Christian militia on the grounds that they were Lebanese. At the centre of the line, Iranian and Nepalese units tried to avoid taking a stand one way or another. It was reported that officers of various contingents complained that orders coming from the UN Secretariat were "contradictory, unclear and unrealistic". Such problems of general interpretation of the mandate and specific implementation are common to most peacekeeping operations, especially those

*Infiltration
of armed
Palestinians
and Moslems*

as heavily laden with political considerations as the operations in Cyprus and the Congo. There is also the problem of the meaning of "the use of force in self-defence", when a strict implementation of the mandate by the officer in the field may elicit armed action by the party concerned.

It was the frequency of such incidents involving the use of force, the extensive and rugged terrain that had to be patrolled and the delicate and sometimes dangerous tasks to be performed that persuaded the Secretary-General, after his personal tour of the area, to ask the Security Council to increase the total strength of the force from 4,000 to 6,000, a request that was granted on May 3. Fiji, Iran and Ireland agreed to provide the additional forces. The Secretary-General also requested troops from Romania and several other East European states. Refused in each case, he was at least able to report to the Security Council that he had made every effort to achieve "balanced composition" for UNIFIL.

Political considerations

As UNIFIL met with resistance in the field in its effort to deploy its forces throughout the area from the Litani River to the Israeli border, and with continuing difficulty in the fulfilment of the other aspects of its mandate, much of the UN activity was concentrated at the political level. General Siilasvuo, General Erskine, Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim and his Under-Secretary, Roberto E. Guyer, in various visits to Beirut, Damascus and Jerusalem, used their considerable skills in prevailing on Lebanon, Syria, Israel and the PLO to co-operate in enabling UNIFIL to fulfil its mandate. Pressure was put on Yasir Arafat to withhold hostile action in the southern sector. The French Ambassador in Beirut also held discussions with Arafat to the same purpose. But perhaps the most convincing pressure came from Syria, which, though it was party, with the PLO, to a mutual defence pact and was opposed to Israel in every way, placed a ban on movement of troops and material assistance to the PLO in the southern sector. Arafat agreed to comply, and arrangements were worked out to avoid incidents.

Heavy pressure by the United States and the United Nations was also brought to bear on Israel for rapid and complete withdrawal. On April 6, Israel finally agreed to a staged withdrawal. The first stage was completed by April 14 in the eastern sector, south of the Litani River and adjacent to the Golan Heights. But the pace was slow. In consequence,

Kuwait, acting in the name of the Arab countries, insisted that the Security Council meet and take a tough position on the slowness of the Israeli withdrawal; at the same time, the United States raised the question of Israeli contravention of agreements by using American arms in the invasion of Lebanon; and the Secretary-General issued his third appeal for a rapid and complete withdrawal. Israel responded with a further withdrawal by April 3 from positions comprising 65 per cent of the area of original occupation. Elements of the Senegalese, French, Iranian and Swedish units took over this area. By June 13 the Secretary-General was able to report that all Israeli forces were out of Lebanon and the first phase of the mandate had been completed. But the return of the territory to effective Lebanese authority was still a matter to be resolved.

In its withdrawal, Israel did not turn over to UNIFIL its positions along the 60-mile Israel-Lebanon border, but instead handed them over to Major Saad Haddad's Christian Maronite force, with which Israel maintained friendly and co-operative relations. It appeared, for a time, that Haddad would act on behalf of the Government of Lebanon when he followed its orders and confined his men to barracks and attempted to hand over the positions to UNIFIL. But other Christian elements of the Falangist Party and of the National Liberal Party refused to accept these orders and denied UN entry. They feared that UNIFIL would permit the return of Palestinian elements and, in fact, Israel charged that hundreds of armed PLO terrorists had clandestinely returned to the south and that UNIFIL had permitted the transfer to them of food and other supplies.

Though its forces were strategically stationed throughout the area, UNIFIL proved unable to assert full control as rival Christian forces clashed around them and the Government of Lebanon looked for a way to establish its own authority in the area. To that end the Lebanese Government declared its intention of sending in its own force by June 20. In the meantime, bloody fighting broke out in Beirut between the Christians and the Syrian troops — fighting that alternated with uneasy cease-fires during the ensuing months. Disagreement among the Christians, especially between the Falangists and the Chamounists (who support the Maronites in the south), also erupted into open hostilities. Finally, on July 31, the Lebanese Government did send elements of its reconstituted military forces into the south to replace the Maronite militia.

*Syrian ban
on movement
of assistance
to southern
sector*

Israel raised objections with the stipulative Israel-Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission, established by UNTSO in 1948, arguing that Palestinian guerillas should not be allowed into the area, that the frontier should be kept open to allow contact between Israel and the Maronite-controlled areas and that Maronite officers should not be punished for their defiance of the Lebanese Government and UNIFIL. Nevertheless, a Lebanese Government battalion, apparently under Syrian escort, moved towards a Maronite position in a village policed by UN troops. The Maronites, however, held firm. Fears were expressed that the Syrians would gain entry into the area, and the Syrian escort was withdrawn. On this occasion, the UN acted as intermediary between the Lebanese and the Maronites. However, fighting broke out between them and by mid-August the Lebanese battalion abandoned its efforts to enter the area. Reminiscent of August 1960, when the Lumumba Government of the Congo tried to follow ONUC (the United Nations Operation in the Congo) into secessionist Katanga but was thwarted by the UN forces, the Lebanese Government gave consideration to the redefinition of the United Nations role to permit the use of force if necessary to dislodge the Maronite militia and allow the entry of Government forces. But no action of this kind was taken.

There was also the human problem with which UNIFIL had to deal, since relative stability had been achieved in the south after the total withdrawal of Israeli forces. Many of the 250,000 Lebanese, including about 65,000 Palestinians, who fled the battle-zone upon the Israeli invasion, began streaming back into a zone where towns were smashed or obliterated by war, where food was difficult to obtain and normal services disrupted or entirely unavailable. UNIFIL was called upon to regulate the flow, filter out dissident elements, curtail internecine struggles and, with the help of a special humanitarian fund established earlier by the Secretary-General, do all it could to help provide the basic human needs for a population ravaged by war.

Renewal

At the time of writing, the original mandate has been renewed for a further four months. However, determined efforts by

Lebanese forces to enter southern Lebanon have been forcibly repulsed, UNIFIL has yet to fulfil the second half of its mandate, the establishment of its full control over the area of operations and the return of Lebanese forces. But, with the political turmoil and frequent hostilities raging in the north and with powerful Syrian forces entrenched on Lebanese soil, UNIFIL also serves as a buffer and as a deterrent to any attempt by the PLO or Syria to disrupt progress of the Camp David framework for peace by moving hostile forces close to the Israeli border. This is a silent aspect of the mandate, not to be found in Security Council resolutions.

There can also be no doubt that UNIFIL, in the implementation of Resolution 425, functions at a high level of continuous and critical political involvement. Its role is broader than the forms of interposition of UNEF and UNDOF, and well beyond the limited observation of UNOGIL. It can be likened to the complexity of ONUC, but without the attendant political confusion and financial burden that threatened to wreck the UN. On the contrary, UNIFIL adds to the competence and prestige of the organization.

It may be argued that, in the present era of search for *détente*, UN peacekeeping is less subject to the hostile criticism and partisanship that characterized the period of the Cold War. Soviet restraint and French participation are testimony to this view. The successes of UNEF, UNDOF and UNOGIL also provide the legitimacy to the conception of UN peacekeeping that may carry it to the next stage of agreement in the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations on the standards, planning, control and infrastructure of peacekeeping for future operations.

As for UNIFIL, it will be some time before its full effects can be assessed. It will certainly face serious tests in the foreseeable future. And, unless the Camp David framework for peace is expanded to include all Israel's neighbours, the need for its existence will continue. But peacekeeping is a vital part of the long and precarious path to peace. There should be no doubt that, in this case, peacekeeping and peacemaking are inextricably combined. Any echoes of past voices that criticize peacekeeping for failures in the process of peacemaking have no relevance to the contemporary situation.

*High level
of political
involvement
for UNIFIL*

The future of growth in advanced societies

By David S. Wright

Expectations heightened by generation of prosperity

International anxiety regarding the recent economic performance of leading industrialized countries tempts one to ask whether something new and very fundamental has happened that limits the capacity of men and governments to manage economic affairs. Traditional Keynesian tools seem inadequate to cope with the present combination of unemployment, inflation and monetary instability. Of course, current economic problems do not approach those of the 1930s, and perhaps the anxiety is in part the result of a much more sophisticated public awareness of economic matters. However, expectations have been heightened by a generation of prosperity and steady increases in living standards, and there is some doubt as to whether these expectations can continue to be met to the same degree as in past years.

Two broad arguments may be put forward. The first is that the economic problems of the 1970s are the product of an unfortunate coincidence of events and that underlying elements of strength will reassert themselves once these shocks have been absorbed and overcome. The second is that, for a number of fundamental reasons, industrialized countries have reached a plateau, and will not, for the foreseeable future, experience the kind of economic growth they enjoyed in the 1950s and 1960s.

The first argument is an optimistic one. It acknowledges that developments in the past five years have had an ex-

tremely unsettling effect on the elements of confidence and certainty on which strong economic performance depends. The legacy of several years of high inflation and the fear that it will accelerate again, slow growth, the rapid rise in oil prices, and increased competition from the Third World have been major shocks for industrialized economies. The argument continues that, with sound fiscal and monetary management, economic performance will turn round and confidence will be restored.

More pessimistic

The second argument is more pessimistic. It suggests that certain basic maladjustments — notably excess capacity that has emerged in key industries such as steel, shipbuilding, textiles, artificial fibres, and some petrochemicals — will result in a general slowdown in industrialized countries after several decades of fairly rapid growth. Export-led growth, which brought a steady and rapid increase in living standards in many countries, can no longer be maintained in the face of such overcapacity. Fundamental adjustments in industrial structures, it is argued, will be necessary to cope with new realities, including shifting comparative-advantage relations with Third World countries. Such adjustments are always politically painful because they inevitably involve high social costs such as unemployment and displacement of population. Yet, until the adjustments take place, it is argued, a return to economic stability and steady increases in real living standards will not be possible.

The present worldwide slack in economic activity and the accompanying inflation make it difficult to assess whether this more pessimistic argument is correct, whether certain more fundamental maladjustments in economies may have long-term depressive effect on economic performance. Shorter-term cyclical problems can easily be misinterpreted as being longer-term at times of economic slack.

Mr Wright was until recently Deputy Director of the Commercial and General Economic Policy Division of the Department of External Affairs and participated in Canada's preparations for the Bonn "economic summit". He had previously served in Rome and at the United Nations in New York, and has written several earlier articles for International Perspectives. He is now Economic Counsellor at the Canadian Embassy in Tokyo. The views expressed in this article are those of the author.

Very long-term predictions of economic performance are usually of limited use. The Russian economist Kondratieff studied long-term economic trends and concluded that there were 50-year cycles or long waves in the performances of Western economies. (He was imprisoned during the Stalinist period for ideas inconsistent with those prevailing in his government at the time.) The cycles he identified were roughly the following:

1790 - 1815	upward
1815 - 1845	downward
1845 - 1870	upward
1870 - 1895	downward
1895 - 1920	upward

Kondratieff attempted little in the way of explanation of these long waves save the cataclysmic effects of major wars and discoveries of large deposits of gold. Nonetheless interest in his work and in long cycles was heightened in June 1978 when, in its annual report, the Bank for International Settlements in Basle referred to a possible slowdown "of the Kondratieff type". The possibility of industrialized countries having entered the downward side of a 50-year cycle was widely reported in the press, particularly in the lead-up to the Bonn "summit".

One way of tackling the question of whether or not the leading industrialized countries have reached an economic plateau, and of judging the validity of the optimistic and pessimistic arguments presented above, is to look at some of the basic qualitative factors that affect the numbers by which economies are measured. Such factors include:

- population growth
- availability of natural resources
- technological innovation
- government participation in economies
- situations in developing countries
- social factors.

Population growth

In industrialized countries, population growth has ceased to be a dynamic factor in economies. Populations are stabilizing. Social and economic development usually result in more careful planning of family size. The postwar "baby boom", which contributed to much investment-led growth after the Second World War (e.g., housing, schools), has now resulted in high unemployment rates among young people because slow-moving economies cannot absorb new workers quickly enough.

While in industrialized societies the child is now viewed as an economic liability,

in many developing countries the child is still seen as an economic asset. Developing-country populations continue to grow rapidly in most regions, and they may not stabilize before about the year 2050. Such growth is likely to have a dynamic effect on overall economic output in developing countries, although its effect on *per capita* income is clearly quite different.

Natural resources

Concern over the rapid exploitation of non-renewable resources is at the centre of some of the arguments that anticipate physical limits to growth in the future. There is a clear need to recognize that some fundamental changes will have to take place to respond to resource depletion, e.g. adaptation on a massive scale to new sources of energy for the post-petroleum era.

In general, the raw materials necessary to fuel economic growth are harder to obtain and more costly than they once were. Exploitation of cheap resources in colonies and the Third World led to easy and rapid growth. The colonies no longer exist and the Third World wants a legitimate return for its resources. The Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries (OPEC) is a good example of this. The cheapest and most accessible natural resources in the industrialized countries themselves have been exploited. What remains will be more difficult to obtain in terms of the input of energy, technology and transport. This may act as a brake on economies, although the need to adjust to changing resource-supplies can in itself be an incentive for various kinds of economic activity.

Efforts to economize on resources, to find substitutes and to develop new techniques for resource exploitation may provide an important stimulus in the future to further technological innovation and investment, and may be a major force in generating new economic activity.

Technological innovation

Growth in industrialized countries has been stimulated by quantum leaps in technology — e.g., the internal-combustion engine, electricity. Technological advance in recent years has tended to result in more efficient processes rather than new products. Often the advances are "labour-saving", and thus job-destroying rather than job-creating. There is a view that the technological revolution may have reached a stage of maturity in industrialized countries, and that there are not many major innovations on the horizon that would create dynamic growth. Such

Raw materials harder to obtain and more costly than ever before

a view is almost purely speculative. There is at least an equal probability that major innovations will occur in a number of areas — solar and other forms of energy, the seabed, space, agriculture — that will have an important impact on economic activity.

Government participation in economies

In many countries, the economic prosperity of the last 20 years allowed expansion of the public sector to a considerable degree, notably in important social areas. This expansion was broadly supported and, it is argued, contributed to economic growth. Even very conservative elements of society were willing to see some spending of the benefits of growth for the common good.

An economic downturn, however, has led to a surprisingly large consensus that governments have gone too far and that government spending needs to be cut back. Governments are under widespread pressure to reduce their role in society. California's Proposition 13 is a dramatic example. Although this might remove an element that has contributed to growth, governments are perceived by some as getting in the way of progress through the very size of the public sector, and through over-regulation. It is argued that less government would free the private sector for stronger expansion of economic activity.

Situations in developing countries

Whatever one's view as to whether certain resource, population, consumer, technological and public-sector plateaus may have been reached in the industrialized countries, these clearly have not been reached in the Third World. There is an enormous amount of dormant consumer demand throughout the Third World. The need for improved infrastructure is obvious. The scope for applying present technology is considerable. The problem is a shortage of investment and expertise. The savings and capital, along with the technology, remain in the industrialized countries, while there is ample need for its application in the Third World. Middle-income developing countries are at present growing more quickly than any other countries.

Meanwhile, in areas in which the Third World has become industrialized, its exports are having very disruptive effects in less efficient sectors in the industrialized world. The Third World clearly has a comparative advantage in these areas (footwear, textiles). This has led to excess capacity and the need for structural change in industrialized countries.

Social factors

At least for more affluent societies, traditional economic indicators are an inadequate measure of human satisfaction. The quality of life becomes more important once basic economic needs are met or exceeded. Concern for the environment grows as societies grow richer. This has acted to check some forms of industrial activity that have led to traditional economic growth.

There is another related social phenomenon that sets limits on the desire of societies for quantitative growth. As individuals grow richer, the satisfaction they derive from goods and services depends not only on their own consumption of them but on consumption by others. The satisfaction derived from country house depends in part on how many other people have access to the surrounding area. Economic growth can lead to congestion, while the affluent man seeks some exclusiveness in his life. The use of a private automobile is a good illustration of a phenomenon to which certain social limits will inevitably have to apply.

At a certain stage of individual wealth, a consumer's behaviour begins to shift in a way that may lead to his making a lesser contribution to the gross national product in favour of a better quality of life. After the Second World War, consumer behaviour provided a positive stimulus to growth in industrialized societies. Enormous demand for material goods was released. A stage has been reached in some wealthier countries in which a growing percentage of the population is turning its attention away from material goods (another car or television set) to better services and more leisure. It is also argued, however, that further steps in income distribution within industrialized countries (and between developed and developing countries) would have a stimulating effect on consumer spending.

Conclusion

No definitive conclusion of a trend toward greater or less dynamism over the longer term can be drawn from the evidence. Neither the optimistic nor the pessimistic argument is overwhelming. It is certainly conceivable that industrialized countries are in the early stages of a longer-term downward swing in economic performance. Because of the clear need for difficult structural adjustments in industrialized countries over the next generation, the possibility should be borne in mind that economic growth will not be adequate to meet the expectations of wide sectors of

*Consensus
that governments
are costing
too much*

the population, exaggerated by the inflationary experience of the past decade. *Economic relations among industrialized countries, in the past involving a division of the fruits of growth, may in the future be characterized by an apportionment of the burdens of adjustment.*

The necessary structural adjustments to cope with the circumstances faced in industrialized countries cannot be dealt with as effectively in a period of low growth. Accordingly, it would be wrong to accept with resignation the prospect of mediocre growth for a prolonged period.

Renewed efforts aimed at innovation in the energy and resource fields may act against some of the more depressive longer-term factors identified here. It also appears that the "engine of growth" that might turn the process round in the next decade lies in the Third World. While industrialized countries are over-saving and under-investing, there are enormous opportunities in the Third World. Investors are understandably cautious, wary of political risk as well as normal business risk. Even OPEC surplus countries, which

are part of the Third World in terms of political solidarity, tend to invest their surplus money in Switzerland or the U.S.A.

The worst way to cope with this situation would be to allow industrialized countries and developing countries to slide into confrontation. Unfortunately, the causes of potential confrontation are at the heart of the need for structural adjustments in the future. Low-cost textiles, footwear, electronics goods and other products from Third World countries trying to industrialize are displacing the products of less-competitive manufacturers in developed countries.

While the Third World needs the investment and technology of the industrialized world to achieve more acceptable living standards, industrialized countries need the dynamic effect on their own economies of all the unfulfilled demand, untapped skills and unexploited resources of the Third World. Interdependence has never had more real meaning, or constituted a more important challenge.

How "official" Ottawa views the Third World

By P. V. Lyon, R. B. Byers and D. Leyton-Brown

According to a recent survey of élite opinion, four-fifths of the makers of Canadian foreign policy agree that world peace depends upon narrowing the gap between the rich and poor countries. A third perceive that the likeliest source of global instability in the coming decade will be the North-South tensions, while less than a twentieth now perceive that the primary threat is the continuing East-West rivalry. Over half believe that Canada's development assistance should be doubled. Responses such as these to the survey questions might well convince you that official Ottawa is seriously concerned about the Third World. You would be wrong.

A similarly erroneous conclusion might be drawn from the speeches of our leaders, most notably those of Pierre Trudeau. For example, in a moving but little noted speech to the Canadian Jewish Congress in 1974, Trudeau said that if "Canada's presence in the world" was to

be judged by a "single criterion," he hoped that it would be its "humanism, its pursuit of social justice . . . Canadian foreign policy would be meaningless if it were not caring" and "our compassion must have no geographic focus". In his celebrated Mansion House speech a year later, he went even further in demanding "an acceptable distribution of the world's wealth". Such statements have been noted in Third World capitals, where no Western leader enjoys a better reputation than

Professor Lyon teaches at Carleton University in Ottawa; Professor Byers and Professor Leyton-Brown teach at York University in Toronto. They jointly conducted the study upon which this article is based. A table showing the numerical responses to the questions discussed in the article is available from Professor Lyon on request. The views expressed here are those of the authors.

Trudeau for personal commitment to the cause of global equity.

Some of the Government's actions have been consistent with the Trudeau rhetoric. Until 1976, the proportion of Canada's gross national product committed to official development assistance had climbed steadily to .56 per cent, within hailing distance of the United Nations approved target of .7 per cent. Canada in 1977 took a useful initiative in cancelling debts owed by the poorest of the aid-recipients. It has recently been active in the UN, and quietly effective, in seeking to accelerate decolonization in southern Africa. In 1972, Ottawa acted quickly in receiving many of the victims of Idi Amin's racism. Despite considerable weariness, we continue to assist Third World countries by being the UN's most reliable supplier of efficient peace-keepers.

The shortcomings in Canada's response to legitimate Third World demands, however, are increasingly obvious and embarrassing. The proportion of GNP spent on development assistance dropped in 1976 to less than .5 per cent, and in 1978, as part of an economy drive, the Government cancelled the increase planned for the following year. Canada long dragged its feet in introducing the generalized system of tariff preferences to benefit the exports of less-developed countries. The imposition in 1976 of quotas on textile and clothing imports was directly contrary to Canada's commitment to the New International Economic Order. Despite belated support for a buffer fund to cushion swings in commodity prices, Canada retains a well-earned reputation for niggardliness in the UN Conference on Trade and Development and for opposition to reforms of the international monetary system that would benefit the LDCs. Canada's exceptional influence in the Law of the Sea Conference has contributed to the sabotage of the "Common Heritage" proposals that could have effected a really significant transfer of resources to the very needy.

Discrepancy

How is one to explain this discrepancy between promise and performance in Canada's response to the rising demand for global equity? Assuming, as is likely, that Trudeau's personal concern is genuine, it is unfortunate that he is not the autocrat so often portrayed in Parliament and the media. Indeed, in terms of Cabinet management, he is arguably the most consensual Prime Minister Canada has ever had. Ottawa officials and ministers certainly

act as a rule in Third World matters as they need pay little heed to his pronouncements. Since they perceive Canada's participation in international development to be essentially a matter of altruism and conscience, and nothing in which Canada has a vital stake, they attach low priority to meeting the challenges posed by the Third World. Their diagnosis of the problem seems radical, but their policy prescriptions are conservative.

This is the depressing conclusion to be drawn from the response to 35 Third World questions put to nearly 300 ministers, Members of Parliament and senior officials in interviews conducted by the authors as part of the Canadian International Image Study (CIIS), which was described in the Summer 1977 issue of *International Journal*.

Ottawa's foreign-policy elite readily agrees that the rich-poor dichotomy poses the most serious threat to stability and peace, and is willing to increase Canada's aid budget. Aid, however, is what Lester Pearson and others have described as the "soft option". Though still relevant, it can scarcely begin to implement the structural changes required if Third World poverty and dependence are to be alleviated. When it comes to more significant reforms, especially those that are politically difficult, our foreign-policy makers sing a different tune. By a two-to-one margin, for example, those we interviewed rejected the proposal that Canada should speedily remove tariffs on imports from developing countries. Asked to name the most important problem confronting Canadian foreign policy, less than a tenth mentioned one related to the Third World. Similarly, when invited to rank the six themes from *Foreign Policy for Canadians* (the Trudeau Government's definitive statement of 1970), "Social Justice", the theme embracing economic redistribution and race equality, came a poor fifth, well below "Peace and Security", "Sovereignty and Independence", "Economic Growth" and "Quality of Life".

A separate study of foreign-policy priorities in the Department of External Affairs was even more revealing, and disturbing. This was conducted by Professors Brian Tomlin, Harald von Riekhof and John Sigler. Fourteen carefully selected senior officials were invited to weigh 77 specific foreign-policy objectives derived from a study of internal and public statements. Only one primarily concerned with the Third World — peace in the Middle East — was placed in the top 25. Dominating the top-ranked objectives were those having to do with

Embarrassing shortcomings in Canada's response to Third World

Canada's material well-being, especially those related to the law of the sea. Objectives involving global economic redistribution, or human rights, emerged right at the bottom.

Although four-fifths of the Canadian foreign-policy elite concurred that non-aligned countries are significant in world affairs, they appeared to attach relatively little importance to the organizations in which these nations are predominant. Only 13 per cent perceived the United Nations, increasingly a Third World club, as gaining in influence; 60 per cent perceived decline. The reduction in influence was frequently attributed to the disparity between UN voting and "real" power, and the consequent disregard of many Assembly resolutions. The few who perceived an increase in the UN's stature often referred to the shift in its agenda to issues, such as poverty and race discrimination, that matter more to more people than do the traditional Cold War and security issues. For most of the Canadian decision-makers, however, this shift seems more to be deplored than encouraged.

Commonwealth

The Commonwealth is the organization in which Canada interacts most intimately with Third World countries. Unlike the UN, it has engaged the wholehearted enthusiasm of the Prime Minister. Only two-fifths of the foreign-policy elite, however, share his conviction that "the Commonwealth is a significant factor in international relations". At least in principle, the elite endorsed the Third Option, the Government's strategy to diminish Canada's dependence upon the United States, but only 3 per cent mentioned Third World countries as the likeliest with which to generate countervailing relations. By a wide margin, the elite perceived the European Community as a more influential actor in international affairs than the Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries. In terms of Canadian priorities, the makers of our foreign policy clearly regard Third World countries as the ones that could most easily be ignored.

Twelve of the CIIS propositions dealt with the motivation of Canada's development assistance. Less than a fifth of the elite perceived it to be primarily self-interested in any direct way, such as to promote Canadian exports (6 per cent), or as a means to augment Canadian influence (9 per cent). Over three-quarters saw it as essentially altruistic — to help the most needy (48 per cent), to close

the rich-poor gap (11 per cent), "humanitarian" or "moral" (11 per cent) — or as a means to promote Canada's interest indirectly, and in the long run, by contributing to a peaceful international order (8 per cent). Asked to name the country that behaved most like Canada in international affairs, over half named one of the Scandinavians (45 per cent) or the Netherlands (9 per cent), while 29 per cent cited a member of the white Commonwealth. A reason frequently offered for the selection was that the other country shared with Canada a genuine concern for the well-being of the weak and the poor.

(Independently of the CIIS project, one of the authors interviewed 71 foreign elite members in 25 Asian and European capitals; although by a smaller margin (60 per cent compared to 77 per cent), they also perceived Canada's aid as primarily altruistic, and the largest portion (49 per cent) concurred that, in its general behaviour, Canada most closely resembled those nice Scandinavians (39 per cent) especially Sweden, or the Netherlands (10 per cent). Whatever the factual basis, one must accept that Canada's international image, both at home and abroad, remains remarkably benign.)

Image remains remarkably benign

Objectives

To gain a more comprehensive understanding of the values of the Ottawa decision-makers, the CIIS interviewers asked them to indicate the weight that should be assigned 11 objectives in determining Canada's aid policy. Four-fifths agreed with the proposition that an important objective should be "to assist those recipient countries whose need is greatest". Far less support was accorded such objectives as promoting Canadian exports (52 per cent) or fighting Communism (22 per cent). It is difficult to be certain whether the elite attached less value to these objectives, or simply considered economic aid to be an inefficient means to attain them. Other CIIS questions revealed that Canadian decision-makers are no longer militantly anti-Communist, but more of them might favour using aid to wage the Cold War if only they thought it might work.

The objective given the strongest endorsement was the promotion of stability in the recipient countries. This is not necessarily in conflict with the desire to assist the most needy, which received almost the same support. The respondents may well have reasoned that economic well-being is improbable without stability. Not everyone recognizes, as has Mitchell

Sharp, that economic development is likely to be disruptive. A clearer indication of the élite addiction to the status quo may be seen in its emphatic rejection of national liberation as an objective of aid policy, and in the fact that only a narrow majority concurred that "Canada should restrict its relations with countries that make racial discrimination an official government policy". On the other hand, four-fifths rejected the proposition that "Canada should take no responsibility for helping to solve racial problems in Africa" and, asked to rank 20 international actors in terms of their impact upon the global system, the élite considered only the Palestine Liberation Organization to be more negative than South Africa.

Canada's most active Third World role has been that of peacekeeper. An overwhelming majority of the élite (94 per cent) agreed that this role should continue. Only 14 per cent concurred that "Canada should *automatically* volunteer troops whenever the United Nations establishes a peacekeeping operation", and many respondents volunteered that we should be more discriminating than in the past. Nevertheless, asked to evaluate the importance of ten reasons for Canada to maintain armed forces, the élite ranked peacekeeping second only to the defence of sovereignty, and well ahead of such objectives as "to help counter the Soviet military threat," or "to maintain internal security". Although the Third World has been the locale for most of the post-1945 violence, and the area where all the UN's peacekeeping has occurred, or seems likely to occur, the élite's commitment to the peacekeeping vocation seems unlikely to be mainly attributable to concern for the well-being of the developing nations. It results also from pride in a role that has brought Canada considerable distinction, and concern for global stability. The super-powers have avoided direct confrontation in the many Third World conflicts, but the possibility remains that one of these disturbances might trigger a major war that Canada could not escape, or economic dislocation that would probably injure Canada through the impact upon its major trading partners.

The élite no longer appears to believe that Canada's contribution to peacekeeping is essential, or even that UN peacekeeping in itself constitutes a major contribution to global stability. Still less does it appear to believe that Canada's response to the demands for a New International Economic Order are likely to matter very much. Hence, even when the desirability of global harmony is recog-

nized, the conviction often remains that Canada could afford to take a cheaper ride in international development. That Canada fails to exercise this option, the élite appears to believe, is primarily because its foreign policy is substantially influenced by the morality and altruism of the Canadian people. These qualities however, are perceived to be limited. Unless the élite is persuaded that Canada must respond more adequately to the demands of the Third World to escape serious material damage, it seems unlikely to alter the current policy priorities. Alternatively, it would need to be convinced that the Canadian electorate is more moral, and more determined to share with the wretched of the world, than has been assumed. There is little evidence of strong popular resistance to Canada's modest role in the Third World. There is even less, alas, of a mounting demand that Canada should do a great deal more.

The Canadian Institute of Public Opinion reported in 1975 that 72 per cent of Canadians believed that the developed countries should share in the responsibility for Third World development, and over half (53 per cent) favoured an increase in economic assistance. On the other hand, other polls have found an unwarranted degree of public satisfaction with Canada's contribution to international development, and a reluctance to make sacrifices in order to improve its performance; CIPO, for example, reported in 1968 that two-thirds of the Canadian public rejected the proposal that their taxes be increased as a means to assist the poorer nations.

Variations

Striking variations exist within the foreign-policy élite. Not surprisingly, the strongest support for doubling Canadian aid came from the senior officials of the Canadian International Development Agency whom we interviewed. This might be discounted on the ground that CIDA has a vested interest in a large development budget; the cynic could also cite the self-serving instinct that prompted a large majority in CIDA to reject the proposition that most Canadian aid should be channelled through effective multilateral agencies. CIDA's sympathy for Third World aspirations, however, is well demonstrated by its relatively strong support for race equality and national liberation, and the fact that it was the only sub-élite to favour the speedy removal of tariffs on imports from less-developed countries. The CIDA officials were also the most likely to insist that the need of the recipients should be

*Peacekeeping
second only
to the defence
of sovereignty*

basic criterion, and to reject the promotion of Canadian exports as an important objective of aid policy. They were unanimous in opposing the use of aid as means to wage the Cold War.

The military establishment provided the sharpest contrast. It was the least likely to perceive altruism in Canada's aid policy, or to believe that it should be an important element. The military were the least likely to locate the source of global instability in the Third World, or to agree that peace depends upon closing the rich-poor gap. They were the only sub-élite in which a plurality agreed that an important aid objective should be the containment of Communism, and were the most unanimous in support of stability in the recipient countries. They offered no support for national liberation as a purpose of Canadian assistance, and were the least likely to favour restrictions on Canada's relations with countries that make race discrimination official policy. In view of these responses, it would be difficult to read much altruism in the military's enthusiasm for Canada's role as a peace-keeper. Indeed, it seems possible that their coolness towards the aspirations of the Third World stems from a fear that generosity would be at the expense of the defence budget.

The senior officials in the Department of External Affairs emerge as the bureaucrats most concerned about internal Canadian politics. They were three times as likely as Industry, Trade and Commerce officials to agree that an important objective of Canadian aid should be the promotion of cohesion *within* Canada, and twice as likely to support using it to strengthen ties with La Francophonie; presumably External Affairs officials were more likely to be knowledgeable about the skilful way Canadian economic assistance had been employed to undercut the campaign to upgrade the position of Quebec in francophone West Africa, and to appease the critics who used to argue that Canadian foreign policy ignored the French fact". This concern with cohesion within Canada should not surprise those who recall that several Prime Ministers have contended that the first aim of Canadian foreign policy must be the preservation of Canadian unity. It is less easy to explain why External Affairs should give least support to proposals to eliminate tariffs on Third World exports, and be second only to IT&C in its willingness to exploit the aid program to promote Canadian exports. In conversation, External Affairs officials are generally sceptical about the leverage to be gained over the policies of

aid-recipients, but as a group they are the most likely to endorse the use of aid to augment Canada's influence. They show considerable sensitivity to Third World feelings about maintaining relations with countries that make race discrimination official government policy. In general, however, External Affairs officials are content to leave to CIDA the advocacy of Third World interests in the Canadian policy-making process. Their complacency is also reflected in the fact that they were much the most likely to agree with the optimistic prediction that by the year 2000 the distribution of the world's wealth would be more equitable.

This facile optimism was rejected most emphatically by the 19 young External recruits we interviewed; only 24 per cent agreed with the majority of their seniors, while 38 per cent withheld any opinion. They were also decidedly more willing to meet Third World demands. Ninety per cent agreed that Canadian aid should be doubled, compared to 53 per cent of the External élite, and a third favoured the speedy removal of tariffs on LDC exports, compared to 18 per cent of their seniors. Dare one hope that the recruits will soon be influencing policy? Or is it more likely that they will be conditioned to adopt the complacency now characteristic of the department?

Industry, Trade and Commerce officials were the most prone to perceive Canadian aid as being essentially altruistic in purpose. To judge by their responses, however, this altruism is a fault to be remedied. Three-quarters agreed that an important aid objective should be the promotion of Canadian exports, and less than one-fifth favoured the speedy removal of tariffs on Third World imports. Though generally less insensitive to the LDCs than the military, IT&C officials appeared to be the least warm towards the Commonwealth and the United Nations, and exceptionally unlikely to welcome the intrusion of moral considerations, such as human rights, in the conduct of Canada's foreign relations.

Ministers

We interviewed 11 serving ministers, and ten who had been in earlier Trudeau Cabinets. Their perceptions of the Third World were generally similar to the bureaucrats', but they were considerably more willing to accommodate Third World aspirations. The Cabinet-level respondents, for example, were likelier to support an increase in aid and the speedy removal of tariffs. They were also more disposed to limit relations with states

*Facile optimism
emphatically
rejected
by recruits*

practising race discrimination, and to make the need of the recipients the primary criterion for economic assistance. The ministers gave less support to the use of aid to promote exports, but more to the combating of Communism. Their political sensitivity was displayed in their relatively high support for domestic cohesion as an objective of aid policy, and the related strengthening of ties with La Francophonie and the Commonwealth. Politicians may be more inclined than bureaucrats to shade their responses to cater to the presumed views of the interviewer, and several volunteered that they would go further to meet Third World demands if they thought public opinion would tolerate it. Nevertheless, especially in view of the strong statements by the Prime Minister, it seems regrettable that Canada's Third World policies are closer to those advocated by the bureaucracy than by our Cabinet respondents.

The only non-governmental élite interviewed was a group of 36 academic specialists in international relations. They proved less likely than the Ottawa élite to concur that peace depends upon closing the rich-poor gap, and, perhaps in consequence, fewer of them attached importance to using aid to promote stability. They were the least likely of our sub-élites to agree that Canada's aid has been essentially altruistic, but approached CIDA in their support for a doubling of the program, and were relatively strong in support of cutting tariffs on Third World exports. On most points, academic views did not differ greatly from those of the politicians and officials.

The interviews were conducted late

in 1975 and early in 1976 — before the shock of November 15, 1976. It would be comforting to believe that Ottawa perceptions have evolved in the interim, and are now more sympathetic to the needs of the LDCs. With the persistence of Canadian economic tribulations, however, and the renewed threat of domestic disintegration, this hardly seems likely. Canadian living standards remain very high by global standards, and we consume more than is good for our health, to say nothing of our souls. Worry about the threat to national unity is understandable, but obsession with the problem can be counterproductive. One way to counteract the centrifugal forces is to shift attention away from domestic issues, which frequently divide, and to concentrate on the global concerns that can only be tackled effectively if all Canadians pull together. In the postwar years, the so-called "golden decade" of Canadian diplomacy, Canada's contribution to international causes was second to none. A revival of its internationalist vocation could strengthen pride in Canada and support for its central institutions as the obvious means to make an impact upon world problems.

To be internationalist in the late Seventies, however, means to contribute seriously to the establishment of equitable economic conditions for all peoples — to help bridge the North-South gap that is the greatest scandal of our time. This will not happen without cost. Since the Ottawa policy-making élite does not perceive a vital Canadian stake in this cause, it will have to be persuaded to act by a manifestation of popular demand far exceeding anything we have yet seen.

What does the future hold for Canada-France relations?

By Neil B. Bishop

What does the future hold for relations between Canada and France? In order to answer this question, it would be helpful to know the present state of these relations. Canada is one of the many countries

with which France has fairly close contacts, but its relations with France are among the most difficult to analyse and the most seriously threatened by latent instability. Indeed, any discussion of them may be likened to a stroll across a stretch of quicksand.

This instability understandably surprises the average Canadian and the average Frenchman. It is, of course, the task of Quebecers and Frenchmen to describe the relations between their two groups,

Dr Bishop did his graduate work in French-Canadian literature. He is at present doing postgraduate research in Marseilles. The views expressed here are those of Dr Bishop.

of an English-speaking Canadian from the West such as myself. The English-speaking Canadian, for his part, cannot help but be impressed by the generally excellent quality of relations between English-speaking Canadians and the French. He knows that as a traveller, student or employed person in France the very fact he is Canadian tends to guarantee, on the part of French people who are aware of his nationality, a degree of friendliness, co-operation and even enthusiasm that is often denied the citizens of other countries. It has long been common knowledge that it is in the interest of Canadians visiting Europe to make their nationality known, and there are few European countries in which Canadians are as well treated as they are in France.

These excellent relations find expression in Canada too. Many Frenchmen have had occasion to appreciate, in various parts of Canada, a real enthusiasm for almost everything French — an enthusiasm, it must be admitted, that is sometimes observed in the same people who exhibit a disappointing lack of enthusiasm for or even understanding of their French-speaking compatriots. The very understandable anti-French sentiments provoked in many English-speaking Canadians by General de Gaulle's "Vive le Québec libre" in 1967 seem for the most part to have been short-lived. The remarkably successful 1977-1978 activities of the Alliance Française in Toronto bear witness to the pro-French attitudes of a considerable number of English-speaking Canadians, who represent almost three-quarters of the population.

The atmosphere of uncertainty or latent instability is characteristic not of the relations between the two peoples but of the relations between the two governments. This being so, such uncertainties are even more surprising, objectionable and unnecessary. France is evidently uncertain what kind of relations it wishes to have with Canada, especially since Quebec, quite naturally, is trying to develop closer relations with Paris than is Ottawa.

Ambiguities

The attitude towards Canada adopted by Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and the French governments formed since the 1974 Presidential elections has been more moderate in tone, and politer, than that of governments under General de Gaulle and Georges Pompidou. It is clear that the equivocal nature of present relations between Canada and France derives primarily from the fact that these apparently normal, or almost normal, relations were

established after a period of open hostility — so some progress has been made. Current ambiguities may escape the notice of the general public but will be of concern to close observers of Franco-Canadian relations. Memories of visits to France by members of the present Quebec government, formed by the Parti Québécois, are still fresh. The reader will recall the problem of René Lévesque, the present Premier of Quebec, and his Legion of Honour decoration; from Ottawa's point of view, it was an insult to Canadian sovereignty.

However, a far more striking example of the ambiguities that still hang over Franco-Canadian relations was provided by the spectacle of the successive trips to Paris, in the months following the 1974 French Presidential elections, of Prime Minister Trudeau of Canada and the Quebec Premier of the day, Henri Bourassa. Of course, Mr Trudeau received an official welcome worthy of a friendly country's head of government, and according to French television he was to be seen walking "arm in arm" with Gaullist Jacques Chirac, his French counterpart at the time. Mr Bourassa, however, received an even warmer welcome, highlighted by his attendance at a meeting of the French Council of Ministers, a rare honour intended to evoke what was tantamount to a family relationship between France and Quebec. And why not? Provided that the special relations between France and Quebec do not hinder the development of special relations between France and Canada.

Nevertheless, the example of Mr Trudeau's and Mr Bourassa's visits to France shows that the lack of clarity that is spoiling official Franco-Canadian relations is largely the result of France's ambiguous attitude towards the "two Canadas". This lack of clarity, of course, is partly due to the ambiguous nature of Canada itself and to the uncertainties that, at least since 1867 — and especially since November 1976, when the Parti Québécois came to power —, have affected Canadian political, social and economic life. The dual nature of Canada, and the potential instability inherent in this duality, combined with the manner in which France chooses to react to it, explain the uncertain, even uneasy, state of Canada's relations with France today.

Auriol and de Gaulle

Yet such ambiguities have not always typified France-Canada relations, and this implies, of course, that they are not inevitable. Ample proof is given in a particularly interesting article appearing in

Official visits emphasized ambiguities in relations

the current issue of an interdisciplinary scholarly journal the very existence of which indicates how good relations between the two countries could be. *Etudes canadiennes/Canadian Studies* has been published annually in Bordeaux since 1975 by the Association française des études canadiennes. Pierre Guillaume's article, "Montaigne et Shakespeare: Réflexions sur le voyage du Président Vincent Auriol au Canada en avril 1951", describes Mr Auriol's official visit and compares it with de Gaulle's visit in 1967. The author also very effectively explains how General de Gaulle's view of Canada evolved from 1940 on.

Guillaume argues convincingly that in 1951 Mr Auriol, President of a France weakened by war and in quest of support from a rich and united Canada for French positions within the Atlantic Alliance, made a point of acting in the same way towards English- and French-speaking Canada and of publicly honouring such myths as Canadian unity and the equality of the two languages and two linguistic groups within Canadian society. Guillaume links Auriol's attitude and behaviour not to personal factors but rather to his conception, as President, of his country's national interest. The author shows, however, that, even if the national interest of France in 1951 had not required a united Canada under a strong Federal Government, the ideological and personal preferences of this socialist with little interest in Catholicism would in all probability have precluded the development of closer relations with a Quebec whose political and religious élites did not hide their disapproval of the kind of France he represented or their fond memories of Pétain, the Vichy regime — and even the Ancien Régime.

According to Guillaume, from 1940 onward General de Gaulle displayed an entirely different attitude. This difference can doubtless be attributed in part to his ideological and personal predispositions: de Gaulle, in 1940, presented himself to French Canadians as a Frenchman and a Catholic. It must primarily be linked, however, to the fact that in 1958 he became President of a France that was stronger than the France of Auriol, a France whose national interest, in de Gaulle's view, no longer required a united Canada and whose mission was to aid and unite French-speaking peoples all over the world. It should be pointed out here that the Gaullist position on Canada is quite logical and should give Canadians cause for reflection on some points, as Guillaume's article shows. It is time to change the

popular Canadian image of de Gaulle as a lunatic or monster. Guillaume also observes a paradoxical liking for Canada on de Gaulle's part. It is not a question of "forgiving all" but rather of developing a clearer perception of history in order to understand it better.

New policy

Although Guillaume refrains from discussing the present state of relations between Canada and France, he has very effectively described the historical context so essential to our understanding of them. In spite of the fact that Giscard d'Estaing may now appear to be merely vacillating passively between the opposing types of Canadian policy that have successively been adopted by France — Auriol's pro-federalist position and de Gaulle's pro-separatist stand —, to believe that this is really the case would probably be to underestimate the President of the Republic. He seems, in fact, to be one of the most active promoters of the West's evolution towards what he explicitly envisages as a "new world order". That, precisely, is what one would wish for: not a return either to Auriol's policy or de Gaulle's but rather the elaboration of a new, clear position that would take present realities into account.

Future development of French policy towards Canada and of relations between France and Canada will depend on where the two countries feel their national interest lies. Mr Trudeau's desire to establish closer links with the European Economic Community while increasing Canada's independence from the United States is important in this regard. This twofold development will probably also depend on the changing Canadian constitutional and political situation. However natural, and even highly desirable, close economic and cultural ties between France and Quebec may be, it is much to be hoped that France will not overlook this exceptional opportunity to establish, in every field of endeavour, very cordial, and even special, relations with English-speaking Canada as well. The national interest of both countries is at stake.

Improved official and economic relations could easily be built on the excellent relations that already exist between the two peoples. The governments of France and Canada bear a great responsibility in this respect; it is not normal for relations between two countries so closely linked by history, culture and the sufferings of two world wars, as well as present and future mutual interest, to be fraught with uncertainty and even suspicion. However,

responsibility for changing this state of affairs also rests with the general public and the media, which can and must influence their governments' policies in order to make the relations between the

two countries as cordial as those that already exist between the two peoples.

How long will it be until the President of the French Republic makes an official visit to Canada?

Eastern Europe

Yugoslav foreign policy's ambivalence towards *détente*

by Francine Friedman

Yugoslavia's dilemma concerning its role in world affairs has increased as the decade draws to a close. The Soviet-American *détente* process promised, at the beginning of the 1970s, an era of peace and de-escalating world tensions. But *détente* also presented Yugoslavia with the problem of how to maintain its large influence (large relative to its population, size, and level of development) in the light of a possible superpower condominium. The departure from government of President Josip Broz Tito, who is a major unifying factor in multinational Yugoslavia and the principal architect of its nonalignment policy, is imminent. The question of the extent of Yugoslavia's unity and strength of purpose in his absence has increased Yugoslavia's ambivalence towards Soviet-American *détente*. The process itself is currently fraught with inconsistencies and deadlocks so that even the promise of a decline in world conflict is endangered. In this situation, Yugoslav ambivalence towards the Soviet-American *détente* in the decade of the 1970s and the effect of the vagaries of the *détente* process on Yugoslav relations with the major actors in both the East and the West warrant examination.

Yugoslavia has achieved outstanding social, economic and cultural progress since the end of the Second World War. The formerly backward agrarian country has become a moderately-developed industrial nation with a comparatively modern working class.

Yugoslavia's present-day international status was achieved through the determination to maintain the independence for which the partisans fought during the Second World War. It has tried to follow an independent foreign policy despite its strategic location in the his-

torically-unstable Balkan area, between the two military-political blocs, and in proximity to the volatile Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean areas. Furthermore, Yugoslavia is situated between two different socio-political systems but belongs to neither; it is a European country outside the European bloc system, a Communist regime outside the organized socialist community. As a result, Yugoslavia's concern has been to protect not only its territorial integrity and political independence but also its unique socio-economic system of "socialist self-management".

The country's situation is reflected in its unique foreign policy. Having established contact with newly-independent countries of Asia and Africa in the early 1950s, Yugoslavia became a leader of the nonaligned movement. The nonaligned countries rejected great-power hegemony, power politics and colonial relations as well as the special role of the great powers as political leaders and sole decision-makers in international relations.

Yugoslav leaders publicly and consistently emphasized that Yugoslavia's national interest would be served best if it followed its own ideological principles without interference from either the Soviet Union or the United States. In the eyes of many non-Yugoslav observers, however, the country's chosen policy of nonalignment contradicts its desire for "socialist

*Between
two systems
and belonging
to neither*

Dr Friedman is a Visiting Associate at the Jerusalem Institute, studying various aspects of Yugoslav federalism. Dr Friedman previously lectured in international relations and comparative politics at Temple University. The views expressed here are those of the author.

sondarity". The Yugoslavs are Communists and, therefore, do agree with many positions taken by the Soviet Union. At the same time, however, they fear that the Soviet Union might use this feeling as an entry point in order to infringe ultimately upon Yugoslav independence and exert influence over its decision-making as the price for the Yugoslav desire for "socialist solidarity".

Basic tension

Thus there exists a basic tension in Yugoslavia's foreign policy. On the one hand, the Yugoslavs desire to a certain extent to placate the Soviet Union, which poses a potentially dangerous and imperialist threat to Yugoslavia (but also shares with Yugoslavia certain common principles and visions of a socialist world). This is coupled with Yugoslavia's particular influence, by the example of its success as a Communist country outside the Soviet bloc, on other Communist parties and states. The Yugoslav example could be viewed by some impressionable Communist parties as an encouragement to defy certain Soviet strictures on foreign and/or domestic policy.

On the other hand, the successful use of the nonalignment policy to manipulate both super-powers has increased Yugoslavia's power and influence in world affairs far beyond what its size, location and level of development would ordinarily have indicated. The Yugoslavs have not forgotten that they survived the 1948 clash with the Kremlin mainly through massive co-ordinated trade and economic, and even military, aid from the West. No demands that would have compromised Yugoslav independence accompanied Western assistance. As a result, the Yugoslavs have maintained their ties to the West more or less closely depending on the intimacy of their relations with the Soviet Union at any given time. Memories of 1948 have insured that Yugoslavia has regarded the U.S.S.R. with at least a touch of caution no matter how friendly relations between the two countries have become.

Yugoslavia tends to react more harshly to potential Soviet threats than to possible Western threats. For example, the Yugoslavs roundly condemned the December 1975 statement of Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counsellor of the U.S. State Department. Sonnenfeldt had suggested that Yugoslavia should become less dependent upon the United States and should rely more on its own strength in its relations with the Soviet Union. He commented further that world tension

might decline if there were a more "organic" relation between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Such remarks implied that the Yugoslavs might not always be able to count entirely on an American counterbalance to possible Soviet imperialism as they had since 1948. Until Sonnenfeldt's statement, American foreign policy had seemed to assume the need to forestall Soviet attempts to extend hegemony over Yugoslavia. Such an American stand had allowed Yugoslavia to follow a foreign policy based on extracting concessions from both super-powers by balancing the interests of one against those of the other. The Sonnenfeldt statement implied, however, that this freedom of manoeuvre might not in the future be in the American national interest. The Yugoslavs responded to the Sonnenfeldt remarks with loud and widespread criticism.

On the other hand, the remarks by Secretary-General Leonid Brezhnev after the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 generated more than verbal condemnations. Brezhnev justified this intervention in Czechoslovakia in a statement, known in the West as the "Brezhnev Doctrine", of the limited sovereignty of socialist countries. The "Doctrine" cited the defence of the socialist achievements that were being threatened by imminent counterrevolution of the Czechoslovak "reformers" as the reason for the invasion. The implication of this rationale was that the Soviet Union alone decided when the interests of the "socialist commonwealth" took precedence over international law. The Yugoslavs responded by developing a new defence system to guard against the prospect of a Czechoslovak-type intervention in Yugoslavia. It is clear, furthermore, that Stane Dolanc, Secretary of the Executive Committee of the Presidency of the League of Communists' Central Committee, was looking eastward when he warned in 1976:

... this country wishes to make it quite clear that it will not tolerate threats to its independent, sovereign and non-aligned position from anyone or from any quarter. To be sure, there are no overt threats of this kind being made today; nevertheless, there have been instances of mischief-making from time to time and various malicious conjectures are often heard about what will become of Yugoslavia tomorrow. Let it be well understood that the future of Yugoslavia lies in the further development of the socialist system of self-management and the policy of nonalignment, and let there be no illusions that it might be elsewhere.

*Successful use
of non-alignment
to manipulate
superpowers
has increased
influence*

the early 1970s, both super-powers tried to create a relaxation of tension in international relations and to avoid confrontations with each other that could lead to war. Initially, this *détente* process was heartily welcomed by Yugoslavia as a possible source of peace and disarmament and as a means of ending the Cold War atmosphere through the dismantling of the blocs. After all, since 1950 Yugoslavia had been on record as a firm proponent of peaceful coexistence. Edvard Kardelj, Yugoslav Vice-President, declared then in the United Nations General Assembly:

the people of Yugoslavia cannot accept the assumption that mankind must today choose between the domination of one great power or another. We consider that there is another path, the difficult but necessary path of democratic struggle for a world of free and equal nations, for democratic relations among nations, against foreign interference in the domestic affairs of the people and for the all-round peaceful co-operation of nations on a basis of equality.

To this idea of peaceful coexistence, advocated by many nonaligned countries, Yugoslavia contributed the idea of action as described by President Tito in a speech in Rangoon on January 16, 1955:

Active coexistence is active engagement to ensure that all international problems, even the most complicated and acute ones, those that are the main source of international tension, are settled peacefully, through negotiations.

This contribution was one basis for Yugoslavia's large influence within the nonalignment movement. With such a history of leadership in the search for peaceful coexistence, it is not surprising that Yugoslavia, as a leader of the nonalignment movement, was in the forefront of those urging *détente*. What, then, was the dilemma in Yugoslav eyes regarding the *détente* process of the 1970s, which seemed to be pursuing the lines of "active, peaceful coexistence?"

The problem was that since the Second World War Yugoslavia had depended on the particular counterbalancing of the great-power blocs to help preserve its independence and its unique social identity. As a result, it was able to increase its influence in international affairs to the point where it was an important connecting link between Eastern, Western and nonaligned countries. It could influence the socialist development of the nonaligned countries while, at the same time, attempting to inject more liberal

ideas into the East. This influence was due mainly to its leadership position in the nonalignment movement.

The beginning of *détente*, however, heralded the end of the influence and efficacy of nonalignment, which was mainly a movement in opposition to the Cold War. As the *détente* process grew, the nonaligned countries found that their notion of themselves as intermediaries in the Cold War struggle — a role that had enhanced the prestige of the nonalignment movement — had been negated by the super-powers. The nonaligned countries were still insisting on the need to abolish blocs even at the time when the two blocs were negotiating over their differences rather than threatening the independence of the nonaligned countries.

The *détente* era signaled the possible end of bloc conflicts over various non-committed areas or countries. Confrontation politics were to be replaced by the politics of negotiation as the super-powers instituted diplomacy by conference. But since the *détente* process was monopolized from the beginning by the super-powers, there was a tendency for them to try to solve all international problems without necessarily communicating with other involved countries. Yugoslavia discovered that the status of smaller countries like itself could be used as part of an agreement rather than as an object of conflict as it had been during the Cold War. The outcome for a small country in such a case, however, could conceivably be the same — domination by a super-power — though by a different method. Furthermore, there were none of the perquisites for the small country that wooing during the Cold War period had provided. Nor was there the influence the country in question might have garnered by keeping both super-powers at arm's length.

The *détente* process thus raised in nonaligned Yugoslavia fears of its position under *détente* conditions. Its leaders became more wary in their pronouncements about *détente*. The Yugoslavs also had very real misgivings about their future if the United States and the Soviet Union should agree on Yugoslavia's position and then consider it a closed subject. On the other hand, Yugoslavia, as a leader of the nonalignment movement and one of the major agitators for Soviet-American negotiations to reduce conflict, could not oppose *détente* as such. Its name was very closely linked to efforts by the nonaligned countries to promote *détente*. Like other small countries, therefore, Yugoslavia began to oppose *détente* as a manifestation of "great-power domination".

*Détente process
monopolized
by superpowers*

It would appear that Tito was finally acknowledging his mortality as he began a round of visits in 1977-78 to major countries to try to insure Yugoslavia's continued viability after he left the political scene. The question remains, will Yugoslavia be able to cope successfully with the changing world situation when Tito departs, or will the world situation, and Yugoslavia's own internal problems, prove overwhelming? More precisely, is Yugoslavia's return to the Soviet bloc, in an ideological – or any other – sense, imminent, despite its own predilection for nonalignment? The answers to these questions depend, of course, on what Soviet intentions are towards Yugoslavia in the post-Tito era.

The question of Yugoslavia's future in world affairs is closely tied to the degree of internal stability Yugoslavia can maintain after Tito – the major unifying force in the country – departs. The Soviet Union, which most Yugoslavs consider to be the real threat to an independent Yugoslavia, might welcome a reawakening of nationality problems in the post-Tito era. Such a situation could allow it influence over Yugoslavia's development. Conservative forces in Yugoslavia itself might welcome this if they believed that the U.S.S.R. was the only country that could protect Yugoslavia's Communist regime against a liberalizing trend and its federal system against too rapid a movement towards confederation (trends of the 1960s that could again rise should over-enthusiastic reformers and nationalists gain sufficient power).

It seems more likely, however, that the long-term Soviet interest would not be in a break-up of Yugoslavia (though the Soviet Union has been accused of intriguing with Croatian nationalists, Bulgarians over Macedonia, and pro-Soviet groups within Yugoslavia itself). The Soviet Union would probably prefer a weak but unified Yugoslavia. Such a potentially-pliable Yugoslavia would allow the Soviet Union to manoeuvre for a larger influence in Yugoslav policy planning as well as for naval and air facilities on the Adriatic with access to the Mediterranean. If, however, nationality problems arose within Yugoslavia, the Kremlin could justifiably worry about the stability of the historically conflict-ridden Balkans and the effect on Eastern-bloc countries. Furthermore, a civil war in Yugoslavia might invite super-power intervention, which would endanger peace in the rest of Europe.

If these nationality problems in-

creased in Yugoslavia to the point where there was a succession struggle, peace in the Balkans and prospective *détente* in Europe could be threatened. For instance, if a Croat opposition to Yugoslav leadership asked for United Nations protection for an independent existence (a proposal made by some Croats in 1971), the Soviet Union would probably see this as a danger to its vital interests and become involved. The United States, too, would almost certainly be interested in the consequences of such a development. Another possibility that could call forth Soviet action would be nationality problems that became so severe as to portend an anti-socialist revolt in Yugoslavia.

In a *détente* situation, the script could read a little differently. *Détente* and a resulting lessening of tensions could also make the achievement of security more difficult for Yugoslavia. As a country becoming increasingly important in the eyes of the super-powers because of its geo-strategic location, especially in regard to the Middle East and the eastern Mediterranean areas, Yugoslavia promises to be a subject of much superpower discussion.

Non-intervention

Early indications of the *détente* process suggested that the super-powers were quite capable of negotiating with each other to insure their own interests in return for non-intervention in the vital interests of the other. If Yugoslavia were claimed by the Soviet Union as a vital interest, the United States might be tempted to ask for concessions in another area important to it in return for a "hands-off" or "look the other way" policy in regard to Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia's future might thus be taken out of its own hands, as its importance as a great-power pawn increased. Or a *détente* agreement between the super-powers could conceivably – though not very probably – result in an eventual military withdrawal of the American presence from Europe. Yugoslavia, as part of its nonalignment posture, is anti-bloc and should therefore be unrestrictedly pleased at the possible disengagement in Europe; nevertheless, such a move by the United States would leave the Soviet Union in a better position to re-absorb Yugoslavia into the socialist bloc, if it so desired, should the countervailing force of American troops be absent.

A possible alternative scenario would be little more pleasing to Yugoslavia: Soviet disengagement from Europe through a devolution of power from the Kremlin to the East European regimes could cause

*Yugoslavia's
future in world
closely tied
to post-Tito
stability*

ern Europe to undergo such upheavals as to imperil the Yugoslav Communist system as well. It would appear, therefore, that a fundamental change in the European situation managed by the super-powers would not be welcomed by Yugoslav leaders.

Yugoslavia's ambivalence toward the Soviet-American *détente* is heightened by its somewhat ambiguous relations with both parties. Its dislike for the non-socialist West was moderated in the early 1950s by generous American and allied assistance at a time when the Yugoslavs had been cut adrift by the socialist camp. Helmut Sonnenfeldt's speech in 1975 served as a reminder, however, that the United States still maintained above all an interest in world stability and some type of *modus vivendi* with what it considered to be the leading threat to that stability, the Soviet Union.

Yugoslavia's relations with the Soviet Union seem to have shifted perceptibly since the 1968 intervention in Czechoslovakia by the Warsaw Pact countries. Yugoslavia's moderately-consistent tilt towards the Soviet position on many important issues had been maintained since the mid-1950s when Khrushchov decided that the Yugoslav heresy was not as catastrophic as Stalin had portrayed it. It would seem, however, that the Soviet-bloc invasion of Czechoslovakia frightened the Yugoslavs so much that even Tito, based on the conception of international communist unity and socialist solidarity, became somewhat sceptical of its value to Yugoslavia.

The younger leaders in Yugoslavia, some of whom grew up without this desire for "socialist solidarity", might be tempted to move even further away from the Soviet Union than Tito has done. The post-Tito era could, therefore, witness an attempt to maximize alternatives by giving a higher priority to the question of the unification of Europe than to warmer ties with the Soviet Union. Already it seems that Yugoslavia's major political effort has shifted somewhat towards attainment of an unstructured but effective co-ordination of foreign-policy positions among European countries. If Yugoslavia's nonalignment policy, which has embraced the Third World since the mid-1950s, should be adopted as a model for European nonalignment in the post-Tito era, Yugoslavia might be able to salvage some of the influence the superpower monopoly of the *détente* process has chittled away. Yugoslavia's truly independent, and not eastward-looking, position between the two blocs would make

it a natural leader of a newly-nonaligned Europe. The influence Yugoslavia could exert within such a powerful grouping of countries could insure its continued viability as an independent country and replace the conception of "socialist solidarity" with that of a "nonaligned Europe" or at least a "European consensus".

Mixed blessing

On the whole, it appears that the Soviet-American *détente* process beginning in the early 1970s has been considered a mixed blessing by the Yugoslavs. In his speech at the Eleventh Congress of the League of Communists in June 1978, Tito reiterated that "*détente* between the super-powers is an essential prerequisite for the whole process of the easing of international tensions, preservation of world peace and fostering of international relations on the principles of active peaceful coexistence". He called on the United States and the Soviet Union "to make serious efforts to transcend the present unsatisfactory situation" arising from "signs of a deterioration and increased distrust". Tito thus appeared as a leading advocate of Soviet-American *détente*. The winding-down of superpower hostility would be beneficial for all the world, helping to ensure the continued existence of the planet and opening up new avenues for co-operation. Tito may have decided that Yugoslavia would be under less pressure from the Soviet Union in the possibly-chaotic post-Tito period if there were to be the stability that the Soviet-American *détente* could provide.

At the same time, however, the Yugoslavs still entertain some qualms as to their situation under *détente*. Like many others, they fear that the promise of ever-increasing Soviet-American consultation and co-operation might see settlement of international problems without consultation of less influential, but nonetheless involved, countries. Yugoslavia, whose influence has rested primarily on its ability to mobilize public opinion in favour of nonalignment, is thereby faced with the prospects of declining prestige and power, which, in turn, could spell an increasing vulnerability to Soviet desires for hegemony.

The current stalemate in *détente* has provided an excellent opportunity to use the nonalignment platform to push for renewed movement towards *détente*. Tito seized this opportunity during his travels in early 1978 and stressed the need for worldwide, and not just superpower, involvement. This was an attempt to revitalize the nonalignment platform from

*Importance
of ability
to mobilize
public opinion*

which to urge further progress towards peaceful coexistence and to bolster Yugoslavia's prestige as a leader of the movement for *détente*. The rewards, however, could be shortlived if the United States and the Soviet Union should again emphasize bilateral, rather than multilateral, negotiations, with Yugoslavia's future as a subject of those talks. Yugoslav leaders might then be forced to end their heretofore profitable balancing act and decide between two courses (alignment with the capitalist West being considered tanta-

mount to desertion of socialism). Would Yugoslavia have to agree to participate in Soviet-influenced "socialist solidarity" in order to maintain its viability? Or should it try to lead the way toward European nonalignment in an attempt to salvage its declining influence, especially in the post-Tito era? It is no wonder that Yugoslav leaders, faced with such a potentially difficult and dangerous situation, look upon the Soviet-American *détente* with ambivalence.

Eastern Europe

Hungarian minority in Romania

By Paul Pilisi

In September 1977, a Communist leader and member of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party wrote an open letter denouncing the violation of the individual and collective rights of his people. With a courage not often seen in these times, this Marxist of Hungarian origin criticized the deplorable way the Romanian Party and Government had dealt with the Hungarian minority in Transylvania. On January 23, 1978, Reuters confirmed from Belgrade that the Romanian police had placed Karoly Kiraly under house arrest because of his letter. The matter at issue here is not just the violation of the rights of an individual but the violation of the collective rights of a people forced to live outside the national borders it has known for a millennium. What reasons and motives exist for this denunciation in a socialist country? In answering this question, it is important and helpful to examine various major aspects of the current quarrel between Hungary and Romania, two socialist countries, over the "nationalities" problem. Sixty years ago, in October 1918, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Austria-Hungary presented the Act of Surrender to the President of the United States,

Woodrow Wilson. After the First World War, the Versailles system sanctioned the balkanization of Central and Eastern Europe. This policy, based on the democratic principle of self-determination of nations, in practice gave rise to the oppression of minorities. The political and economic atomization of Central and Eastern Europe, intensified between the First and Second World Wars by rivalries among the new "national" states (each of which had several nationalities sharing its territory), favoured the growth of the influence of the powers directly interested: Germany and the Soviet Union. Torn apart by conflicts and disunited in their efforts, the new national states became one by one victims or satellites of these two powers.

The lessons of their shared or similar past experience have not led these countries towards a democratic, voluntary and sensible reunion, but rather towards the reversal of the earlier situation. The formerly dominant peoples have become, in most of the new states, dominated minority groups.

Socialists and nationalists

After the Second World War (the causes of which are fundamentally linked to the situation arising from the First World War), the Eastern European countries, which had adopted the Soviet model of socialism, were not capable of resolving the nationalities problem. In Marxist

Mr Pilisi teaches in the Department of Political Science at Laval University. The views expressed here are those of the author.

theory, this problem is considered to be restricted to capitalist society. The national bourgeoisie maintains and nourishes it in order to strengthen further the unity of the oppressing mechanism, the state. In a socialist society, characterized above all by collective expropriation (nationalization) of the means of production, the nationalities issue disappears, for it is a problem that is specifically bourgeois.

In fact, however, the socialist countries, in spite of clear doctrinal guidelines, are incapable of settling conflicts between nationalities. One has only to consider the quarrel between the Serbs and Croats, the differences between Czechs and Slovaks, the Macedonian problem involving Bulgaria and Yugoslavia or the fate of the Hungarian minority in Transylvania. Moreover, under the pretext of socialism, some countries, such as Romania, have gone beyond the discriminatory methods and policies practised in the inter-war years by "bourgeois" governments towards the minority nationalities.

Since the Belgrade Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, held in the summer of 1978, the observance of human rights in the Eastern countries — and in the U.S.S.R. in particular — has aroused sustained public interest in the Western hemisphere.

In recent months, Western public opinion has discovered that entire peoples are condemned to the fate that was believed to be restricted to certain individuals. The public is learning that avowed socialist political systems are using Marxist doctrine and the omnipresence of the state, which is in the hands of a single party, to violate the right of national groups to lead a collective life, at least so far as culture and national language are concerned. It goes without saying, using the most elementary logic, that if individual rights and freedoms are violated, then similar rights of minorities and communities will certainly not be respected either.

This sudden new concern was sparked by the dissident Romanian writer Paul Goma at a press conference held in December 1977 in Frankfurt, West Germany. The young author, who had spent part of his life in concentration camps, gave a stirring account of the violation of minority rights in present-day socialist Romania. Mr Goma, who was present on the invitation of the Komite für Menschenrechte in Rumänien (Committee for Human Rights in Romania) and the Gesellschaft für Menschenrechte (Human Rights Association), painted a dark picture of the fate of the minorities in Romania, and of the Hungarian minority

in particular. It should be noted that there are some 300,000 Germans in Romania today, besides Ukrainian and Serbian ethnic groups.

After this interview, the most influential and respected newspapers and magazines of Western Europe (the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, *Der Spiegel*, *L'Express* and *Die Welt*, among others) began to cover the problems of the Hungarian minority in Transylvania.

One French journalist did not hesitate to describe the policy of the Romanian Government as actual "cultural genocide". In the October 28, 1978, international issue of *L'Express*, the term "ethnocide" was used by E. Bailby, who had studied the question at first hand. According to statements by the Hungarian socialist poet Gyula Illyés, winner of the European prize for literature in 1967, the term is very accurate. The poet accuses the Government, the Romanian Communist Party, and in particular its Secretary-General, Nicolae Ceausescu, of "proceeding in the name of socialism to liquidate the Hungarian culture in Transylvania".

With the publication in 1976 of a book documenting the changes in Transylvania by this Transylvanian author, the problem of the Hungarian minority had become a subject for thought in Western Europe. The question acquired considerable dimensions in September 1977, when Kiraly published his open letter denouncing the "tragic" situation of the Hungarian minority in Transylvania.

What are the roots and implications of the problem? Transylvania, an integral part of Hungary and the home of the national Magyar (Hungarian) culture, was allotted to Romania after the First World War. The homeland of three nationalities (Hungarian, Romanian and German), Transylvania became part of Romania on June 4, 1920, under the Treaty of Trianon, which reduced Hungary's territory by two-thirds. Romanian sovereignty was therefore established without prior concern for the wishes of non-Romanians, who nevertheless represented over 50 per cent of the population. This, then, is when the whole Transylvanian problem began, in that the Romanian Government was to disregard the guarantees it had signed as a safeguard for minority rights. Between the First and Second World Wars, the chief monuments to Hungarian history and culture were systematically destroyed. The policy of assimilation to which minority nationalities are usually subject was applied.

The Treaty of Paris, signed on Feb-

January 10, 1947, confirmed Romanian sovereignty over Transylvania. The 1952 Romanian constitution granted the status of Magyar Autonomous Region to the land of the Szeklers. For self-protection, the Hungarian people joined the Communist Party. The end result of the administrative reforms of 1956 and 1968, aimed at dispersing and then assimilating the Hungarian minority, was the abolition of the Magyar Autonomous Region.

According to the 1966 census figures, the Hungarian population numbers about 1,800,000, or 9.2 per cent of the population of Romania. One-third of this number lives in the large cities along the border between Hungary and Romania, and constitutes the majority group in the following cities: Nagyvárad (Oradea), Szatmar (Satu-Mare), Arad and Temesvár (Timișoara). Another third of this minority is concentrated in the Szekler region, making up over 80 per cent of the population of the former districts of Csik (Ciuc), Háromszék (Trei-Scaune) and Udvarhely (Cluj). The remaining third is spread among the towns and villages of Transylvania. Some 200,000 Hungarians live beyond the Carpathians, cut off from the rest of the Magyar population in Transylvania.

Since the administrative reform of 1968, a whole series of steps has been taken by Romanian authorities in order to restrict the individual and collective rights of the Hungarian minority. These measures generally focus on the areas of culture, education and national development. Recent decrees place very severe restrictions on contacts among Hungarians themselves.

Culture and education

The educational and cultural policies of the Romanian Government continue, and go beyond, postwar principles. As early as 1949, the Hungarian writers' union of Romania was forced to join the Romanian writers' union. Dissidents have been relegated to the condition of labourers and eliminated forever from the writing profession. Censorship of minority-group publications is stricter than censorship of the ideological content of approved texts. The decreasing output of the minority press is blamed on a shortage of newsprint and economic conditions in general. Censorship guidelines set out limits, subjects and proscribed words. However, since the beginning of the 1970s, the Romanian Party and Government have put the nationalist policy in high gear and have been paying special attention to the issue of minorities. At the Eleventh Congress of the Romanian Communist Party in 1974, Mr Ceausescu,

representing the Central Committee, stated the Party's guidelines on this matter. Law 63, concerning the protection of the Romanian cultural heritage, which dates from November 1, 1974, gives Romanian authorities the power to expropriate works of art, documents, church archives and so on. Particularly valuable archives belonging to two Hungarian secondary schools were quickly seized. This law effect hands over property that is part of the Hungarian cultural heritage — many respects richer than that of Romania — to the Romanian Government.

In 1960, the Romanian Government began forcing the Hungarian-language universities in Transylvania to integrate with their Romanian counterparts. Despite the suicide of one vice-chancellor, court proceedings, harassment and "voluntary" resignations followed. Schools and institutes of higher learning are now almost all Romanian. For the few hundred Hungarian students still following courses in their mother tongue in departments of the former Hungarian university in Kolozsvár, which has become Romanian, there are almost no opportunities. The number of Hungarian secondary schools has been gradually reduced to the point where the special correspondent for *L'Express* in Transylvania affirmed in the October 2, 1978, issue that the secondary schools were disappearing.

Hungarian primary schools are also being transformed into Romanian schools in accordance with Party guidelines, the excuse given being the "insufficient number of Hungarian students". The primary education problem is much more serious in regions where the Hungarian minority is surrounded by a Romanian majority. In Moldavia, Hungarian schools have been suppressed since 1960 and the use of the Hungarian language banned in Catholic religious ceremonies. Since the Romanian population in this region is Greek Orthodox or Greek Catholic, this ban has the pure and simple effect of eliminating freedom of religion — a right that is, moreover, guaranteed by the constitution.

In addition, the textbooks distributed to Hungarian schoolchildren are simple translations of Romanian books. It is forbidden to use any other type of material. Thus students have no source of knowledge of their national culture and history except for information acquired at home. These facts were noted in the open letter already mentioned from Karoly Kiraly:

We were promised secondary and technical schools in which the language of instruction would be that of the nationalities, and we are seeing these schools

*Restriction
of individual
and collective
minority rights*

decrease in number before our eyes from year to year. Children are not able to study in their mother tongue; compulsory teaching of the Romanian language is introduced in kindergarten. The 1976 decree suppresses the right of Hungarian-language institutions of higher learning to exist. The fate of Bolyai University in Kolozsvár (now Babes University) was shared by the Medical and Pharmacological Institute in Marosvásárhely and, following a high-level decision, the Istvan Szentgyorgyi art school was changed into a Romanian faculty. Such steps have eliminated the last pockets of Hungarian post-secondary education. It is no secret that the director of the Hungarian National Theatre in Marosvásárhely is a Romanian who does not speak Hungarian. Nor is it a new phenomenon to see Romanian mayors who do not speak a word of Hungarian appointed in such cities as Nagyvárad, Marosvásárhely and Szovata, which still have a Hungarian majority.

Mobility and development

Social mobility, usually compulsory, and national development are classical methods used to weaken the influence and solidarity of a minority group. Compulsory social mobility separates Hungarian workers from their ethnic and cultural group. Under the labour code, they must accept a job offered in another area and consequently move. In order to obtain a better job, through opportunism or for personal or professional reasons, Hungarian workers will even change their names. For example, many people are unaware that the parents of the gymnast Nadia Команeci, the champion at the Olympic Games in Montreal, changed their name from the Hungarian form Kemenes. The trainer of the Romanian team, Béla Kiraly, has the same last name as that of the author of the open letter. The Hungarian trainer and gymnast were obliged to speak Romanian in public, in accordance with directives issued by Ceausescu on April 4 and 5, 1974.

The dispersal of the Hungarian population of Transylvania weakens the influence of the minority and at the same time changes the ethnic make-up of the cities. In general, a Hungarian is almost always refused permission to move to a large city with a significant Hungarian population, such as Kolozsvár. On the other hand, Romanian municipal authorities encourage the exodus of Romanians to large cities having Hungarian populations. For example, the population of

Kolozsvár increased from 167,000 in 1965 to 220,000 in 1976, but the Hungarian population, which totalled 75,000 in 1965, had hardly increased in number by 1978. For reasons of professional mobility, the Hungarian rural population must leave Transylvania and look for employment in remote regions. This enforced mobility, which particularly affects young people fleeing the rural areas, explains in large part the considerable number of Hungarian workers in outlying industrial centres.

Ethnologists and sociographers, who are concerned about preserving folk culture in villages and isolated regions, are routinely harassed by the police. Their instruments are often damaged while at work, in "inspection" accidents. In most cases they can find no employment and the Hungarian Academy of Science appoints them as academic "corresponding members", so that they can receive a minimum salary in the form of an honorarium.

Mail between Hungary and Transylvania, as well as conversations on the telephone and in restaurants, is monitored. Regulations concerning visits between Hungarians on either side of the border prohibit a Hungarian from Hungary from staying with relatives in Romania; the only exception is made for visits with immediate family members, which may not last longer than three days. Violation of the rules means an automatic fine of \$500 and the possibility that the next visiting request will be refused. Despite these restrictions, the Hungarians of Hungary are going in greater and greater numbers to Transylvania to show their national solidarity. These tourists from a "sister" country are not well received by the exclusively Romanian staff of the tourist industry. The tombs and monuments of scientists or artists who have contributed to world culture — for example, the house in which Béla Bartok was born — cannot be seen or are in poor condition. This is the case with the tomb of the Hungarian national poet Sandor Petöfi, who was killed during the revolution and war of independence of 1848-49 by Russian troops.

Kiraly's open letter clearly recognizes a gulf between socialist practice and Marxist theory:

It is clear from these few facts that the situation openly contradicts the constitution, the Party's fundamental rules and the principles stated in its official documents. Not only does this conduct go against these principles but it contravenes Marxist-Leninist beliefs and totally ignores the most basic human rights, ethical values and human dig-

nity; in sum, it goes against all the things promoted by propaganda in its most varied forms.

Moderating influence

The Kiraly letter sounded a new note in the controversy involving the two parties and governments. If this controversy has not yet taken on an aggressive and tragic nature, it is due to the moderating influence of Janos Kadar, the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Hungary.

The meeting between Kadar and Ceausescu in the summer of 1977 took place in an atmosphere of discontent on the part of the Hungarians of Hungary. It produced uncertain results. The only positive result of the meeting was the relaxing of restrictions on the contacts between the people of Romania and Hungary. The border zone in which people can circulate freely was extended by only five kilometres (from 15 to 20). The three main cities of the border region on the Romanian side with a significant Hungarian population were not included in the zone. At the present time, the Hungarians of Transylvania are not allowed to visit their families in Hungary more than once every two years.

Public opinion in Hungary appears to be increasingly hostile to Bucharest's policies towards the sister minority. The performance of plays by Transylvanian authors in Budapest has been accompanied by repeated demonstrations by young people. On December 31, 1977, and January 1, 1978, the Budapest daily newspaper *Magyar Nemzet* (*The Hungarian Nation*) published two articles by Gyula Illyés. The title, "Reply to Herder", is symbolic, referring to the German philosopher and writer J. G. Herder, who in the eighteenth century predicted the assimilation and disappearance of the Magyars since they had no ethnic or linguistic relatives on the European continent. Illyés wrote that a large Hungarian minority was without a university and soon its own language would no longer be taught.

The Romanian Government, for its part, continues to ignore the nationalities issue and intervenes only indirectly in the debate. After the distribution of these two issues of the Budapest daily was banned in Romania, a reaction appeared in the weekly publication *Contemporanul* on February 10, 1978, in Bucharest. The Romanian magazine did not discuss the complaints expressed either by Kiraly or by Illyés. The two historians working for the publication, D. Berciu and C. Preda, limited themselves to examining a study that appeared on December 25, 1977, in

the Budapest newspaper *Magyar Hirlap* (*The Hungarian Gazette*), in which the official theses on the historic rights of the Romanian people in Transylvania were again called into question. "What worries me is the obstinacy shown by Party officials, from the lowest to the highest level in refusing to discuss these problems," wrote Kiraly in his open letter, in which he still affirmed his Marxist beliefs.

At the very moment when public opinion, the Party and the Government of Hungary expect some explanations from Romania, the Romanian Party maintains its silence and builds a personality cult around the figure of Nicolas Ceausescu, President of the Republic and Secretary General of the Romanian Communist Party. In January 1978, on the leader's sixtieth birthday, this cult assumed unprecedented proportions. On January 2, four pages out of six in the journal *Scinteia* were devoted to him; they contained personal statements concerning "the most beloved son of the people". On the Government official expressed his joy "being a contemporary" of the man praised by an obscure poet of the Stalin era: "the passion and the shield of our land". With last summer's strike of miners, a large number of whom belong to the Hungarian minority, he became the nation's "honorary miner".

When will Comrade Ceausescu take up the honourable cause of the Hungarian minority in the name of socialist internationalism?

In the next issue . . .

William Epstein reported on the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament in our September/October issue. In the March/April issue he returns to our pages with an analysis of subsequent Canadian disarmament initiatives. "The year 1978," he declares "marked a turning point in Canadian disarmament policy." In that context he examines the handling of disarmament questions at the UN's thirty-third General Assembly last fall.

Evaluating the progress of test ban negotiations

Ashok Kapur

A study of the Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) negotiations since 1977 shows how shaky international disarmament diplomacy is and how disarmament diplomacy is primarily about national policy rather than about global disarmament. Since the acceptance of the Partial Test Ban (1963), the CTB has remained on the agenda. To date, China and France have not joined the test ban but France entered the anti-proliferation debate through its participation in the London Nuclear Suppliers Group (1975 onward) and in the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament (1978). At this session, China opposed superpower policies verbally but played a constructive role by not challenging the consensus in the final document of the session. In signing this document, China, with other nuclear-weapon states, is now on record in favour of nuclear disarmament as the final goal. Still, the CTB is being negotiated at a time that the superpower *détente* is in trouble and there is no consensus in the American foreign-policy establishment about the future of U.S.-Soviet and U.S.-Chinese relations.

In historical terms, a dual thrust has moved the CTB negotiations to their present status. The Third World pressure against the superpower arms race is growing. Even though UN statements are ritualistic and verbal, the pressure from Brazil, Argentina and India is gaining momentum. At the 1978 special session on disarmament Brazil fought unsuccessfully to eliminate a reference to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and it is arguable that today it would be difficult to get the Third World to accept the ban. The real source of pressure lies in the emergence of Third World nuclear options. The Third World plea to the nuclear-weapon states to move towards disarmament is a threat to the existing hierarchy because any disarmament can unfreeze the structure of global power and produce an upward mobility of select regional military powers.

The plea that the superpowers ought to freeze the arms race and prepare for disarmament is politically significant because it is accompanied by an implicit threat that the failure to disarm is likely

to increase incentives towards horizontal proliferation. It implies a promise to slow the acquisition of nuclear options if the super-powers tone down their arms race. So today the linkage between disarmament diplomacy and nuclear-option diplomacy of the Third World nations creates a new element in the context for superpower negotiations. It is still a marginal element but has potentialities nevertheless.

The second overt pressure towards a CTB is related to the first one. Until India exploded its nuclear device in 1974, there was no question of linking the control of peaceful nuclear explosions to a CTB. The PNE element was added after the Indian test. The reason for the addition is that, even though PNEs are mostly dead as engineering resources, they are alive as diplomatic and political ones. So the PNE argument is still alive theoretically — in the Soviet Union, India, Brazil and Argentina, in the language of the Treaty of Tlatelolco (1967), and in the absence of a technical consensus against PNEs in the debates of the International Atomic Energy Agency and at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. At the international level, the issue becomes urgent because the Soviet Union has an important PNE bureaucracy. Secondly, because of its irritation with China, Moscow would like to have the right to conduct peaceful nuclear explosions as its escape clause to a CTB agreement. So, unless the complete defection of the Soviet Union from the PNE case can be arranged, the issue cannot be killed. This is the background against which the CTB negotiations can be studied.

The status of the current negotiations for a Comprehensive Test Ban is

*New element
for superpower
negotiations*

Dr Kapur teaches political science at the University of Waterloo. This article is based on research he did while on sabbatical leave during the 1977-78 academic year. He is the author of International Nuclear Proliferation: Multilateral Diplomacy and Regional Aspects, which is to be published shortly. The views expressed in this article are those of Dr Kapur.

somewhat as follows.

Initially, the Soviet Union wanted to exclude the PNE issue from the CTB negotiations. On November 2, 1977, Leonid Brezhnev offered to place a moratorium on Soviet PNE testing for a limited time, as well as to ban military testing; the duration of these bans remains unspecified. In diplomatic circles this is taken to mean three years (the Soviet preference) and five years (the Western preference). A possible U.S.-Soviet bargain on this point is that the United States would admit that PNEs are allowed in principle and the Soviet Union would admit that extremely strict international control is needed to conduct them. In this case, any state (including the Soviet Union) would have to justify its PNE requirement before an international authority on a case-by-case basis. The chances are that perhaps one out of ten projects might be approved after prolonged debate. The key element is that the Soviet Union itself would insist on strict international controls and would accept self-restraint in its PNE program as the price for its commitment to non-proliferation.

The other problem in negotiating a CTB concerns the issue of verification. A combination of seismic monitoring, on-site inspection by challenge, and national intelligence methods seems technically workable and politically acceptable to CTB negotiators. It is, therefore, possible that this issue can be settled at the tripartite level.

There is a problem, however, in the linkage between the questions of duration and of entry into force of the CTB and the PNE moratorium. The Soviet position offers two choices. The debate preceding November 2, 1977, between the Soviet and Western powers was to get Moscow to discuss the PNE issue seriously. Mr Brezhnev offered to do so in November 1977. The Soviet idea subsequent to November 2 was to offer a choice: (a) limited duration for the treaty (three years) and immediate entry into force subject to review by the parties. This approach was based on the premise that China and France would not join the treaty and that it would be a non-universal document. Alternatively, Moscow offers an unlimited duration period, but with no immediate entry into force until China and France join.

Welcome discussions

For those who argue that the NPT provisions must be implemented conscientiously and that there should be a movement towards disarmament, the tripartite CTB

discussions between the U.S., Britain and the U.S.S.R. are welcome. The condition of deflection of Moscow from its wholehearted commitment to PNEs is a major achievement of the CTB debate so far. Making the PNE issue a theoretical one can be viewed as a non-proliferation measure that can be expected to influence the foreign policy debates in select Third World nations. Therefore, even though the CTB is currently meant to be a finite agreement, it has some infinite implications with respect to the PNE issue and strengthening the arms-control constituency of superpower decision-making in diplomacy. A CTB would freeze military testing and strengthen the superpower strategic dialogue. Britain's role is to assist the two principals as a "honest broker" rather than to function as a principal itself. So even a time-bound PNE moratorium buys time for the tripartite negotiations and the superpower dialogue. The underlying premise is that the role of UN members and of China are presently marginal to the reaching of agreement on the test ban but that China is a factor in Soviet thinking (in the "long run") and yet the dialogue is basically "bilateralized" and likely to remain so in the view of the superpowers.

At present a superpower dialogue in which the CTB serves a number of purposes. Because of the difficulties of fostering a spirit of *détente* these days, the CTB debate creates an atmosphere for bilateral negotiations in a number of areas — for instance, in SALT II. Negotiations towards a moratorium can be a preparatory step for a permanent ban on all testing in the perspective of military or peaceful distributions. A moratorium now would also free the military-technology situation and at the same time leave the political position of the principals intact because neither superpower could at present renounce its current positions and close all loopholes.

Soviet and American perceptions of each other are different and there is no consensus in the foreign-policy and security communities about the central political premises. The perception of issues varies with respect to technical detail and concerning political and psychological issues. The differences affect the narrow issues of the CTB negotiations as well as the broader political context in which the negotiations occur. For Moscow, the issues exist not as bargaining chips. Geopolitical and geo-strategic considerations make it important not to renounce all options without examining all implications. For India (a marginal actor in the CTB debate), the PNE option is important in the

*Verification
poses problem
to negotiations*

text of its evolving relations with China. On the one hand, it necessitates moves to normalize relations with China; on the other hand, the Desai Government, like the Indira Gandhi Government, has given the border issue more visibility. In Europe there is no meaningful activity relating to PNEs but the deliberations of the International Atomic Energy Agency demonstrate the practical possibilities of PNE experiments. Internationally, therefore, the issue is not quite resolved and is tried. It may be assumed that, once China has a strong nuclear status (say, five to ten years hence), it may be able to join the disarmament debate. Even if this happens, China may itself want a PNE option as an escape clause. The superpowers have to keep such possibilities in mind.

A moratorium also has its uses in the context of the play of bureaucratic politics in the U.S. and U.S.S.R. It is far from clear that military bureaucracies in these countries are willing to accept a permanent freeze on military testing and retesting of existing equipment and technology. Nor is it certain that organizational interests and rivalries can be curbed by political leaders and that intergovernmental negotiations can escape the role of paythings for officials and bureaucratic interests in order that the two governments may make reciprocal sacrifices. Politically, therefore, as a temporary agreement, the moratorium buys time for the principals to work on their problems at home. Internationally, in the context of post-NPT diplomacy, a CTB/PNE debate neutralizes the national PNE debates and yet keeps the PNE issue theoretically alive by shifting the discussion to the realm of Article V of the NPT. This aspect is important, because it practically nullifies the PNEs and yet theoretically implements Article V of the NPT and thus one of the NPT bargains.

Real issues

CTB/PNE negotiations to date disclose an area of negotiability for a tripartite agreement if the issues are seen as: PNE control; accepting a finite CTB agreement; implementing Articles V and VI of the NPT; gradually drawing China and France into the disarmament dialogue; and responding to Third World pressure in the UN to move towards nuclear disarmament.

If these were the principal issues, a CTB/PNE agreement would be relatively easy to negotiate. But it is a mistake to view these negotiations primarily as an exercise in intergovernmental negotiation. Rather, the intergovernmental arena is

meant to work out intragovernmental debates in the U.S. and U.S.S.R. The American debate seems more important than the Soviet one because Americans seem to have a capacity to influence the Soviet debate greater than the Soviet capacity to influence the American debate. A number of considerations are involved about the context of CTB/PNE debate, and we now turn to an assessment of these.

In de Gaulle's time, France was formally the third nuclear-weapon state in the world because of its maverick behaviour, because Britain was largely predictable and controllable in the nuclear field by the American partnership, and because China did not count much in military terms. France, however, was ignored by the two principals because it chose to be ignored. Under President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, it has developed a new posture. It joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group and entered the UN Special Session on Disarmament in a big way as a nuclear-weapon state. However, it will still be ignored because the strategic dialogue is basically bilateral. France is at present militarily stronger than China. For example, the Chinese armed forces still use anti-tank equipment of the kind used by the Imperial Japanese Army in the Second World War. It is possible that China will make a quantum leap in the modern era, and, taking such considerations into account, China is the potential third voice in international-security policy-making. (Even the Federal Republic of Germany has a greater impact than France on alliance policy and disarmament diplomacy, and its involvement in the international nuclear trade and its space-research activities based in Zaire merit attention.) The rest of the world does not count at present in nuclear and military strategy, but it does count in UN diplomacy — and this is a marginal factor the superpowers consider.

*New posture
for France
developed
under Giscard*

Some movement

To date there has been some movement in the CTB debate, but the superpowers have not conceded anything of substance, except that the Soviet Union is now willing to accept a non-universal treaty and thereby give China a chance to continue its military testing while Soviet testing is suspended for three to five years. The Soviet-Chinese military gap is immense, and on a military basis cannot be bridged. So banning all tests is really a political decision, and the underlying Soviet motives could include the following.

First, a moratorium can help develop intelligence about Chinese intentions by

*Moratorium
helps leaders
to negotiate
with military
bureaucracies*

giving China an opportunity to increase, decrease or suspend its nuclear-testing program during the life of the superpower agreement. Secondly, the moratorium period can be an offer of time to China to develop its disarmament policy; the underlying expectation is that China will do something with this time rather than merely keep criticizing the superpowers. Thirdly, as noted earlier, the moratorium period helps the political leaders to negotiate with their military bureaucracies and other sectors in the domestic debates. Fourthly, at the intergovernmental level of perception, it can be argued that a number of factors work against an American decision to move quickly towards a CTB: (1) The United States has more "pull" than the Soviet Union to set the pace of negotiations in the latter and to accelerate the conversion of China to the disarmament persuasion; conversely, the Soviet leaders have less chance of converting the Americans and the Chinese permanently to a test-ban position. (2) Because of the absence of consensus in the American foreign-policy and security communities, the Soviet Union (the Soviet experts say) has to live with the prospect of prolonged negotiation until the U.S. can make up its mind about a permanent ban. These factors thus recommend the utility of moratorium as a time-buying activity in superpower relations.

There is an additional explanation. To avoid accepting the blame for failure in the eyes of the Third World and of American audiences, the Soviet Union made its November 1977 concession on PNEs with a view to putting the ball in the American court. The premise is that the American debate about a CTB has yet to emerge publicly and the high visibility given to SALT II in American politics does not denote the absence of a CTB debate. Even the verification issue is unsettled in American politics, though it appears to be a marginal issue in tripartite debate. Furthermore, there is a larger question among Washington insiders whether the U.S. ought even to negotiate with (as distinct from talk to) Moscow. The argument is that American military technology is superior to Soviet technology, the Soviet economy faces insurmountable difficulties in the foreseeable future, and the Soviet Union is an expansionist regime with the outlook of the principality of Muscovy in the fifteenth century. Hence no real settlement with Moscow is possible and arms-control agreements create a false sense of security and a false expectation that nuclear disarmament is possible.

A formidable task

In this perspective, the task before Soviet strategists is a formidable one — viz., first to convert the Americans to recognizing the use of a permanent ban on testing and then to have them induce a change in Chinese thinking to facilitate its entry into the disarmament debate. Brezhnev's November 1977 announcement had, therefore, little to do with PNEs but a lot to do with Soviet relations with the U.S. and China. Underlying the linkage of the United States and China in Soviet disarmament diplomacy is the opinion that the key to change in Peking's foreign policy orientation lies in committing the U.S. to the idea of a comprehensive test ban and then moving to involve China in that agreement.

Underlying this approach is the perception in Moscow that the main problem of China is internal. Until China's power struggle is settled, it needs an external threat to justify its current military and foreign-policy orientation. For Soviet experts it is not a question of who the leader is, as long as he is powerful and is able to commit China to involvement in the policy debate on international security. So, when the power structure in China is firmly established, the Chinese will start to think of their national interests, in which perspective Sino-Soviet relations are not permanently hostile. The process of reaching this conclusion is likely to be slow. Militarily, China can be disregarded by the Soviet Union but, since it has the capacity to do political harm, Sino-Soviet adjustment is needed. One approach is to encourage the Chinese leaders to indicate their willingness to join the CTB when they have reached a certain level of development in their military technology and their force structure.

Soviet disarmament diplomacy does not rely only on American assistance, and Soviet/Third World connections are helpful. Encouraging China to come out of its self-imposed isolation in international security policy by participating in international-disarmament diplomacy is an opportunity and a danger for China. If support for disarmament would win applause in the Third World, but there is also danger: China could lose the opportunity to quickly militarize itself and thereby realize its potential as the third major voice in international-security policy-making. To some extent, the game is "zero-sum" because a China moving towards superpower status is likely to lose its credentials in the Third World. Today China can blur the choices because it has

st recently entered the UN and needs ne to shape its diplomacy and make a ntribution. But once the novelty of hina's presence in the UN wears off hina will eventually have to support hird World disarmament positions *vis-à-vis* the nuclear-weapon states in the disarmament field.

The issue is becoming a practical one because Third World nations have finally learnt the art of working together, of compromising to establish a united front against the nuclear-weapon states. Third World behaviour at the recent special session on disarmament and in international-conference diplomacy reveals this fact. At the disarmament session, the subject was ventilated at the highest level and the Third World pressure on the nuclear-weapon states increased. The session made disarmament a big issue in UN diplomacy and another such session is likely in 1981-2, at which time the nuclear-weapon states will again have to explain their disarmament record. Since China has also signed the final document, which emphasizes the importance of vertical-proliferation control, China may at that time find itself on the other side of the boundary.

It is possible, however, that the Soviet shift on PNEs in November 1977 will make no difference because the fundamentals in the American security and foreign-policy debate are unsettled in the Carter Administration. One voice in the American debate asserts that the U.S., like Western Europe and Japan, ought to strengthen the practices and institutions of peace and of economic and cultural exchange so that the Soviet system is gradually reformed from within and the habits of peaceful competition and exchange are gradually institutionalized.

The opposing voice says that disharmony between the superpowers is the natural and permanent condition in their relations, and *détente* is a waste of time, since it creates a false sense of security and it is much neater to fight a Cold War or to prepare for one than to prepare or practise peace. At present there is no one in the United States, including President Carter and his adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, who can synthesize ideas and policies and settle the debate. The negotiating context for the CTB will, therefore, probably remain mixed and inconclusive with regard to the settlement of the premises.

In conclusion, a finite CTB agreement is unlikely to settle the central issues but it will create the "cosmetic" effect of movement, if not achievement. China is unlikely to join the CTB, and there is sympathy for its position because of its problem with Soviet Union and because of its inexperience with international-conference diplomacy. India is important for "cosmetic" reasons, but it is suspicious of the CTB. The temptation to take a seat at the table by signing a moratorium, and thereby to acquire the right to consider the future of the moratorium a few years hence (in return for Indian acceptance of full-scope safeguards), is a weak bargain that does not appeal to a self-contained India today. The real debate is still bilateralized, and this requires clarification about the effects of the American debate on the Soviet debate and *vice-versa*. The CTB could symbolize the taking of a step towards disarmament, but it is likely that the principals are not yet ready to abandon all their options. The CTB debate has consequently little to do with PNEs and with the goal of nuclear disarmament and a lot to do with intra-élite debates in the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R.

Agreement unlikely to settle central issues

Book review

Goldmann's Jewish paradox

By Sidney Freifeld

At the age of 84, Nahum Goldmann can look back on a crowded career as a Jewish leader extraordinary; at one period in the sixties, he held simultaneously the presidencies of the World Jewish Congress, which he helped to found, the World Zionist Organization, the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations, the Conference on Jewish Material Claims against Germany — for which he was the

prime and successful negotiator — and the Memorial Foundation for Jewish Culture, as well as several lesser offices. This may explain why, when Pope John wanted to

Mr Freifeld, an officer of the Department of External Affairs since 1947, retired in 1975. His last post was Ambassador to Colombia and Ecuador. The views expressed here are those of the author.

task with a Jewish leader, he sent his confessor, Cardinal Bea, to Goldmann and the Cardinal said: "It's hard to negotiate with the Jews, because one does not know who best represents them. For us, there is the Vatican; for the Protestants, there is the World Council of Churches; but when I investigated the present-day structures of Jewry . . . it was so complicated that I asked other Jesuits for advice. They told me that you were the ideal man to see, particularly the Pope of the Jews!"

If his awesome list of positions should convey the impression that Dr Goldmann has been a stodgy figurehead of the Jewish establishment, this book quickly reveals him as a provocative dissenter from a number of Israeli policies and as a gadfly who seemed to derive satisfaction from raising hackles and playing the maverick. During his lifetime he achieved the not inconsiderable feat of being attacked at the same time by Zionists and anti-Zionists, and by Israeli officialdom as well as the Diaspora establishment. In more recent years, during which he appears to have mellowed not at all, he has not hesitated to criticize domestic tendencies within Israel and, more conspicuously, important aspects of Israel's foreign policy — in particular, its posture towards the Arab world. He was critical of Henry Kissinger's step-by-step negotiations following Egypt's 1973 attack on Israel, and he expressed preference — this was before Camp David — for seeking a general settlement through the Geneva conference that was then being considered. He wanted the Israelis to commit themselves to evacuating the occupied territories, while "the Arabs must formally recognize the Jewish state". He feels, however that division of Jerusalem would be "intolerable" and that "a solution acceptable to all the different peoples and religions would have to be found".

Dr Goldmann has frequently drawn the ire of Israeli leaders for his forays into sensitive fields. At one time after 1967, he was reported as about to meet with Nasser and later with President Sadat; more recently, he has been reported as willing to meet with Yasser Arafat. He comes down especially hard on his old friend David Ben Gurion, a "clever, brilliant man, who had a statesman's perspective and the admiration of a man like de Gaulle," but who "never forgives a defeat, never forgets a humiliation, and always wants to exact revenge". Goldmann was often critical of Ben Gurion's policies towards the Arab world.

This volume is replete with Dr Goldmann's *obiter dicta*: on the the deficien-

cies of a world organized on the basis of nation states, the sins of the super-powers and the virtues of neutralism for Israel and of a confederation of states of the Middle East. He defines a politician as one who takes account only of what his supporters want, and a statesman as one who is concerned also with the needs of his adversaries because they are the people he must settle with. In his view Israeli negotiators have to learn that no one is ever altogether right; absolute situations do not exist because the absolute is impossible to reach. He is unhappy that, because of the wars imposed upon it, Israel had to start its existence as a state by concentrating on physical power and also because, convinced of its own rights, it often overlooks those of its adversaries and weakens its position in the eyes of the world.

What Dr Goldmann fears for the Jews is not another holocaust but the loss of their heritage, "not murder but suicide". Jewish youth, he believes, need a challenge: "To build an Israel which is not content with having the best army in the Near East . . . which concentrate instead on religious, cultural and social creativity". He would like to see world Jewry, inspired by an Israel of peace and justice, become a champion of the war against poverty, illiteracy and inequality, demanding the abolition of the sovereign state and the establishment of peace.

When he founded the World Jewish Congress 40 years ago, Dr Goldmann became a *bête noire* to some Jews in the West, who feared the Congress might prejudice their struggle for equality in their own countries and wanted to forestall any resurgence of age-old charges of conspiracy. Today the WJC stands for a wider acceptance of the view that Jews in many countries may have common interests and concerns, and that it is natural that they should organize to advance them.

During a hectic life of considerable attainment, Dr Goldmann has dealt with many of the world's leaders, from Churchill, Attlee, Roosevelt and Acheson to Pope Paul VI, Adenauer, Brandt, Tito and Ceausescu — and also, during the Thirties, an emissary from the Hapsburg family, who came to him with a scheme to enlist Jewish support for the restoration of the monarchy, in return for which the would grant haven for Germany's 700,000 Nazi-endangered Jews in Austria, which the Hapsburgs believed, would thereby regain economic prosperity and cultural pre-eminence. Dr Goldmann expresses a decided preference for dealing with "exceptional persons", who, by his own ac-

Goldmann
a provocative
dissenter

ent, reciprocated. Chancellor Raab of Austria tells him that he's "too clever a man". Mussolini is annoyed with Goldmann for not having accepted a proposal but later admits: "You were right. You are a statesman". After a meeting with President Ceausescu, a Romanian participant tells him that he "has just learnt a valuable lesson in diplomacy". Another European leader says that he "always foresees what is going to happen". Dr Goldmann seems to have spent undue time nodding in approval before his own mirror; whether or not this constant praise

of self through the utterances of contemporaries is narcissistic or reveals some deep-seated insecurity, it needlessly tarnishes his image if not the record of his accomplishment.

This lively volume is a good translation from the French original, but is marred by a number of typographical errors and editorial blemishes, e.g.: "I knew Gromyko well when he was in office."

Goldman, Nahum. *The Jewish paradox*. Translated by Steve Cox. New York: 1978. Fred Gordon Books/Grosset & Dunlap.

Reference Section

Canadian Foreign Relations

I. Recent Books

Bruneau, T.C., and Jan J. Jorgensen

C.I.D.A.: the organization of Canadian overseas assistance. Montreal: Centre for Developing Area Studies, McGill University, 1978. 50 pp. (Working Paper No. 24).

C.D. Howe Research Institute. Canadian-American Committee.

Bilateral relations in an uncertain world context: Canada-U.S. relations in 1978, a staff report. Montreal, 1978. 102 pp.

Cuff, R.D., and J.L. Granatstein

American dollars — Canadian prosperity: Canadian-American economic relations 1945-1950. Toronto: Samuel-Stevens, 1978. 286 pp.

Dhawan, K.C., and Lawrence Kryzanowski

Export consortia: a Canadian study. Montreal: Concordia University, 1978. 249 pp.

Donnelly, D.K.

CanAmerican union now! Toronto: Griffin House, 1978. 208 pp.

Kasinsky, Renée G.

Refugees from militarism: draft-age Americans in Canada. Totowa, N.J.: Littlefield Adams, 1978, c1976. 301 pp.

McLeish, John A.B.

A Canadian for all seasons: the John E. Robbin story. Toronto: Lester and Orpen, 1978. 315 pp.

Oil in the seventies: essays on energy policy. Edited by Michael Walker and others. Vancouver: Fraser Institute, 1977. 283 pp.

Seward, Shirley, and Helen Janssen

Canadian development assistance: a selected bibliography 1950-77. Edited by Jane Beaumont. Ottawa: International Development Research Centre and Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, 1978. 62 pp. (Norman Paterson School of International Affairs Bibliography No. 6).

Stiles, John A.

Canada, Korea and the Pacific Rim. Honolulu: Centre for Korean Studies, University of Hawaii, 1976. 27 pp. (Colloquium paper No. 6).

Ward, W. Peter

White Canada forever: popular attitudes and public policy toward Orientals in British Columbia. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1978. 205 pp.

II. Recent Articles

Adashev, V.

"USSR and Canada moving to closer cooperation." In *International Affairs* (Moscow) No. 10 1978 pp. 95-100.

Bannon, Sharleen

"McBride Commission: a progress report on UNESCO's study of global communication problems." In *Development Directions* October 1978 pp. 18-22.

Bassiouni, M. Cherif

"Perspectives on the transfer of prisoners between the United States and Mexico at the United States and Canada." In *Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law* 11:249-261 Spring 1978.

Copes, Parzival

"Guidelines to bounty; ocean frontier: Canadian fishery under Canadian management." In *Report on Confederation* December 1977 pp. 17-22.

Johnson, Randel

"The United States-Canada Income Tax Convention and Protocol — method and criteria used to define the meaning of 'Permanent Establishment', Revenue Ruling 77-4 1943 C.B. 526." In *International Trade Law Journal* 3:427-430 Summer 1978.

Litvak, Isaiah A., and Christopher J. Maule

"Canadian small business investment in the U.S. — corporate forms and characteristics." In *Business Quarterly* 43:69-79 Winter 1977.

Modak, N.D.

"Opening the trade barriers." In *Canadian Banker and ICB Review* 85:24-26 December 1978.

Nord, Douglas C.

"The 'problem' of immigration: the continuing presence of the stranger within our gates." In *American Review of Canadian Studies* 8:116-133 Autumn 1978.

fishshore oil and gas exploration in North-Eastern Canada." (summary) Ed. from material supplied by D.G. Crosby, Director, Resource Management and Conservation Branch, Dept of Energy, Mines and Resources, Ottawa. In *Polar Record* 19:186-190 May 1978.

Siroeder, Dennis

"Third world coverage in Canadian newspapers." In *Development Directions* October 1978 pp. 13-15.

Sow, Rodney A.

"Extended fishery jurisdiction in Canada and the United States." In *Ocean Development and International Law: the Journal of Maritime Affairs* Vol. 5 No. 2/3 1978 pp. 291-344.

Vyer, R.D.

"The Canadian image in a changing world: a scientific and technological perspective." In *Musk-ox* No. 22:73-76 1978. Paper given at the seminar "Nordicity: Canada as a northern state", Edmonton, Feb. 1-2, 1978.

Walker, John R.

"Keeping at peacekeeping." In *Report on Confederation* December 1978 pp. 8-10.

Williams, Paul

"The Canadian connection." In *Canada and the World* 44:18-19 January 1979.

Publications of the Department of External Affairs

The following lists consist of the most recent publications of the Departmental Press Office and the External Information Programs Division concerning international affairs and Canadian foreign policy.

Press Releases, issued by the Departmental Press Office:

No. 105 (December 1, 1978) Visit to London and Brussels by Secretary of State for External Affairs.

No. 106 (December 1, 1978) Canadian participation in United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF).

No. 107 (December 8, 1978) Statement by Deputy Prime Minister MacEachen in House of Commons December 8, 1978, regarding thirtieth anniversary of Universal Declaration on Human Rights.

No. 108 (December 12, 1978) Statement on behalf of Canada by Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs Gignac during consultations on Indochina refugee problems held in Geneva under sponsorship of UN High Commissioner for Refugees.

No. 109 (December 13, 1978) Establishment of diplomatic relations between Canada and Democratic Republic of Sao Tomé and Principe.

No. 110 (December 18, 1978) Air-quality talks between Canada and United States.

No. 1 (January 4, 1979) Coming into force of convention on multilateral co-operation in Northwest Atlantic fisheries.

No. 2 (January 5, 1979) Canada-U.S. negotiations on maritime boundaries and fisheries problems.

No. 3 (January 5, 1979) Evacuation of Canadians from Iran.

No. 4 (January 10, 1979) Visit to Commonwealth Caribbean by Secretary of State for External Affairs, January 16-21, 1979.

Statements and Speeches, published by the External Information Programs Division:

No. 78/12 Growing Economic Interdependence, with Special Reference to Developing Countries. A statement at the OECD ministerial meeting, Paris, June 15, 1978, by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Don Jamieson.

No. 78/13 Conference on International Human Rights. An address at a lunch co-sponsored by the Canadian Human Rights Foundation, the Canadian Council on International Law, and the Canadian Section of the International Commission of Jurists, by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Don Jamieson, in Ottawa on October 26, 1978.

No. 78/14 Thirtieth Anniversary of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. A statement by the Deputy Prime Minister, the Honourable Allan J. MacEachen, in the House of Commons, December 18, 1978.

No. 78/15 The Commonwealth — A Unique Instrument for Co-operation. A speech during the Royal Commonwealth Society lunch, London, December 6, 1978, by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Don Jamieson.

No. 78/16 Canadian Position on Disarmament Restated. A statement by the Adviser on Disarmament and Arms Control, Mr G.A.H. Pearson, to the First Committee of the thirty-third regular session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, November 21, 1978.

No. 78/17 A Reunion of Friends and Neighbours. A toast by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Don Jamieson, at a dinner in honour of United States Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, Ottawa, November 21, 1978.

No. 78/18 An International Problem of Greatest Urgency — Resettlement of Refugees from Indochina. A Canadian statement by Mr Jacques Gignac, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, during consultations held in Geneva on December 11 and 12, 1978, concerning the Indochina refugee problem, under the sponsorship of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

Treaty Information

Bilateral

Egypt, Arab Republic of

Development Loan Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt

Cairo, December 21, 1978
In force December 21, 1978

European Space Agency

Agreement between Canada and the European Space Agency concerning Co-operation

Montreal, December 9, 1978
In force December 9, 1978
With effect from January 1, 1979

France

Agreement on Mutual Assistance between Canada and France for the Prevention, Investigation and Suppression by the Customs Administration of Both Countries of Customs Offences

Paris, January 9, 1979

Iran

Exchange of Notes constituting an Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of Iran concerning Visa Requirements for Non-immigrants

Tehran, November 2, 1978
In force December 1, 1978

Italy

Agreement on Social Security between Canada and Italy

Toronto, November 17, 1977
Instruments of Ratification exchanged
December 28, 1978
In force January 1, 1979

Korea, Republic of

Exchange of Notes constituting an Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Republic of Korea concerning Textile Restraints

Ottawa, December 13, 1978
In force January 1, 1979

United States of America

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America constituting an Agreement concerning the Establishment, Maintenance and Operation of four OMEGA Navigation Monitoring Stations in Canada

Ottawa, July 26 and December 20, 1978
In force December 20, 1978

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America constituting an Agreement amending the Technical Regulations annexed to the Agreement between Canada and the United States of America for Promotion of Safety on the Great Lakes by Means of Radio, 1973

Ottawa, December 29, 1978
In force December 29, 1978
With effect from February 1, 1979

Exchanges of Notes (June 30, 1953) between Canada and the United States of America constituting an Agreement concerning the Installation of an Oil Pipeline from Hailuoguo to Fairbanks, Alaska

Ottawa, June 30, 1953
In force June 30, 1953
Amended by Exchange of Notes March 1960
Amended by Exchange of Notes April 1962
Canadian Notice of Termination of Agreement dated January 12, 1979, to be effective January 12, 1980

Multilateral

Protocol Extending the Arrangements regarding International Trade in Textiles (Subject to the following declaration):

"In depositing this Instrument of Acceptance, the Government of Canada declares as follows:

This acceptance is made taking into account the confirmation, by all Parties to the Protocol extending the Arrangements regarding International Trade in Textiles, of the understandings set forth in the conclusions adopted by the Textiles Committee on December 14, 1977, a copy of which is attached to the Protocol."

Done at Geneva December 14, 1977
Entered into force January 1, 1978
Canada's Instrument of Acceptance deposited October 24, 1978
Entered into force for Canada October 1, 1978

Final Acts of the World Administrative Radio Conference for the Planning of Broadcasting-Satellite Service in Frequency Bands 11.7-12.2 GHz (in Regions 2 and 3) and 11.7-12.5 GHz (in Region 1), Geneva, 1977

Done at Geneva, February 13, 1977
Canada's Instrument of Approval deposited at Geneva, December 13, 1978
Entered into force January 1, 1979

Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries
Signed at Ottawa, October 24, 1978
Canada's Instrument of Ratification deposited November 30, 1978
Entered into force January 1, 1979

CORRIGENDUM: The first treaty listed under "Multilateral" in the November/December 1978 issue of *International Perspectives* should read as follows (corrections shown in italics):

Adopted at New Delhi, November-December 1956; revised April 24, 1963, April 14-17, 1969
Entered into force May 10, 1958
Canada's Instrument of Accession deposited October 24, 1978
Entered into force for Canada October 1, 1978

SUBSCRIPTION ORDER FORM

International Perspectives

Published bimonthly, subscription rates Canada, \$4.00 a year; other countries \$5.00 a year.

Name


Address

Country **Postal/Zip Code**

**Please make your remittance, in Canadian Funds, payable to
The Receiver General of Canada and mail to:**

**Printing and Publishing,
Supply & Services Canada,
Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, K1A 0S9**





If undelivered,
return cover only to:
Canadian Government Printing Office,
Ottawa, K1A 0S7, Canada

En cas de non-livraison,
retourner cette couverture seulement au:
Imprimerie du gouvernement canadien
Ottawa, K1A 0S7, Canada



External Affairs
Canada

Affaires extérieures
Canada

ISSN 0381-4874

March April 1979

International Perspectives

A journal of opinion on world affairs

AI
A
I 36

Canada's disarmament initiatives

Canada, NATO and the neutron bomb

Implications of the Afghan *coup*

Three aspects of Asia

Canada at the Tokyo Round

Energy: an international problem

International Perspectives

Contents

March/April 1979

Canada's disarmament initiatives/William Epstein	3
Canada, NATO and the neutron bomb Hugh Macdonald	9
Implications of the Afghan coup David Van Praagh	12
Aspects of Asia	16
China: catching up with the world R. and S. Reford	19
Sino-American normalization Georges Vigny	23
Japan, China and the U.S./F. Q. Quo	27
Canada at the Tokyo Round Gilbert R. Winham	31
Energy: an international problem Ulf Lantzke	35
Letter to the Editor	36
Reference section	

International Perspectives is issued bimonthly in English and French by the Department of External Affairs, Ottawa. Any material in this publication may be reproduced. Mention of *International Perspectives* as the source would be appreciated.

Published by authority of the
Secretary of State for External Affairs.

Authorized as third-class mail,
Post Office Department, Ottawa.

Subscription rates: Canada, \$4.00 a year
single copies \$1.00; other countries
\$5.00 a year, single copies \$1.25.
Remittances, payable to the Receiver
General of Canada, should be sent to:
Canadian Government Printing Office
Ottawa, Ontario, K1A 0S9.

Editors:

Alex I. Inglis
Louis Balthazar

International Perspectives is a journal of opinion on Canada's role in the world and on current international questions. Its purpose is to stimulate discussion and interest in international affairs. It is not intended to reflect Canadian Government policy or perceptions. Indeed, the editors often seek to include material that expresses different or contrary views. The Department of External Affairs accepts no responsibility for the views expressed except where it is clearly stated that an article by a departmental officer is a statement of Government policy. All other articles contain a specific disclaimer of departmental responsibility for their contents.

Letters of comment on issues discussed in *International Perspectives* are welcome and will be considered for publication. Please address your correspondence to: International Perspectives, Department of External Affairs, L. B. Pearson Bldg., 125 Sussex Drive, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, K1A 0G1.

Canada's disarmament initiatives mark return to active role

by William Epstein

The year 1978 marked a turning-point in Canadian disarmament policy. Canada had long been a supporter of disarmament and, because of its wartime role in helping to produce the first American atomic bomb, had been an active participant in all the UN bodies concerned with negotiating disarmament. But in recent years Canada has played a much less active role. For more than a decade Canada had presented no new major concrete proposals, being content to leave the initiatives to the two superpowers, which were mainly interested in collateral measures of arms control rather than in disarmament measures that would really reverse the arms race. The activist non-aligned and Third World countries such as Mexico, Sweden, Yugoslavia, and, to a lesser extent, India and a few others made valiant and determined efforts to ensure that the disarmament negotiations were concerned with substantial measures of real disarmament, but with little success.

During the same period, despite the achievement of eight multilateral treaties and a dozen bilateral American-Soviet treaties and agreements mainly having to do with SALT, the arms race was neither halted nor even slowed. Indeed, it has accelerated in both its quantitative and qualitative aspects.

For example, in the last 17 years world military expenditures have increased from about \$100 billion a year to more than \$400 billion. Even allowing for inflation and the lessened value of the dollar, this represents a startling increase in terms of constant dollars. When the SALT talks began in 1969, the United States and the Soviet Union possessed, in all, fewer than 3,000 strategic nuclear-missile warheads. Today they have a total of some 15,000 deliverable strategic-missile warheads.

The most important and dangerous side of the arms race is the technological or qualitative aspect, particularly in offensive weapons. According to various official government estimates, from 25 per cent to 50 per cent of the scientific, engineering and technological manpower of the industrialized states, and 40 per cent of all research and development spending, are devoted to military purposes. So rapid is the pace of the technological arms race that some scholars believe that, if the number of weapons were reduced by 20 per cent a year (i.e. not in absolute terms but by 20 per cent of

the declining balance) for the next five years, that would not by itself serve to halt the arms race or really reduce the killing power of the military arsenals of the two superpowers.

It is a disturbing fact that, if all the arms-control negotiations now proceeding at SALT, the Geneva Disarmament Conference, the mutual force reduction talks in Vienna, and the several other negotiations now under way, were to succeed in their immediate objectives, that would not result in significantly slowing down the arms race. The slow pace of disarmament negotiations lags far behind the speed of advancing military technology. The world is on the verge of a new technological explosion in both nuclear and conventional weaponry, and nuclear proliferation and possible nuclear terrorism loom as increasing threats.

Strategy of suffocation

It was, no doubt, growing concern about the continuing nuclear-arms race and the threat that it posed for both human survival and human welfare that led to a reawakening of Canadian interest and efforts to halt what has been aptly described as this "mad race to oblivion".

A group of consultant experts was established by the Department of External Affairs at the end of 1977 to help prepare the Canadian position for the UN Special Session on Disarmament in the spring of 1978. Mr Trudeau chose the special session as the first occasion in his ten years as Prime Minister to appear before the United Nations. In his address to the General Assembly on May 26, 1978, he outlined a new "strategy of suffocation . . . to halt the arms race in the laboratory". The importance of this major initiative merits its reproduction at some length. The Prime

Mr Epstein is a Special Fellow of the United Nations Institute for Training and Research and a Killam Visiting Fellow at the University of Calgary. He was formerly Director of Disarmament Affairs in the UN Secretariat and was a special adviser to the Canadian delegation to the thirty-third session of the General Assembly. He is the author of The Last Chance: Nuclear Proliferation and Arms Control (1976). The views expressed in this article are those of Mr Epstein.

Minister said:

The conclusion I have reached is that the best way of arresting the dynamic of the nuclear-arms race may be by a strategy of suffocation, by depriving the arms race of the oxygen on which it feeds. This could be done by a combination of four measures. Individually, each of these measures has been part of the arms-control dialogue for many years. It is in their combination that I see them as representing a more coherent, a more efficient and a more promising approach to curbing the nuclear-arms race. The measures I have in mind are:

First, a comprehensive test ban to impede the further development of nuclear-explosive devices. Such a ban is currently under negotiation. It has long been Canada's highest priority. I am pleased that the efforts of Canada's representatives and those of other countries stand a good chance of success during 1978. The computer can simulate testing conditions up to a point. But there is no doubt in my mind that a total test ban will represent a real qualitative constraint on weapons development.

Secondly, an agreement to stop the flight-testing of all new strategic-delivery vehicles. This would complement the ban on the testing of warheads. I am satisfied that, in the present state of the art, such an agreement can be monitored — as it must be — by national technical means.

Thirdly, an agreement to prohibit all production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. The effect of this would be to set a finite limit on the availability of nuclear-weapons material. Such an agreement would have to be backed up by an effective system of full-scope safeguards. It would have the great advantage of placing nuclear-weapon states on a much more comparable basis with non-nuclear-weapon states than they have been thus far under the dispensations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Fourthly, an agreement to limit and then progressively to reduce military spending on new strategic nuclear-weapon systems. This will require the development of the necessary openness in reporting, comparing and verifying such expenditures.

A strategy of suffocation... will have a real and progressive impact on the development of new strategic-weapons systems. It will have that impact in three ways: by freezing the available amount of fissionable material; by preventing any technology that may be developed in the laboratory from being tested; and by reducing the funds devoted to military expenditure.

The second of the four points calling for a ban on flight-testing of all new strategic-delivery vehicles was completely new. Although various proposals had been proposed from time to time to halt the production of new strategic nuclear weapons, this was the first time that any official proposal had been made in

the United Nations for a ban on flight-testing. Such a ban is essential as a practical way of stopping the development and production of new nuclear-weapon systems.

It was not, of course, possible for the special session to give full consideration to this new Canadian initiative, but it did decide that the various proposals presented to the session should be transmitted to the appropriate deliberative and negotiating organs dealing with disarmament for further and more thorough study. Among the list of these, specific reference was made to the "Proposals by Canada for the implementation of a strategy of suffocation of the nuclear arms race".

In addition to this reference, the Final Document of the special session contained language that was similar in its intent to the strategy of suffocation. Paragraph 50 called for the "cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapon systems" and the "cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery and the production of fissionable material for weapon purposes". Paragraph 51 called for "the cessation of nuclear-weapon testing by all states within the framework of an effective nuclear disarmament process". Paragraph 89 called for "gradual reduction of military budgets on a mutually agreed basis".

On June 30, 1978, at the conclusion of the special session, the Secretary of State for External Affairs stated in Parliament that he had "started a new mechanism in Canada and the department to deal with disarmament questions". On July 13 he announced the creation of a new Office of the Adviser on Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs in the department, with Mr Geoffrey Pearson appointed as Disarmament Adviser. In addition to acting as principal adviser on disarmament policy and being responsible for following up the decisions of the special session, he was charged with strengthening Canada's role in the negotiations and with encouraging research and stimulating public information activities in relation to disarmament.

At the thirty-third regular session of the General Assembly in the fall of 1978, Mr Pearson took personal charge of the disarmament work of the Canadian delegation and two of the members of the original consultative group of disarmament experts were appointed to the delegation as special advisers.

General Assembly

Since this session followed so soon after UNSSOD, its work and tone were largely determined by the special session. As had been decided by the special session, the First Committee devoted its full time solely to disarmament and related international security questions and 45 resolutions were adopted, about double the number in recent years. The debates, although dealing with a number of highly controversial subjects

were somewhat lower-keyed than in the past because of the absence of any competitive proposals by the two superpowers and also because the issues had been so fully thrashed out during the special session.

The session engaged in a thorough and generally constructive discussion of substantive issues but it did little to advance the results of the special session. The United States and Soviet Union provided no real leadership. The United States did not undertake a single positive initiative and frequently adopted a negative attitude to many of the initiatives of others. The Soviet Union took two initiatives (on security guarantees and on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons) that were mainly propaganda efforts, and it too maintained a largely negative stance on the proposals put forward by other states.

France continued the role it began at UNSSOD by taking an active part in the session, but China continued its previous role of minimal participation, and both France and China maintained their long-standing positions that gave them a free hand to continue to build up their nuclear arsenals.

The non-aligned and Third World countries continued the active role they had played at UNSSOD. Argentina, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and Yugoslavia, in particular, took a number of initiatives and sponsored or co-sponsored many resolutions.

Follow-up

Canada played a more active role than for many years and co-sponsored nine resolutions. For the first time in more than a decade, it launched a major initiative in presenting the resolution on the prohibition of production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. This was a follow-up of the third point of Prime Minister Trudeau's "strategy of suffocation". The Canadian proposal, as was indicated by the Prime Minister, was important both as a measure for limiting the nuclear-arms race and for preventing the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. The U.S.S.R. however, opposed it as not going far enough since it did not also call for a cut-off of production of nuclear weapons. Although the U.S. had proposed such a cut-off more than 20 years earlier, and had vigorously supported it for several years, the issue had lain dormant for ten years. The U.S. was no longer a strong advocate of the idea, but it did vote for the Canadian proposal, which was co-sponsored by Australia, Austria, Bolivia, Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Romania and Sweden.

The resolution as adopted reads:

The General Assembly,

Conscious that effective measures on a universal basis are necessary in order to facilitate the process of nuclear disarmament and the eventual complete elimination of nuclear weapons,

Convinced that efforts to halt and reverse the

nuclear arms race will facilitate the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices,

Considering that the acceptance by all States of binding and verifiable controls in the form of full scope safeguards, on a non-discriminatory basis, on all production of fissionable material, so as to ensure that it is not used for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, would contribute towards the efforts to promote non-proliferation, limit further production of nuclear weapons and facilitate nuclear disarmament,

Noting with satisfaction that the General Assembly at its tenth special session recognized, in paragraph 50 of its Final Document, that the achievement of nuclear disarmament would require, *inter alia*, the urgent negotiation of an agreement, at an appropriate stage and with adequate measures of verification satisfactory to the States concerned, on the cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes,



Prime Minister Trudeau addressed the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament on May 26, 1978. In his speech, he advocated a "strategy of suffocation" as a means of achieving progress in disarmament. He is seen here at the podium of the Assembly.

Requests the Committee on Disarmament, at an appropriate stage of its pursuit of proposals contained in the Programme of Action adopted by the tenth special session, to consider urgently the question of an adequately verified cessation and prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes and other nuclear explosive devices and to keep the General Assembly informed of the progress of that consideration.

The resolution was adopted by 108 votes in favour, ten against (the Soviet bloc, except for Romania) and 16 abstentions (including France, India and Argentina). China did not participate. This large affirmative vote should encourage the Canadian delegation to pursue the matter actively when the new Committee on Disarmament begins its work in Geneva in 1979.

A comprehensive test ban to prevent the development of nuclear-explosive devices was the first of Trudeau's four points and a long-standing Canadian policy. Canada, therefore, also supported the Indian proposal calling for a moratorium on testing nuclear weapons and explosive devices, and co-sponsored the New Zealand resolution calling for a comprehensive test-ban treaty as a matter of the highest priority, which could be considered at a resumed session of the present General Assembly in 1979. The Indian resolution was adopted by a vote of 130 (including the U.S.S.R.) to two (China and France), with eight abstentions (including the U.S.A. and Britain). The New Zealand resolution was adopted by a vote of 134 to one (China), with five abstentions (including France). Since the U.S.A., Britain and the U.S.S.R. are making progress in their tripartite negotiations for a comprehensive test ban, there is hope that agreement on this measure of disarmament may be achieved during 1979.

Although no specific or formal proposals were made concerning a flight-test ban, Mr Pearson referred to it in his statement in the First Committee on November 21, 1978, as a "useful and feasible way to seek to curtail the qualitative aspects of the arms race". Mexico once again submitted its usual resolution on SALT which, *inter alia*, stressed the need for qualitative limitations on strategic arms and regretted the delay in achieving a SALT agreement. Canada supported the Mexican resolution, which was adopted by a vote of 127 to one, with ten abstentions (including the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R., Britain and France). China did not participate.

In addition, Sweden initiated a proposal for the preparation of a new comprehensive report on nuclear weapons, whereby experts would, *inter alia*, study trends in the technological development of nuclear-weapon systems and the implications for international security as well as for negotiations on disarmament of the continued quantitative increase and qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapon sys-

tems. Canada supported the Swedish study, which was approved by an overwhelming vote of 117 to none with 21 abstentions, although all the nuclear powers abstained. The new study is closely related to the concept of the ban on flight-testing and, if properly undertaken, it is bound to come to grips with that question. It is hoped that Canada will name an expert to participate in the study who will ensure that the flight-test ban is given the most careful and thorough consideration.

Canada also supported another Swedish resolution which is intended to facilitate the reduction of military budgets by having a panel of experts carry out a practical test of a proposed instrument for standardized reporting on the military expenditure of states. This pilot test study is related to and helps to promote the fourth point in the strategy of suffocation.

Thus, in addition to the main Canadian effort in support of the cut-off, the other three points in the strategy were all covered in greater or less degree and the groundwork was laid for further steps toward their future implementation.

Other measures

A total of 16 resolutions, the largest number on any substantive matter, dealt with nuclear disarmament which confirmed the decision of the special session that nuclear disarmament must be given the highest priority.

The question of the use or non-use of nuclear weapons was a prominent item at this session of the General Assembly. One resolution, initiated by India declared that the use of nuclear weapons would be a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and a crime against humanity and that the use of nuclear weapons should therefore be prohibited pending nuclear disarmament. The resolution also requested all states, in particular the nuclear-weapon states, to submit to the Secretary-General, before the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly, proposals concerning the non-use of nuclear weapons and avoidance of nuclear war, in order that the question of an international convention, or some other agreement on the subject might be discussed at that session. The resolution was adopted by a vote of 103 to 18 (all the NATO powers including Canada) with 18 abstentions (the Soviet bloc and a few others). China did not participate in the vote.

Another item dealing with the non-use of nuclear weapons was put forward by the U.S.S.R. as a way of promoting the idea of non-proliferation among non-nuclear states and also as a means of embarrassing the U.S.A. and its NATO allies. It proposed the elaboration of a convention on strengthening guarantees of the security of non-nuclear states, whereby the nuclear-weapon states would pledge not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear

tates which renounce the production and acquisition of nuclear weapons and which have no nuclear weapons in their territory or anywhere under their jurisdiction or control. Pakistan proposed a counter-draft convention whereby the nuclear-weapon states would pledge not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states not parties to the nuclear-security arrangements of some nuclear-weapon states, and whereby the nuclear-weapon states would undertake to achieve the complete elimination of nuclear weapons in the shortest possible time.

The U.S. and its NATO allies were opposed to both proposals. The U.S. contented itself with proposing that the Security Council merely endorse the limited pledges made by the three nuclear powers at the special session in the spring, which were regarded as less than satisfactory by the non-nuclear states. It did not, however, press this suggestion to a vote; had it done so, its proposal would probably have been rejected.

In order to avoid a bruising showdown, the U.S.S.R. and Pakistan agreed to a compromise. Both revised their draft resolutions to request that the Committee on Disarmament consider all the proposals made, without assigning priority to any. Both resolutions were adopted by overwhelming majorities, with Canada voting in favour of both. The U.S. voted in favour of the Soviet draft. China voted against the Soviet resolution and France abstained. Both China and France voted for the Pakistani resolution, but the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. abstained. These votes well illustrate the degree to which expediency, or their individual perceptions of their interests, override positions of principle, particularly, but not solely, among the nuclear powers.

Another Soviet initiative in the nuclear field dealt with the stationing of nuclear weapons abroad. It proposed a resolution which, *inter alia*, called upon all nuclear-weapon states to refrain from stationing nuclear weapons on the territories of states where there are no such weapons at present. The resolution was adopted by 105 votes to 18 (all the NATO powers including Canada), with 12 abstentions. China did not participate in the vote.

Since Canada had decided not only to refrain from manufacturing or acquiring nuclear weapons for itself but, in fact, also to withdraw from any nuclear role either for its forces in Europe or in Canada, it is not easy to understand why it did not abstain on this resolution rather than vote against it. While it is not impossible to do so, it is difficult to envisage other new countries where the U.S.A. might need or want to station nuclear weapons in peacetime, and one can only conclude that Canada voted as it did on grounds of basic NATO strategy and alliance solidarity.

The Assembly also adopted the usual resolutions in support of nuclear-weapon-free zones, namely

Protocols I and II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, in Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia, as well as in the Indian Ocean (as a zone of peace). These resolutions did not introduce important new elements compared with the corresponding resolutions of 1977. Canada voted for all of them except the one on the Indian Ocean, where it abstained together with most of the Western powers, because of law-of-the-sea considerations.

Canada co-sponsored a resolution on the preparation of a second review conference on the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1980. The resolution was adopted by 122 votes to one with 16 abstentions (including Argentina, Brazil, France, India, Israel, Pakistan and Spain, none of which are parties to the NPT). China did not participate.

Finally, a resolution was adopted on the initiative of Iraq, co-sponsored by 38 Arab and some non-aligned countries, which requested the Security Council to call on all states under Chapter VII of the Charter to halt the supply of all arms and military equipment, and all transfer of nuclear equipment, material or technology to Israel. The vote was 72 to 30, with 37 abstentions, which was the smallest vote received for an anti-Israel resolution in a number of years. Canada, like the U.S.A., Britain, France and most of the NATO countries voted against the resolution.

Non-nuclear measures

Somewhat surprisingly in view of the decisions of the special session in this field, there was very little discussion of conventional disarmament. One resolution was adopted by consensus as a follow-up to previous ones on prohibitions or restrictions of use of certain conventional weapons deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects.

The Federal Republic of Germany initiated a proposal, which Canada also co-sponsored, on confidence-building measures. States were asked to consider on a regional basis specific confidence-building measures, and all states were invited to inform the Secretary-General of their views on measures they considered appropriate and feasible. The resolution was adopted by 132 votes to none, with two abstentions. All nuclear powers voted in favour.

Belgium proposed a comprehensive study by the Secretary-General with the assistance of governmental experts on all aspects of regional disarmament. The resolution was adopted by a vote of 93 to none, with 40 abstentions. Canada joined all the NATO powers in the affirmative vote. The Soviet bloc and a number of non-aligned states abstained.

As in previous years, the Assembly also adopted by overwhelming majorities, including Canada, Western- and Eastern-sponsored resolutions on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new weapons of mass destruction. Two resolutions on

chemical and biological weapons were adopted by consensus, one calling for the early conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of conventional weapons and the other on the holding in 1980 of a review conference on the Convention on Biological Weapons. Canada co-sponsored both resolutions.

This session of the General Assembly was also highlighted by the approval of nine studies to be undertaken by governmental and non-governmental experts, by far the largest number ever approved, and sorely needed in order to provide greater understanding and wider knowledge of the subjects. Canada co-sponsored two French resolutions for studies on an international disarmament fund for development and an international institute for disarmament research, and voted in favour of the other seven dealing with disarmament and development, disarmament and international security, nuclear weapons, military budgets, regional disarmament, an international satellite-monitoring agency (also sponsored by France), and the work of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies.

In a vote that is somewhat strange to the author, however, Canada joined the four nuclear powers and some other Western states in abstaining on the decision (taken by a vote of 100 to none, with 23 abstentions) that the UN Secretariat produce an anti-war film at a cost of less than \$200,000 for dissemination in schools and to the public.

Finally, in the field of information and publicity, the Assembly: approved the guidelines prepared by the Secretary-General for the establishment of a program of 20 fellowships on disarmament, to be started during the first half of 1979; set out some guidelines on the dissemination of information on the arms race and disarmament; and adopted a resolution on the implementation of a measure taken at the tenth special session — namely, the proclamation of the week starting on 24 October of each year as a week devoted to fostering the objective of disarmament. All these resolutions were adopted by consensus.

Considerable attention was devoted by the Assembly to the machinery for disarmament deliberations and negotiations. Seven resolutions were adopted, including a decision to hold a second special session on disarmament in 1982. These resolutions dealt with: the agendas and work of the Disarmament Commission and of the Committee on Disarmament; the implementation of the Program of Action adopted by the special session and the elaboration of a comprehensive program of disarmament; the transmission to the deliberative, negotiating and studying organs of the 33 proposals (including the Canadian one) submitted to the special session that were not fully considered by it; the review of the membership of the Committee on Disarmament; and the continuation of the work of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the World Disarmament Conference.

Another agenda item that led to considerable discussion was that dealing with the strengthening of international security. Four proposals were submitted which were only tangentially related to disarmament rather than being directly concerned with the subject. They were: a Polish declaration on the preparation of societies for life in peace, which was a rather lengthy propaganda document; a Guyanese resolution on non-interference in the internal affairs of states calling for the elaboration of a declaration on the subject; a Yugoslav omnibus resolution reaffirming the position of the non-aligned countries on a number of previous UN resolutions on various problems such as colonialism, disarmament, the new international economic order, the Helsinki Final Act, the dismantling of foreign bases, etc.; and a Venezuelan resolution on the situation in Nicaragua, expressing concern over the domestic situation there and the threat it posed to the security of the region.

The Polish resolution was adopted by an almost unanimous vote, with only the U.S. abstaining. Canada reluctantly voted for the Polish resolution, explaining its reservations about the insufficient emphasis on human rights in the resolution and the constitutional problems involved for Canada. The Guyanese resolution was also adopted by a large affirmative vote, but Canada abstained along with most NATO members. On the Yugoslav resolution, the U.S. and Israel voted "no" and Canada joined the other NATO powers in abstaining. The Venezuelan resolution was adopted by a somewhat smaller majority, with Canada voting in the affirmative although the U.S., Britain and France abstained along with a number of African and other countries.

In general, the session may be regarded as a constructive but not particularly productive follow-up to UNSSOD (except, perhaps, in terms of the number of resolutions adopted!). More countries than ever before, and in particular the smaller ones, became actively involved in the disarmament work both in regards the debates and the sponsorship of resolutions, which may indicate an increased interest in disarmament in general and perhaps also their greater feeling of competence in the subject. While it is not possible to say that any specific or concrete measure of disarmament was brought nearer to achievement as a direct result of the session, the program of work and studies outlined for the Committee on Disarmament, the Disarmament Commission, the Secretary-General and the member states will certainly keep them fully occupied during the forthcoming year, and will provide new opportunities for real progress.

From the Canadian point of view the session was especially noteworthy in that it marked the resumption by Canada of an active role in the disarmament field and the taking of the first steps along the road of implementation of the new Canadian disarmament policy set forth in the strategy of suffocation.

Canada, NATO and the neutron bomb

By Hugh Macdonald

From mid-1977 to early 1978, the "neutron bomb" was a subject of widespread debate in Canada and other countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The issue of deploying in Central Europe American enhanced-radiation warheads (ERW) for the Lance battlefield missile and for the eight-inch self-propelled cannon was presented by NATO authorities in Brussels as one of military necessity, arising from the superior offensive capacity of Warsaw Pact armoured ground forces.

The weight of public opinion in this country and elsewhere, however, turned decisively against deployment. ERW were viewed as dangerously provocative in crisis situations, likely to cause escalation in the event of war, and in any case of dubious moral character.

This difference between what was said to be the case by NATO authorities and what was judged to be the case by the general public was highlighted in April 1978 when President Carter postponed the production and deployment of ERW. Did his change of heart affect NATO one way or another? And how did the Government of Canada react?

Seven or eight defence ministers attend the meetings of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), which are chaired by the Secretary-General of NATO. In 1977, the NPG appeared to be in favour of deploying ERW, but the United States wanted explicit governmental confirmation, from its main allies at least. There were several important and instructive reasons for this caution.

In accepting ERW, America's allies would be accepting for the first time nuclear weapons designed primarily for close-range defensive nuclear war, as opposed to crisis-deterrence, or wartime escalation to the use of strategic forces.

Secondly, the military utility of ERW lay in their early use against concentrations of tanks and military personnel. Efficient deployment and use would require initiatives by battlefield commanders, prompt authorization from political authorities, and probably heavy early use along the forward edge of the battlefield.

Thirdly, these military dispositions, though not more than changes of degree in themselves, would commence a shift in NATO strategy away from "flexible response" covered by American strategic nuclear forces towards a form of forward defence dependent

on nuclear firepower deployed within the theatre. The United States would thereby gradually lessen its strategic liability to spread a war in Europe beyond the region itself. ERW would facilitate this in a double sense. The low blast effects of ERW would (supposedly) "make it possible to save West Germany without destroying it"; but at the same time it would become possible to fight a "limited" nuclear war in Europe while lessening the risk of escalation to inter-continental nuclear systems.

Fourthly, the United States had begun to seek allied understanding of the dynamics of theatre nuclear forces on both sides of the military balance in Europe. American force-improvements in operation since the early 1970s have been directed towards a smaller arsenal of lower-yield (more "useable") weapons. Soviet force-improvements have been towards an increasingly large arsenal of not-so-low-yield weapons. The interaction of these deployments was revealed in the mid-Seventies, when a number of analyses of force postures, weapons effects, budgetary trends, and Soviet and NATO options, suggested that a hitherto presumed NATO advantage in theatre nuclear systems probably had — or soon would — become a crucial, perhaps decisive, initial *disadvantage*. The most probable form of Soviet offensive would become an armoured ground attack from "ready-to-go" positions, initiated by selective nuclear pre-emption.

Finally, there was concern about the impact of ERW on arms-control negotiations in Vienna, because within NATO these involved a delicate balancing of the interests of several major allies. Rapid moves to deploy ERW would risk a collapse of consultation within the alliance and set back arms control in Europe; but too much time spent considering the arms-control implications of ERW would crucially delay short-run defensive improvements in NATO's force posture.

Had these considerations been clearly presented publicly, the neutron-bomb debate would have been very different. The public would have become aware for the first time that fundamental changes in Soviet-American strategic deterrence had unfavourably

Dr Macdonald is Research Associate at The Centre for Strategic Studies of the University of Alberta. The views expressed here are those of Dr Macdonald.

altered the strategic situation of Western Europe, and that the stability of the military balance in that region was now jeopardized more by regional nuclear options — on both sides — than by Soviet tank numbers. Consequently, ERW deployment would have appeared in its proper context — as a palliative of NATO's conventional weaknesses in the front line but, by the same token, as a marginal addition to the nuclear firepower already available in the region as a whole.

Sacrosanct doctrine

However, NATO's ten-year-old doctrine of "flexible response", with its "built-in" assumption of escalation dominance, remains sacrosanct. Thus, officially-inspired press comment favouring ERW could not emphasize their political-strategic context. Instead their battlefield "virtues" were stressed. ERW were presented as "clean" because of low yields, low collateral damage, relative absence of fissile by-products, accuracy and lethality against tank crews, and as "just another weapon" with the unexceptionable quality of killing by massive doses of fast neutron radiation. Moreover, NATO claimed that deploying ERW would increase deterrence and would not lower the "nuclear threshold".

ERW do have low yields, owing to miniaturization and efficient engineering of the warhead. They are less immediately destructive than equivalent-yield *fission* (atomic) weapons, being based upon a predominant *fusion* (thermonuclear) reaction, which is optimized to yield radiation over blast and heat. Because their radius of effect is greater for prompt radiation than other effects, ERW detonated at specific burst-heights against given point targets can kill military personnel without extensively damaging surrounding structures — which low-yield fission weapons cannot.

Other things being equal, there is no reason to think that planning to destroy a tank offensive with ERW rather than by other means would undermine deterrence, which is a structural relation between material capability and political credibility on both sides of the East-West balance. To deploy ERW alongside other capabilities and assert that their use would be defence against armoured assault is perfectly believable. But ERW probably would lower the "nuclear threshold", which is fundamentally determined by a political calculus of means and ends for each side separately. If NATO deployed ERW, their use in the event would be certain; but deploying ERW for this obvious purpose would equally certainly reinforce the present Soviet emphasis upon nuclear pre-emption. Thus ERW possess a limited but significant military potential against concentrations of manned vehicles and large-scale offensives; their deployment, however, would exacerbate the dynamics of theatre and regional nuclear systems, which are, in general, significantly unfavourable to NATO.

Moreover, ERW require a small fission-trigger that in practice limits the proportion of prompt radiation to other effects to about 50:50, which means that collateral damage cannot be eliminated. Against fast-moving and widely-dispersed targets, ERW low-yield and low-blast combination would be inefficient which might lead to heavier collateral damage than use of fewer low-yield fission weapons. The particular systems chosen for ERW are open to criticism; *Lance* allegedly has poor survival and command-and-control qualities, and is too expensive, while the artillery cannon lacks range compared with Soviet artillery. The Pugwash Council has contradicted the claim that ERW are "clean", stating that "the neutron bomb would generate strong induced radioactivity by neutron capture in the soil . . . and . . . long-lasting somatic and genetic effects . . . cast grave doubts on the assertions . . . that its use would minimize harm to non-combatants". Finally, developments in new conventional-weapons technology, such as precision guided anti-tank weapons, offer an alternative — and far more flexible — strategy of defence, which NATO is anxious to exploit.

"Foxy" look

It is scarcely surprising that NATO's position looked "foxy" to the man in the street, to parliamentary opposition, to the press, to many academics and, of course, to the dewy-eyed idealists of the peace groups. A formidable barrage of counter-fact and option was soon set up against ERW.

Of all the claims made in public comment for ERW, it was the quasi-moral usage "clean" that provoked the greatest uproar. This epithet provided a handle for a "moral" campaign against ERW. Socialist opinion in Europe, prompted by a Soviet campaign of feigned distaste and heavy political innuendo denounced ERW as instruments of capitalist class interests for exterminating the masses while preserving private property. Precisely why the masses in question should be driving across West Germany in Soviet tanks, and why capitalist interests should choose that country to fight an aggressive war in defence of private property, were riddles that remained largely unnoticed.

But, in any case, NATO's cumbersome machinery for political consultation was thrown well and truly out of gear. From a mid-1977 position wherein deployment of ERW seemed agreed on by the main allies with others such as the Dutch more or less opposed and yet others such as the Canadians more or less undecided, public controversy delayed any final decision at year-end NATO meetings. Then the American position began to change. President Carter embarked upon a complete, personal reconsideration — strongly supported by "liberal" arms-control advisers — and as the American position shifted, irritation rose in Europe, becoming quite pointedly public in Bonn.

Chancellor Schmidt, though, did have special reason to worry. He feared that ERW would become yet another technical "bargaining chip" in the strategic arms-limitation talks (SALT) without being deployed, rather than, as he himself had strongly suggested the previous autumn, a strong political card to play in European arms-control negotiations after (but only after) a NATO decision to deploy ERW had been taken. In the end, President Carter decided to postpone production pending further NATO consultation. But his clear aim in asking for comparable Soviet restraint in deploying further SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic missiles was to unload the ERW issue from NATO military policies and place it firmly in the context of nuclear-arms control, whether "strategic" or "regional".

In all of this there was an undue amount of vacillation and outright contradiction in statements of

Ottawa's position.

Initially, the Minister of National Defence, Barney Danson, said Canada's position was undecided but stressed the "reduced-blast" character of the weapon and the need for rational appraisal of its broader implications, which went "quite beyond" the narrow question of military utility. Several months later, when speculation arose in Washington about the use of ERW as an arms-control "bargaining chip", or as an example of unilateral "restraint" demanding some Soviet *quid pro quo*, the Minister suggested that "... perhaps we should take this and give it to the Russians". But, early in April 1978, a new set of emphases appeared; the Government's policy was "still evolving", it was not going to be rushed on such an important matter, and anyway this was an American problem, which did not bear directly upon non-nuclear Canada.

You were saying...

At press time we had received 339 responses to the questionnaire enclosed in the January/February 1979 issue. Of these, 237 (70 per cent) were from individual readers and 102 (30 per cent) were on behalf of institutional recipients. Here is what we have learnt so far:

- | | | |
|---|--|-----|
| 1. How long have you been receiving <i>International Perspectives</i> ? | 2. Why do you read it? | |
| Five years or more | For professional reasons | 76% |
| Two to five years | For personal reasons | 21% |
| Less than two years | | |
| 40% | | |
| 41% | | |
| 19% | | |
| 3. How would you rate the magazine in terms of your reading? | 4. Should an alternative publishing arrangement be concluded, would you be prepared to subscribe to <i>International Perspectives</i> at a commercially-competitive subscription rate? | |
| Essential | Yes | 45% |
| Very useful | No | 42% |
| Desirable | | |
| Marginally useful | | |
| Not useful | | |
| 13% | | |
| 43% | | |
| 25% | | |
| 15% | | |
| 2% | | |

In calculating the replies to Question 4, we had to create a new category to accommodate those who made a conditional response. These accounted for 12 per cent of the respondents.

Where percentages do not total 100, it is because a few respondents did not answer all questions and the figures have been rounded to the nearest whole number.

The Greater Game: implications of the Afghan coup

By David Van Praagh

"I am only a beginner at the Game, that is sure." —
Kim, from the novel of the same name by Rudyard
Kipling.

For the best part of a century, the British *raj* in India played what was called the "Great Game" against Czarist Russia for paramount influence over Afghanistan. At stake in endless international intrigues, military operations and economic pressures was control of the historic gateway to the subcontinent. It was the stuff from which Kipling could weave a tale like *Kim*.

Despite severe losses at the hands of the untamed Afghans, the British imperialists succeeded in securing the traditional invasion route to India. This was partly due to establishing an intelligence network dependent on not-so-innocent operatives like the young Kim, partly due to setting up an emir in Kabul in 1881 from whom the Afghan royal family descended.

After independence and parti-

tion of India in 1947, the "game" continued. Rulers of the Soviet Union exerted persistent pressure towards the warm waters of the Indian Ocean, while the United States, later joined by Iran in aid programs, blocked Soviet domination of Afghanistan, which shares a 1,500-mile border with the Soviet Union.

The bloody overthrow on April 27, 1978, of the ruling members of the Mohammadzai clan, Afghanistan's educated *élite*, appears to have ushered in — or helped to set in motion — a Greater Game.

The Russians not only overcame the last barrier to control of Afghanistan through previously outlawed local Communists. The *coup* also put them in a position to influence decisively events in both India and the oil-rich countries of the Middle East — above all troubled Iran.

The turning of Afghanistan into a "democratic republic" sponsored by the Soviet Union has Asia-wide implications. It may be part of a pattern extending from the Horn of Africa to Indochina. Certainly it is no coincidence that the Soviet Government has recently concluded treaties of peace and friendship with the Communist governments of Ethiopia, whose forces have reached the Red Sea opposite Saudi Arabia, Vietnam, whose forces have conquered Cambodia; and Afghanistan.

A future chronicler of the Greater Game may note that it showed even less Soviet respect for the spirit of *détente* and non-inter-

ference in other nations' affairs than the game played with Cuban troops in a number of African countries. But we in the West, to paraphrase Kipling, are only beginners at the Game, that is sure. Perhaps the United States in particular, under the Carter Administration, will shed its innocence and, like Kim, adapt quickly to Asian reality through tutoring by more experienced if self-serving players. The new "triangular association" of China, Japan and the United States is confronted by serious challenges and a need to respond strongly, possibly with other partners.

Unlikely locale

The harsh Central Asian land of Afghanistan seems an unlikely place for events to shake the continent of the world. A landlocked, backward, rigidly Moslem country without even a railway, Afghanistan is characterized by rugged mountains — the Hindu Kush, or "Killer of Hindus" — and equally fearsome deserts. Its often handsome tribesmen and nomads could come straight out of the Old Testament except that many carry homemade guns. It is uncertain how many Afghans there are, but the population of 15 million or more is among the poorest in the world.

Following a brief visit by President Eisenhower to Kabul in 1954, the United States put roughly one dollar into aid to Afghanistan for every two dollars of Soviet assistance, though Moscow alone equipped and trained Afghanistan

Mr Van Praagh is a journalist specializing in Asian affairs and international development issues, and an Associate Professor in Carleton University's School of Journalism. He was South and Southeast Asia correspondent for The Globe and Mail of Toronto from 1965 to 1972, during which time he revisited Afghanistan several times. Mr Van Praagh is completing two books, on the Indian subcontinent and Southeast Asia in the past 20 years. He continues to write for a number of Canadian and U.S. newspapers, and does frequent commentaries for the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. The views expressed here are those of Mr Van Praagh.

armed forces. The two superpowers financed power and irrigation projects. Soviet and U.S. road-builders in Afghanistan found themselves co-operating in creating a transportation network where none had existed before the mid-Sixties, the Soviets building roads south from the Oxus River and their Central Asian republics, the Americans pushing them east and west between Iran and the storied Khyber Pass into Pakistan and the subcontinent. Wheat from the United States was baked into bread in a Soviet-built bakery in Kabul. Some aid projects — such as showpiece airports — were extravagant or unnecessary, but Afghanistan began slowly to emerge from its backwardness, with some amenities that were more advanced than rebuilt or expanded structures left behind by the *raj*, such as the narrow, dusty highways of India and Pakistan.

This modernization was encouraged by King Mohammad Zahir Shah, a benevolent, popular monarch who was descended from the emir established by the British in 1881. The women in the royal family set an example for removal of *purdah*, and the King nurtured a cautious democratic experiment. A constitution was adopted in 1964 — the Afghans refused to follow any foreign models — a parliament was brought into being and two popular elections were held, but without officially-recognized political parties. However, as early as 1968, a group known as Khalk was identified as being Communist and having close ties to the Soviet Union. Its student supporters held flash demonstrations at Kabul University and in the streets of the capital for “homes, clothes and food for all”.

Liberalization of the political process came to an abrupt end in

July 1973 with the overthrow of the King, who was visiting Italy, by Mohammad Daud. Daud and his brother, Mohammad Naim, were first cousins of the King, and Daud was his brother-in-law; the two brothers had effectively ruled Afghanistan before King Zahir took matters into his own hands to bring about a democratic set-up.



It was widely believed at the time of the 1973 *coup* that the Soviet Union would control the new government. Moscow may have been behind the abolition of the monarchy with its opening of Afghanistan to a number of foreign influences. But Daud continued to take U.S. and Iranian economic aid for his new republic. In 1977 he allowed a new constitution to be adopted. And he not only came close to agreement with Pakistan on the disputed border between the two countries, but quickly made friends with the Janata Party Government of Prime Minister Morarji Desai after the people of India voted Indira Gandhi's Congress Party, which was closely linked to Moscow, out of power in March 1977.

Afghanistan's improving relations with Pakistan under President

Daud appear to have been a key factor in what happened next. Perhaps even more important was the astonishing turnabout in India from an authoritarian government in economic step with Soviet five-year plans to a democratic government committed to rural development on the village level. Turmoil in neighbouring Iran, undermining the power and position of the pro-Western Shah, while fed from Afghanistan as from other outside sources, is not likely to have been an immediate objective of the Communist *coup* in Kabul. But the turmoil following on the *coup* vastly strengthened the Soviet hand in the region.

Hardy Pushtu tribesmen — or Pathans, as they are called in Pakistan — live on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistani border. The Afghans never accepted the British imposed Durand Line separating their country from undivided India's — later Pakistan's — North-west Frontier. Starting in the Fifties, they called for a tribal homeland, to be called Pushtunistan. They have never made clear how much this notion encompasses. But if Pushtunistan ever came into being, it would tear away much of present-day Pakistan, which since 1971 has been without its old east wing, now Bangladesh. Even as a propaganda ploy, the demand for Pushtunistan has led to suspension of diplomatic and trade relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The Soviet Union has supported this Afghan claim against Pakistan, a U.S. ally in the Central Treaty Organization. Moreover, India under Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and later under his daughter Indira Gandhi, from time to time joined Afghanistan to squeeze Pakistan on the Pushtunistan question, partly to counter Pakistani demands for a plebiscite among Kashmiris.

However, Daud, a Pathan whose family came from Peshawar on the Pakistani side of the Khyber Pass, and who had been a loud advocate of a tribal homeland, signalled Pakistan in the last months of his rule that he was ready to accept the Durand Line. This was a relief to the Pakistani generals, many of them Pathans, who had reimposed martial law on the country as a response to violent protests over Prime Minister Ali Bhutto's claimed victory in elections shortly before the Indian popular vote ousting Mrs Gandhi. Anything that would help hold Pakistan together was welcome. Tribal unrest in the Northwest Frontier Province and in Baluchistan to the south had not disappeared with the deposition and imprisonment of Bhutto. Tense rivalry between Punjabis and Sindhis in Pakistan's other two provinces increased with the sentencing of the former Prime Minister to death upon his conviction for alleged participation in a political murder.

Meanwhile, in India the unexpected defeat of Mrs Gandhi represented a setback to the Soviet Union whose severity was not fully appreciated in the West. The Soviets had spent years and billions of rubles and much industrial and military hardware on tying New Delhi to Moscow politically, economically and militarily. While Mrs Gandhi's Congress Party did not quite embrace the pro-Soviet Communist Party of India on the federal level (it did so on the state level), Indian armed forces were dependent on Soviet weapons systems, Indian heavy industry was dependent on Soviet technology, and Indian non-alignment had been compromised in most eyes by the treaty of peace and friendship concluded with the U.S.S.R. prior to India's forcible conversion of East Pakistan into Bangladesh.

Suddenly, with the defeat of Mrs Gandhi, this whole edifice was in danger of falling, not all at once but gradually. Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and ranking Soviet military officers rushed to

New Delhi to shore it up, Prime Minister Desai even went to Moscow and East European trade delegations continued to troop to India. But the nature of the Janata Party's new development strategy spelt diminishing Indian reliance on Soviet economic and possibly military assistance. It called for emphasis on agriculture, the village and cottage industry, as prescribed by Mohandas Gandhi, instead of state-owned heavy industry on the Soviet model. And, while India could hardly be expected to align itself under Desai with the United States and the West to the same extent it had aligned itself with the Soviet Union under Mrs Gandhi, President Carter told a responsive Indian Parliament at the beginning of 1978 that "for the remainder of this century and into the next", the world's democratic nations would increasingly consult on how to adjust common values to meet social and economic challenges.

There is no way to prove that the Soviet leadership saw its great investment in India placed in such jeopardy by Mrs Gandhi's ouster that it instigated the Afghan *coup* as a way of dramatizing Moscow's regional presence. But, even if the Russians only seized on the *coup* as an unexpected windfall, there is no doubt that its implications spread immediately beyond Afghanistan. It represented a Soviet victory after a bad year for Moscow round the world in 1977: Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's visit to Israel; the Indian elections; perhaps above all the growing strength of the post-Mao, pragmatic, anti-Soviet leadership in China; and, even in Europe, mounting discontent in the Soviet bloc while Spain, Portugal and Greece groped their way from right-wing dictatorships to viable democracies, and the Communist Parties of France and Italy were unable to share national power even after breaking with the Soviet Union.

The circumstances of the *coup* itself remain unclear, and there are several versions of events. But there is no dispute on some points. Soviet

military advisers were attached to all major units of the Afghan armed forces. The Communists who took power as a result of action by some of these units were few in number and could not have succeeded on their own. As soon as they did succeed, Daud, his immediate family and his brother Naim were executed on the spot. And a "revolutionary" cabinet headed by Premier Noor Mohammed Taraki, a former U.S. Embassy translator, was immediately formed.

It is uncertain that a move by Daud to arrest Communist plotters against him was the immediate cause of the *coup*. It is puzzling why, according to reliable sources following a lull in the fighting after defenders of the palace had apparently beaten off attackers, the loyalist troops suddenly capitulated. It is not clear what happened to members of the Mohammadzai clan beyond Daud's immediate entourage, who held most of the key government, business and educational positions in the capital.

Within a month or two of the *coup*, however, a completely new pattern in Afghanistan began to emerge. With the Communist rulers apparently unable to run the country on their own, and fearful that they could suffer the same fate as the Daud Government, the number of Soviet civilian and military advisers in Kabul increased from 200 or 300 to more than 1,000 and approximately 100 new Soviet tanks joined the Afghan armed forces *via* one of the Soviet-built roads south from the Soviet border. The Intercontinental Hotel outside Kabul held a weekly "Russian Night". According to reliable reports, more than 1,000 former officials, military officers and teachers were being held in Afghan jails, and thousands more had been transferred to minor posts in remote areas. Afghan ministries were manned by formerly low-grade functionaries and by young Afghans loyal to Khalk, or the People's Party, the pro-Soviet Communist faction that had banished a group of ideological purists.

In an ironic way probably unappreciated and certainly unintended in Washington, the aid efforts of the superpowers in Afghanistan had meshed again. The Soviet-equipped armed forces carried out the *coup*, and students and former students taught about social injustice by American teachers in U.S.-built schools provided much of Khalk's support.

It was India's Prime Minister Desai who quietly brought home to the Carter White House the immediate danger outside Afghanistan of the Communist takeover. "The last thing India wants," Desai told Carter in Washington in June, 1978, "is a Pakistan in four pieces."

The remark reflected Indian understanding of Afghanistan as a historic pressure point on the subcontinent and Indian awareness of Pakistan's vulnerability. It is not known what Carter's response was, or what he replied when General Mohammad Zia ul-Haq, Pakistan's Chief Martial Law Administrator, wrote to him shortly after the Afghan *coup* to express Pakistani fears that, as he put it in an interview in July, a Soviet-dominated Afghanistan "is likely to change the total geopolitical situation in this region".

Although he was soon preoccupied with upheaval at home, the Shah of Iran also was reported profoundly disturbed by the *coup* in Kabul; he had failed in his pledge to help maintain a non-Communist Afghan Government on his eastern flank, and his commitments to help keep Pakistan together, and to keep open the oil lifelines to the West and Japan through the Persian Gulf, were increasingly called in question. At a greater distance, though Sinkiang touches the Pamirs of Afghanistan, China's leaders, in their paranoia about Soviet encirclement and "hegemony", took a dim view of Afghan events; like India's leaders, they desperately seek years of peace in Asia to permit internal economic development.

It did not take long for the new Afghan Government, with its Soviet advisers, to revive the idea

of a tribal homeland for Pushtus living in Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Province as well on both sides of the Kabul Gorge. Fresh Afghan enticements to Baluchis living in both Pakistan and Iran may have even more farreaching potential for instability. Pakistan's bleak, uncertain political picture did not show signs of the cohesion of its "four pieces" at the beginning of 1979. If Mrs Gandhi had still been in power, India might well have seized the opportunity presented by the Afghan *coup* to try to break up Pakistan altogether. Desai's Government followed the Soviet lead in immediately recognizing the new Afghan regime, stimulating old Pakistani fears. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the Soviet Union, through Afghanistan, is tempting its old friend India to do just that. If India took the bait; its revived dedication to democratic development would be sidetracked and perhaps crippled. But the Janata Government is actively exploring instead the chances of close regional co-operation with Pakistan, Turkey, Iran (when and if Iran gets on a new track) and even Afghanistan. This is part of what can be called a new Indian good-neighbour policy, and is rooted partly in deep, if not openly, expressed, concern over Soviet ambitions.

Characteristically, General Zia and Pakistan are more direct in warning of the implications of the Soviet border's finally extending, in effect, to Peshawar. To keep it from reaching Amritsar, India's north-western city on the line with Pakistan, and to help protect Iran, Zia has proposed acceptance of his country as a buffer against further Soviet advances. Pakistan would replace Afghanistan, the traditional buffer state in the region, now that the Russians have won the Great Game. International measures are necessary, in Zia's blunt view, to prevent the Russians from now attaining "their dream of reaching warm water," possibly at Karachi. For Pakistan, in its weakened state to play any role in such arrangements, un-

derstandings would be needed with India, with China and with the United States, which under the Carter Administration has blocked sale of 100 A-7 aircraft to the Pakistanis.

U.S. Strategy

If U.S. strategic considerations have always put the Indian subcontinent to one side, this is not true of Iran and the oil lifelines. If the importance of a warm-water port seems archaic in the last quarter of the twentieth century, a Soviet naval base athwart the tanker routes through the Strait of Hormuz to Western Europe and Japan would have major modern impact.

Moreover, while China's leadership is painfully aware of its distance from the region — though a Chinese road has been built through Pakistan's northern mountain reaches —, its view of Soviet policies in Asia helps to put the seemingly remote Afghanistan *coup* into a possible pattern.

In this view, the Soviet leadership is using client Communist powers to advance Moscow's aim of "hegemony" in Asia. The most dramatic example of this is Vietnam's swift military takeover of Cambodia — Hanoi had extended its control over most of Laos earlier — through what the Chinese call "regional hegemony". This was a major setback to China itself. It brought the Vietnamese military machine, supplied and fuelled by the Soviets, to the borders of Thailand, the front-line non-Communist South-east Asian nation. But there is an even more encompassing danger, and the possibility of its coming to pass penetrates to the core of the Greater Game.

Having helped Vietnam extend its sway in Indochina, the Soviets may be closer to the prize of the U.S.-built, deep-water base at Cam Ranh Bay on the South China Sea for their powerful Pacific fleet, which has been largely bottled up in the Sea of Japan because of dependence on its home base of Vladivostok. With such a base in southern Viet-

nam, the Soviet fleet could range at will through the Western Pacific Ocean into the Indian Ocean. And with a similar Indian Ocean base west of India, reached through Pakistan, Iran and/or Ethiopia, a huge Soviet naval arc would be complete, bringing constant pressure on Ja-

pan, China, non-Communist Southeast Asia, India and the oil lifelines.

The Afghan salient, especially with the internal disruptions in Pakistan and Iran, is a two-edged sword. To turn it aside, and to foil the entire scheme of which it may be a part, old enmities will have to

be forgotten and new friendship forged, not only among the United States, China and Japan — an “association” already developing rapidly — but also India and Pakistan.

Then, and only then, will it be possible to exclaim with Kim: “Well is the Game called great!”

Editor's note: The following three articles on Asia were written before the outbreak of war between China and Vietnam.

Aspects of Asia

China: an ancient land catching up with the world

By Robert and Stephanie Reford

Not so over in National Defence headquarters. The American decision not, for the time being, to deploy ERW provoked a determined defence of their military and political merits in the face of public and Parliamentary criticism. Civilian experts in the Department of National Defence concluded that, “given reductions in indiscriminate effects and the potential for a more resilient deterrent posture, it is likely that the enhanced-radiation warheads would be a positive addition to NATO’s nuclear inventory”. Then the Chief of Defence Staff bluntly supported ERW, timing his pronouncement perfectly to contradict the thrust of a major speech the Prime Minister gave before the UN special session on disarmament.

The Prime Minister was predictably statesman-like and developed his long-standing dislike of things military in an eloquent plea for disarmament by a “strategy of suffocation” of new-weapons development, praising President Carter’s “farsighted postponement” of a decision to produce ERW. Exactly how far President Carter had seen became less certain when, after six months, he decided to authorize production (but not deployment) of ERW components.

But this apparent retreat met with official silence in Ottawa.

What lessons are suggested by the neutron-bomb debate? For NATO, it again demonstrates that to mis-state or under-state the meaning of policy is to pave the way for bad policy, or even none at all. For too long, NATO has been attempting to sustain public support for modernization programs — good as well as bad — based on a faulty and obsolescent dogma about “flexible response”. So far as Canada is concerned, the issue shows that this country pursues each line of development separately in an *ad hoc* fashion, reacting to the initiatives of others without clear aim or understanding. It suggests also that, if members of the public are not offered a clear and consistent official policy, they will be influenced by other sources of fact and opinion.

The neutron-bomb issue has been treated too politically by NATO, too emotionally by the general public, and too inconsistently by governments; neither the case for, nor that against, ERW has been demonstrated.

Although NATO is a creature of its 15 members, its institutionalized world view sometimes seems to take on an independent existence; usually, however, this is because member countries, which should decide on their own policies, have not done so. A better-thought-out set of defence policies in Canada would go some way to ensuring a more coherent and less paranoid self-image for the NATO alliance as a whole. The People’s Republic of China celebrates its thirtieth

Mr Reford was, for seven years, Executive Director of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs. Mrs Reford's work has been in the field of international education. Both have served on the staff of the United Nations. They now operate Reford-McCardless International Consultants Corporation in Toronto. The views expressed here are those of the authors.

birthday in 1979, and this year is likely to prove among the momentous of its history. On a recent visit, we were left with the impression of an ancient land hurrying to catch up with the rest of the world. Already, it is beginning to emerge from its self-imposed isolation, a process highlighted by the decision to establish diplomatic relations with the United States. Its leaders, Chairman Hua Kuo-feng and Vice-Chairman Teng Hsiao-ping, have already started paying state visits to other countries and the roster of very important people travelling to Peking will grow larger and more illustrious. China seems to have accepted the fact that one cannot be in the world without being part of it. Its emergence into the international arena may not make the task of achieving peace and development easier, but it was an illusion to believe that, in the long run, this could be accomplished without China.

The time of inward-looking may have been necessary if the Government was to achieve the extraordinary feat of feeding, housing and clothing a population currently estimated to be some 900 million. This appears to have been done. In addition, China has survived the passing of its two principal architects, Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai. There have been times when it seemed about to lapse into chaos — as in the heyday of the cultural revolution — and times when there have been setbacks rather than great leaps forward. There have been occasions when democracy might appear to threaten the centralized control of the country, such as the recent parade of wall-posters. But the Government in Peking still appears to have things well in hand and is determined to bring China into the twentieth century. Looking at what has been accomplished in the first 29 years, one cannot shrug off the prospect of success. Yet one must ask what the price may be.

Chinese society is tightly organized; people are apparently sent wherever their services are required. One of our interpreters was working in a different city from her husband, and another had only recently been reunited with his wife after several years apart. When young men and women have finished training, their job assignments are not usually a matter of preference. A Canadian would find this lack of choice an intolerable infringement of his freedom, but it is designed to make an efficient allocation of human resources, as well as being one method of preventing unemployment.

Chairman Hua Kuo-feng told the Fifth National People's Congress in Peking, on February 26, 1978:

In order to make China a modern, powerful socialist country by the end of the century, we must work and fight hard in the political, economic, cultural, military and diplomatic spheres, but in the final analysis what is of decisive importance is the rapid development of our socialist economy.

At the third National People's Congress and again at the fourth, Premier Chou, acting on Chairman

Mao's instructions, put forward a grand conception for the development of our national economy, which calls for the all-round modernization of agriculture, industry, national defence and science and technology by the end of the century so that our economy can take its place in the front ranks of the world

The socialist modernization of our agriculture, industry, national defence and science and technology is a great and unprecedented undertaking and a profound revolution, too.

Ambitious program

This is an ambitious program, and the first reaction of a Western observer is to wonder whether it can possibly be carried out. In 1958, Mao introduced what became known as the "Great Leap Forward". It has not succeeded in making China the equal of the West, and some observers have described it as a disastrous failure. One can also recall Nikita Khrushchov's claim that the Soviet Union would surpass the United States by the end of the century, which seems as much an impossible dream today as it did at the time.

Perhaps the Government in Peking has learnt from the mistakes of the past and the failures of the Soviet Union. If it is to succeed, however, there are likely to be side effects that will transform China.

In the field of agriculture, Chairman Hua called specifically for "the highest possible degree of mechanization, electrification and irrigation".

China is still an agricultural country. Wherever one travels, the amount of land under cultivation is impressive. Equally impressive is the fact that, at least in the parts we have visited, farming is still done by hand. Rice seedlings, for example, were being transplanted from the seed-beds to the paddies where they grow to maturity. In an industrial exhibit in Shanghai, we saw tractors designed to plant, transplant and harvest rice, but we did not see them being used in the fields. We cannot be sure, therefore, whether they are as efficient as they look or how many are being produced and used. If mechanization is carried out on the scale apparently envisaged, many country people are likely to find themselves out of work, and no alternative employment program has yet been outlined.

Industry

For industry, Hua said "there will be automation in the main industrial processes, a major increase in rapid transport and communications services and a considerable rise in labour productivity". Industry was not included in our program on any substantial scale. What we saw indicated that China was capable of manufacturing high-quality goods, though we did not learn whether they were produced in quantity. Nor were we able to judge the efficiency of servicing and maintenance. We have been told by people better qualified than ourselves that this has been a problem.

At the factories we did visit — making machine-tools, textiles and carpets —, we were told that whatever troubles there have been in recent years were the fault of the “Gang of Four”. This is the name given to Chiang Ching, Mao’s widow, and the three “Politburo” members from Shanghai who were dismissed and disgraced in October 1976. Indeed, everything that has gone wrong in China is blamed on the Gang, whether it be the failure to reach a production target, the banning of traditional Chinese art forms, or even the firing of the chef at a leading hotel in Shanghai because he cooked “Peking duck”. One could not get through a briefing or a conversation without hearing the Gang of Four taken to task for something.

To the Chinese, the modernization of defence is essential because, as they see it, war with the Soviet Union is inevitable. The Russians, we were told over and over again, are aggressors and it is impossible to change the nature of an aggressor. Sooner or later, he will become blinded by self-confidence and will launch an attack. This can be postponed but not prevented. “We shall not attack unless we are attacked,” said Chairman Hua to the eleventh National Congress of the Communist Party of China. “If we are attacked, we shall certainly counterattack.” On another occasion, he expressed the attitude towards a world war as: “First, we are against it; second, we are not afraid of it”. A visitor is told that, if the Russians enter China, they will never be allowed to leave. It is apparent that defence strategy is based on a relentless guerrilla war in which large parts of China’s territory and millions of lives might be sacrificed. But, in the long run, China is confident of victory.

To a Canadian, the chances of a Soviet invasion seem unlikely. The U.S.S.R. has shown itself to be more concerned with holding what it has than gaining additional territory, and ruling an occupied China would appear a virtually impossible task. However, we do not have an army of a million men stationed on our border.

Canada is accustomed to *détente* and the search for peace through agreements acceptable to both parties. To the Chinese, this smacks of appeasement. They maintained that President Carter’s decision to scrap the B-1 bomber and postpone production of the neutron bomb were acts of appeasement that would only tempt the Kremlin. We were told that the Soviet Union was trying to gain a foothold in the Middle East and along the coast of North Africa so that it could encircle Western Europe. This strategic deployment must be “smashed”. Did this imply the use of force? The answer we were given was that Soviet influence in Egypt and Somalia had been smashed (we might say “exposed”) and the same must happen to their designs against Europe. Thus, one finds China supporting a strong North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Our visit did not take us to military establish-

ments, though some of the airfields on which we landed were used by both civil and military aircraft. Members of the People’s Liberation Army could be seen on the streets of every place we visited, though they did not carry arms.

In the light of their belief about the inevitability of war, it was hardly surprising to find active preparations for survival. At a middle school in Shanghai, we were shown with pride the tunnel, or air-raid shelter as we might call it. We were told it was dug by the students and finished by the workers. Walking down some 30 steps, we passed through double concrete doors each one foot thick into a central chamber surrounded by corridors and a number of smaller rooms. It is used today as a recreation centre for students. As justification for this construction, a rather curious dictum of Mao Tse-tung was cited: “Dig tunnels deep, store grain everywhere, and never seek hegemony”. This was quoted by Hua Kuo-feng in his address to the eleventh Party Congress. He continued by saying: “We shall never seek hegemony or strive to be a superpower. In our international relations we should get rid of great-nation chauvinism resolutely, thoroughly, wholly and completely.”

The key

Science and technology is, perhaps, the key modernization among the four listed by Hua Kuo-feng. Without it, the other three may prove impossible to achieve; at the same time, it is here that China may have fallen farthest behind. During the decade between the start of the cultural revolution and the downfall of the Gang of Four, the educational system was virtually at a standstill. Many schools were closed and only recently have they returned to what we should call normal operation. The universities are still recovering and enrolment is, by our standards, very small. However, the emphasis in admission today is on ability rather than party qualifications or an equitable geographical and professional distribution. The Government has apparently recognized the shortcomings of the universities in the aftermath of the Gang of Four era by deciding that it must send thousands of young men and women to universities in the West for their education.

The emphasis on excellence and on learning from others is likely to have repercussions that will affect the structure of society, the system of government and perhaps even the purity of Mao Tse-tung’s revolution, which has been so jealously guarded. Already the conception of material compensation for better work has been supported by the *People’s Daily*. “The difference in skill and work should be reflected in the pay of the workers, with those making outstanding achievements given extra material rewards,” said an editorial that appeared while we were in China. New perquisites can also be introduced, as they have been in other Communist societies. The encouragement of

science and technology involves the encouragement of creative thought and invention. Will it, in turn, lead to independence of thought, which is virtually impossible to control? Freedom of this kind carries with it the seeds of danger and dissent for a highly-organized society such as China's. This is a chance the Government is apparently willing to take.

Until recently, self-reliance was the watchword of the People's Republic. After the Soviet Union abruptly withdrew all aid in 1960, Peking was determined that such an experience should never be repeated. China could not find itself relying on others.

This stand has now been modified. "China should learn everything that is advanced from other countries," Chairman Hua told a conference on finance and

trade in Peking in July. "Theory, politics, economics, management, science and technology — all need to be studied and the general education level raised."

China, then, is launched in new directions that may radically change its society as well as its economy. The task it has set itself is formidable, and it remains to be seen whether this new Great Leap Forward can be accomplished. When one looks back on what has been achieved during the past 29 years, the record indicates that one should never underestimate the capacity of the Chinese people. By the end of this century, China may have become what it claims it doesn't want to be — a global super-power in the true sense of that phrase.

Aspects of Asia

One man's "China card" is another's "America card"

Sino-American normalization

By Georges Vigny

A reality is a duality all of whose aspects are interchangeable. This interchangeability applies both to the motives underlying the reality and to the objective reality itself.

The normalization of relations between Washington and Peking is a two-sided reality. The so-called "China card" is much like a magician's trick card with a different face on either side; depending on whether the person presenting it is American or Chinese, the same card will be spoken of as the "China card" or the "America card".

In other words, the "China card" is politically, spatially, chronologically and strategically the same as the "America card" played by Peking; the cards are much like two sides of the same coin.

If we take the comparison with the magician one step further, a determined effort has been made, since the famous evening of December 15, 1978, when President Carter made his dramatic announcement to the American nation, never to show more than one face of this master card at a time. Witness the fact that, in the official announcement itself, most American commentators omitted or ignored the striking

element of the joint statement, and it was left to Moscow to mention it before it was finally discussed "on the rebound", as it were.

Thus, in the communiqué read by President Carter, there were five clearly-defined principles, the second of which was the most important in this context, since it went far beyond bilateralism, giving this normalization its specific flavour. The principle was that neither party "should seek *hegemony* in the Asia-Pacific region or any other region of the world" and that both were "opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such *hegemony*". Neither hegemony nor "hegemonism"! If the communiqué had contained no more than these passages, it would still have constituted an affront to Moscow,

Mr Vigny was formerly assistant senior editor and editorialist of Montreal's Le Devoir. Recently he has been working on an essay on human rights and development; a second essay, dealing with American foreign policy, is under way. The opinions expressed in this article are those of Mr Vigny.

since, in official Chinese jargon, "hegemonism" stands for Soviet "social imperialism".

The few times this principle — reduced to a single word — was quoted, it was out of context, or it was mentioned briefly to illustrate another point placed in a "linkage" situation. Such discretion on the part of the Americans was suspicious; it was almost as if they were seeking to deny the obvious fact that this normalization was a move against the Soviet Union and its attitudes towards China and the rest of the world. Either discretion or simple clumsiness was behind the subsequent incident involving the American President, who misinterpreted — or slanted — the message of his Soviet colleague and prompted a clarification from the Tass news agency.

Are we to believe that the White House does not know the political meaning of the word "hegemony" as the Chinese use it, and sees in the word only a refined expression for the desire to dominate? Such a reading would make the paragraph in the joint communiqué a pious generality, like the claim to be in favour of virtue and opposed to vice.

This would certainly be surprising — and neither Peking nor Moscow (especially not Moscow!) — understands it in such a sense.

The counterweight

The thaw in relations caught the Americans unawares, while Cyrus Vance was in the Near East and, curiously enough, during the assessment of the chances for a Carter-Brezhnev summit meeting. However, the matter had been a long time germinating, and the surprise consists only in the final state of the Sino-American negotiations, which cannot, in any case, be understood without the Chinese internal context.

This crucial phase can readily be dated from June 25, 1978, not because it began on that precise day but rather because on that day the Soviet Union issued a public warning against the temptation to play Peking off against Moscow. The expression "China card" originated with Leonid Brezhnev himself. Speaking on June 25 in Minsk during an official tour, the Soviet President, without naming names, attacked those American politicians who sought to play the China card against the Soviet Union. Condemning this policy as shortsighted, the Soviet leader expressed the hope that those taking such a step would not have to repent bitterly of their error.

Whom was he talking about? Clearly, it was President Carter's appointed adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, who had said, on his return from a trip to China in May, that a strong and secure China was in the interests of the United States.

This public warning to the United States has turned out to be an error in judgment on the part of the Soviets; it was just what was needed to encourage the Americans, and even more the Chinese, to complete the normalization process.

The next day, June 26, in a press conference, President Carter denied the Soviet accusation, saying that the Americans were not trying, and never would try, to play the Soviets off against the Republic of China, or *vice versa*. The denial is clear, but the choice of words and the allusion to a possible and implicit "Soviet card" ("play the Soviets against the Republic of China") constituted a shift of language and of conception; the denial does not cover the same ground as the accusation. To begin with, President Carter did not merely refute the accusation but, adding insult to injury, he made it clear that China and the United States shared common hopes throughout the world, and that Sino-American relations, by reason of their very extent, needed to be developed. The object, continued Jimmy Carter, was to live in peace with this people nearly one-billion strong. Is it necessary to point out that at that time China was providing unequivocal support to the anti-Soviet camp both in Zaire and in the Horn of Africa?

In undeniable continuity of purpose, the White House announced next day, June 27, a visit to Peking on July 6 by American scientists, at the very time China was voicing more and more plainly its great desire for Western technology. Colloquially speaking, the warning was answered by "one-upmanship".

We need not go over the history of the diplomatic exchanges between Washington and Peking or between Moscow and Washington, but need only locate the key stage in order to comprehend it.

The context of the summer of '78 was that of the stalling of SALT, of an outbreak of espionage, of increased Soviet repression against "dissidents", and of the "destabilization" of Africa already referred to. It was a context aggravated by the impossible "linkage" and the selectivity of *détente*.

Washington's overtures to China, at a time when Leonid Brezhnev in person was visiting the Sino-Chinese border to reassure his own people and presumably to disturb the Chinese, were already a sort of counterweight. The theory that, in order to conduct successful negotiations with the Soviets (that is, to force them to a compromise), the U.S. must improve its relations with China has always had its advocates in Washington.

All this did not take into account — at least not sufficiently — the Chinese domestic crisis, in which the indefatigable Teng Hsiao-ping was daily erasing from Chinese life all traces of the Gang of Four — which in the end became the "Gang of Five", once it was realized that the first member was not Mao's widow but Mao himself.

In the meantime, Peking was launching an all-out offensive (offering a little comfort to Don Jamieson, who was swiftly overtaken by the Europeans in the race for the Chinese market), negotiating the agreement of the century with Japan and even sending President Hua to the Balkans to defy the Soviets in

their own backyard. On the way, Enver Hodja was cast off like an old shoe and Tito came back into favour.

The illusion

All the preceding goes to show where Brezhnev's error lay. It was as if he were solemnly admitting on the public square that Sino-American normalization would hurt Moscow, or that the Soviet Union was taken aback by such a thaw in relations.

It is easy to see that the heads of the American and Chinese offices, Messrs Woodcock and Chai Tse-min, had an eventful fall season, and clear indication of China's impatience can be detected in the warm welcome given in October to James Schlesinger, U.S. Energy Secretary and champion of the hard line against Moscow. But, as always, these efforts came up against the obstacle of Taiwan. On this point, however, an essential clarification must be made, which the Americans, caught up in their own set of problems, were unable to understand — the obstacle of Taiwan, with which Washington is slowly and painfully learning to live, is an *illusion*!

At various times, and in particular after the deaths of Chou En-lai and Mao Tse-tung, the Chinese leaders, caught in the infernal spiral of the battle for succession, clearly announced that the "liberation" or reintegration of Formosa with the mother country was the responsibility of Peking alone, which was reserving its decision for the proper place and time. It is certainly difficult, in translation from one language to another, to render all its subtleties, but the Chinese internal situation was such that this language, which appeared hard, meant the opposite of what the West generally thought it meant. Although, in the literal sense, Peking's statement meant that it was not giving up Taiwan and was threatening reconquest, reading between the lines showed that Peking was not in a hurry to recover the island, which reduced the urgency of the problem.

Yet this was not the sense in which the Chinese statement was read in Washington. Nor was Peking in a hurry to provide the key to the code. Relying on American myopia, which was cunningly sustained by Chinese ambiguity, the leaders in Peking took full advantage of the Taiwan problem for the purpose of imposing their own perspective on the negotiations and, even more obviously, their own rhythm, dictated by internal developments.

To reveal the Taiwan problem in its true light would have been not only a strategic and ideological mistake but also, concretely, a surrender of Chinese control over the negotiations and, even more obvious, of the rhythm already referred to.

The Chinese have often been praised for their pragmatism, and justly. But another gift that has always been ignored is their refined use of illusion, their sure control of ambiguity and false appearances.

Never look at the empty hand held out by the magician; the action is taking place in the other hand, between the bent fingers, shielded from everyone's attention. We know who Rameses II was, but what about President Hua — do we know his real name? Do we even know whether or not Hua and Teng, rather than being opponents, support each other in a constant battle against extreme elements pressuring them from both right and left? How many people understood, when Teng met his political downfall for the second time after the death of Chou En-lai, that his ouster was not the end of a process but rather the beginning of an upheaval that is now in the "boomerang" stage?

All this is to say that the Taiwan illusion worked marvellously, attracting great attention to a stake that, in the final analysis, concerned only the Americans. It is the United States that is linked to Taipei by a defence treaty, and Washington has incurred all the odium of the rejection of this document now that the American leaders have become convinced of the inevitability of the change in direction that must be made. The masses of angry Taiwanese reviled the American representatives and insulted Carter, not Hua or Mao.

And this despite the fact that Peking has never had, and still does not have, the means to capture the island of Formosa by storm, or the intention of doing so. It can even be said, in the celebrated Chinese spirit of pragmatism, that it is in Peking's interests to leave Taiwan as it is indefinitely, since the island is a bigger, richer version of Hong Kong. It can more profitably be left as an autonomous entity than swallowed up in China's insufficiencies.

The "America card"

In an interview with Walter Cronkite of the Columbia Broadcasting System on December 31, 1978, Jimmy Carter said that Leonid Brezhnev's message concerning the Sino-American normalization was "very positive" in its general tone. He even commented on the "understanding" of the Soviet leader, according to whom the new Sino-American relations would contribute to world peace.

And Carter added, when Teng's trip had already been announced for January 29, 1979, that he hoped Brezhnev would go to Washington before the visit of the Chinese Foreign Minister. This was shown to be a false hope when the subsequent meeting between Vance and Gromyko on SALT did not produce the desired breakthrough. All the same, Tass took the initiative of offering a clarification that, though moderate in tone, was still a denial of Carter's claim. According to the Soviet agency, Brezhnev's message noted the development and, while admitting that it was quite legitimate for sovereign states to establish normal relations, inquired about the object being sought in this particular case. Did Jimmy Carter

misinterpret Brezhnev's message? Or did he deliberately read it selectively in order to force the Soviets to express themselves openly for or against? Normalization is one question, but "on what basis the normalization takes place, and what aims are pursued by the parties" is quite another.

The Soviets did not miss the references to hegemony and hegemonism. According to Tass, the joint communiqué contained "expressions whose direction is beyond doubt, if one bears in mind the usual vocabulary of the Chinese leaders". Moscow would, therefore, follow closely the development of the new relations between Washington and Peking to see what they would be like in practice, and would "draw appropriate conclusions for Soviet policy".

It can be inferred that, even before the economic impact of normalization with Washington can be evaluated, Peking is reaping political and strategic dividends from its "America card". Washington gratified Peking more by including in the communiqué the very word that calls up for Moscow the disconcerting spectre of "encirclement" than it did by renouncing the "two-Chinas" position.

The question now is not how many bottles of Coca-Cola will sell in China, how many tourists and businessmen will visit Peking, how many American tractors will be sold or how many hotels will be built. All of this constitutes the corollary of the fundamental question, which can be expressed as follows: is the Sino-American *rapprochement* irreversible, as is the countervailing Sino-Soviet divorce?

Until now, it has been the fashion to speak of "objective alliances" between China and the United States and between China and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, particularly in a "containment" approach to what has been called "Soviet expansionism". Peking has been a thoroughgoing debunker of the idea of *détente*, and has never hesitated to take the side of the West against the Warsaw Pact countries, in either the European or the African theatres. As for the entry of Vietnam into Comecon, it can even be maintained that this creates more problems for Moscow than it solves, since Peking considers the development a direct threat to its borders.

In other words, Sino-American normalization had been in the realm of possibility for a long time. The current *rapprochement* is much more significant in view of its timing; at the height of Teng's power and of his specific line, this normalization means that China has overcome its instability and found a form of internal stability that makes it possible for the masses to accept this major event. Preceded by a vast campaign of conditioning through the *dazibaos*, normalization has coincided with a challenge to the legacy of Mao himself.

The "Great Helmsman" is quoted as saying that, while all men are no doubt mortal, some of the dead weigh more than Mount Taishan and others are lighter than a feather. Could he have imagined that this would be applied to himself, and in both senses — first as Mount Taishan and then as a feather?

Dissuasion and influence

Peking knows very well that it cannot dissuade Moscow by itself, and so it is trying to succeed in this effort by turning to the colossal American potential. The question is not so much whether the United States alone is able to provide the quantity and quality of technology Peking needs as whether any other power except the U.S. is capable of lending China credibility.

With the obstacle of Taiwan behind them and with full normalization established, it can be claimed that, in all probability, the Sino-American *rapprochement* is irreversible and that Moscow must give up its dream of an Asian security treaty.

Even if it is granted that the Americans will one day recover from the Indochinese trauma, Peking knows full well that friendship with the United States and the objective *rapprochement* under way cannot seriously threaten its own priorities.

Through Western glasses (particularly America's dark ones), the interchangeable duality disappears. The fact is that repudiation of the man Mao and his thought has never meant, nor will it ever mean, repudiation of China's past, its tradition or its heritage. The truth is that China aspires to achieve power; if it succeeded, with American, European and Japanese help, in getting its industrialization off the ground (which, needless to say, is its chief priority), the country would become the spiritual beacon it has been aspiring to become once again after centuries. Its prosperity would attract the covetous, while the influence of its thought and the image of its power would rebuff them.

This is not a poet's dream; it is a pallid reflection of the Chinese spirit, an image maintained by millennia of tradition to which Mao only added a new page. It is no coincidence that the Great Helmsman, the equivalent of a Celestial Emperor of China, was simultaneously the greatest revolutionary in Chinese history and a poet. It is the intersecting of these two dimensions that makes it possible to attain, with or without Mao, government by thinking men with a social conscience.

Contrary to what is believed in the West, this attitude does not produce a nation of dreamers; it induces in the Chinese a sharp perception of reality that its Western partners confuse with pragmatism.

Japan, China and the U.S.— the new trilateralism of Asia

By F. Quei Quo

In 1978, while the attention of the world was focused on the situation in the Middle East, a new international power configuration was quietly in the making in the Far East. The ratification of a peace and friendship treaty between China and Japan on October 23, the announcement of official normalization of relations between China and the United States, to take place at the very outset of 1979, the signing of a friendship treaty between Vietnam and the U.S.S.R. on November 3, the increased hostilities between Vietnam and Cambodia, and the successive visits by high-ranking officials and politicians of China, Vietnam and the U.S.S.R. to the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) countries were not an accidental accumulation of isolated events. Viewed together, these events signify the coming of a new era in the international politics of Asia.

The "new trilateralism" consists of the United States as the prime mover, China as the balancer and Japan as the follower. The coalition among these three nations now creates a supreme force — in military strength, human resources and technological and economic powers. The "new trilateralism" now effectively controls Soviet ambitions in the Far East and compels the U.S.S.R. to search elsewhere for a breakthrough against containment; hence the moves in Southeast Asia.

Nearly half a decade has elapsed since Prime Minister Tanaka shook hands with the late Chairman Mao and Premier Chou En-lai, indicating to the Chinese that Japan would not fall behind the United States (though his visit was a few months after the "Nixon shock") in the degree of its interest in developing friendship with China. The negotiation of a peace and friendship treaty, however, had been prolonged because of interrupting events and some basic differences in principles insisted upon by the parties involved. The turn of events late in 1978 was, therefore, hardly predictable, and the Russians were the most surprised of all. There were, however, a number of reasons for the rapid emergence of the new scheme of things in the Far East. These included the failure of *détente*, the internal conflicts within the two major ideological camps and, in particular, the changes in

political leadership of the nations involved.

To begin with, the *détente* of the Sixties and Seventies had very little impact on the Asian front, where the problem was more among allies than between enemies. To the Russians, the Chinese appeared to have become more Communistic and revolutionary than themselves. To the Americans, the Japanese seemed to have become more capitalistic and peace-loving than Americans had ever wanted them to be. Moscow found itself branded as the capital of the "revisionists" and the New York money market became the trade centre for Japanese *yen*.

The conflict in the socialist camp was both intensive and extensive. It involved ideological disagreement, border skirmishes, struggle for leadership within the camp and competition to win allies among the new nations.

The economic warfare between Japan and the United States was more real than it appeared to be. It became such a highly-politicized issue that a special Cabinet post was created and a former diplomat was appointed for the purpose of smoothing Japan's trade relations with the United States and the countries of the European Economic Community. The economic competition launched by "Japan Inc." was, to many Americans, as unfair as the attack on Pearl Harbor by Imperial Japan in 1941. Criticism of Japan's getting a "free ride" in its journey towards "peace and prosperity" placed Japanese leaders in an untenable position, for the nation's political climate was not yet ready for a "right turn". At an international meeting, Prime Minister Fukuda lamented that the situation reminded him of the Thirties, leaving his Western colleagues to speculate on the implications of his remarks. Somehow a new international order had to be created so that each of these Asian powers — the

Dr Quo is Professor and Chairman of the Department of Political Science at Simon Fraser University. He has written extensively on Asian affairs and his current teaching and research areas are the theories of international politics and Japanese politics. The views expressed in this article are those of the author.

U.S., the U.S.S.R., China and Japan – could find its proper place.

The diplomatic offensive was initiated by the United States as soon as its internal political instability was settled by the election of Mr Carter as the thirty-ninth President. In Far Eastern policy, two general principles were to be applied – first, to make the Asians responsible for their own security and prosperity and secondly to neutralize the Russian ambition for Asian power. The timing was perfect. The new Chinese regime had just rid itself of the fanatical “Gang of Four”, under whose leadership any rational policy had been impossible. The 1978 Constitution inspired by Chairman Hua now proclaims China’s desire to become “modern” in its military and socio-economic development. Zbigniew Brzezinski flew to Peking to pave the way for eventual normalization of relations between the two nations, but also stopped in Japan before he returned to the United States. The scheme was to cultivate China and Japan as an effective check against the Russian threat.

To accomplish this purpose, both an American understanding with China and the exertion of pressure on Japan were required. The proposed withdrawal of troops from South Korea also called for co-operation with both China and Japan, since the former exercised a persuasive influence over the North Korean Government and the latter over the Government of South Korea. The tie between Kim’s North Korean Government and Peking is a close one. North Korea owes a great debt to China, without whose military intervention the Government could have been chased out of Korea in 1951. In the south, Park’s regime is indebted to the Japanese for its industrialization and its economic prosperity. The conservative Liberal-Democratic Government of Japan even helped Park by voicing a minor plea against the withdrawal of U.S. troops. It was not difficult for both China and Japan to convince their Korean friends that the status quo in the Korean peninsula had to be preserved, at least for the time being. The difficulty lay, however, in Japan’s own decision to take part in the new scheme, which would have such serious political implications. The instinct of the political animal was to shy away, if possible, from any serious political involvement.

Partnership with China, though economically desirable, is politically unwise in the eyes of some Japanese politicians, including former Premier Fukuda. It offends the U.S.S.R., with which a peace treaty has not yet been signed. The Soviet Union remains in occupation of the islands north of Hokkaido, which it took over in 1945 and which are still claimed by Tokyo as Japanese territory. In spite of repeated efforts on the part of Japan, the Soviet Union is not prepared to talk peace while U.S. bases continue to exist in Japan. The Japanese were warned

officially that the “anti-hegemony” clause in the proposed Sino-Japanese Treaty implied hostility towards the U.S.S.R. However, the issue became more non-partisan day by day. All the opposition parties joined the majority of the ruling Liberal Democrats in urging normalization of relations with China. The only objection came from the pro-Taiwan faction in the Liberal Democratic Party itself. Especially important was the upcoming presidential election in the LDP, in which the main opponent to Premier Fukuda would be Masayoshi Ohira, Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Tanaka Cabinet, who championed the cause of normalizing Sino-Japanese relations. To deprive Ohira of an issue favourable to his candidacy, Fukuda finally approved the signing of the treaty.

There was, of course, the prospect of the Chinese market as a solution to the problem of current stagnation in Japan’s heavy industries. Japan’s technological skill and plants could be exchanged for Chinese resources. Facing mounting problems in the American and European markets, Japan might find China its most suitable partner in economic affairs. Thus, as economic pressure from the West increased, the industrial leaders of Japan exerted political pressure on the Government for an early normalization of relations with China. Without an alternative market, it was argued, Japan’s heavy industries would be forced to move towards military production.

For the first time since 1945, voices urging the Government to relax the limitation on the exporting of military products were heard among industrial leaders. The shipbuilding industry said that it could have produced battleships and submarines for Iran, which had recently placed a \$500-million order with West Germany. This was also the case with the automobile industry, which could convert its truck-production line to the production of armoured vehicles for Middle East nations. Indeed, Japan could also increase its own defence expenditure by enlarging its armament, which would be more in line with what the United States and the right-wing political forces of Japan wanted. With the memory of the Second World War fading and the pressure of economic expediency rising, it looked as if the revival of “Imperial Japan” was imminent.

For the majority of the Japanese population, however, the treaty with China has more sentimental than military or economic value. Historically, none of the other three nations had been “friends” of Japan. The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5, the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 and the Second World War of 1941-5 indicate the inevitability of conflict with others whenever Japan contemplates its own expansion. However, China stands alone as a nation that suffered from Japanese imperialism without indemnity. If there are any guilt feelings about the war remaining in the Japanese mind, they must be towards China first. For the United States, appreciation of its gentle

reatment of the defeated nation cannot outweigh the resentment against its use of atomic bombs. There are ample reasons for the Japanese to hate and distrust the Russians. The Soviet declaration of war against Japan on the eve of Japan's surrender, the mistreatment of Japanese prisoners of war, the continuous occupation of the northern islands and the recent military manoeuvre exemplify its attitude towards Japan. Japan's defence efforts are today directed north — against the U.S.S.R., the only possible enemy. The new trilateral arrangement, therefore, is an exploitation of the historical and economic circumstances of Japan by the United States.

The scheme conceived by Brzezinski, however, also implies the declining political role of the United States in the Far East. Under the new arrangement, the Americans think it possible for them to manipulate from the vertex of the triangle. The price to be paid is, in Brzezinski's own words, "to nurture Japan", even if it includes the remilitarization of a "fragile" democratic Japan. The fight by proxy is the new rule of the game. As the Cubans fight in Africa under the hegemony of the Russians, so the Chinese are advising the Africans with American blessing. At the global level, the entrance of China into international politics with its anti-U.S.S.R. policy relieves the United States from being the "lone ranger" policing international security. At the regional level, the participation of Japan in Far Eastern affairs means the creation of a new sphere of influence. Both Japan and the United States have received notice that China claims Taiwan as an integral part of its territory; in fact, the Chinese have recently made this legal through their new Constitution. Privately, however, the Chinese agree that "timing and international circumstances" are important factors in the assumption of sovereignty over the island. Japan's special concern for South Korea was recognized in exchange for acceptance of China's dominance over North Korea.

The agreement can be extended to Southeast Asia only if Japan is willing. Already there is heavy economic involvement. But Japan still prefers to keep economics and politics separate. The separation is artificial and can serve only as a temporary measure pending definite political policies. Conflict between Japan's economic expansionism and Southeast Asian nationalism has already been witnessed from time to time. The gospel of the "Great East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere" advocated by Japan before and during the last war may be resurrected as a new policy without objection from the United States or China. Fortunately, Japan's entry into the new alliance had little political reason or global strategic significance. Vice-Premier Teng Hsiao-ping's blessing on the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Act and Japan's Self-Defence Force, conferred in his interviews while he was in Tokyo to exchange letters of ratification, actually embarrassed many enthusiastic supporters of the

treaty, especially the Japanese Socialists and the Communists.

Needless to say, for the United States the "new trilateralism" in Asia is a link in its global strategy of containing the Russians as well as of stabilizing potentially-troublesome areas so that it can avoid being drawn into unnecessary direct confrontation with others, as in the case of Vietnam. The difficulties with the SALT II talks, the increased Russian influence in Africa and the aging of Brezhnev have Washington worried. The "new trilateralism" will, the United States seems to expect, force the Russians to become closer and friendlier in their dealings with Washington.

But the Russian leaders have more to be uneasy about than their counterparts in Washington. Their influence in Europe has diminished and now they are denied any role in Asia. Their repeated gestures towards mending the fence with China have met only with discourteous rebuffs. Furthermore, the Carter Administration's position on human rights interferes with the domestic affairs of the U.S.S.R. The feeling of being encircled is running high again in Moscow for the first time since the days of Stalin.

Examined from the viewpoint of the politics of the balance of power, the Russian strategy has been wrong. In the first place, the Russians should realize that reconciliation with China is most unlikely in the foreseeable future. The "liberalization" of China will bring it closer to the capitalist U.S. than to its fellow "revisionist" the U.S.S.R. The weakest link in the "new trilateralism" of Asia is Japan. One should not minimize the possibility of neutralizing Japan. Were the Soviet Union to return the northern islands to Japan, extend generous fishing rights to the Japanese and make possible joint ventures in natural-resource development, Japan might be prompted to clean up the anti-U.S.S.R. atmosphere surrounding the new trilateral agreement. In fact, it is the U.S.S.R. itself that has deprived the Japanese left wing politicians and intellectuals of evidence of a friendly relation with the Russians. There is no effective link for the Russians in Japan. Neither the Japanese Communist Party nor the Japanese Socialist Party identifies itself with the U.S.S.R., though both are critical of Japan's becoming a surrogate for the United States.

Outlook and problems

In the immediate future, the "new trilateralism" will create peace and stability in the Far East. The tension over divided Korea has already been relaxed considerably, through the recognition of Kim's regime in the North by Japan and the United States in return for recognition of Park's Government in the South by China is still on the short-term agenda. At least, establishment of some cultural and economic relations between Japan and North Korea is conceivable. Across the Strait of Formosa, Teng Hsia-

ping is making all kinds of gestures in his wooing of the regime and people on the island. With the assurance of preserving the capitalistic socio-economic structure of Taiwan, Peking hopes for a peaceful settlement with the island through talks with the Kuo-mintang officials. What remains to be seen is the determination of the 16 million people of the island, who may not accept the transition easily. However, China's insistence on its sovereignty over Taiwan and simultaneous acceptance of the real state of affairs suggests the possibility of some sort of association between the two — a sovereign state and an associate state or an autonomous region with a considerable degree of independence.

In spite of the long historical association between Japan and Taiwan, the former considers the issue a political taboo in its relations with China. For Japan, the hottest local issue in the Far East is the return of its northern islands by the U.S.S.R. A recent suggestion is that Japan should ask for the return of the two nearby islands of Kunashiri and Etorofu only and settle for the non-fortification of the others. The compromise may have some appeal to the Soviet Union should the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Act be abandoned. The new Government under Prime Minister Ohira is not, however, prepared for an expansion of its own military capabilities. The course of "Nippon Maru" requires economic prosperity first. More attention will be paid to improvement of domestic living conditions such as housing, health and welfare.

Nevertheless, the pressure for a more independent and positive role by Japan in international affairs is there. The "hawk" candidate, Nakosone, polled a surprising 15 per cent among the LDP supporters at the party's recent presidential election. Nakasone campaigned with slogans such as "Amend the Constitution; legitimate the Self-Defence Force" and also argued for the need of "legislation for emergency", meaning delegation of powers to the military in order to meet any unexpected attack or crisis. Next to the urge for establishment of effective anti-submarine forces, the Japanese Government will also face pressure to develop a security system for its "supply-line" to Southeast Asia.

Southeast Asia thus becomes the theatre of struggle for domination among the superpowers. Whatever the Russians have lost in the Far East, they intend to regain, at least partially, in Southeast Asia. The accelerated aid to Vietnam and the latest fall of Phnom Penh seem to have turned the tide against China. In addition to worry about border conflict with the "Northern Bear", China will probably face problems at its south gate. The Russian version of a collective-security system for Southeast Asia now finds a partner in Vietnam, which subscribes to the idea of a "Great Indochina" under its own hegemony.

Any tension at the border will disrupt the internal

progress to which China is now fully committed. For China, however, the "four modernizations" — defence industry, agriculture, science and technology — must go ahead at full speed. In the long run, the United States may be most instrumental in the modernization of Chinese defence capabilities, while Japan becomes the major helper in China's industrialization. Should Canada be interested in becoming a participant in this "Western consortium" of China helpers it would have to be in the field of agriculture, and perhaps jointly with others too in the areas of science and technology — especially the often-talked-of Canadian supremacy in oil-exploration. Competition among the Western industrialized nations, as well as Japan in the China market is inevitable. Already there have been warnings by specialists against the optimistic use of China as a solution to the problems of industrial nations. After all, Japan probably will be the winner in most of these competitions for historical, geographical and economic reasons.



At the end of January, Chinese Vice-Premier Teng Hsiao-ping made his historic visit to Washington. Following his third meeting with U.S. President Jimmy Carter, Teng and the President stepped out of the Oval Office for a public appearance on the lawns of the White House.

Canada at Tokyo Round of trade negotiations

By Gilbert R. Winham

Five years of effort are now on the line in the trade negotiations in Geneva. Launched in Tokyo in 1973, the current negotiations are joined by approximately 97 nations participating under the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Canada, an original signatory of the agreement, is participating fully in the current "Tokyo Round", and senior Canadian officials claim a successful conclusion will produce substantial benefits for Canada's ailing economy. But success is far from certain.

The timetable for the Tokyo Round is rapidly running up against very real deadlines. As in past trade negotiations, an export-oriented United States has taken a leading role in this round, offering an attractive package of concessions to its trading partners, and demanding much in return. But U.S. authority to negotiate is limited by Congressional legislation. The present legislation expires on January 4, 1980, thus fixing the early spring of 1979 as a practical working deadline. The current economic downturn, and protectionist sentiment in Congress, both ensure that no extension of authority would be forthcoming for U.S. negotiators. Without the United States, there would be little practical reason or political impetus to continue.

The Tokyo Round comes in a historical context. There have been six rounds of previous negotiations (the first was in 1947, and the sixth, the "Kennedy Round", concluded in 1967), and they were mostly concerned with reducing tariffs on

industrial products. The current Tokyo Round is tariff negotiation, but it also includes discussions on non-tariff trade barriers and on improvements in the structure of the international trading system. Most nations, with the possible exception of Canada, view these latter issues as relatively more important than tariffs in current trading practices. Ironically, these issues may be more important in an absolute sense as well, for, as tariffs are lowered, protectionist forces tend to be manifested in trade restrictions other than tariffs.

Canada's traditional concern in international trade has been twofold. As a producer of primary products and semi-processed goods, Canada has pursued internationalist policies (and supported institutions) designed to encourage a healthy export trade. On the other hand, Canada has been a relatively protectionist nation so far as imports were concerned (particularly imports of industrial and finished products) in an effort to develop the manufacturing sector of the Canadian economy. The latter policy has long-standing political roots, dating back to the National Policy of 1879, when the tariff was used to help foster economic and political integration in Canada. Today the imperatives appear to be more export-oriented. It is necessary for Canada to maintain its exports of semi-processed goods, while at the same time boosting employment-producing exports of manufactured goods, an area where the Canadian economy does not perform well. To

manage this requires reducing the restrictions of other nations on Canada's products, which in turn means that the Canadian Government's offer on its own restrictions must be attractive. So far, in these negotiations, Canadian policy has worked from the premise that a big deal, meaning greater reciprocal liberalization for more products, is better for Canada than a little deal. One gives more but gets more in return.

Tariffs

The tariff negotiations at the Tokyo Round have been especially important for Canada, since it is generally recognized that Canada relies more on tariffs than non-tariff measures to protect domestic industry. In the Kennedy Round, which consisted principally of industrial-tariff negotiations, nations evolved an across-the-board (or formula) approach to tariff-cutting. The formula cut agreed on at the Kennedy Round —

Professor Winham is Director of the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies at Dalhousie University. He has written on the theory and practice of international negotiation, and has consulted on study sessions on negotiation at the Department of External Affairs and the U.S. Department of State. An account of internal Canadian decision-making in the Tokyo Round appears as "Bureaucratic Politics in Canadian Trade Negotiation", International Journal, Vol. 34 (Winter 1978-79). The views expressed in this article are those of Professor Winham.

namely 50 percent fewer exceptions — was not subscribed to by Canada, on the ground that its exports were largely primary products, on which foreign tariffs were low, while its “inputs” were industrial products on which tariffs were much higher in all countries. Hence 50 percent cuts across the board could have produced inequities for Canada. This negotiating position was severely criticized abroad, and served to increase pressure for Canada to accept a formula approach in the Tokyo Round.

Nations devised a formula approach in the current negotiations, based on a “Swiss formula” that called for across-the-board cuts of about 40 per cent, with a harmonizing principle that provided for deeper cuts in high tariffs than in low ones. After substantial deliberation over the winter of 1977-78, the Federal Government accepted the formula, recognizing that Canada's goals in the negotiations could not be met without accepting the implications of what had become a general negotiating practice among industrialized countries. The Government did attach certain conditions to its acceptance, however, in order to ensure that Canada's goals in certain sectors of resource-based goods would be reached.

Canada's concern in resource-based sectors springs from a policy of seeking to increase the amount of “value-added” processing in the production of raw materials. The connection with tariffs comes from the fact that most nations maintain an ascending level of tariff protection related to the amount of processing in the product, with the result that small tariffs, and small tariff differentials, can have a large impact on a nation seeking to diversify its exports. Consider one hypothetical comparison: metal exported in ingots at \$1.00/lb. over a tariff of 2 per cent *versus* metal exported in rolled bars at \$1.10/lb. over a tariff of 4 per cent. In either case, the tariff on the product itself is probably insignificant but the tariff on the value-added portion is a sub-

stantial 20 per cent, thus inhibiting industrial development in the exporting country. These concerns led Canada initially to propose a “sector approach” to negotiation, which would have dealt with certain resource-based sectors in integrated packages, ranging from raw materials to finished products, and would have keyed on eliminating small foreign tariffs on semi-processed goods. This approach was not acceptable to Canada's trading partners, leaving the Government the task of realizing its sector concerns, especially in forest products and non-ferrous metals, through the mechanism of formula cuts.

Most important element

Canada's position in the tariff negotiation with the United States, its largest trading partner, is the most important element in the negotiations as a whole. There are now prospects of substantial agreement in this area that will accommodate most of the Federal Government's objectives. The main task as the negotiations wind up will be to keep an attractive U.S. offer “on the table”. Canada has made exceptions to the formula tariff cut that will have to be reassessed as the negotiations conclude, and the decisions remaining will be as difficult as the decision to accept formula cuts in the first place. At stake is the possible loss of jobs in import-competing industries such as textiles, as opposed to access in foreign markets for export-oriented industries such as petrochemicals. Since provincial interests differ sharply on these issues, the negotiations will present problems of balancing regional economic interests that go to the core of the Canadian national existence.

Regardless of the outcome of the Tokyo Round as multilateral negotiations, a large Canadian-American package is likely, since there is between these nations a large bilateral trade in many products that does not involve third countries. It is estimated that Canada and the United States are approaching a free-trade position now, 70-75 per

cent of the products now traded being non-dutiable. Assuming a successful bilateral package at the Tokyo Round, the number of non-dutiable items would rise to over 80 per cent, with corresponding reductions in the tariffs of those goods remaining dutiable.

Non-tariff measures

The negotiations over non-tariff measures are also of importance to Canada. Such barriers are extremely varied, ranging from simple quantitative restrictions like quotas to complex customs-valuation procedures or government-procurement policies that restrict access to foreign markets. The main object of the Tokyo Round in the non-tariff area is to remove the trade-distorting effects of such barriers, and to bring them under more effective international scrutiny and control. The emphasis in the negotiations has been on reducing the uncertainty exporters face in selling their products abroad and stabilizing international trading patterns by removing the unilateral right of nations to restrict movement of goods.

The non-tariff negotiations constitute one of the most interesting examples of multilateral negotiation occurring today. Faced with a staggering variety of trade restrictions GATT members began the process of compiling data on the non-tariff measures taken by various trading nations. With the help of the GATT Secretariat, nations pinpointed those practices that adversely affected the access of their exporters to foreign markets, and further indicated what action the government in the importing country should take. This information was brought together in a non-tariff measure inventory that identified the nation making the complaint, the practice in question, and the nations against which the complaint was made. Further work reduced the inventory to categories, and then draft codes of conduct were drawn up in each category, which served as a basis for further negotiation. The entire operation is a

object lesson in the process of achieving regulation in a vast and complex area of international relations. Even if the "code" negotiations fail, it is likely that the structural effects of the work already completed will help regulate the international trading system of the future.

The process of negotiating the non-tariff codes has been more difficult than negotiating tariffs. Unlike tariffs, non-tariff barriers are not necessarily intended to restrict or distort international trade, even though they may have that effect in practice. They often represent practices or institutions that are deeply entrenched, such as provincial liquor-control boards, and they are difficult to alter even though they make trade more difficult. In Canada, many identified non-tariff measures are provincial in origin. This has obliged the Federal Government to maintain close liaison with the provinces throughout the Tokyo Round, and it will necessitate in some cases agreement by provincial governments on any final international settlement, a fact that increases uncertainty over the outcome of the negotiations. The problem is even more severe in the United States. Whereas in the negotiation of tariffs the Administration acts with full authorization from Congress, its authority to negotiate non-tariff issues is only partial, and any agreements of this sort must be ratified by Congress. By law, this ratification must be all or nothing, yet Congress does not have the opportunity to propose amendments that will undoubtedly make it easier to secure approval. And approval is far from certain in view of the current protectionist mood prevailing in Congress.

Codes of conduct

Four codes of conduct regulating non-tariff measures have evolved in the Tokyo Round. One is the "Technical Barriers to Trade", which aims to reduce trade obstacles caused by technical requirements, standards, test methods or certification sys-

tems. This draft code is nearly in final form, and attention is turning, at least in Canada, to the question of what legislation or mechanisms will be necessary to implement the code. A second code attempts to establish an international procedure for customs valuation. Canadian valuation procedures are significantly different from those of other countries, and Canada has not to date been substantially involved in these negotiations. Whether this position will change depends on consultations taking place with provincial governments and private-sector interests.

The third code deals with government procurement. The object here is to regulate the purchasing policies of governments, which are increasingly large consumers of goods and services, and in particular to prevent governments from legislating against the purchase of competitive goods coming from foreign countries. Legislation such as the Buy America Act, and certain protectionistic practices in Canada concerning bidding and tendering, would be regulated under this code as it has been framed thus far during negotiation. The code is, however, far from complete, and its precise scope and coverage will have to be spelt out in greater detail if it is to be effective. For example, there is no agreement on what specific purchasing entities will be affected by the agreement (Air Canada, the provincial governments?) and there is no commonly-understood threshold value below which preferential government purchasing would be tolerated. This code is important, and the trade values in the area are significant. As one example, the U.S. Government recently passed an Urban Mass Transit Act containing a "Buy American" component that has a heavy impact on Canadian exports of transportation equipment. If the government procurement code were fully realized, enabling legislation or amendments to laws such as the Mass Transit Act would be necessary, which indicates the amount of work remaining to be

done in the Tokyo Round.

The fourth code, concerning subsidies and countervail duties, has been one of the most hotly-contested subjects of the Tokyo Round, and is shaping up as a major obstacle to any general agreement. On one side are nations, principally those of the European Economic Community, that use government subsidies in part as a means of encouraging exports; the code would seek to provide redress for other nations affected by these subsidies. On the other side is the use of countervail duties (principally by the United States) to offset any advantages that might be gained through export subsidies; the code would provide an injury test to demonstrate that economic disruption had actually resulted from subsidized exports. Were the matter limited to export subsidies, it would be more easily solved, but the issue cuts deeper than that. Export subsidies cannot be distinguished in practice from regional-development policies practised by many countries, such as the operation of Canada's Department of Regional Economic Expansion (DREE). Hence, countervail duties, which can appear in some cases as a justifiable means of offsetting a government-induced advantage in the exporting country, can appear in other cases as an unjustifiable tampering with regional-development policies in the exporting country. Canada finds itself in the middle on this issue, between the EEC and the United States. It supports international guidelines that would restrict EEC domestic-subsidy programs, particularly those related to agricultural products, where Canadian interests are at stake. Canada is however, opposed to current U.S. countervail procedures, and has strongly pressed the United States to adopt an injury test that would more fairly determine the need for countervail actions. This issue has exacerbated bilateral trade relations with the United States in the past, notably over the export of tires from the DREE-supported Michelin plant in

Nova Scotia, and more recently over the export of fish products. It would be helpful if the problem could be resolved in the context of a multi-lateral settlement.

The prospects are not promising for the subsidies/countervail code, however. The issue has become symbolic, with the Europeans on one side refusing to admit that the EEC's agricultural-export restitution system constitutes export subsidy, while, on the other side, the Americans are maintaining the right to countervail with no evidence of injury to U.S. industry. Much remains to be negotiated in the code, and the question is complicated by the fact that U.S. legislation requiring countervail duties on a number of EEC products is being waived until January 2, 1979, after which the duties automatically become obligatory. The Administration is unlikely actually to collect these duties, but the problem of who goes first nevertheless remains an awkward one. Congress has insisted it will not change U.S. countervail law without a completed package on subsidy/countervail as a *quid pro quo*, while the EEC has declared that it will not negotiate a subsidy/countervail package under the threat of a U.S. law it feels contravenes GATT obligations. It is entirely possible that this dispute will run out the clock on the negotiations over subsidy/countervail.

Agriculture and safeguards

Remaining areas of importance in the Tokyo Round include agriculture and safeguards. As to the first, the United States, Canada and

other exporting countries have pressed for a substantial agreement on agricultural products, involving in particular improved access to the EEC and Japan. As with the Kennedy Round, however, it is not expected much will materialize in this area. The Japanese have been unforthcoming in agriculture, and the EEC is much too absorbed internally in working out its Common Agricultural Policy to contemplate serious change in international trading patterns. What may evolve from the negotiations on agriculture is a new forum within GATT where the relations between internal agricultural programs and external agricultural trade might be examined in a comprehensive way. This may be an improvement over present procedures, since the trade-negotiating format has not generally been an effective mechanism for liberalizing agricultural trade.

The safeguard issue arises over attempts to clarify the provisions of Article XIX of GATT, under which imports that cause serious injury to domestic producers can be temporarily restricted. A major problem here has been the "selectivity" idea introduced by the EEC. This would allow a country to take action only against those countries whose exports were actually causing injury, rather than against all suppliers of the product in question. Selectivity represents an exception to the general GATT rule of non-discrimination, and is defended by the EEC on the ground that, in today's market, disruption is most usually caused by identifiable large shipments from single countries and it

is against such countries that action should be taken. The EEC position is unacceptable to most other countries, and it can be expected that there will be strong pressure to incorporate non-discrimination, or at least notification and consultation procedures in the draft text or safeguards.

Prospects

At the Bonn "summit" last summer agreement was reached among the major participants in the Tokyo Round to conclude negotiations in December 1978. This target is particularly important to U.S. negotiators, who must give 90 days notice of impending trade legislation to Congress in addition to the 60 working days required by law for Congress to take action. As with past deadlines, the December target is important but probably not definitive, and its main implication now will be that work not completed by the end of 1979 will probably not be advanced much in 1980. However the early months of 1980 will present more serious deadlines. Multi-lateral negotiations inevitably involve trade-offs and interlocking issues, and there comes a point where failure to resolve a few sticky issues could cause the entire agreement to unravel. Negotiators will try to avoid this by maintaining the momentum for an agreement in the coming months. The best guess now is that a significant agreement will be reached, but with extreme difficulty. It is hard to imagine a worse economic climate in which to conclude a major initiative in trade liberalization.

Sorry we're late! A combination of having to wait for the award of a new printing contract followed by delays in the delivery of paper for the presses, has made the appearance of this issue later than usual. *We apologize for any inconvenience.*

Energy: an international problem

by Ulf Lantzke

Seldom during the postwar period have world economic prospects been so uncertain. Though industrial countries have managed to weather the recent recession, difficult economic problems persist, whose scale goes beyond the normal cyclical pattern of the post-war years.

While there is a complex set of causes that has given rise to these problems, it is important to recognize that energy is both an objective and a psychological factor underlying the present uncertain economic climate. It is an objective factor because the energy situation contributes directly to some of these problems — for example, inflation due to higher energy prices or the large energy component in trade deficits. It is a psychological factor because insecurity about energy undermines confidence in plans for economic expansion and reduces expectations among both investors and consumers about general economic prospects.

I do not want to overemphasize the role of energy in this process. Nevertheless, one cannot treat energy as an isolated issue. The energy problem has triggered far wider economic, and even political, problems, and one cannot afford to ignore the general context.

Future crisis

A number of commentators have recently made rather optimistic statements on the near-term energy situation, largely because of the current surplus in the world oil-market.

I cannot, however, share the view that the present oil-market surplus solves the energy problem. First, we must remember that we have paid a heavy price in reduced economic growth for the reduction that has taken place in oil demand. Secondly, we must recognize that prospective new supplies are relatively insignificant compared to incremental oil demand each year, though we have, at the same time, been fortunate that earlier investments in new supplies from the North Sea and Alaska have given us additional breathing space on the supply side.

Thirdly, the industrial nations continue to be extremely vulnerable to decisions by the Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries on supply and prices. Fourthly, there is the danger that the current

temporary oil-market surplus could mislead public opinion into believing that the energy problem does not exist, and thus undermine political support for the strong energy-policy measures that are necessary.

For the reality, underlined by a wide range of expert analysis, is that, if the industrial democracies do not strengthen their energy policies, then mounting oil demand will reach the limit of available supplies perhaps as soon as the mid-1980s, creating crisis conditions in world energy-markets, with severe economic and political consequences for all nations. It must be emphasized that, though such a crisis is very possible, it is not inevitable. It can be avoided if we act now, while we have a relatively calm energy environment, to initiate the necessary energy-policy measures that have long "lead times".

Consequences of doing nothing

If we do not strengthen our energy policies sufficiently, the gap between potential demand and available supply will be closed forcibly for us. In the short term, energy uncertainty would only continue to frustrate efforts to achieve non-inflationary economic recovery. Indeed, at the present time, one is constantly struck by the number of business people who point to energy uncertainty as a major element in their lack of confidence in the general economy. In the medium-to-long term, by not doing enough about energy we should be inviting steep and sudden price increases and chronic supply shortages.

In all the industrial democracies, energy problems would spill over into general economic difficulties by adding to inflationary pressures, larger balance-of-payments deficits, increasing trade restrictions, and monetary instability. As a result of these pressures, erosion of business and the confidence of investors

Dr Ulf Lantzke is the Executive Director of the International Energy Agency in Paris. This article is based on his presentation to the Canadian Institute of International Affairs Jubilee Year Study Conference, held in Toronto from June 8 to 10, 1978. The views expressed here are those of Dr Lantzke.

could still further reduce economic activity and increase unemployment. Our economies would be faced with the task of trying to accomplish within a very short time major energy-induced structural changes under conditions of intolerably low economic growth.

It is hard to see how our societies could avoid the serious social and political unrest that might result from such general economic deterioration. The internal political stability of many countries could be gravely weakened.

Competition among nations for access to scarce oil-supplies could be particularly divisive. In such a situation of chronic shortage, the stronger economies may come off best in the short term, but this will mean that other nations may not have enough energy to meet their essential economic needs. The weaker economies might feel obliged to take severe deflationary and protectionist measures, which would, though a "feed-back" process, result in lower world economic growth and reduced trade and would, in the long run, adversely affect all countries.

Nor could it be ruled out that nations, either individually or collectively, would seek, through measures going beyond the usual forms of commercial competition, to develop preferential supply relations with oil-producing states. To the extent that these succeeded, they would threaten the flexibility of the world oil-trading system. Moreover, such arrangements could extend into politically sensitive areas such as arms sales, the supplying of sensitive nuclear technology without adequate safeguards, or fresh political complications in the settlement of the Middle East dispute. All these developments would have a negative effect on the interests of the Western industrial nations. And, indeed, they could create an atmosphere of confrontation that would be harmful to global relations. No one wants this situation to arise. Everyone realizes how inadequate such short-term responses would be. But we must ensure through action and co-operation on energy that conditions will not develop in the future that could give rise to such tendencies.

I believe, therefore, that, if we allow present energy trends to continue, if we do nothing about the energy situation, we can expect growing energy insecurity to have an increasingly negative effect on relations among the industrial nations — which would be disastrous for everyone.

Lengthy transition

We must recognize that the world faces a lengthy transition from primary reliance on relatively low-cost oil to greater reliance on other, more plentiful, energy resources and, later, to reliance on renewable energy systems. Although it will be a long process, if it is begun now it can be managed smoothly. If, on the other hand, the necessary changes have to be made suddenly the result will be costly disruption.

Market forces alone will not bring about such a transition. The investments required are of such magnitude and the strategic importance of energy is so great that the political responsibility of governments must be brought into play.

I do not underestimate the difficulties posed for many people by stronger energy programs. Measures required involve significant changes in the mode of living we have grown used to, and they will also affect traditional interests. For example, the penalties aimed at encouraging the production of fuel-efficient cars or at improving energy efficiency in buildings may be quite painful. But the inconvenience of adapting to these changes is far less than the consequences of allowing the energy situation to worsen. Similarly, some energy-development projects may affect certain visual amenities — or even interfere with the mating habits of the caribou! Even though the environmental aspects are not important, they should be kept in the proper perspective — and the present perspective as I have already described it is one of serious damage to vital economic and political interests unless we act rapidly to improve the energy situation.

In view of the global nature of the energy problem, what sort of action is required and who should take it? On the demand side, we shall have to increase the efficiency of energy use and change the structure of energy consumption to match the new "mix" of energy supplies that will be available in the future. On the supply side, we need to maintain oil and gas production, greatly expand the role of coal and nuclear power and support vigorous programs to develop new energy technology.

International co-operation

In principle, it is individual governments that will have to decide on energy policies and implement them. The energy circumstances of the industrialized countries vary widely, and in countries such as Canada there are important regional differences that have to be reconciled. But, though policy must be implemented on a national scale, international co-ordination is vital, too. Energy interdependence is a reality, and the energy problem is an international one that can only be solved on an internationally co-ordinated basis. No nation can solve the problem on its own. If any major industrial nation attempts to "go it alone" irrespective of the plans or policies of other nations, it risks making the wrong decisions, making inefficient investments and jeopardizing not only its own economic prosperity but also that of its economic partners and political allies. Only through the co-ordinated efforts of all nations can we hope to guarantee sufficient energy supplies to meet future needs.

Each nation must make a contribution according to its ability. Among the industrial countries, the United States stands out as the country with the

greatest capability of reducing its oil imports, improving energy efficiency and expanding supplies. Perhaps the most urgent task of U.S. energy policy is to raise its energy prices closer to world levels, since action on pricing would have a major positive impact on the domestic and international aspects of energy policy. The potential of the other medium-sized economies, such as Japan, Germany, Britain and Canada, is also significant, for, in the aggregate, they could make a contribution as important as that of the United States. Because of the relatively poorer energy-resource base of the European nations and Japan, their contribution will differ from that of North America. Nevertheless, they too must make a determined effort to adapt their energy-consuming industries to a new energy structure.

Canada's role

Canada's role is an important one, not least because Canadian leadership in energy matters will have an important effect on the opportunities available to other countries. Considerable attention has been paid in Canada to energy policy since the 1973-74 energy crisis. Many improvements have been made that will ultimately have a beneficial impact on the domestic energy situation. Specific energy goals have been established. A pricing schedule for oil and gas has been adopted that should in time allow energy to be priced at more realistic levels. Energy conservation is taken seriously. But what about the international implications of Canadian energy policy? Canada is fortunate to be well endowed with energy sources — with deposits of conventional and non-conventional hydrocarbons, with large coal and uranium reserves, and with proved nuclear technology. Canadian energy-supply policies could make a significant contribution to an improved worldwide energy situation. What exactly should Canada do, and why?

Canadian coal policy, along with that of the United States and Australia, could greatly affect the energy alternatives open to Europe and Japan. If the Europeans and Japanese are to succeed in displacing oil in electricity-generation and in industry, they will require large quantities of imported coal. For Canada and other coal-producers, an enormous export potential exists in the long term. Co-operative international efforts to tap this potential could be aimed at large-scale expansion of a world coal-trading network, which would need stable trading conditions. Major infrastructure investments would be required in mining, inland and marine transportation and port facilities and would bring substantial economic benefits to all concerned.

On a similar basis, international co-operation could provide the right conditions for expanded exports of Canadian uranium and nuclear know-how to countries whose energy requirements over the remaining decades of this century cannot be met with-

out nuclear power. Again, assured supplies would be necessary to encourage Europe and Japan to develop adequate nuclear-generating capacity.

Canadian efforts to develop oil and gas in frontier areas could also make a significant contribution to the energy situation as a whole. First, expanded domestic oil-production would reduce the Canadian need to increase oil imports and would ease conditions in the world oil-market for countries poor in resources. Secondly, expanded gas exports to the United States could similarly help to reduce the U.S. need for increasing supplies of imported oil.

The point about all of these efforts is that, though they must be implemented on a national level (or, in Canada, often at the provincial level), they are part of a broader international effort. They require other countries to undertake complementary efforts; thus the European countries and Japan should be prepared to substitute imported coal for imported oil and to embark on the necessary structural changes in their energy economies. Canada would be required to adopt a more open attitude towards international investment and trade in energy.

World energy body

The International Energy Agency has been established as a framework within which such efforts can be organized internationally on a co-ordinated basis.

Canada's experience to date in the IEA is that closer consultation among member countries reduces their uncertainty concerning one another's plans and policies. International agreement on a broad policy approach on areas such as coal and nuclear policy can help to crystallize the decisions and directions each country must take in the light of its individual energy circumstances. Energy co-operation does not limit but rather enlarges the range of energy-policy options open to each country. Moreover, co-operation among industrial nations sets the stage for coherent forms of broader co-operation on a global scale with the oil-producing and other developing nations.

How can we ensure that this co-operation will be effective enough to match the nature and scale of the energy problem? How can we ensure that stronger policies are being implemented and that they are mutually consistent, so that they reinforce each other? Again, our experience within the IEA points to its usefulness as an instrument by means of which such co-operation can be assessed and intensified as necessary. Most important, it has established a policy framework in which long-term energy aims have been clearly defined and means are available to assess, on a continuing basis, the progress made in achieving those aims.

At a meeting in Paris last October, chaired by Alastair Gillespie, Canadian Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources, ministers from IEA countries

agreed on the basic elements that should be contained in each country's energy policy. Recognizing that only limited quantities of oil would be available from the world oil-market in the mid-to-late 1980s, they decided to establish a group objective of holding their oil imports in 1985 to no more than 26 mb/d. They also agreed upon 12 principles of energy policy that would serve as guidelines for the implementation of national policy efforts. These principles include the basic policy issues for North America, Europe and Japan I have already described.

Finally, they agreed that the International Energy Agency should conduct regular systematic reviews of each country's energy policy. These reviews are for the purpose of ensuring that the contribution of each country will be sufficient to achieve the group objective, as well as to indicate scope for improvements and the strengthening of energy policies.

Our country reviews have drawn attention to the fact that each country faces difficult issues in implementing stronger energy policies. Canada is no exception. For example, the decision on the Trans-Canadian gas pipeline did raise difficult issues for Canada — issues concerned with environmental impact and the rights of the Eskimo people. But one must remember too that this decision not only affected Canadian and U.S. energy prospects but was followed closely by other countries throughout the world. Similarly, the question of sovereignty over natural resources, whether federal or provincial, has been raised in the context of foreign investment and access to energy resources. But, again, these concerns must be set against the global energy problem and, indeed, its ultimate impact on the Canadian and Western economies.

With regard to nuclear policy, too, it is right that Canadians should be concerned about the spread of nuclear technology.

But this must be balanced against the fact that nuclear power is the only hope for some countries of meeting their energy requirements. Canada must accept the fact that other countries have real need of nuclear supplies and must ensure that they have access to such supplies so that nuclear power can be developed in a controlled way. Otherwise, countries will seek to satisfy their nuclear needs in whatever way they can, which may ultimately mean fewer controls over nuclear development.

Our most recent review of energy programs concluded that existing efforts in all IEA countries were insufficient to achieve the Agency's aims. In consequence, each country will have to implement stronger energy policies and take into account IEA recommendations such as those I have already discussed.

Benefits

Thus the IEA provides a forum in which the industrial democracies can work together to shape energy poli-

cies that respond to the needs of all groups of countries. The benefits of undertaking such co-operation and implementing stronger policies are considerable.

A leading benefit would be that all nations could look forward to an energy future of great security. Oil would be available in adequate quantities throughout the transition to alternative energy sources. Gas could make an increasingly important contribution and natural-gas infrastructures could be developed in such a way that they could also be used at a later stage for manufactured gas. Coal and nuclear power would increase their share of total energy supply and there would be enough time to develop the new energy technology that will be needed in the next century.

For a country like Canada, there would be significant benefits in the form of increased investments in energy production and enlarged secure export markets. There would be benefits too for the general economy. First, all nations would escape the severe economic consequences that would otherwise result from future imbalances between potential energy demand and available supply. Secondly, greater certainty on energy prospects would help to restore confidence. Moreover, the investment required to increase energy efficiency and to expand new supplies would give an important stimulus to economies. Many of the energy-policy actions that are necessary, such as insulation in buildings, manufacturing an entire new generation of fuel-efficient cars, and construction of port facilities or railroads for coal transport, could increase the demand for goods and services in other key parts of the economy. Many are also labour-intensive and could help relieve persistent unemployment. Instead of being a constraint on growth in general economic activity, energy could serve as a means of giving renewed dynamism to the economies of IEA countries.

Finally, in political terms, the industrial nations could look forward to revitalized relations. Strengthened energy co-operation would remove a source of political weakness and instability. Success with energy would act as a powerful example of what could be done in other areas. The industrial nations would be in a stronger position to tackle difficult problems in various parts of the world — areas such as East-West relations, the Middle East, African problems and co-operation with the developing countries on economic and political issues.

Energy is a major challenge for all of the industrial nations, though it is a difficult one because it requires a continuing political commitment and strong and sustained action to meet it. The consequences of doing nothing threaten the vital interests of all regions. This means that we cannot afford to fail. On the other hand, the benefits of strong political leadership and action on energy would greatly enrich the relations among the industrial democracies. This opportunity should not be lost.

Lament for Third Option . . .

er,

Only two years ago I was still taking comfort from the knowledge that Canadians are fair-weather nationalists; as soon as we would cease to be so stupidly obsessed by the threat of United States domination, I told myself, as soon as we were again confronted with problems of real substance. Now my worry is that the Government, apparently with broad popular support, has swung much too far towards the other extreme. Concern about independence has faded into insignificance. How can we expect the world to take Canada seriously when our moods and policies are so erratic?

The Third Option, we are assured from on high, is still official doctrine, and the "special relationship" with Washington has not been formally revived. But, on reading the speeches of the Honourable Don Jamieson, and more especially excerpts from the cloying dialogue between "Don" and "Cy", one really must wonder.

Admittedly, the Third Option was never intended to be anti-American. While seeking to strengthen Canada's distinctiveness, and to diminish its vulnerability to policy changes and other developments south of the border, the Government promised to maintain the substance of existing relations with the United States, and to conduct them in a co-operative spirit. If the Third Option means anything, however, we should be striving to augment ties with other countries and shunning new measures that would lock Canada more firmly into the American embrace.

The Northern pipeline appears to make economic sense, but could well be more integrative in its consequences than any changes in the regulations governing the continental flow of goods. Our one concern, to judge by the Parliamentary and public debate, has been "jobs for the boys", a determination to see that Canadians will get their full share of the new employment opportunities.

Similarly, the Government is to be applauded for not rejecting out of hand the Senate report endorsing continental free trade. Canada would not only prosper from such a reform but could strengthen its independence as well. I am startled, however, that the Senate committee has not been widely criticized for dismissing, with almost no explanation, the possible political implications of bilateral free trade. Conceivably the committee was influenced by the study of these implications that I wrote for the Economic Council of Canada.

More plausibly, it considered that extended comment was superfluous in view of the rapid decline in public and governmental concern about national independence. It is to be regretted, moreover, that Canada, were it to accept the Senate committee's advice, would now need to negotiate free trade from a weaker position than in 1975, when the Economic Council offered similar recommendations, or in 1947, when the initiative last came from Washington.

The decision not to buy the *Tornado*, the European candidate in the competition for a new fighter-reconnaissance aircraft for the Canadian forces, is another setback for the Third Option. Its purchase would have fostered a shift in trade and corporate structures from North America to transatlantic, and impressed foreign governments with our determination to diversify. I'm told that it was more suitable for the European theatre than the Canadian Arctic, and that we could not afford two different aircraft. One would have more confidence in the Government's decision, however, had it displayed greater support for the Third Option in other contexts, and if it were not so obvious that the Canadian brass have become homogenized into the North American *élite*.

Peyton V. Lyon,
Professor of Political Science
and International Affairs

Reference Section

Canadian Foreign Relations

I. Recent Books

Dunn, Robert M.

The Canada-U.S. capital market: intermediation, integration, and policy independence. Montreal: C.D. Howe Research Institute; Washington: National Planning Association, 1978.
139 pp. (Canada-U.S. Prospects Series).

Frank, Helmut J., and John S. Schanz

U.S.-Canadian energy trade: a study of changing relationships. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1978.
136 pp.

Kay, Zachariah

Canada and Palestine: the politics of non-commitment. Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press, 1978.
218 pp.

Hudson, Michael

Canada and the new monetary order: borrow? devalue? restructure! Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1979.
117 pp.

Lower, J. Arthur

Ocean of destiny: a concise history of the North Pacific, 1500-1978. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1978.
242 pp.

Macdonald, Ronald St. J., Douglas M. Johnston and Gerald L. Morris, eds.

The international law and policy of human welfare. Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff and Noordhoff International Publishers, 1978.
710 pp.

Perlgut, Mark

Electricity across the border: the U.S.-Canadian experience. Montreal: Canadian-American Committee.
65 pp.

Reisman, Simon

The Canadian automotive industry: performance and proposals for progress. Inquiry into the Automotive Industry, Simon Reisman, Commissioner. Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada for Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce, 1978.
250 pp.

Sussman, Gennifer

The St. Lawrence Seaway: history and analysis of a joint water highway. Montreal: C.D. Howe Research Institute; Washington: National Planning Association, 1978.
84 pp. (Canada-U.S. Prospects Series).

II. Recent Articles

Black, Warren

"Novel features of the Immigration Act, 1976." In *The Canadian Bar Review* 56:561-578 December 1978.

Chevrier, Bernard

"L'aide du Canada au tiers-monde: sommes-nous trop généreux?" In *Opinion* Vol. 8 No. 5 January-February 1979 pp. 43-44.

Coomb, J., and C. Madden

"The MacKenzie valley and Alaska highway gas pipeline route proposals." In *Polar Record* 19:282-285 September 1978.

Feldman, Lily Gardiner

"Canada and the United States in the 1970's: rift and reconciliation." In *World Today* 34:484-492 December 1978.

Fraser, T.G.

"The Sikh problem in Canada and its political consequences, 1905-1921." In *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 7:35-55 October 1978.

Humphreys, David

"External fallout from internal strains." In *Report of Confederation* Vol. 2 No. 3 February 1979 pp. 12-13.

Lavoie, Luc

"Un trou dans la Grande Muraille." In *L'Actualité* Vol. 4 No. 4 April 1979 pp. 52-56.

McLin, Jon

"Surrogate international organization and the case world food security, 1949-1969." In *International Organization* 33:35-55 Winter 1979.

McMillan, Carl H.

"Soviet and East European direct investment in Canada." In *Foreign Investment Review* Vol. 2 No. 2 Spring 1979 pp. 14-16.

Murphy, Rae

"Who's re-opening the free trade file?" In *Last Post* Vol. 7 No. 3 February 1979 pp. 15-19.

Nossal, Kim Richard

"The unmaking of Garrison: United States politics and the management of Canadian-American boundary waters." In *Behind the Headlines* Vol. 37 No. 1 December 1978 pp. 1-30.

Smith, Brian J.

"Canada, with U.S. allies, fights Missouri spill." In *Report of Confederation* Vol. 2 No. 3 February 1979 pp. 25-28.

anford, Gerald B.

"Canadian perspectives on the future enforcement of the Exclusive Economic Zone: a paper in diplomacy and the Law of the Sea." In *Dalhousie Law Journal* 5:73-120 January 1979.

hornley, Allan

"Reflections on 10 years of Canadian assistance to developing countries." In *Development Directions* Vol. 1 No. 5 November/December 1978 pp. 27-29.

orelli, Maurice

"Les relations extérieures de la Communauté Economique Européenne." In *L'Action nationale* 68:378-393 January 1979.

pton, Brian

"Sugar technology: Canada assists Caribbean sugar producers to revive a failing industry." in *Development Directions* Vol. 1 No. 5 November/December 1978 pp. 15-17.

ex, Samuel

"Innovation for growth." In *Report on Confederation* Vol. 2 No. 3 February 1979 pp. 5-7.

inham, Gilbert R.

"Bureaucratic politics and Canadian trade negotiation." In *International Journal* 34:64-89 Winter 1978-79.

titten, Mark

"Why the Auto Pact is obsolete." In *Canadian Business* 51:33-36 February 1979.

ood, Bernard

"The meaning of CIDA's development assistance cut-backs." In *Development Directions* Vol. 1 No. 5 November/December 1978 pp. 19-21.

Publications of the Department

External Affairs

Listed below are the most recent publications of the Departmental Press Office and the External Information Programs Division concerning international affairs and Canadian foreign policy.

Press Releases, issued by the Press Office:

- No. 5 (January 12, 1979) Diplomatic appointments — Arcand as Ambassador to Lebanon and concurrently to Syria and Jordan; Beaulne as Ambassador to the Holy See; Middleton as Ambassador to South Africa and concurrently High Commissioner to Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland; Morantz as Ambassador to Ethiopia; Roger as High Commissioner in Barbados and concurrently to Grenada and Dominica, as well as Commissioner to the West Indies Associated States and Montserrat; Sheehan as High Commissioner in Jamaica and concurrently in the Bahamas, as well as Commissioner to Belize; Trottier as Ambassador and Permanent Delegate to UNESCO.
- No. 6 (January 18, 1979) Visit of OECD Secretary-General to Ottawa, January 22-24, 1979.
- No. 7 (January 20, 1979) Canada/CARICOM Trade and Economic Co-operation Agreement signed January 20, 1979.

No. 7 (January 29, 1979) Corrections to above release.

No. 8 (January 23, 1979) Canada presents *Cosmos 954* claim to U.S.S.R.

No. 9 (January 25, 1979) New Zealand Deputy Prime Minister visits Ottawa.

No. 10 (January 31, 1979) Agreement concerning investment insurance in Rwanda signed by Canada and Republic of Rwanda.

No. 11 (February 8, 1979) Visit to Canada of Foreign Minister of Republic of Korea.

No. 12 (February 9, 1979) Canada-France extradition agreement signed.

No. 13 (February 9, 1979) Canada-France agreement signed on transfer of prison inmates.

No. 14 (February 9, 1979) Canada-France social-security agreement signed.

No. 15 (February 14, 1979) Joint Canada-U.S. statement on Atlantic Coast fisheries and boundary agreements.

No. 16 (February 16, 1979) Canada announces recognition of Iranian provisional government.

No. 17 (February 19, 1979) Special Canadian representative at St. Lucia independence celebrations named.

No. 18 (February 22, 1979) Canada-Australia Literary Prize winner announced.

No. 19 (February 23, 1979) Canada-Denmark marine-environment talks, Ottawa, February 21 and 22, 1979.

No. 20 (February 27, 1979) Canada-Mexico treaty on prisoner transfer ratified.

No. 21 (February 28, 1979) Canada agrees to protect Israeli interests in Iran.

No. 22 (March 2, 1979) UN Human Rights Commission chooses Canadian chairman.

No. 23 (March 6, 1979) Canada-EEC fisheries relations.

No. 24 (March 7, 1979) March 12 chosen as Commonwealth Day.

No. 25 (March 9, 1979) Canadian response to fifth annual report of IJC on Great Lakes water quality.

No. 26 (March 12, 1979) "Proximity" talks on Namibian settlement set for New York, March 13-20, 1979.

No. 27 (March 15, 1979) Joint press release issued at end of second meeting of Canada-Japan Joint Economic Committee, Tokyo, March 15, 1979.

No. 28 (March 16, 1979) Canadian delegation named to eighth session of Law of the Sea Conference, Geneva, March 19 to April 27, 1979.

No. 29 (March 29, 1979) Canada-U.S. fisheries and boundary agreements signed in Washington, March 29, 1979.

No. 30 (March 29, 1979) Vietnamese diplomat declared *persona non grata*.

No. 31 (March 29, 1979) Diplomatic appointments — Béchard as Consul General in New Orleans; Nutt as Consul General in New York; Stone as Consul General in Chicago.

No. 32 (March 30, 1979) Regional passport offices to be opened in Calgary, Saskatoon, Hamilton, Quebec City and St John's.

Statements and Speeches, published by the External Information Programs Division:

- No. 79/1 Canada reminds the Security Council of its South-east Asian Responsibilities. A statement by Ambassador W.H. Barton, Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations, in the Security Council, New York, on February 24, 1979.
- No. 79/2 Canada and the States of the Caribbean Community. A statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Don Jamieson, on the occasion of the signing of the Canada/CARICOM Trade and Economic Co-operation Agreement in Kingston, Jamaica, on January 20, 1979.
- No. 79/3 A Canadian View of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations. Remarks by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Don Jamieson, to the Young Presidents' Organization of Ontario, Toronto, February 5, 1979.
- No. 79/4 An Auspicious Development in Canada-U.S. Relations. Remarks by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Don Jamieson, in announcing the Agreement on Atlantic Coast Fisheries and Boundaries, Ottawa, February 14, 1979.

Treaty Information

Bilateral

Algeria

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Algeria constituting an Agreement amending and extending the Agreement between Canada and the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria concerning the Establishment of a Line of Credit for Co-operation, dated June 1, 1973

Algiers, November 6, 1978, and February 12, 1979

In force February 12, 1979

With effect June 1, 1978

France

Agreement between Canada and France concerning Extradition

Ottawa, February 9, 1979

Agreement between Canada and France on the Transfer of Inmates and the Supervision of Persons under Sentence

Ottawa, February 9, 1979

Agreement between Canada and France on Social Security

Ottawa, February 9, 1979

Denmark

Treaty between Canada and the United Kingdom of Denmark concerning Extradition

Ottawa, November 30, 1977

Instruments of Ratification exchanged

February 13, 1979

In force February 13, 1979

Indonesia

Convention between Canada and the Republic of Indonesia for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes Income and on Capital

Jakarta, January 16, 1979

Korea, Republic of

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Republic of Korea constituting an Agreement with Respect to the Protection of Industrial Property

Ottawa, February 13, 1979

In force February 13, 1979

Mexico

Treaty between Canada and Mexico on the Execution of Penal Sentences

Ottawa, November 22, 1977

Instruments of Ratification exchanged

February 27, 1979

In force March 29, 1979

Philippines

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Philippines constituting an Agreement relating to Trade in certain Textile Products

Manila, February 19, 1979

In force January 1, 1979

Rwanda

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of Rwanda constituting an Agreement relating to Canadian Investments in Rwanda assured by the Government of Canada through its Agency the Export Development Corporation

Kigali, January 30, 1979

United States

Protocol amending the Convention of August 16, 1916, the Protection of Migratory Birds in Canada and United States

Ottawa, January 30, 1979

Multilateral

Trade and Economic Co-operation Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Governments of Member States of the Caribbean Common Market

Kingston, January 20, 1979

Protocol amending the International Convention for High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean

Done at Tokyo, April 25, 1978

Instruments of Ratification exchanged

February 15, 1979

Entered into force February 15, 1979

Amendments to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and other Matter, 1972

Adopted at London, October 12, 1978

Canada's Instrument of Acceptance deposited
February 27, 1979

Convention on Inter-American Institute for Co-operation on Agriculture

Signed at Washington, March 6, 1979

SUBSCRIPTION ORDER FORM

International Perspectives

Published bimonthly, subscription rates Canada, \$4.00 a year; other countries \$5.00 a year.

Name

Address

.....

Country **Postal/Zip Code**

**Please make your remittance, in Canadian funds, payable to
The Receiver General of Canada and mail to:**

**Printing and Publishing,
Supply & Services Canada,
Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, K1A 0S9**



If undelivered,
return cover only to:
Canadian Government Printing Office,
Ottawa, K1A 0S7, Canada

En cas de non-livraison,
retourner cette couverture seulement au:
Imprimerie du gouvernement canadien
Ottawa, K1A 0S7, Canada



ISSN 0381-4874

May/June, July/August 1979

International Perspectives

A journal of opinion on world affairs

CAI

EA

- I56

Towards a foreign policy for the 1980s

External Affairs as a central agency

Canada on the Security Council

Recap of thirty-third UN Assembly

President Carter and human rights

International Perspectives

Contents

May/June, July/August 1979

Towards a foreign policy for the 1980s <i>Douglas Roche</i>	3
Is External a central agency? <i>W. M. Dobell</i>	8
United Nations	
Canada on the Security Council <i>W. H. Barton</i>	12
Recap of thirty-third Assembly <i>J. F. Tanguay</i>	17
Carter and human rights <i>Louis Balthazar</i>	22
Federal-provincial development assistance <i>C. V. Svoboda</i>	25
Western Europe's 'guest' workers <i>Thomas Land</i>	28
Letter to the Editor	30
Reference Section	31

International Perspectives is issued bimonthly in English and French by the Department of External Affairs, Ottawa. Any material in this publication may be reproduced. Mention of *International Perspectives* as the source would be appreciated.

Published by authority of the
Secretary of State for External Affairs.

Authorized as third-class mail,
Post Office Department, Ottawa.

Subscription rates: Canada, \$4.00 a year,
single copies \$1.00; other countries
\$5.00 a year, single copies \$1.25.
Remittances, payable to the Receiver
General of Canada, should be sent to:
Canadian Government Printing Office
Ottawa, Ontario, K1A 0S9.

Editors:

Alex I. Inglis
Louis Balthazar

International Perspectives is a journal of opinion on Canada's role in the world and on current international questions. Its purpose is to stimulate discussion and interest in international affairs. It is not intended to reflect Canadian Government policy or perceptions. Indeed, the editors often seek to include material that expresses different or contrary views. The Department of External Affairs accepts no responsibility for the views expressed except where it is clearly stated that an article by a departmental officer is a statement of Government policy. All other articles contain a specific disclaimer of departmental responsibility for their contents.

Letters of comment on issues discussed in *International Perspectives* are welcome and will be considered for publication. Please address your correspondence to: International Perspectives, Department of External Affairs, L. B. Pearson Bldg., 125 Sussex Drive, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, K1A 0G1.

Towards a foreign policy for Canada in the 1980s

by Douglas Roche

Alexander Solzhenitsyn's indictment of the West for losing its courage provides a good introduction to an examination of Canada's role in the world community as it enters the 1980s. The Russian exile declared at Harvard that the fight for the planet, physical and spiritual, had already started, adding that were nevertheless oblivious to new dangers, spiritually exhausted and content to see the media reflect our "prescribed smiles and raised glasses".

What kind of world is Solzhenitsyn talking about?

It is a world of multidimensional dangers: the escalation of nuclear arsenals and conventional weapons, imbalances of food and population, violations of human rights, depletion of resources, economic disorder, an upsurge in violence and terrorism. These are the critical problems of our time that demand political solutions. Long-range survivalist policies are imperative to protect the next generation, and the one after that, from even greater global disorder.

Yet there is no sense of urgency, or even priority, in Canada concerning global problems. On any list of the ten most important problems Canada faces, foreign policy is usually eleventh. The debates on national unity and the domestic economy have so mesmerized Canadians that they have forgotten that 93.7 per cent of the world's land and 99.5 per cent of its people exist outside Canada. *Saturday Night* has described the situation as the "decline and fall of Canada's foreign policy". Certainly the optimistic and generous spirit of Canada in the 1950s and 1960s has been replaced by a defensive and restrictive mood in the 1970s. A self-serving inwardness is the new characteristic of our society. Solzhenitsyn could have had Canada in mind.

It is ironic that this new insularity has occurred at precisely the moment when the conjunction of two great trends ought to be awakening us to new challenges. First, the gravity of the global problems reveals an unprecedented crisis of social organization, and of civilization itself. Secondly, with the fantastic advances of science and technology that could ensure a life of human dignity for everyone, human development has reached a turning-point.

A geopolitical movement of historic proportions

is taking place in the world today. Changes and developments in the world economy, in political institutions, in the environment, and in science itself have combined to produce a world that, though composed of independent and sovereign states, is becoming more interdependent. Thus we are entering a totally new period in our planet's history. As the Club of Rome points out in *Goals for Mankind*:

Through the birth of a spirit of world solidarity . . . the world would change from an arena of marginal security and economic and political conflict to a global society of undiminished diversity but firm collective self-reliance, greater security and more equity.

Fundamental unity

For a long time, of course, we have known of the inescapable physical unity of the planet, the interdependence of winds, tides and climates. International systems of trade and commerce reflect this physical interdependence. Now I sense a new recognition of the fundamental unity of mankind.

Last summer I travelled round the world on a foreign-policy mission for the Progressive Conservative Party. One cannot make such a journey round McLuhan's "global village" without being profoundly impressed with a new sense of human creativity. As I travelled through several countries, seeing people in their own surroundings, I was aware of the deep common desires that link the human family. People everywhere want to live in an atmosphere of security, economic progress and human dignity. The wide discrepancies in the ability to attain these goals jolt the traveller, but the desire to have decent, happy, peaceful, orderly, satisfying human relations is now universal.

Mr Roche is the Progressive Conservative Member of Parliament for Edmonton Strathcona. A former journalist, he is the author of several books on international economic development. This article was written by Mr Roche in 1978 and has not been revised by him since then. The views expressed are those of the author.

I remember vividly: the native Anglican priest from the Solomon Islands proudly carrying his country's flag down the aisle of Westminster Abbey during a service marking the entry of the Solomons into the Commonwealth; the widow in an Indian village, grateful for a dairy co-operative that bought the milk from the buffalo tethered to her hut; the rich Japanese businessman telling what legislative improvements were needed in Canada to make our country more attractive to Japanese capital. These incidents reveal the very human qualities that make up a world of instant communication and rapid transportation.

All this is a new sign of hope that the world, amid its griefs and anxieties, can attain a more balanced and stable development. The problem is how to make sensible international arrangements that will promote the new creativity possible in the technological age.

The task, therefore, for Canadian foreign policy in the 1980s is to reconcile independence with interdependence. To do so it must be flexible enough to take an enlarged view of the opportunities that unite and the problems that divide mankind. Unfortunately, we lack the drive to act in accordance with this enlarged view.

Weak image

Time and again, in meetings held during my trip, the message was conveyed to me, sometimes indirectly, sometimes directly, that Canada was not regarded as playing its full and proper role in world affairs. Despite the presence of competent officers in its foreign service, Canada's image abroad is weak and its performance mediocre. The inadequacies of political direction in Ottawa result in confusion, poor morale in the field and a sense of diminished stature for Canada.

In the 1978 cutbacks, the Government slashed the budget of the Department of External Affairs by \$20.9 million and froze the budget of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) by withholding an anticipated \$133-million increase as part of Ottawa's desperate restraint program. Although a vigorous external policy does not depend on money alone, these cuts are not likely to improve Canada's performance abroad. How can we meet the demand for Canadian participation in the UN peacekeeping forces when \$150 million is cut from the defence budget? How can we reach the declared goal of .7 per cent of the gross national product in official development assistance when CIDA's budget is frozen? How can we improve the Canadian presence abroad when we are closing embassies?

Indeed, the inability to manage the federal budget in a systematic way has prevented Canada from fulfilling its responsibility in the international community — and this at a time when we should be more, not less, active in the world.

I am not arguing that a country of 23 million people could or should remake the world in its image. But it is in our own interests, as the second-largest country in the world, possessing enormous resources of land and technology, to play a leading role in building the planetary conditions for peace. Canadians are among the most privileged and fortunate people in the world. If we want to preserve the security, freedom and progress that we enjoy, Canadian foreign policy should be pursued with more vigour.

Some say that we cannot focus on foreign policy until we get our own house in order, until our national unity and domestic economy problems are solved — a shortsighted view. The world is changing rapidly and will not wait for Canada. Moreover, a new understanding of Canada's role in a world seeking more security, trade and development would itself be an important element in the internal struggle to preserve national unity. In short, planning and explaining to the public a constructive role for Canada in the world community during the next decade can help us renew the sense of purpose and direction in this country.

That sense of purpose is found in John Holmes's phrase "enlightened internationalism". By this I mean that we stop separating the traditional issues of war and peace from the new global questions of justice, equity and human rights. The new issues of foreign policy include the escalating arms race, nuclear proliferation, food and energy shortages, the problems of international development, and world-wide inflation and unemployment.

Our goal should be the strengthening of Canada's voice and action in the world community. Only the world community can bring about practical solutions to global human problems — to end world hunger in the next ten years, to provide every human being with clean water by 1990, to introduce a housing program that will provide a decent shelter for every family in the world.

In an interdependent world, Canada's future depends as much on the solution of problems caused by the unequal distribution of the world's resources as it does on the search for *détente*; in such a world developments in the Middle East and in southern Africa can be of no less concern to us than our own relations with the United States and Europe. In the name of our common humanity, we must seek to ensure that human rights are universally respected.

Total review

Canada cannot, of course, be a major player in every arena. Nor should we try to make policy overnight, reacting to the latest headlines. The careful construction of a foreign policy for the 1980s that will be both realistic and productive demands a total review of present Canadian policy.

The last time foreign policy was reviewed was in 1970 — since when one shock-wave after another has

been felt. The price spiral started by the Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries, Soviet military expansion, China's westward orientation, the North-South development imbalance, recession in the West spawning protectionism, and a new demand for human rights — all have had a major impact on world affairs. The magnitude of the new problems, and the new opportunities, requires a new Canadian approach.

This does not mean throwing out all the old policies. In fact, the preparation for the 1980s ought to reaffirm Canada's traditional, and necessarily strong, ties with the United States, its defence alliances and the Commonwealth. The biggest foreign-policy mistake the Government made in the Seventies was to give the impression that we were downgrading these ties. This impression had serious repercussions abroad and upset and confused the Canadian public.

It is precisely because of the dramatic changes in the world that, to be supported by the electorate, responsive foreign policy needs to be presented in terms that are reassuring as well as challenging. To knock over the sign-posts of the past is not only one further aggravation in the age of discontinuity but bad policy organization as well. A sense of our own history must inspire each new step forward.

That is why I am proposing that the formulation of a new policy to meet the demands of the Eighties be done in terms that are both important and understandable. There are three areas — security, trade and development — through which the old and the new currents flow. By approaching a reconstituted foreign policy in the light of what ought to be done by Canada on security, what ought to be done on trade, and what ought to be done on development, Canada will find it possible to develop a comprehensive policy that will enable it to relate systematically to an interdependent world. Only by recognizing the interrelations between the security, trade and development aspects of our foreign policy can we establish cohesion, clarity and conviction — and show the Canadian people why it is in our interest to become more active in foreign policy.

Security

Canadian security is of primary importance. Despite the human movement forward, the world remains an increasingly dangerous place. All the briefings I have received from security experts have convinced me that strong and expensive defence commitments must be maintained, especially while Soviet expansionism in Eastern Europe and Africa is so pronounced. The first requirement for any government is to maintain strength against attack and to work for nuclear control to prevent expansionists and revolutionaries from slaughtering humanity and blowing up the planet in the process.

Far from undermining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (as Canada did in the early Seventies),

we should reaffirm our commitment to that organization as the key alliance maintaining stability between the superpowers. This entails broadening Canada's participation in the joint international efforts of NATO in the areas of strategic and economic study, as well as political exchange, while maintaining and improving the present level of commitment to the Alliance in Europe. NATO — and the North American Air Defence Command as well — provide the only assurance Canada has against aggression, besides making possible a certain degree of influence on the maintenance of a semblance of order and security in a crisis-ridden world.

Security, however, demands more than a military presence. One of the paradoxes of the modern world is that, though arms are necessary, the arms race itself is a threat to security. The arms race, aside from being potentially fatal to the world, siphons off untold quantities of resources and scientific expertise needed for world development.

Canada, as a member of the United Nations Security Council, should work more diligently to create the conditions for peace. A willing participation in workable UN peacekeeping arrangements is part of this task. In his latest report, UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim appealed again for governments to bring their problems to the Security Council, declaring that, if the Council had the will and means to deal with them on merit, "we would have made a decisive step towards world order". Used properly, the United Nations can be the instrument for overcoming much of the mistrust and insecurity that make so many international problems insoluble.

Human rights

One of the conditions for peace is universal respect for human rights. The widespread practice of torture, degradation of the human spirit and suppression of basic political and civil rights lead to further violence.

Amnesty International, which was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize last year, emphasizes the fact that becoming aware of the need for international rules to safeguard the individual's rights is the first step towards achieving international machinery for maintaining them. Action by individual governments will never be sufficient. International responsibility in this field is increasingly recognized.

The argument that the treatment of its citizens by a state is strictly an internal matter and should not be subjected to foreign intervention is no longer valid. The shared commitment to the United Nations Charter and other human-rights documents has irrevocably placed human rights on the agenda of subjects of common international concern.

That is perhaps the chief lesson of the Belgrade Conference, where 35 nations, including Canada, reviewed all aspects of the Helsinki Final Act. Although this conference could not provide a substantive docu-

ment on human rights, the very fact that the whole issue is today a central factor in East-West relations is itself a sign of progress. Western pressure is bringing some slight improvement to civil rights in the Soviet Union — e.g., on reunification of families — but this amelioration has been accompanied by tougher Kremlin action against internal dissent. It is thus, as the *Christian Science Monitor* remarked, “a delicate line the West treads in pressing the Soviets to be more humane without inviting even harsher policies”.

Acknowledging the delicacy, the Canadian Government needs to take a more forthright and active role in those international bodies that are charged with the safeguarding of human rights — in particular, to press for the appointment of a UN Commissioner for Human Rights. We need to give more than lip service to the principle of human dignity. Where religious and ethnic communities are denied civil and political rights, or are refused social, economic or cultural justice, Canadians ought to declare their active support for these communities when they demand freedom for their members — notably freedom of emigration and equality of political expression. Further, the reunification of families and persecution of non-violent dissidents should be raised on all possible occasions by the Canadian Government in its relations with foreign governments.

In view of the lack of progress at Belgrade, Canada should look elsewhere for ways in which its foreign policy might more effectively work towards the end of human-rights violations. One such area is external aid. The Government of Canada should reduce to a minimum its material assistance to, and symbolic approval of, governments that commit gross violations of human rights. Necessary food aid should be exempted from such a policy.

The year 1978, the thirtieth anniversary of the adoption by the UN of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, was dedicated to the theme of education about human rights. A Canadian foreign policy vigorously directed against human-rights violations could increase the awareness by Canadians of this fundamental issue.

Trade

When we consider Canada's trade position, it is easily understood why the maintenance of a strong and productive relation with the United States is essential. The U.S. accounts for 72 per cent of Canada's exports, and the trading relation with the U.S. continues to grow despite the “Third Option” and the “contractual link” with the European Economic Community.

The Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, which advocated in 1973 the development of closer trade links and a contractual link with Europe, presented a new report this summer advocating bilateral free trade with the United States. In short, the committee

said that the Third Option was unrealistic; bilateral free trade was essential to the stimulation of industrial development in Canada. With trade blocs growing and non-tariff barriers being raised against third countries, the committee concluded that Canada could not remain “odd man out”.

The response to this recommendation will depend in part on the outcome of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade negotiations. But already the report has served to focus on Canada-U.S. trade as a basic component of foreign policy. If the free-trade idea is advanced, dislocations in Canadian industry are inevitable. Is the price of these dislocations acceptable in the name of a stronger Canadian economy in the Eighties? And is not an economically-strong Canada a prerequisite to preserving our cultural and political identity?

This question is, of course, closely linked to the larger issue of trade-liberalization. The protection of Canadian industries from the exports of rapidly industrializing nations is becoming increasingly costly as we see in the textile and footwear industries.

Arguments against trade-liberalization have focused on the unemployment that would result in Canada. Yet the Economic Council of Canada, as well as the World Bank, maintain that open trade fosters a more rational division of labour, provides products at lower prices, and thus reduces inflationary pressures and encourages expansion in markets for Canada's own exports. Of course, liberalization must be accompanied by a domestic program of adjustment and stimulus in industries where Canada has a comparative advantage.

In the words of the Economic Council:

The best policy for Canada will be one that enables industrial capability to arise wherever there is an actual or potential comparative advantage — including in developing countries — so that factors of production at home may be concentrated in areas where Canadian efficiency is greatest.

Some of the most rapid rates of growth are projected in manufacturing, especially wood and paper products, mixed fertilizers, non-industrial chemicals, non-metallic mineral products, aircraft and parts, and electrical industrial equipment, including communications equipment. The Canadian private sector should become involved in the implementation of foreign policy through joint ventures in these and other areas.

I have seen the vast new opportunities for economic co-operation and trade that exist in several countries in the Middle East and Asia. The development of Canadian business opportunities abroad ought to be just as much an aim of foreign policy as adequate diplomatic representation.

International economic co-operation — as much as security — is a prerequisite for peace and stability

Once we grasp fully that low productivity, in both the developed and developing worlds, is at the heart of present economic instability, it becomes easier to take a systematic approach to Canada's role in world development.

It is in the interest of both rich and poor to boost productivity all over the world, and this can best be done by stabilizing commodity prices, lowering tariff barriers, increasing the flow of capital into the developing world, and improving the transfer of technology. All of this constitutes the North-South dialogue, which, unfortunately, has lost sight of the interdependence of global interests.

There are important gains to be made by forging a stronger North-South partnership. Most of the industrial countries are today afflicted by high unemployment, slow growth and continuing inflation. Similarly, the developing countries, particularly the poorer ones, suffer directly from the repercussions of this recession — and even those that have gained from the rise in oil prices or exports of manufactures have lost out to inflation and protectionist pressures in the industrial economies.

To move towards a more dynamic global economy could thus be in the mutual interest of both North and South. By raising the purchasing power among the greatly-expanding populations of the South, releasing new resources and developing new markets for both poor and rich, higher levels of trade can be created within and among all countries. In effect, the developing countries of the South could become one of the engines of growth of resumed progress in the industrial world.

My argument is thus that economic growth in the North demands progress in the South.

Bridge-building

This idea ought to permeate a new Canadian strategy for international development co-operation as the Third Development Decade starts in 1980. Here is where Canada can play a major bridge-building role in the international community. It is time to offer a moderate yet constructive solution to world poverty that avoids the extremes of utopian solutions and transience or structural change. As Maurice J. Williams, chairman of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, notes:

Broad international support is more likely to be mobilized for evolutionary changes which remove unjust constraints in the international economic order, facilitate an on-going process of structural change, and encourage a concerted effort to help weak and vulnerable people.

Canada is better suited to lead than to be a grudging participant in the search for new order in the world.

The goal of improved economic relations should be to bring about equality of opportunity, both within and among nations, rich as well as poor, without discrimination as to race, colour, religion or sex. Consequently, it should be a matter of priority for national and international efforts to meet the basic human needs of the vast majority of mankind by the turn of this century, by enabling the poorest sections of society to increase their productivity and to participate in economic development on an equal footing and on the basis of self-reliance.

The complex North-South question can be boiled down to a two-pronged approach: the provision of basic needs and the mutuality of North-South trading interests.

Committed Canadian leadership could help significantly to develop better negotiating attitudes in international forums searching for new arrangements in the fields of trade, commodities and credit. The struggle in the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development over the Common Fund for Commodities is a case in point.

It is no longer enough to think that aid (particularly when it is tied so tightly to Canadian benefit) is a sufficient response to the challenge of world development. A more realistic Canadian policy would comprise such multiple steps as: more emphasis on water-management and soil-conservation and the notion of self-reliance in our aid program; intensified and continuous technical co-operation with developing countries; and domestic industrial-adjustment strategies to enable Canada to produce more of the high-technology goods needed on world markets.

To restore the Canadian public's confidence in the \$1.2-billion CIDA operation, it will be necessary to make public an independent management study of the Agency. Only in this way can Parliament decide whether aid is as effectively administered as it might be and whether it really helps the poorest people whom Canadians wish to help. This move, coupled with the establishment of a Canadian Advisory Council on International Development to provide systematic consultation between business, labour and government, would stimulate public support for a renewed development effort in the 1980s.

Finally, we are left with Solzhenitsyn's call to rise to a new height of vision in the global community. If a nation as blessed as Canada cannot respond to such a challenge, what hope is there for humanity? We must ask ourselves if we have the courage to bring peace and hope to a world in conflict.

Is External Affairs a central agency? — a question of leadership controls

by W. M. Dobell

Deputy ministers do not deliver speeches to gain partisan political exposure. They may speak more today than a generation ago, yet as a group they still do not talk very much to public audiences. It may occasionally be necessary to represent a department at a senior level when its minister is unavailable and the parliamentary assistant too inexperienced. Nevertheless a deputy ministerial address remains a rare occurrence. It usually means not that an occasion requires a speech but that selling an idea demands an audience. A deputy minister who has been the senior civil servant in three departments over ten years may well have perspectives worthy of reflection. Thus, when the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs delivers a public lecture on the role of his department within the fabric of government, his message should be studied. Yet, as a shrewd practitioner of bureaucratic politics, he would be the last to expect his words to be taken as Holy Writ.

"The Government considers the Department of External Affairs to be a central agency," the Under-Secretary boldly declared in Toronto on February 15, reasserting a few

minutes later that "there is no doubt that the Government regards the Department as a central agency." To understand the implications of this statement, some knowledge of what constitutes a central agency is required. What units within the Federal Government are accepted as central agencies? Which of their responsibilities make them central agencies?

The term "central agency" has gained increasing currency throughout the 1970s, but has yet to find a regular place in the table of contents or index of standard works on the Canadian Federal Government or Canadian public administration. Since some phrases that sound similar are not synonymous while others are, a necessary step is the clarification of terminology. The Post Office, which is supposed to supply a service to the Canadian public, is an example of a central-service agency. It is not a central agency, and even its performance of a service efficiently would not make it one.

Crown corporations are sometimes called Crown "agencies", and are then subdivided into three categories, one of which is the "agency corporation". Examples of the latter are Atomic Energy of Canada Limited and the National Harbours Board, which have considerable authority but within a limited jurisdiction. Neither the umbrella Crown agency nor the more specific agency corporation is analogous to a central agency. On the other hand, a central control agency, a central policy

agency, or a central policy-support organization is a central agency.

Definition

Although the term central agency has become bureaucratized, it has not progressed sufficiently from the colloquial to the institutional to have become a statutory term with some precision. An acceptable definition would involve three components: a broad spectrum of government activities; a co-ordinating role with respect to those activities; and a leadership role with respect to the co-ordination. How policy-oriented a spectrum, how extensive the co-ordination and how much authority should accompany the leadership are not as widely accepted.

No one would fail to list the Privy Council Office as a key central agency. It is responsible to the President, who has also served as Deputy Prime Minister for nearly three years, and to the Prime Minister. Some would list the Prime Minister's Office as a separate central agency, but its limited size and capacity make this questionable without the co-operation and support of the PCO, it could not adequately perform central-agency functions. The two complement each other in what has become a cliché of the Seventies — the PCO is not partisan, operationally-oriented yet politically-sensitive, whereas the PMO is partisan, politically-oriented yet operationally-sensitive. No draft legislation on any subject can reach Cabinet without passing the scrutiny of the PCO; every proposal

Professor Dobell teaches in the Department of Political Science at the University of Western Ontario. From 1970 to 1972, while on leave from the university, he served in Ottawa as executive assistant to the Honourable Paul Martin. The views expressed in this article are those of Professor Dobell.

checked to ensure that the requisite co-ordination has been undertaken and the probable consequences assessed.

Since the era of the Glassco Commission on Government Organization, the Treasury Board has been the other indisputable central agency. That term was used by its secretary ten years ago, at least in the negative sense of denying that a central agency was like Kafka's castle — amorphous, inaccessible and powerful. But it was expected to evaluate the effectiveness of programs, to ascertain the relations of competing programs to government goals, and to ensure that funding was consistent with predetermined priorities.

A much more questionable central agency is the Public Service Commission. After the Glassco reforms, some of the old Civil Service Commission's hiring functions were taken over by departments, and its pay-research functions fell to the Treasury Board. Even "pre-Glassco", the CSC's control functions were in too narrow an area to make it a convincing central agency, and the term been in vogue. The present PSC possesses broad staffing responsibilities and advisory duties in organization and management analysis, but makes almost no contribution to substantive public policy.

Finance

Enlarging the central-agency category beyond the PCO and the Treasury Board involves considering particular government departments whose responsibilities might be thought to involve the equivalent of central-agency status. Of these, the department with the largest operating budget is Finance, which is responsible for the Federal Government's fiscal and economic policy. Finance has a clear co-ordinating and leadership role in all areas of government expenditure; other departments are well aware that they cannot spend money Finance has not raised. External Affairs has not sought to compete with it for leadership in international financial and

monetary questions. In the Under-Secretary's February lecture, Finance was the only other department listed as a central agency.

The Board of Economic Development's jurisdiction might appear on paper to have the breadth, co-ordination and leadership attributes associated with a central agency. Such a generous interpretation would be contingent on a support role on the part of Finance, the Treasury Board and the Deputy Prime Minister. The full participation of all three in the new board is less than formalized, and indeed the whole board may prove to have enjoyed an ephemeral existence. Many of its responsibilities and staff have, however, moved over from Industry, Trade and Commerce, leaving the latter much weakened. Traditionally, I, T and C has been the department most resistant to any imperial pretensions on the part of External Affairs. At the moment, it is no worthy adversary, any central-agency pretensions having lain dormant throughout the winter.

A final department to be considered is Justice, which is charged with drafting bills for the entire Federal Government prior to their submission to Parliament. That is an internal Government service, not a substantive policy "input". Its liaison with the provinces on legal and constitutional matters, however, and its responsibility for the Government's legal position, give Justice a major policy role. It could readily enough manage Canada's international legal position as well, further consolidating its own case for central-agency status, should External Affairs cease to discharge that function. That option enjoys little support at External Affairs, even among diplomats indifferent to the central-agency argument. To the diplomatic central-agency enthusiasts such a transfer would be unthinkable, for the international legal mandate is an integral part of External's case.

It is now time to examine that case. Having defined such common agreement as exists on the import of

central-agency principles, and listed the candidates mentioned in the debate, what is the rationale for including External Affairs? Looking back to 1977, when he took up his post, the Under-Secretary was convinced that the Department must become "a modern central-policy agency". So apparently it was not a central agency two years ago. Yet, in February of this year, he stated that it was one, together with the PCO, the Treasury Board and Finance. How other departments or foreign-service officers had failed to adjust to the situation was not made clear, but the fact that External Affairs was a central agency was "less appreciated" than it should have been: "It is part of my purpose to ensure that this is understood and that the Department acts accordingly."

The Under-Secretary acknowledged having posed four basic questions in 1977: What did the Government expect of the Department? What authority did the Department need? What structural changes had to be made at headquarters and abroad? And what personnel policies were required? His answer to the first was a strong foreign-affairs role, more analysis of international issues, and awareness of competing policy objectives and provincial interests. This expression of generality could hardly be criticized. It was in answering the second question that the plan for central-agency status became most apparent.

"Central agencies not only co-ordinate and consult, they lead on key issues of national policy." External Affairs had "a responsibility to provide other departments with coherent policy and priority guidance"; each central agency had its task, and External's was to be the "central foreign-policy-management agency". The Under-Secretary did not precisely state what authority was needed — but leaders do expect to be followed, priorities involve an established order, and management implies control. When he had begun his career 22 years earlier, the speaker recalled, the Department

had a clear mandate to lead and to manage. A reinforced mandate was evidently being sought, albeit through depicting a central-agency role that incorporated directional powers. The difficulty here is that the speaker was suggesting something beyond an Under-Secretary's capacity to command.

Part of the Under-Secretary's third question was within the Department's control — i.e., what changes had to be made at headquarters. The changes specified — establishing a new level of Deputy Under-Secretaries capable of acting as surrogate Under-Secretaries, appointing special co-ordinators for disarmament and development policy, and establishing *ad hoc* task forces — had already occurred. Apart from demonstrating a willingness and ability to take charge, the intra-Departmental changes do not appear to do very much to establish External's interdepartmental mandate.

New procedures

The other part of that third question (i.e., what changes had to be made at posts) was back in the realm of matters beyond the Department's unilateral control. But in this instance the Under-Secretary was able to announce that new procedures had been agreed on by the Interdepartmental Committee on External Relations. In 1970 a confidential task force had recommended a single comprehensive system for an integrated foreign-operations program. Full structural integration (or unification, as it was called) would have absorbed I, T and C's Trade Commissioner Service, Manpower and Immigration's Foreign Service Branch, and the Canadian International Development Agency's development officers into a single unified foreign service in which the influence of External Affairs would have been predominant. Because of interdepartmental resistance, only the lower-level or support-staff integration was introduced in 1971. The system was a hybrid, with administrative service under External Affairs and foreign-

service officers independently controlled by their respective departments.

The new procedure agreed to in 1978 involved assigning "line authority" to the head of post over all operations within the scope of approved programs. The individual program manager was not to treat his home department as his sole controlling authority, but he was to be responsible as well to his head of post for approval of the planning and implementation of all program objectives. The practice of imperfectly informing the head of post was "no longer acceptable". The ICER departments and CIDA had established "unequivocally that the head of post is accountable both to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, and to the relevant deputy ministers, for all post activities in their respective jurisdictions".

Although the obligation on the program manager was intended to clarify the role and reaffirm the authority of the head of post, the dual accountability of the head of post to Ottawa went beyond that. It was well short of unification, but it was a further step beyond the integration process of 1971. Where the head of post is a diplomat, External Affairs acquires a post-program responsibility for the programs of other departments; where the head of post is from another department, he is still accountable to the Secretary of State for External Affairs. This innovation did lend some additional support to the central-agency claim, dovetailing thereby with the Under-Secretary's second question about what authority the Department needed.

His fourth question — what personnel policies were required — was reminiscent of his approach to changes at headquarters. His emphasis was on quality, semi-specialist training, much-increased two-way secondment, some lateral entry, and a slowdown in the process of rotation. Like the headquarters changes, there was little direct relevance to External's mandate, but an undertaking of largely internal initiatives

that could affect behaviour and image. Rotational deceleration, in particular, was intended to enhance the level of effectiveness of diplomats in Ottawa by reducing the disadvantage of unfamiliarity with issues in the "interdepartmental game". When playing bureaucratic politics for central-agency status the Under-Secretary obviously saw no point in playing under a handicap.

Credentials

In addition to posing his four questions, the Under-Secretary spoke of the Department's authority to act as a central agency in matters of formal credentials, particularly those of the Minister, and of informal arrangements, including his own role. Under formal credentials, he briefly listed legislation, Orders-in-Council, Cabinet directives and custom and precedents, specifying the SSEA's authority to sign all submissions to Cabinet concerning international agreements and the size and composition of delegations to international conferences. The content of these formal credentials was evidently somewhat less than compelling. In its efforts to exercise this authority, according to the Under-Secretary, the Department ran into problems that compelled it to rely largely on informal arrangements.

It is an accepted principle that even the humblest department supports its minister to the full. Nevertheless, the Under-Secretary chose to include constant support for the Minister as an informal device to consolidate and enhance the Department's role as a central agency. For citation of the SSEA's chairmanship of the Cabinet Committee on External Affairs and National Defence ignores the fact that all the major relevant studies of the 1970s — the foreign-policy review, the development-assistance review, the long-range patrol-aircraft decision and the European-sector battle-tank purchase — bypassed this committee.

Perhaps for this reason the participation of the Minister in the key Priorities and Planning Com-

nittee is also mentioned. But the SSEA only happens to be a member of the latter committee; he is not included automatically, and the next Minister may not be included. Central-agency status would seem logically to require that relevant policy decisions for Cabinet approval be handled by a committee in which the Department enjoys a *primus inter pares* advantage, the leverage of chairmanship. In Priorities and Planning, the Minister's "clout" is more political than departmental, which does little to support the central-agency claim.

Regarding his own role, the Under-Secretary believes that his most important responsibility is that of making recommendations for heads of post. Although assisted by ICER, he alone has that responsibility, he avers, and some of the posts are the equal of deputy ministerships in scope. The problem about his assertion is that it focuses on recommendation, not nomination, and Prime Ministerial appointment of the occasional political colleague for an overseas post detracts from the central-agency argument.

Committees

The Under-Secretary is chairman of three interdepartmental committees. The one concerned with Third World relations, the Interdepartmental Committee on Economic Relations with Developing Countries, has existed for five years in comparative obscurity. A 1978 creation, the Committee of Deputy Ministers on Foreign Policy, is much broader in scope, and is a forum for discussing almost any policy issue with international implications. If this committee becomes a channel for resolving interdepartmental differences in a manner consistent with External's perceptions, it will certainly enhance the central-agency case. But, if, on the tough issues, the key departments continue to go their own ways, the central-agency claim will not have been forwarded. It is, however, one of the two real steps the Under-Secretary has taken towards central-agency status. The

other step was taken in the third committee he chairs, ICER — the move already described to take support-staff integration forward to include the head of post's line authority over all programs, and dual accountability to the SSEA and to the home-program department.

A possible third step towards central-agency status, one taken prior to the Under-Secretary's assumption of office, has also been mentioned. This was the allocation to the SSEA of the authority to approve and make recommendations to Cabinet on the size and composition of delegations to international conferences. The Cabinet directive did not cover technical meetings, general official travel or unofficial deliberations, otherwise known in Orwellian jargon as non-conferences. As for meetings in Canada, other departments are more likely to reveal that they are expecting overseas visitors, who may well not pass unnoticed, but the same does not apply to visiting American officials.

In 1972, External Affairs was assigned responsibility for ensuring co-ordination of the external aspects and applications of national policy. The functionally-originating department was supposed to notify External of any program with external content or aspects, but, inadvertently or otherwise, sometimes failed to do so. Since the most frequent omissions were in the area of Canadian-American relations, a further and more specific Government guideline was issued in 1974 to try to stop issues with Canadian-American implications from reaching Cabinet without prior consultation with External Affairs. Throughout much of the decade, therefore, the Department was obviously not viewed as a central agency from which other departments had to seek clearance before carrying through those functional programs that happened to have incidental external aspects.

The limitation of co-ordination as a central-agency tool is that it is dependent on co-operation and persuasion. Unless the responsible body

stipulated has the power to ensure compliance, not merely with the outward forms of co-ordination but with the policy implications of its direction and leadership, then its formal obligations and responsibility with respect to other departments may be purely nominal.

The Under-Secretary affirms that the Department's means of exercising its authority distinguishes External Affairs from other central agencies. Treasury Board controls the budget expenditures for all Government departments; it establishes the administrative policies of the Government as an employer: "Government departments and agencies do not have a choice whether to go through Treasury Board." The USSEA might have said the same of the PCO, the guardian of the gates to Cabinet. No department can circumvent the Treasury Board and the PCO, but departments can extend minimal co-operation to External Affairs without following its leadership and without suffering severe consequences as a result. The Treasury Board and the PCO have something to offer or hold back that is considered valuable to regular departments; External does not.

All three are concerned with a spectrum of policy issues broad enough to qualify them as central agencies; all three have the requisite co-ordinative responsibilities; but only two enjoy the powers of control necessary to ensure successful discharge of those responsibilities. The power to control is a crucial lever in the weaponry of a central agency. What distinguishes External Affairs is not the difference in methods of exercising central-agency authority but the absence of the authority required to ensure that it consistently acts as a central agency.

External Affairs falls comfortably into that slightly larger group of departments and agencies known as the traditional "horizontal co-ordinative portfolios". These departments have high policy influence owing to the frequency of their opportunities to intervene in policy

issues. Each deals with basic horizontal, or cross-cutting, dimensions of Government policy. If External Affairs obtains leadership control of, say, international commercial policy, and maintains its sway over

international legal policy, its authority will have been sufficiently consolidated for it to move into the central-agency category. If it does not obtain enhanced powers, use of

a looser definition of central agency will not satisfy its aspirants. The central-agency debate is not really a semantic one — it concerns leadership controls.

United Nations

Ambassador Barton recalls term on Security Council

A personal reminiscence

by W. H. Barton

Just as the League of Nations was conceived as a response to the horrors of the First World War, the founders of the United Nations were motivated primarily by the need to provide mankind with an institution to prevent the recurrence of the madness of the Second World War. It was for this reason also that the drafters of the Charter of the United Nations listed as the first of its purposes the maintenance of international peace and security. Moreover, the Charter conferred on the Security Council, as the organ primarily responsible for the achievement of this aim, exceptional powers to act on behalf of all members of the organization.

The record of the Security Council in fulfilling its responsibilities during the past 33 years has been a mixed one, reflecting the reality of relations between the nations, particularly the major powers. But, for better or worse, the Council has been, and remains, the focus of power and centre of attention at the United Nations, and, indeed, in the eyes of the world, on those issues of peace or war that nations are prepared to have come before the world body.

For this reason, and because service on the Council carries with it the assumption of special responsibilities by those governments selected for the assignment, it also confers on them the opportunity to play a particularly influential role in negotiations aimed at resolving some of the most threatening issues facing the world today.

The five permanent members of the Council carry this mantle of responsibility and influence as a matter of course, but for the 146 other members of the United Nations the opportunity to serve a two-year term can at best arise only at infrequent intervals and competition for the assignment is fierce. Canada's case, notwithstanding its active participation in the UN and its leading role in peacekeeping, it has served on the Council only four times. At the same time, Canada is the first member of our geographical group to have served so often.

Responsibilities

The responsibilities and the distinction of membership on the Security Council are, of course, assumed by member governments, and in particular by the foreign ministers. But it is only rarely that ministers attend meetings of the Council, so that, although the Permanent Representative in New York is guided by instructions from his home office, a considerable burden devolves on him. George Ignatieff, who was Permanent Representative during Canada's last period

Mr Barton is Canadian Permanent Representative to the United Nations in New York. In that capacity, he sat on the Security Council during Canada's most recent two-year term on that body. The views expressed here are the personal views of Mr Barton.

vious term of office called it "the hot seat". I did not have his experience of being involved in a war situation (the Six-day War of 1967), but I was very conscious of being the fourth Canadian to have had the honour and privilege of serving on the Council, and of the obligation to try to live up to the standards set by General McNaughton, Charles Ritchie, and George Ignatieff before me.

To one who is used to working in the unwieldy General Assembly of today, where it is rare to find even an intersessional committee with fewer than 40 or 50 members, there is a real "culture shock" in learning to operate in the clubby atmosphere of the Council, limited as it is to 15 members and with the reality of the veto lying behind every negotiation. I have described the atmosphere as clubby with reason. During its early years, the Council was notorious for confrontations between East and West and for the succession of Soviet vetoes. As time has gone by, the Cold War has moderated, the influence of Third World nations has grown, and a new atmosphere of co-operation, within the limits imposed by basic national positions, has emerged. Nowadays most differences are argued out in closed informal consultations and formal meetings are normally held only when a course of action and a script for what is to happen have been worked out behind the scenes. Because the Council is small, the members get to know each other really well and work together with good humour in an effort to achieve the widest possible agreement.

During our tenure of office, the Council met formally 125 times, 73 in 1977 and 52 in 1978. But behind these statistics lay countless hours of informal consultation and negotiation between delegations, at all times of the day and night, and all too often on week-ends.

The Council has a long-established practice of reacting only responsively to situations that are referred to it by governments. In the last two years, the principal substantive areas of concern have been southern Africa, including Rhodesia, Namibia and the *apartheid* policies of the South African Government, the Middle East, including the problems of Lebanon, and Cyprus. The Council also gave some attention to problems in other parts of Africa, notably the mercenary raid on Benin in January 1977 and the differences between Chad and Libya over support allegedly given by the latter to Chad rebels. The Council did not take up the situation in the Horn of Africa or in the Sahara, nor did it deal in any way with issues in other parts of the world.

Although the Security Council has not evolved in the way envisaged in the Charter, as a body watching over the peace of the world, and, given the present state of relations between the great powers, is unlikely to do so in the foreseeable future, at the outset of our term Mr Jamieson advanced the idea that a modest beginning might be made towards trying to head off

trouble rather than wait for it to happen before doing anything. He suggested that, from time to time, when foreign ministers represented on the Security Council were in New York, they should take advantage of the opportunity to have informal consultations on the state of the world. When we attempted to follow up on this idea, we found that, while Western members of the Council and those familiar with the traditions of the Commonwealth were receptive, some of the others found it difficult to grasp the idea of a free and informal exchange of ideas without publicity or commitment, and the Eastern European and Chinese members were resolutely opposed. Even if our efforts were unsuccessful, I believe they were worth trying. But changes along the lines we were working for will not occur until the permanent members of the Council are prepared to espouse them and work actively for their adoption.

It was evident at the outset of our term of office that the Council would be actively involved in the problems of the Middle East and Cyprus and, because Canada was playing a major role in the UN peace-keeping activities in both of these areas, I arranged, together with the Mission's Military Adviser Lieutenant-Colonel Bob Gallagher, to visit the Canadian and other peacekeeping forces in the Sinai, on the Golan Heights and in Cyprus. It proved to be an invaluable experience, and added enormously to my understanding of the issues and of the problems of the peacekeepers who serve with selfless dedication in conditions that are difficult and often dangerous. With benefit of hindsight, I only wish that I had arranged a familiarization tour of southern Africa, the other principal area of UN preoccupation. My advice to my successor as Permanent Representative, even though he will not be on the Security Council, is that, at an early stage in his tour of duty, he should press to make visits to both areas unless he is already familiar with them.

Southern Africa

During 1977 and 1978, the problems of southern Africa were unquestionably the major preoccupation of the Security Council. The African members of the Council, actively backed by their regional group and with the support of the whole of the Third World, pressed vigorously for action to resolve the situation in Rhodesia and Namibia, and for punitive measures against South Africa unless it abandoned its *apartheid* policy. In African eyes, these were all aspects of the same problem, because it was South African involvement and support that made it possible for Ian Smith to cling to power and South African refusal to terminate its illegal mandate over Namibia that prevented the UN's Council for Namibia from taking over the administration of the territory and establishing a truly independent government with SWAPO at the helm.

In the early months of 1977, the African members of the Council launched a major initiative consisting of four draft resolutions focused on the problems of southern Africa, including Rhodesia, *apartheid* in South Africa, and Namibia. These resolutions embodied a number of provisions — particularly mandatory sanctions against South Africa — that the Western members were simply not prepared to contemplate, not least because of the extremely painful effect such measures would have on their own economies.

At that moment, the Western members of the Council (the Federal Republic of Germany, Britain, France, the United States and Canada) had a private meeting at the Canadian mission to discuss what we should do. This was the first occasion on which Andrew Young, as a black, had been faced with the prospect of public confrontation on an issue of deep emotional significance to him. His response to this challenge was imaginative and courageous, and though it did not work out exactly as he had hoped, it has served as the most important single element in the Western plan of action in the Council since then.

Two-pronged approach

Ambassador Young suggested that we should follow a two-pronged approach. First, we should suggest to the Africans that, instead of following the route of confrontation in the Council, with the inevitable vetoes that would follow, we should try collectively to draft a declaration asserting affirmatively the wide areas of agreement on southern African issues. Such a declaration, as a considered expression of the convictions of the Council, would have an important impact on world opinion. Secondly, the five Western members of the Council would use their good offices, as major trading nations dealing with South Africa, to see if they could persuade South Africa to accept a plan, consistent with guidelines laid down by the Security Council, to hold free elections at an early date in Namibia, leading to its establishment as an independent state recognized as such by the UN.

It was acknowledged that this approach rested on pretty shaky foundations, but at least it meant that we should be taking the initiative rather than remaining in a negative position of inaction. The five governments were, therefore, pleased to endorse it. From the outset, the Africans were doubtful about the feasibility of our approach, but they agreed to hold off pushing their resolutions until we could test the water.

We spent a busy spring preparing what we thought was an affirmative declaration on southern Africa and then trying it on our African colleagues. We made some progress, but in the end, as I suppose was predictable, there were simply too many questions of principle where the maximum distance we could go fell short of the minimum positions that the Africans could contemplate, and by June this particular fire

had spluttered out. Things were quiet during the summer, but then the build-up of detentions and prison deaths, culminating in the death of Steve Biko and the suppression of the anti-*apartheid* press stirred the Africans to demand that the Council deal with their proposals.

The Western members of the Council shared the general repugnance against the direction affairs were taking in South Africa, and looked hard for something to be done that would express the universal sense of indignation but, at the same time, could be tolerated economically, particularly by Britain. The most obvious target was a compulsory arms embargo, to be implemented in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter. It would be the first time that compulsory sanctions had been invoked against a member state, and even that limited measure produced doubt and tensions within the Western group.

There was an intense period of internal discussions, which involved extended consultations with our governments, before we finally reached a decision to go ahead. Unfortunately, the resulting delay led to a highly-charged debate in the Council, in which the Western countries were accused of negotiating in bad faith. The outcome was that the Western members went along with one of the African-sponsored resolutions but voted against the other three, which meant that they were vetoed by the negative votes of Britain, the U.S.A. and France. We then brought forward the Western proposal for a compulsory arms embargo. The angry Africans at first spurned it but, after a cooling-off period of a day or so, they accepted an Indian re-write of the text, which was essentially the same as the one we had proposed. This landmark resolution was adopted on November 4, 1977.

Namibia

While all this was going on, the Western Five had also been working on the other element of their plan of action, Namibia. As it turned out, this initiative proved to be, on all counts, their major preoccupation during 1977 and 1978. At this moment, it also looked as if it may prove to be a major accomplishment of the Security Council.

The situation at the beginning of 1977 was that the South African Government had announced a program to give Namibia its independence — South African style. Our first move was to propose to the South African Government that, if it would halt the process, the Five would use their good offices to try to obtain UN acceptance of a plan, based on free elections with universal franchise, that would result in a truly independent Namibia, rather than another unrecognized Transkei. At the same time, it was made clear that, if South Africa persisted in going ahead on its own, the Western governments could not be expected to keep on resisting retaliatory action by the Security Council.

There then began a 16-month balancing act, which was threatened with collapse on an average of once every three weeks. We had to come up with a plan that would insure: that the guerilla warfare along the frontier between Namibia and Angola and Zambia would come to a halt; that the blacks who had fled the country would feel safe to return; that the 20,000 to 30,000 South African troops would be reduced to a minimum so that there could be no possibility of intimidation during the voting process; that the possibilities of intimidation by the police and civil administration would also be neutralized; and, finally, that the electoral and constitutional measures could be carried out to the satisfaction of all that they were fair.

To carry out the negotiations we established a Contact Group consisting of the deputy representatives of the five missions. The Canadian member was Paul Lapointe, who has recently moved to Ottawa as Director-General of the UN bureau of the Department of External Affairs. The main elements of our plan were agreed on at an early stage, but it required months of fine-tuning the language, modifying details, and "hard selling" by both sides to convince the parties concerned that their vital interests were taken care of. The Western Contact Group made five trips to Africa. Sam Nujoma, the head of the South West African People's Organization — the liberation movement recognized by the UN — came to New York for consultations three times. The South African Foreign Minister came twice. The five Western foreign ministers had lengthy joint consultations with both sides, and with the Front-Line States (Angola, Zambia, Botswana, Tanzania and Mozambique).

Western plan

In April 1978, South Africa announced acceptance of the Western plan but, while we were concentrating on trying to get SWAPO's acceptance as well as the support of the Front-Line States, the South Africans launched a fierce raid on SWAPO headquarters in Angola. Nujoma went home at once in anger and consternation and our talks broke off. It took a month for the situation to cool off to the point where talks could be resumed. We found that the Front-Line States were anxious to get a negotiated solution and, with their strong support, SWAPO accepted the Western plan on July 12. As a result, at the end of July we were able to get a resolution through the Security Council authorizing the Secretary-General to send a special representative to Namibia to devise an operation plan to put our proposals into effect.

It was a historic Council meeting, with five foreign ministers present, and I had the honour to preside in the absence of Mr Jamieson, who had to return from New York to Newfoundland to be with the Queen, who was visiting that province at the time.

Then, just when success seemed within our grasp, new difficulties arose that necessitated the Western foreign ministers visiting South Africa, and a subsequent condemnation by the Security Council of the South African decision to go ahead with internally-conducted elections in Namibia, notwithstanding its expressed willingness to see the subsequent implementation of the UN plan. However, once again the seemingly-intractable obstacles were overcome and, at the end of 1978, when Canada left the Council, the prospects for getting a UN presence in Namibia and beginning the electoral process by February looked very encouraging.

Middle East

Contrary to our initial expectations, the Security Council was not actively concerned with Middle East matters in 1977-78, except for the situation in Lebanon, which took a critical turn in March 1978, when Israel reacted to the turmoil, and in particular the fighting between the Palestinian and Lebanese Christian elements in the southern part of the country, by occupying Lebanon south of the Litani River. The situation was highly charged and politically complex, including great-power differences over the conduct of Middle East negotiations, Arab-Israeli hostility, and strong inter-Arab differences.

What happened showed the Council at its best. There were intensive day-and-night negotiations over a period of about 72 hours, which produced a resolution calling for strict respect for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon and the immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces, and providing for the establishment at once of a United Nations interim force for Southern Lebanon (UNIFIL) to confirm the Israeli withdrawal, restore peace and security, and assist Lebanon in the re-establishment of its effective authority in the area.

The prompt action of the Council defused the immediate situation, but Lebanon has remained a troubled country. In October 1978, a resolution that was adopted calling for a cessation of fighting in Beirut was helpful in arranging for a cease-fire, and in December the Council met again to call on all parties not fully co-operating with UNIFIL, particularly Israel, to stop at once interfering with UNIFIL's operations.

Apart from its deliberations on Lebanon and one or two meetings of a general nature on the rights of the Palestinian people, the Council's only business with the Middle East was the renewal of the mandates, when required, for the UN Emergency Force in the Sinai and the UN Disengagement Observer Force on the Golan Heights. Debate on these renewals was, without exception, brief and low-keyed.

If the involvement of the Council in Middle East affairs proved less difficult than we had expected, the exact opposite can be said for the situation in Cyprus.

The sorry tale of events on that unhappy island is too long to be recounted here. Suffice it to say that the presence of the UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) plays a vital role in preventing a renewal of fighting between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. The Security Council mandate for the Force comes up for renewal every six months, on June 15 and December 15, and the debate on the enabling resolution serves as a platform on which both sides can ventilate their views on the situation and on what should be done about it. Up to now, for varying reasons, both sides have wanted UNFICYP maintained but, because in principle their consent to the renewal of the mandate is required, they have attempted to use this as a means of obtaining changes in the text of the resolutions in their favour.

It so happened that, in accordance with the Council's practice of monthly rotation of the presidency, Canada was in the chair in June 1977. In my innocence, I thought that, after one or two private consultations with the parties concerned a few days prior to the expiration of the mandate, we could obtain agreement on the text of a resolution, similar to the one that had been adopted six months earlier, and have the Council approve it in ample time. How wrong I was! Both sides advanced claims as to what should be in the resolution, and neither would budge.

As the deadline of midnight June 15 drew closer, I enlisted the aid of the Secretary-General and several members of the Council to attempt to influence the parties, but late that evening we were still locked in informal consultation in a small conference room in the basement of the UN Building. We finally got agreement on a text at 11:45 p.m., and raced upstairs to the Council Chamber to adopt the resolution formally at 10 seconds to midnight. My colleague, the Bolivian Ambassador, who presided over the Council this last June, was even less fortunate than I was. We had to "stop the clock" at midnight and it took until 5:00 a.m. before the Council was able to act.

The Council took up the subject of Cyprus again in November 1978 at the request of the Government of Cyprus, which wished to have "a political debate" without the constraints imposed by the time-limit for renewal of the mandate for UNFICYP. The goal of the Cypriots was to have the Council set a deadline for the withdrawal of the Turkish Army from Cyprus, failing which the Council would take appropriate action, presumably under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. This goal was unrealistic, and the climate for the debate was made more difficult by some by-play behind the scenes over who should be allowed to participate in the debate and under what auspices. In the end, the Council adopted a simple resolution calling on all concerned to work towards a solution of the problem in accordance with principles previously laid down by the Council and asking the Secretary-General to report on progress next May.

It is easy for those of us not caught up in the Cyprus dispute to say that the two communities must learn to live with each other in peace, and to be impatient with their failure to do so. But there are very great problems for them to overcome — problems compounded by cultural, social and economic differences and, though renewed efforts are being made to get negotiations going again, there is no general air of confidence in success. Instead there is a current opinion, particularly among the main contributors to UNFICYP, that, instead of providing an incentive to peace, the Force is serving as a shelter for the two sides to take intransigent positions. The views of UNFICYP contributors are also influenced by the failure of some countries that have an active interest in peace in Europe to share in carrying the financial burden. It will be interesting to see if this sense of concern is given tangible expression when the UNFICYP mandate comes before the Security Council again next June.

Personalities

Inevitably the personalities and capacities of the individual delegates significantly affect the way the Council works. There were a few "weak sisters", but most were fine men, who, while advocating and defending the positions of their governments with great skill and energy, at the same time were conscious of their obligation to do their best to contribute to the reputation and effectiveness of the Council.

The representatives of the five permanent members of the Council have the advantage of continuity of service, but in fact all were strong personalities and effective representatives of their governments. I shall never forget the blunt, undiplomatic candour of Andre Young, the gentle but firm interventions of Jacques Leprette, the razor-sharp wit of Ivor Richard, the cheerful friendliness of Oleg Troyanovsky, and the dialectical talents of Chen Chu when the opportunity arose to point the finger at some of his colleagues.

The non-permanent members have the disadvantage of transient status, and positions that most or all of them may favour can be blocked by a veto from one or another of the permanent members, but by the same token, their support is essential to an agreement on a course of action. The non-aligned (that is to say, the members from Africa, Latin America and Asia, except for China) caucus on every issue, and participate actively in the drafting of texts. During our period on the Council, the contribution of Rikhi Jaipal, the Indian representative, was particularly noteworthy in this regard.

Finally, I should like to say a word about the role of the two Western non-permanent delegations: the Federal Republic of Germany and Canada. We were both anxious to demonstrate that, while we could be expected to share a general identity of views with the permanent Western members, we should be active

on our own assessment of situations and reaching our own decisions. On the whole, I think we accomplished this purpose. The Western votes were not monolithic, and there were numerous occasions when we persuaded our permanent colleagues to modify their positions in directions we thought were right. The one area where we did operate as a united group was in pursuit of our initiative on Namibia, but even in that case our public positions were preceded by intense argumentation and agreement in the Contact Group as to the best approach to pursue.

The Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany, "Rudi" von Wechmar, was a cheerful and very able colleague in all these negotiations and, if he is successful in his campaign to be President of the General Assembly in 1980, I am sure he will fill that important post with great distinction.

Inevitably, the quality of the Security Council varies from year to year depending on the quality and character of its non-permanent members. Nearly every member nation wants a turn on the Council, but the fact is that some are in a much better position

to make an effective contribution than others. For this reason, I believe that the Canadian Government, as one of those that can be expected to be an effective contributor, is right in pursuing the consistent policy, over the years, of standing for election to the Council whenever the situation is propitious. Looking back on our most recent term, we have received many expressions of appreciation from friendly delegations, and some even from delegations whose views on what the Security Council should and should not do are opposed to ours. The one disappointment has been that events subsequent to our departure from the Council have seemingly brought to naught our efforts to have free elections take place in Namibia under United Nations supervision. Nevertheless, it is our conviction that the great efforts made by the Security Council — and in particular the five Western members — will, in the final analysis, prove to have made an important contribution to the resolution of the problems of southern Africa, thereby earning for the membership of the Council for 1977-78 a place in the history of the United Nations.

United Nations

Recap of Canada's activities at thirty-third General Assembly

by J. F. Tanguay

The United Nations, the most universal of international organizations, continues to grow and develop; its membership has tripled in 33 years. In 1978, the Solomon Islands and Dominica joined the UN, increasing its membership to 151 states. The UN budget has now passed the \$1 billion-mark, and totals \$2.5 billion when the UN Specialized Agencies are added. The heavy agenda of the thirty-third General Assembly contained 129 questions. To finish its work, the Assembly had to hold a resumed session after the Christmas and New Year's holidays. It adopted 205 resolutions and 70 decisions, which were published in a 512-page book.

Canadians have recently shown a renewed interest in UN activities because of Canada's two-year membership in the Security Council and its highly-visible participation in the initiative, together with the United States, Britain, France and the Federal Republic of Germany (the "Western Five"), to bring

about an internationally-acceptable settlement in Namibia. During the thirty-third session of the General Assembly, Jamaica, Norway, Zambia, Bangladesh and Portugal were elected as non-permanent members of the Security Council to begin two-year terms in January 1979. Norway and Portugal replaced Canada and the Federal Republic of Germany, whose mandates ended on December 31, 1978.

During the general debate of the session, Secretary of State for External Affairs Don Jamieson

Mr Tanguay is Director of the United Nations Political and Institutional Affairs Division of the Department of External Affairs. He joined the Department in 1963 and has served on postings to Moscow and Bonn. In Ottawa, he served for a time as Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet. The views expressed in this article are those of Mr Tanguay.

stressed three key international issues: the unresolved Middle East crisis, decolonization in southern Africa and human-rights violations. He deplored the lack of progress towards a durable peace in the Middle East and total decolonization in southern Africa. On human rights, Mr Jamieson noted that it was "not a matter of laying down to governments how they should fashion their political or economic systems". "It is simply," he declared, "a matter of making certain that all governments observe the fundamental decencies of civilized life to which they have all pledged allegiance." He called for a UN investigation into the human-rights situation in Democratic Kampuchea, and urged all states to take action to alleviate the plight of Indochinese refugees.

In the Third Committee of the Assembly (Social and Humanitarian Questions), the Canadian delegation drafted and co-sponsored an important resolution urging governments to investigate and account for cases of disappeared persons, and called on the Secretary-General and the Commission on Human Rights to investigate reports of involuntary disappearances. This resolution was adopted by the General Assembly and was referred to the Commission on Human Rights for follow-up action. Canada also co-sponsored resolutions dealing with national human-rights institutions and regional arrangements for the effective promotion and protection of human rights. Other resolutions focused on equal opportunity for women, youth matters, the elderly, trade-union detainees, and the *UN Yearbook on Human Rights*. In general, the session was notable for the enhanced dialogue that took place between the West and the Third World on human-rights and social-development issues.

On December 11, 1978, the UN General Assembly commemorated the thirtieth anniversary of the Declaration of Human Rights and bestowed several prizes on individuals and organizations for human-rights accomplishments. Professor John P. Humphrey, Special Adviser to the Canadian delegation, addressed the General Assembly. A well-known figure in North America, the Reverend Martin Luther King Jr., American civil-rights leader and 1964 Nobel Prize winner, was among those who received a posthumous human-rights award. The organizations that received the prizes included the International Committee of the Red Cross and Amnesty International.

Middle East

On the political scene, despite dramatic events outside the UN, such as the Camp David agreements, Middle East resolutions at the thirty-third session of the General Assembly, with one or two exceptions, closely resembled those of previous years. One of these resolutions contained a clause directed against the framework for peace negotiations agreed to at Camp David because of which Canada changed its vote on the

resolution from positive in 1977 to negative. Canada, the United States, Israel and most West European nations voted against three resolutions on the question of Palestine.

An entirely new resolution was introduced on the issue of co-operation between the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the Palestinian people. It called on the UNDP to establish and finance projects to improve the social and economic conditions of the Palestinian people. Canada, the U.S., Israel, Australia and Malawi voted against this resolution on the ground that the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) was clearly responsible for providing assistance to the Palestinian people and a duplication of efforts could occur with UNDP involvement in such assistance.

Canada maintained its negative vote on the resolution concerning the situation in the Middle East. This year's resolution referred to a resumption of the Geneva peace talks and the participation in the peace conference of the Palestinian Liberation Organization. It also called for an Israeli withdrawal from all Arab territories occupied since 1967. Canada, the United States, Israel and Guatemala voted against this resolution because it exceeded the framework established by Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, and because the reconvening of the Geneva peace talks would prejudice the negotiations started by the Camp David agreements. Canada, the U.S. and the West Europeans supported, however, a resolution criticizing Israel for establishing settlements in the occupied Arab territories because such settlements reduced the prospects for peace.

The thirty-third General Assembly deliberation did not, in fact, satisfy initial hopes of progress towards peace in the Middle East. Many of the debates were acrimonious and repetitious.

Southern Africa

The problems of southern Africa have increasingly affected the whole UN system. The drive of various liberation movements for international recognition has raised political and legal questions in almost all UN agencies and subsidiary bodies. The General Assembly, frustrated by many years of adopting resolutions that have failed to bring social justice and racial equality to southern Africa, now routinely endorses "armed struggle" as a legitimate method of achieving social and political change. The invidious definition in 1975 of Zionism as a form of racism has led to the linking of two intractable problem areas: the Middle East and southern Africa, and in turn has undermined the consensus that existed previously on questions of racism and racial discrimination.

The Zionism-racism issue re-surfaced at the World Conference to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination in Geneva last August and caused the withdrawal of Canada and 11 other Western nations.

from the conference. General Assembly debate on racial discrimination and the Decade against Racism took place against the background of the results of the conference, which was the subject of two resolutions.

Ghana's strong attempt to minimize the damage to the Decade against Racism, a resolution of the conference that could have been adopted by consensus, failed to win African support. The sponsors of a competing resolution, which explicitly endorsed the world conference's results and thereby made the resolution unacceptable to most Western countries, then decided to offer contentious amendments to the Ghanaian draft. These amendments were ultimately voted on and incorporated in the text. The Canadian delegation strongly criticized such tactics as "divisive". Not only had certain delegations promoted their own resolutions, they had also prevented the adoption of a consensus resolution that could have provided the basis for continued Western support of the Decade against Racism. The Canadian delegation voted against both resolutions, and many other delegations also voted against them or abstained. Canada later abstained on a resolution on the Decade against Racism, the objective of which had been compromised by the world-conference resolutions.

The debate on Rhodesia was marked by increasing frustration over the apparent ineffectiveness of international pressure on the white minority regime, the lack of clear results from the Anglo-American initiative for majority rule, and Ian Smith's successful manoeuvring to retain effective control of the Rhodesian Government. This frustration was reflected in a further hardening of the language of the two traditional resolutions on Rhodesia.

The first resolution on the situation in Rhodesia, which had been adopted by consensus in the three previous years, drew ten abstentions, mostly by Western nations. Canada abstained because the resolution's implicit endorsement of armed struggle was not consistent with the fundamental principles of the UN and because the resolution incorporated allegations against unspecified Western states about support for the illegal Rhodesian regime. The second resolution dealt mainly with sanctions and suffered from similar defects. It also called for measures against Rhodesia that would place restrictions on the basic rights of Canadians to enjoy freedom of travel and information. Canada and 12 other countries abstained.

The final act of the regular session of the thirty-third General Assembly was to adopt three resolutions on Namibia, which studiously avoided any mention of the Western Five's initiative to bring about a negotiated settlement. This silence reflected much scepticism and impatience over the Western Five's initiative. After 20 months of negotiations, it had not yet led to a clear South African acceptance of the UN plan for Namibia's independence. However, as the Five thought their initiative could still succeed,

they chose not to complicate it at a crucial stage by taking a position on the substance of the resolution, and abstained on procedural grounds. South Africa's later acceptance of UN-supervised elections in Namibia kept alive hopes at that time that a successful conclusion to the Western initiative was still possible.

Apartheid

The debate on the agenda item "Policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa" resulted in 15 draft resolutions, the same number as last year. This item was not assigned to a committee for consideration, for the somewhat illusory reason that it gained in importance by having the substantive debate take place in plenary. The item came up towards the end of the session, and the long list of speakers and competing priorities meant that it could not be completed during the regular session.

In the resumed session, resolutions on the UN Trust Fund for South Africa and on political prisoners were adopted without a vote. Furthermore, a resolution on tributes to the memory of leaders and outstanding personalities who worked for oppressed peoples and a resolution on the dissemination of information on *apartheid* were adopted unanimously. Canada voted for resolutions on the international mobilization against *apartheid*, the work program of the Special Committee on Apartheid and *apartheid* in sports.

Although Canada supported the resolution on the international mobilization against *apartheid*, the Canadian delegation stressed its disagreement with the preambular paragraph, which sought to reaffirm the General Assembly's full commitment to "the elimination of the threat to international peace and security caused by the *apartheid* regime". Canada argued that such a determination could only be made by the Security Council and that the General Assembly should not prejudge such an important decision using a casual reference in a preambular paragraph.

Canada abstained on resolutions concerning an oil embargo against South Africa, nuclear co-operation and military collaboration with South Africa. The other members of the Western Five voted against these resolutions, except West Germany, which also abstained on the resolution on military collaboration. Canada and other Western countries voted against resolutions on relations between Israel and South Africa, economic collaboration with South Africa and the situation in South Africa, and abstained on resolutions concerning investments in South Africa and assistance to oppressed peoples.

Regarding Canada's abstention on the resolution calling for a total end of all nuclear co-operation with South Africa and the resolution on military collaboration with South Africa, the Canadian delegation explained that these resolutions might weaken incentives for South Africa to become a full adherent to international nuclear safeguards. Canada abstained on the

oil-embargo resolution and the new-investments question because the action called for could only be implemented effectively through mandatory decisions of the Security Council.

Canada's vote against the resolution on relations between Israel and South Africa reflected again its objection to singling-out Israel. On economic collaboration with South Africa, Canada explained that one of the implications of implementing the resolution would be severance of diplomatic relations with South Africa, a self-defeating measure. As it did last year, Canada voted against the resolution on the situation in South Africa, primarily because of a general hardening of the language, including the affirmation of the legitimacy of armed struggle.

Continuing tensions

The debate on Cyprus in plenary did little, unfortunately, to ease the continuing political tension 14 years after initial UN intervention. The Canadian delegation emphasized that "peacemaking" should accompany "peacekeeping". Canada's Permanent Representative, Ambassador Barton, said:

We think it reasonable to expect that the parties will bend their efforts to finding an accommodation that enables the UN Peacekeeping Force to leave Cyprus rather than keep the Peacekeeping Force as guardian of the status quo.

The resolution adopted at the thirty-third session called for an urgent resumption of negotiations between the Cypriot communities and asked the parties to co-operate with the Secretary-General and the UN peacekeeping force. Canada supported this resolution but abstained on a clause that recommended that the Security Council examine the implementation of its relevant resolutions and adopt, if necessary, appropriate and practical measures to ensure such implementation. In Canada's view, this clause was unnecessary; negotiations between the two communities were the most "appropriate and practical" way to resolve the question of Cyprus.

The continuing dispute in plenary unfortunately spilt over into the Third Committee's discussion of missing persons in Cyprus. The parties, unable to agree on the terms of a single text, produced a resolution whose implementation is doubtful. Canada abstained on all voting on this item on the ground that the resolution could not solve the Cyprus problem and might exacerbate an already serious situation.

The debate on peacekeeping was highlighted by a European Community initiative, a draft resolution appealing to member states to support and strengthen UN peacekeeping operations. Members were invited, for the first time, to consider the possibility of training their military personnel for UN peacekeeping operations. They were asked to provide supplementary assistance to peacekeeping operations through logistic support or any other peacekeeping potential. They

were also invited to supply the Secretary-General with up-to-date information on possible standby capacities. Canada, the largest contributor to UN peacekeeping operations, vigorously supported this resolution.

The debate did not resolve the past and present differences of view among members of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, especially on guidelines to govern the establishment, financing and day-to-day control of such operations. Despite its disappointing lack of progress over the years, the committee has done some useful work by identifying important issues. The General Assembly urged it to complete its work soon on acceptable guidelines and devote attention to specific questions of the practical implementation of peacekeeping operations.

Disarmament

The disarmament debate capitalized on the spirit of compromise that evolved from the special session on disarmament held from May 23 to July 1, 1978. Of the 41 resolutions adopted, 18 passed by consensus. The various aspects of the special session's program of action dealt with included resolutions on the successful conclusion of SALT I, an agreement on a comprehensive test ban and the prohibition of chemical weapons.

Canada's representative on the First Committee, the newly-appointed External Affairs Adviser on Disarmament and Arms Control, Geoffrey Pearson, urged the General Assembly to request the Committee on Disarmament to consider urgently an adequate cessation and prohibition of the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons. The General Assembly adopted the proposal. This Canadian initiative was one of four elements of the "strategy of suffocation" proposed by Prime Minister Trudeau during the special session to arrest the arms race. The other elements were a comprehensive test ban, an agreement to stop the flight-testing of all new strategic delivery vehicles and an agreement to limit and progressively reduce military spending on new strategic nuclear-weapon systems.

The General Assembly session produced a productive debate on economic and financial matters and managed to avoid serious problems despite the frustrations of the Third World members. They were encouraged, for instance, by some progress on the Common Fund, a clarification of the mandate of the Committee of the Whole and the adoption of guidelines for an international development strategy (IDS). During January's resumed session, many important items from the Second Committee were adopted without vote. UN member states are now looking ahead to the fifth UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD V).

The Second Committee adopted 68 resolutions (56 by consensus). The first part of its session was spent working out the mandate of the committee on

the Whole, whose future remains in doubt. The Group of 77's review of all texts also caused a backlog of work and delayed the activities of the committee. Resolutions on an IDS and an international conference on new and renewable sources of energy were adopted by consensus. Non-controversial texts on UNCTAD V, the resumed negotiations on the Common Fund and the UN Conference on Science and Technology for Development also appeared. The imminence of these meetings led to the "mark-time" character of the thirty-third session as far as North-South issues were concerned. A hardening of the Group of 77's position was somewhat impeded by the apparent flexibility of the United States and West Germany. The Nordic countries and the Netherlands consistently pressed for progress on North-South issues. Few political aspects were introduced into the debate.

The Canadian delegation was pleased with the Second Committee's deliberations. Canada had worked for sound decisions on human settlements, operational activities and the energy conference. The Canadian vice-chairman of the Second Committee, Jeremy Kinsman, helped promote Canadian objectives, which were shared by a large group of member states, and mediated successfully on several occasions. This latter work showed that Canada should adopt a mediating role whenever possible.

The UN, like many international organizations, faces financial difficulties. Canada's Permanent Representative, Ambassador Barton, criticized the UN supplementary estimates in a January 26 statement just before the resumed session ended. The supplementary proposals increased the UN net biennial budget after only one year by 39 per cent as compared to 1976-77. The Secretary-General had also indicated that member states could expect further financial requests by the end of 1979. Mr. Barton maintained that the approval of these expenditures was "a testament to the inability of this Assembly to control the budget and the management of the UN", particularly when many member states were struggling with serious economic difficulties and implementing domestic programs of restraint. Ambassador Barton urged the Secretary-General to include controls over budget and programs in his forthcoming report to the General Assembly on improvements in procedures and UN effectiveness. He also warned that some governments would be forced to act unilaterally if the UN members failed to demonstrate their collective ability to control the budgetary process. Canada, Australia, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, Portugal and Turkey abstained on the vote on the supplementary estimates. Even countries that voted in favour mentioned the absolute necessity for greater budgetary discipline and restraints.

The Assembly noted with satisfaction that the UN University's program was progressing in three priority areas: global hunger, human and social devel-

opment, and the utilization and management of natural resources. The Assembly also adopted without vote a resolution on the establishment of a university of peace proposed by the President of Costa Rica. The proposal was passed to UNESCO and to the UN member states for consideration. A resolution on the rights of children was presented to be studied at the thirty-fourth session of the UN General Assembly. It is hoped that it will be adopted during 1979, the International Year of the Child. The General Assembly also adopted by consensus a resolution on the draft convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women. Canada helped to ensure that the mandate for the Outer Space Committee provided adequately for the consideration of the question of nuclear-power sources.

The thirty-third session of the General Assembly could be described as a productive one. The Assembly has worked reasonably well, adopting a growing number of resolutions by consensus. The Canadian delegation took several constructive initiatives, such as the resolution on the prohibition of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes, the resolution on disappeared persons and the resolution to help solve the immediate financial problems of UN peace-keeping operations. Many member states have asked the Secretary-General to develop new procedures so that the General Assembly might better cope with its growing membership and agenda. Canada remains committed to the UN system's continuing quest to respond effectively to the complex and changing global environment.

Our mistake!

In our March/April issue, the concluding paragraphs of Hugh Macdonald's article "Canada, NATO and the neutron bomb", were accidentally placed on page 16 as the opening paragraphs to Robert and Stephanie Reford's article on China. The Reford article should have begun with the last line on page 16. We apologize for any inconvenience our mistake may have caused to either readers or authors.

President Carter and human rights: the contradiction of American policy

by Louis Balthazar

It is not surprising that President Carter has had to tone down his campaign on international human rights. There are so many obstacles standing in the way of such a policy and it is so inconsistent with the exigencies of American diplomacy that it is difficult to see it as anything but a self-indulgent declaration of principle more appropriate for less crisis-filled times or for the early months of a President's administration.

However, it would not be correct to conclude that this direction in American foreign policy is merely a chance event. Neither the left, in vociferously denouncing its "hypocrisy", nor the right, in laying emphasis upon its lack of realism, really defined the true nature of America's foreign policy. Grand statements of principle on foreign policy tend to be generally somewhat hypocritical. This is true for most countries. On the other hand, the United States does not have a monopoly on unrealistic policies. But idealism in foreign policy is a characteristically American trait, a sort of given constant of the American style. Carter's policy on human rights is an expression of this national style.

Professor Balthazar teaches at Laval University and is engaged in a study of Canadian-American relations. Although he is a co-editor of International Perspectives, the views expressed in this article are purely his own and are not intended to reflect the policy of the Department or to state an editorial position for this magazine.

Long-standing obsession

A mood of idealism marked the founding of the American nation. The early American settlers believed that they had found the conditions for an ideal kind of life, and this conviction was a principal factor in their triumphant emancipation from British rule.

This belief was soon translated into a foreign policy characterized by stubborn isolationism. As early as 1796, Washington, in his farewell address, urged his countrymen to remain aloof from the vagaries of European diplomacy, which were considered immoral.

When Presidents William McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt defended a more interventionist policy a century later, they did so in the name of a sacred mission that consisted in extending the notion of "Manifest Destiny" overseas. Their successor, Woodrow Wilson, justified American participation in the First World War on the basis that there was a moral obligation "to make the world safe for democracy". The same was true for Franklin D. Roosevelt during the Second World War.

Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, the great proponent of hard-line anti-Communism in the 1950s, was still motivated by moralism when he became the self-styled promoter of a philosophy that saw the world in strict black-and-white terms and of a dream (never realized) of freeing the captives of Eastern Europe.

John F. Kennedy, in a new

style, appealed in his turn to the conscience of America in committing his country to "bear any burden, pay any price" for the defence of the "free world".

After the dreadful ordeal of a long and humiliating war in Vietnam, the stigma of the Watergate scandal and an interlude of *Realpolitik* with Kissinger, Jimmy Carter, candidate and President, was guaranteed domestic success with his promise to inject a new morality into foreign policy. The man who had not travelled in Washington's political circles, the self-made man from Georgia, was going to come to the defence of human rights throughout the world. Despite all the problems and contradictions inherent in this policy, it was welcomed almost everywhere in the United States with open arms. "It is so refreshing," people were saying in 1977. At last the nation could have a clear conscience again and its former idealism could be restored. It is as if the United States cannot survive long without a moralistic policy. Ever so, the contradictions are quite obvious: this moralism does not in any way eliminate the pursuit of very real interests that are more self-centred than charitable, if not at times rather sordid.

Conditions

Is this American moral will there fore an illusion, an ideological superstructure that helps persuade the American people to accept the immoralities of a foreign policy centred on capitalist exploitation? No

entirely.

Jimmy Carter seems to be sincere, as were those who spoke about the "New Frontier" and as were John Foster Dulles and Woodrow Wilson. When Americans talk about freedom, they believe in it; when they sing the praises of their moral character, they believe in that too, to the point where they can bring about the resignation of a President. But, at the same time, they believe in the virtues of unbridled accumulation of wealth in a world of rank inequalities.

This inveterate ambiguity permeates the entire history of the United States, for Americans have always preserved the legacies of both Hamilton and Jefferson. His respect for individuals and the will of the people made Thomas Jefferson, according to whom "every man is a potential ruler", the champion of democracy. As the author of the Declaration of Independence, he believed so strongly in this democratic virtue that, for a time, he was opposed to industrial growth. The Jeffersonian tradition is still an essential component of the American system. Both the great purge following Watergate and the generous intentions of Jimmy Carter and Andrew Young are living testimony to this fact.

On the other hand, Alexander Hamilton, architect of the federalist Constitution of 1787, was the defender of economic liberalism and law and order in the interests of capitalism. He felt that, if the economic interests of the landowners had to come into conflict with democracy, it was democracy that must be sacrificed, since America's importance and power depended, above all, on private property and the economic strength of large industry. Those who were later to maintain that "what is good for General Motors is good for America" were only restating the Hamiltonian argument.

The American miracle consists in the fact that these two traditions have been able to survive side by side without their inherent contra-

dictions resulting in total chaos. But there is some question whether this ambiguity is not basically detrimental to American foreign policy, or at least to those at whom it is directed.

The use of the term "freedom" is at the very heart of this ambiguity. Americans may call themselves defenders of freedom and at the same time support authoritarian regimes in many parts of the world. For, in American terms, freedom means essentially freedom of trade, the freedom to carry on business, as much as individual freedom. But the word is sometimes defined differently elsewhere. For many people, freedom can only be envisaged realistically and meaningfully in collective terms. From this point of view, "equality of opportunity" is much less important than equality of result. In this case, economic and social rights, rather than political and individual rights, have to be emphasized.

President Carter might well be sincere in stating, as he did in his inaugural address of January 1977: "Because we are free, we can never be indifferent to the fate of freedom elsewhere." But his words remain hollow to those who see the approaches of Hamilton and Jefferson as basically irreconcilable. For such people freedom for some means, essentially, less freedom for others. This attitude does not make it easy to develop a true international policy on human rights.

Responsibilities

Moreover, by defining freedom over the past 30 years as the opposite of Communism, American policy has produced catastrophic results (to use the expression of an American commentator) from the point of view of human rights. On more than one occasion, it has been responsible for perpetuating what it now seeks to prevent.

In the name of anti-Communism, Americans have often set up, or at least supported, regimes that violated human rights. In Latin America (consider Chile, where the

United States preferred Pinochet to Allende, who was democratically elected, or Brazil), in Asia (South Korea and the Philippines, to mention only two examples), and even in Europe (Greece under the colonels, Spain under Franco, Portugal under Salazar), in the name of containment or the *Pax Americana*, Washington had no compunction about aligning itself with those who maintained themselves in power from day to day by means that clearly flouted the most basic freedoms. Indeed, it seems that the defence of American freedom has often involved indirect support for the violation of freedom elsewhere. How can the United States criticize the Soviet Union for its treatment of dissidents when it is itself responsible for so many violations in other parts of the world?

Furthermore, thanks to an annual budget of approximately \$7 billion never yet subjected to real scrutiny by Congress (which nevertheless examines in microscopic detail much smaller sums of money allocated in aid to developing countries), the intelligence-gathering agencies of the United States carry out covert operations whose purpose, it has been learnt recently, is to destabilize popular governments, and even to assassinate foreign leaders, not to mention the many illegal activities they have carried out in the United States itself. It is enough to set Jefferson's statue aquiver in his memorial, which is still the pride of the American capital!

It is, to say the least, disturbing for the victims of these operations to hear the new moral message of American foreign policy!

Constraints

As if this were not enough to make Carter's human-rights policy appear meaningless, there are a number of factors that stand in the way of such a policy, arising from the very nature of the international system.

The rules that relate to the sovereignty of states and the notion that still prevails regarding the

legitimacy of governments mean that a regime's treatment of its population cannot become a genuine object of international concern. The intervention of one state in the affairs of another and subversion (even though both practices are, in fact, widespread) are still considered reprehensible. Despite the fact that it is increasingly difficult to distinguish between domestic and foreign policy, countries continue to protect what they have defined as domestic politics from foreign diplomatic incursions.

Moreover, certain American priorities with respect to foreign policy, such as nuclear non-proliferation, the safeguarding of alliances and strategic-arms limitation, are difficult to reconcile with firm positions on human rights. Thus the withdrawal of credit from Argentina because of its poor record on human rights will not help curb the nuclear ambitions of that country. Other countries have agreed to a sort of trade-off with the United States; in exchange for American bases or for protection of strategic American interests, authoritarian regimes receive American support. And, no matter what is said, it is not easy to disassociate American positions on dissidents in the Soviet Union from negotiations over the SALT agreements.

Position still meaningful

Finally, America's desire to encourage governments to improve the lot of their populations may be totally counter-productive. A government under stress as a result of indictment as repressive withdraws into itself, protects itself and may become even more repressive. President Carter has been criticized for harming *détente* by his crusades for human rights, and thus contributing to strengthening the stranglehold of the Warsaw Pact, which will not promote the liberalization of policy in the East European countries. Some Soviet dissidents have even accused the President of harming their cause by provoking drastic reactions on the part of the Kremlin.

Should Washington, therefore, entirely abandon the idea of a human-rights policy? Despite all that has been said, the answer is still no. Given certain conditions, the first of which is more modest ambitions, an American position in favour of human rights may still be meaningful.

In order to avoid setting themselves up as the champions of human rights and inevitably appearing hypocritical, Americans might first agree to submit to the same criteria they seek to impose on others. In order to accomplish this, it would be highly preferable if they concentrated their efforts, as has already been suggested, within the framework of multilateral institutions such as the Helsinki agreements and the United Nations. At the very least, a human-rights policy would have much more chance of success if it were seen as a strategy of the Western countries in general.

Next, it follows that Washington should take immediate action with respect to regimes that are in power by virtue of American support. President Carter has already taken some hesitant steps in this direction in Latin America. But these were still very minor in comparison with everything that had been done in the past (and is probably still being done) to support authoritarian regimes. Would American policy not have more credibility if it were aimed at South Korea or the Philippines rather than at its longtime rival the Soviet Union?

A further condition is that the American Government, Congress and people would have to be courageous enough to admit that human rights can sometimes be better served by left-wing regimes than by pro-American ones. Objectively speaking, it is very difficult to believe that Batista had more respect for human rights than Castro or that Pinochet is a better protector of freedom than Allende was, regardless of the value judgments which may be made of the Cuban revolution or the Popular Unity Government of Chile.

As a result, the notion of right must be expanded to include collective — economic and social — rights. Can we believe that Washington will ever progress to this position? Can we still believe that American officials will one day agree to open contemplation of a new world economic order? Answering these questions in the affirmative requires a great deal of optimism. Be that as it may, it does appear that this is the direction a genuine universal human-rights policy will have to take.

Meanwhile, all that can be expected is that the American Government will take action one step at a time, in a way that is not too contradictory — satisfying, one might hope, some of these conditions, achieving partial and, one might again hope, positive results. Mr Carter may look like the heir of Jefferson, but it cannot be denied that the spirit of Hamilton is alive around him and within himself. The odds are that the legacy of Hamilton will succeed in greatly reducing Carter's grand aspirations, if that has not already happened. The American contradiction is nowhere close to being resolved.

Note to subscribers:

Production delays have made it desirable to combine the May/June and July/August issues. Subscription expiry dates will be adjusted to provide subscribers with six separate issues.

Federal-provincial co-operation in development assistance

by C. V. Svoboda

Canadian provincial interest in international aid has a long history. Substantively, much of it, such as direct "people-to-people" assistance through voluntary organizations, has been in the form of matching grants from provincial authorities and in emergency-relief ventures by way of food and cash. It was not until the mid-1960s, however, that the Federal Cabinet concluded that, in the context of Canada's general external-aid effort, the provinces could make unique and necessary contributions, particularly in human resources that could be enlisted in support of the program. Thus, in 1965, the Cabinet decided, first, to take steps to facilitate co-operation between the Federal Government and the government of Quebec in implementing Canada's external-aid program and, secondly, to begin consultations with other provinces for the same purpose.

In 1967, a series of propositions and principles on the provincial aspect of foreign aid, subsequently termed the "Pearson Doctrine", were set out in communications to the provinces. The two main features of the proposals were:

- (1) Foreign aid was to remain an integral part of Canada's relations with other countries and therefore a federal responsibility.
- (2) The consequences for the provinces of using their resources in the development and execution of external-aid projects, which might have been heavy, particularly in the field of education, needed to be fully considered.

With regard to the first point, there were concomitant considerations, the most important of which were: that only the Federal Government, in this case the External Aid Office (which later became the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)) and Canadian missions abroad, would serve as intermediary with the government of a country where projects were undertaken, and also that, in the instance of an aid project or projects that a provincial government might wish to finance or otherwise support, the only line of formal communication between the recipient country's government and provincial authorities would be through federal services. Purely

administrative local communications between provincial personnel in the field and recipient-country authorities (necessary for project-execution, for example) could take place under this proposal once projects involving provinces were set in motion under the necessary covering agreements.

Largely in response to the active interest in international affairs shown by Quebec at that time, which was, by contrast with most other provinces, being pursued vigorously, the Federal Cabinet held discussions on this question and, as a result, in 1968 the Government issued *Federalism and International Relations*, a background paper that stated, *inter alia*:

"In addition to participation in federal programs, a number of provinces have indicated an interest in providing assistance directly to developing countries, particularly in the field of education and other spheres of provincial jurisdiction. . . .

"The Federal Government welcomes provincial contributions as consistent with the objectives of increasing Canada's aid effort to the greatest extent possible. The Government nevertheless considers it essential that the Canadian contribution as a whole be maintained and developed in a coherent manner. As a result, the Federal Government has put forward a number of suggestions to the provincial authorities which would permit fuller consultation and more effective arrangements with the provinces . . . it is intended that procedures should be established to provide for consultations with the Federal Government with regard to aid projects financed or supported by the provinces. . . ."

Mr Svoboda is an officer of External Affairs currently on secondment to CIDA as Co-ordinator, Federal-Provincial Relations. A graduate of the Universities of Saskatchewan, Dalhousie and Carleton, he entered the Department in 1963 and has served abroad in Cuba, New Zealand and on several Canadian delegations to United Nations General Assemblies and conferences. He also served on loan with the Federal-Provincial Relations Office during 1977-78. The views and conclusions in this article are those of Mr Svoboda.

In the decade or so since this paper was issued, certain of its recommendations regarding greater federal-provincial co-operation in overseas development have been implemented. Individual provinces have responded in varying degree to the proposals outlined in 1967 and 1968 and, though there have indeed been problems, the general attitude of both levels of government to co-operation in pursuing common goals of international assistance has been positive. Federal assistance to provincial councils concerned with international co-operation, provincial non-governmental organizations and provincial agricultural-aid ventures, through the Voluntary and Agricultural Development Aid Program (VADA), established in 1975, as well as the conclusion of individual federal-provincial agreements on projects and other co-operative-development matters, manifest themselves as milestones in this progress, encouraged by the policies outlined not only in the 1968 background paper but also in the 1970 set of pamphlets *Foreign Policy for Canadian* and the 1975-80 *Strategy for International Development Co-operation* (Point 21).

Still valid

The aims set out in these documents with regard to federal-provincial co-operation in dispensing external aid retain their validity, and recent discussions between federal and provincial officials suggest that the matter is receiving serious consideration. It has become increasingly clear that several provinces desire greater opportunity for participation in matters of international development. From the perspective of the Federal Government, external aid is seen as an integral part of foreign policy, and must therefore be retained under the authority of the Central Government. However, the effectiveness of Canada's aid policy and programs continues to depend in important respects on the co-operation of the provinces. New kinds of co-ordination and co-operation are under current consideration (for example, in VADA and with individual provinces). These changes would not only meet to some extent the growing interest of the provinces in taking part but would give CIDA an opportunity to involve them in the attempt to enlist the support of the people of Canada in responding to the rising economic expectations of the Third World. At the same time, the legitimate interests of the provinces can be encouraged in directions consistent with CIDA's priorities and co-ordinated development-planning processes.

Thus there exists considerable interest in, and scope for, continued co-operation between the Federal Government and provincial authorities in the field of international development. Although there are a number of areas in CIDA's current programs that involve federal-provincial interaction, it is fair to say that the full potential for involvement has not yet been reached. Organizationally, significant progress in

these directions appears to be developing as those CIDA activities that involve the provinces, as a consequence of a thorough review of the matter in 1977 no longer remain unco-ordinated, *ad hoc* and largely responsive in nature.

At present, federal-provincial contact-points involve a number of areas within CIDA. Primarily these are:

- the Policy Branch, which, through the Co-ordinator, Federal-Provincial Relations, has the responsibility for general co-ordination of activities involving the provinces;
- the Voluntary Agricultural Development Aid Program, under the Multilateral Branch;
- the Bilateral Programs Branch, which uses provincial government organizations as executing agencies;
- the Special Programs Branch, which works closely, through the Non-Governmental Organization Division, with certain provincial governments and provincial councils of international co-operation, in support of NGO endeavours which it often finances. (Through the Industrial Co-operation Division, this branch also maintains contact with provincial governments in the development and management of its program of co-operation with business and industrial concerns in Canada and the Third World);
- the Resources Branch, which has entered into agreements with individual provinces in order to obtain the services of qualified individuals, consultants and experts in the context of CIDA projects abroad, and which arranges for the placing of students and trainees in support of several programs and projects;
- the Communications Branch, whose public information programs involve liaison with provincial governments, including departments of education, in order to bring the aid program closer to Canadians.

On the provincial side, the governments approach intergovernmental and international questions, including involvement in the aid program, in different ways. Alberta, Quebec and Ontario have established ministries of intergovernmental affairs and Saskatchewan will do so once current legislation is passed. Other provinces deal with these matters through secretariats or units established under the premier's authority. Because of VADA's agricultural basis, provincial departments of agriculture have long been involved and, in the case of Alberta, which makes some \$4 million a year available for non-governmental organizations engaged in development assistance, the Department of Culture bears a major responsibility in this field. Saskatchewan has this year, in its new Agricultural Development Corporation, also estab-

lished a branch to deal with international co-operation ventures.

Among the provinces, Quebec has, over the years, been involved (usually as executing agent) in by far the largest number (20-odd) of Canadian aid projects abroad, largely in *francophone* Africa and the countries of the Maghreb. That province has also provided the most significant number of technical advisers (*coopérants*) to CIDA projects — their numbers running into the hundreds. Other provinces, however, have responded to similar requests in various ways with the active encouragement of the Federal Government.

In many cases, provincial government departments or agencies under contract with CIDA have undertaken the execution of projects and have directly staffed them. In other instances, provincial administrations have supplied consultants at the feasibility and planning stages in order to develop programs and projects already identified and agreed upon bilaterally — ie., between Canada and the recipient country. Thus provincial administrations themselves have added significantly to Canada's human-resources base in expertise and in the capacity to develop, undertake and execute aid projects and programs in the Third World. This has been specially true in education, public health and rural development, though the focus shifted in recent years towards more technical areas, such as natural-resource exploration and development, communications, hydro-electric construction and railroad-building, as well as other infrastructure projects in line with increasingly-sophisticated requirements.

Difficulties

Provincial involvement in the aid program has not been without administrative and other difficulties. But by and large, it can be argued that these have not been quantitatively or qualitatively of a different order from relations in this regard with the private sector. Special sensitivity has been required, however, to ensure that the implementation of aid projects was not affected by differing views in Canada on the role of the provinces in this field. It is beyond the scope of this article to consider this matter in any detail. (Readers who wish to pursue the question, however, might begin by looking at the article by Claude Morin, Quebec Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs, dealing with the Quebec viewpoint, which appeared in the November 1977 issue of *Jeune Afrique*, and at the March-April 1977 issue of *International Perspectives* for articles on the provinces and foreign affairs.)

Without entering into the constitutional "theology" of the matter, it is nevertheless instructive to review in greater depth Quebec's sustained efforts to establish an identifiable role within the framework of Canada's external-aid efforts. Quite apart from an evident and positive interest in aiding Third

World states, Quebec has in this way strengthened its international presence and experience.

This province's interest and involvement in aid matters also lent special impetus to the Federal Government's consideration of provincial interests in this area; and the direction given to federal actions to facilitate co-operation between the Central and provincial governments thus owes much to Quebec. Perhaps as a consequence, Canada, among the world's federal states, has the singular distinction of encouraging and facilitating the interest of its constituent entities in this way. CIDA has received the benefits of active co-operation, including access to provincial departments and agencies for special expertise in areas not under federal jurisdiction, such as education, and has been able to integrate and maximize the development impact of provincial contributions.

Human resources

Provincial contributions have, in the main, been in the realm of human resources. For example, over the years hundreds of provincial public servants have been made available for special studies, consultant work and roles in project execution. Quebec has supplied several hundred teachers and technical-assistance *coopérants* for service abroad, normally in developing *francophone* states. Provincial governments have responded positively to such requests where this has been possible, recognizing, in part, the staff-development value inherent in such functions, as distinct from the important service provided in support of Canada's external-aid efforts. These services cannot readily have a dollar value assigned to them.

Other provincial governments, notably those of the four Western provinces, have provided funds to non-governmental organizations, including church groups, charitable institutions and voluntary bodies, to an approximate total in 1978 of some \$6 million. Late in April, Quebec announced a special grant of \$100,000 to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees to finance health and educational aid projects in Angola, Burundi and Zaire. The Atlantic Provinces have co-operated with CIDA in such ventures as an international small-farms conference and the training of fishermen from Belize and elsewhere. The provinces have co-operated in making universities and technical-training facilities available to Third World students and trainees. Ontario has on a number of occasions responded to requests for emergency food relief, and all provinces have participated over the past four years in the federal-provincial Voluntary Agricultural Development Aid Program. For 1979-80, VADA ventures are to receive \$1 million in federal funds, largely for the transport of goods and services donated by provincial governments. Proposals are under consideration to increase the scope and funding of this mechanism, which also provides a useful forum

for federal-provincial dialogue on aid matters, to embrace multi-year budgeting and a program committee to receive, consider and fund international aid projects identified by the provinces.

In all, therefore, the federal-provincial co-operation picture in the aid program is a bright one. The will to co-operate has been clearly in evidence on the part of both orders of government, and interest has not only been sustained but has been given practical effect in the various ways already suggested. While the

letter of the "Pearson Doctrine" has never been given formal approval by provincial governments, the spirit is very much alive. The imperatives of the "New International Economic Order" and the Third UN Development Decade will provide new challenges not only for Canadians but for their governments. The federal and provincial governments can, through co-operative leadership, make these challenges better known to Canadian citizens and more effectively met by Canada's resources.

Western Europe learns to live with its 'guest' workers

by Thomas Land

An embarrassing resolution by the United Nations Human Rights Commission seeking "to promote the normalization of the family life of migrant workers . . . by their reunion" illustrates the anxiety of Western Europe over foreign poverty in its midst. The nine governments of the European Community privately acknowledge that their "guest" workers and their families — an economically-exploited and culturally-diverse minority of about 13 million people — are here to stay permanently. But, in the present climate of insecurity caused by growing unemployment, few governments have the political courage to admit that the presence of such a large permanent community undermines

the essential premises of democracy. Apart from Britain's Commonwealth and Irish immigrants, all Western Europe's immigrants lack political power.

In West Germany, Europe's biggest employer of foreign labour, the population of "guest" workers and their dependants is a record four million — in spite of the country's four-year-old recruiting ban and its various schemes to encourage the departure of foreigners. In addition to this figure, 1.4 million close dependants of foreigners already in the country are expected from abroad.

Originally, these "guest" workers were expected to stay strictly for the duration of their employment, performing the dirtiest and least remunerative jobs, scorned by the natives. Their reluctance to leave after the oil crisis, which ended a period of unprecedented economic growth in Western Europe, has surprised the manpower planners of the European Community.

The experts had disregarded the economic conditions of the "guest workers' native countries — in Southern Europe, Africa, Asia and the Caribbean —, to which those of Western Europe compare favourably, even during a recession.

In Canada, different circumstances led to a similar situation. The adoption of universal criteria for immigration, combined with the increase in the number of potential immigrants from the developing countries, has resulted in a significantly growing intake of Third World immigrants. A recent study on relations between Canada and the developing countries records a drastic increase in the proportion of Third World immigrants, from 8 per cent in 1961 to 52 per cent in 1975. The study, published by the Economic Council of Canada, predicts that, though the absolute level of immigration may be declining, "the proportion of immigrants originating from the developing nation is likely to remain significant".

Mr Land is London correspondent for the Financial Post of Canada. He is also associated with The Times, The Observer and The Financial Times of London. The views expressed in this article are those of Mr Land.

The big difference is that Europeans still publicly pretend that their "guest" workers are likely to stay only for a limited time. Europe's immigrants have become a large and permanent economic entity constituting a self-generating population. Their children, officially natives of the countries of their birth, are statistically likely to inherit the poverty and inferior social and employment status of their parents.

Human rights

The uncontroversial resolution by the Human Rights Commission in Geneva expressing particular concern about "the situation of the children of migrant workers and the effects upon their cultural, medical and psychosocial well-being and the difficulties of adaptation and separation to which they are exposed" has added impact when one considers that one-fifth of the school-age children of migrant workers are believed to be receiving no education.

In view of this fact, and in connection with the International Year of the Child, the Commission asked all UN organizations to give special attention to improving the lot of migrant workers and their families. It has also established a working group on the human rights of migrant workers to ensure that the topic receives recurring attention.

Out of this request have come a number of projects and directives. Education pilot projects in many European cities try to ensure that the one and a half million migrant children attending school not only learn the language of their adopted country but also retain their original language and culture. The EC's Council of Ministers has adopted a directive to ensure that school curricula meet the specific needs of migrant children. A proposal to combat illegal immigration and the employment of illegal immigrants has been prepared by the European Commission; and there has been a gradual co-ordination of the immigration policies of the member states. Various housing pilot schemes aimed

at the cultural integration of migrants have been started.

These measures, however, hardly meet the actual needs. A comprehensive report on the housing of migrant workers published by the European Commission proposes the establishment of a fund to finance urgent measures to end discrimination. The report, compiled by 30 specialists throughout the Community, including anthropologists, social geographers, economists, psychologists and sociologists — all of them independent of both the European Commission and the national administrations —, treated the issue as a long-term problem of considerable effect on the entire Community.

Canada

Despite political controversy, Canada's record on the integration of immigrants has been far more successful than the European experience. The reason is probably that in Canada both the newcomers and their hosts admit that they must learn to live with each other permanently.

Ottawa's 1978 Immigration Act gives landed immigrants the same basic rights as those enjoyed by Canadian citizens — with the notable exception of the right to vote. Significantly, an immigrant can apply to bring in his relations as soon as he reaches Canadian soil. The reunification of the family is a consistent objective of postwar Canadian immigration policy, and the present legislation recognizes three classes of immigrant: sponsored (close family members), nominated (more distant relatives) and independent (must qualify on the basis of skills and education).

The European Commission is promoting some modest proposals for a gradual sharing of political rights with the resident foreigners. The Commission also wants them to have an automatic right to bring in their families — as in Canada — and as proposed by the Human Rights Commission. But these proposals are doggedly resisted by member countries, whose governments have been

on the retreat from the vocal extreme-right political movements that thrive on economic insecurity and seek the compulsory repatriation of the foreigners.

Paradoxically, immigration restrictions imposed on foreign labour are likely, in fact, to increase, rather than decrease, unemployment among the natives, according to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. It explains that labour shortages confined to a few sectors of the economy cause a shortfall of output and therefore redundancies. Another study, published in Geneva by the UN's Economic Commission for Europe, argues that economic recovery in Western Europe may well depend on a fresh influx of foreign labour.

This confirms Canada's experience. While it is difficult to assess the economic advantages and costs of immigration from the Canadian perspective, the Economic Council believes the "immigrants from the developing nations . . . appear to have contributed positively to the economic well-being of Canada". The Council's own calculations, based on replacement costs, place at \$2.9 billion the sum that Canada would have to devote to training its own population from 1966 to 1974 had it not benefited from immigration from Third World countries. Its report establishes that the economic advantages may be considerable. The undiscounted net gain for the typical immigrant from the Philippines or India is estimated at close to \$400,000 (in 1974 prices).

Even if it were possible — and, indeed, desirable — to expel the foreign workers from Western Europe, their places would soon be taken by others. Portugal, Spain and Greece are expected to join the European Community within the foreseeable future, opening the door to vast numbers of South European pre-industrial peasants. The cherished principle of free circulation of labour within the Community will thus perpetuate Western Europe's embarrassment over imported poverty.

Letter to the Editor

Sir,

In your January/February issue, you published an article ("Hungarian minority in Romania") by Paul Pilisi on which I must, as a Romanian of Transylvania, cast some light. This article is superposable on one in the *Express* of October 28, 1978, by Edouard Bailby, except for certain passages that apparently did not find favour with Mr Pilisi. The following excerpt from one such passage, notably absent from the Pilisi article, says a great deal about the "restrictions and ethno-cultural genocide" that Pilisi evokes:

For 500 km inside the Romanian border [Mr. Bailey was coming from Hungary to Romania], the traveller seems effectively still to be living in Magyar country. In the streets people speak Hungarian. In the shops, labels are written in Hungarian as well as Romanian. On news-stands, newspapers in Hungarian; in libraries, whole sections of Magyar literature. In Ghiogheni, in Mercuea Ciuc, in Sfantu Gheorge, one feels nothing that conveys a sense of discrimination or the least tension.

The Romanian names of the villages and of the Orthodox churches are the only things that seem to proclaim the influence and hold of Bucharest. On Romanian territory "these are the self-same things that are unacceptable to the national Hungarian poet, Gyula Illyes".

This picture of that part of Transylvania, with all the cities he mentions and for which he fears genocide, should normally reassure Pilisi. Instead it exasperates him, and he uses this so-called genocide as a pretext for reopening an ancient historical debate to try to convince us that Transylvania belongs to the Hungarians. I admit that generations of Hungarians were cradled there; but it was not their cradle, it was mine.

There are 1,700,000 (not 1,900,000) Hungarians in Romania, for the most part established in Transylvania and representing 7.8 per cent of the population of Romania. They account for 23 per cent of the population of Transylvania, compared to the 4,000,000 Romanians who account for some 60 per cent of the Transylvanian population. These statistics are close to those of 1910, when the area was still under Hungarian domination. At that time, the Romanians formed 50 per cent and the Hungarians 25 per cent of the population.

It was on December 1, 1918, that Transylvania, acting in accordance with the principle of auto-determination demanded by President Wilson at Versailles, linked itself to Romania of its own free will, as expressed by the quasi-totality of the Romanian majority in Transylvania. The quotation from Illyes ("The population of Cluj, the capital of Transylvania, was totally Magyar when I visited there in 1930") is doubtful to me. But, if it is true, he simply admits and confirms the policy of tolerance practised by Romania between the two World Wars.

In any case, Mr Pilisi knows very well that, under Hungarian domination, the Romanians of Transylvania did not have the right to inhabit the towns and cities; today the Hungarians account for 40 per cent of the population of Cluj. As to the other cities, already mentioned, with heavy Hungarian populations, I remember the half of Transylvania given to Hungary by the Dictate of Vienne of 1940 as repayment for joining the entourage of the Berlin-Rome axis as early as 1936. During the 1940-44 occupation, the Romanians (especially those in the towns) were once again terrorized and massacred and driven back to their mother country. Now it seems that Janos Kadar, fawning on the new Russian masters, wishes to reissue the Dictate.

This part of Transylvania was reintegrated into Romania in 1945. However, because of the complicity of numerous Hungarian Communists, the then government in Bucharest accorded them an autonomous zone in the very heart of Transylvania, that lasted until 1967, when Mr Ceausescu put an end to it.

If today the Hungarians of Transylvania can travel to Hungary every two years, they should consider themselves lucky. For a Romanian it can take a lifetime to get an exit visa. Men and documents, collectivities or individuals, Hungarians or Romanians, all are at the mercy of the *Arbitrar*. They are victims of the restrictions that are part of the very nature of the ruling regime, and not of a policy of ethno-cultural genocide for the Hungarian minority of Romania.

Romania has integrated over the centuries (without always assimilating, which is the equivalent of cultural genocide) all who came and remained to become sons of that land. The cultural genocide Mr Pilisi talks about is a false issue to bring into our Canadian lives. It pits us one against the other by means of ancient elements of conflicts that 1,000 years of history have not been able to settle. Instead, let us together condemn the absence of liberty in Romania and in all other countries under Communist rule. Let us condemn the personality cult, the regimenting of intellectuals who are given no other choice but jail or exile, the censorship, the Berlin Wall and the totalitarianism. But for pity's sake let us, Romanians and Hungarians, unite against the common aggressor, the Soviet Union of ancient and modern Tsars.

Jean Taranu, M.D.,
President,
Romanian Federation of Canada,
Montreal

Reference Section

Canadian Foreign Relations

Recent Books

Canadian Human Rights Commission/Commission canadienne des droits de la personne.

Final report of the National Conference "Human Rights in Canada . . . the years ahead", held in Ottawa, December 8-9-10, 1978/Rapport final de la Conférence «Les droits de la personne au Canada . . . L'Avenir», tenue à Ottawa les 8-9-10 décembre 1978. Ottawa: Canadian Human Rights Commission, 1979.

57 p.

(Conference sponsored by the Cdn. Human Rights Commission in collaboration with the Dept. of External Affairs—on the occasion of the 30th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights).

Forging the links: a technology policy for Canada. Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1979.

72 p. (Science Council of Canada. Report no. 29).

Publié aussi en français.

Anderson, James E. and Fred W. Belaire

Energy futures for Canadians: Long-Term Energy Assessment Program (LEAP). Report of a study prepared for Energy, Mines and Resources Canada. Ottawa, 1978. 353 p. Publié aussi en français.

Libert, Jacqueline

Le Canada et l'Amérique latine sous le signe de la coopération. Mémoire soumis à l'Institut de Coopération internationale de l'Université d'Ottawa. Ottawa: University of Ottawa, Institute for International Co-operation, 1978.

116 p.

McMillan, Carl H.

Canada's postwar economic relations with the U.S.S.R.: an appraisal. Ottawa: Institute of Soviet and East European Studies, Carleton University, 1979.

64 p. (East-West commercial relations series, no. 10).

Morrison, Robert W. and Edward F. Wonder

Canada's nuclear export policy. Ottawa: Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, 1978.

115 p. (Carleton International Studies, 1978/III).

II. Recent Articles

Abella, Irving and Harold Troper

"'The line must be drawn somewhere': Canada and Jewish refugees, 1933-9." In *Canadian Historical Review* 60: 178-209 June 1979.

Abley, Mark

"Adventures in the arms trade: a Canadian saga." In *Canadian Forum* April 1979, pp. 6-12.

Arvay, Joseph

"Newfoundland's claim to offshore mineral resources: an overview of the legal issues." In *Canadian Public Policy/Analyse de politique* 5: 32-44 Winter/hiver 1979.

Beigie, Carl E.

"Canada would gain competitive clout." In *Report* Vol. 2 No. 6 May 1979 pp. 34-36.

Blom, J.

"The enforcement of foreign judgments in Canada." In *Oregon Law Review* 57: 399-429 1978.

Bombardier, Denise

"Canada: un continent à la recherche d'un pays." In *L'Express* no. 1454 26 mai 1979 pp. 74-85.

Creery, Tim

"Playing the American card." In *Report* Vol. 2 No. 6 May 1979 pp. 5-8.

Cushman, Dawn

"Canadian Transport Company v. United States: an avenue toward a remedy for a treaty violation." In *California Western International Law Journal* 9: 377-404 Spring 1979.

Dow, Alexander and Sheila C. Dow

"The balance of payments and economic policy: the price of dependence." In *Canadian Forum* May 1979 pp. 20-23.

Farr, David L.

"The view of history in the making of Canada's external policies." In *Canadian Historical Association. Historical Papers, 1978*. pp. 1-17.

Ichikawa, Akira

"The 'helpful fixer': Canada's persistent international image." In *Behind the headlines* 37: 3 March 1979 pp. 1-24.

Nossal, Kim Richard

"Business as usual: Canadian relations with China in the 1940's." In *Canadian Historical Association. Historical Papers 1978*. pp. 134-147.

Roche, Douglas

"Canada and Israel: Progressive Conservative Party position." Address delivered by Douglas Roche to the annual conference of the Canada-Israel Committee in Ottawa, February 14, 1979. In *Middle East Focus* V. 2 no. 1 May 1979 pp. 6-9.

Sabourin, Louis

"Le Canada et le tiers monde: origine et originalité d'une politique." In *Studia diplomatica* 31: 527-544. 1978.

Voyer, Roger

"U.S. protectionism would absorb Canada. In *Report* Vol. 2 No. 6 May 1979 pp. 36-38.

Young, Christopher

"What's wrong with our foreign policy?" In *Opinion Canada* Vol. 8 No. 2 March/April 1979 pp. 33-35.

Publications of the Department of External Affairs

The following are lists of the most recent publications of the Departmental Press Office and of the Information Services Division dealing with international affairs and Canadian foreign policy.

Press Releases, issued by the Departmental Press Office, Ottawa:

No. 33 (April 5, 1979) Appointments to the Board of Governors of the International Development Research Centre (IDRC).

No. 34 (April 16, 1979) Canada announces recognition of new Government of Uganda.

No. 35 (April 20, 1979) Canadian playwrights promote Canadian plays in Britain.

No. 36 (April 20, 1979) Seventh Student Commonwealth Conference — April 24 to 27, 1979.

No. 37 (April 23, 1979) Conference of Ministers of Education of French-speaking Countries (CONFEMEN), thirty-second session, Quebec City, April 25 to 27, 1979.

No. 38 (April 24, 1979) Honorary consuls appointed: José A. Brache to Santo Domingo; Allen M. Duffield to Nassau.

No. 39 (April 25, 1979) Robbery at Alta Vista Post Office, Ottawa.

No. 40 (May 8, 1979) Notes for opening statement at fifteenth session, on May 9, of UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD V), Manila, by Larry H. Smith, deputy head and leader of Canadian delegation.

No. 41 (May 10, 1979) "Canada Days" to be held in Paris May 11 to 23, 1979.

No. 42 (May 10, 1979) Montreal National Theatre for Children (Les Pissenlits) to perform in Soviet Union and Switzerland.

No. 43 (May 11, 1979) Expulsion of Mijat Tomic, Vice Consul, Yugoslav Consulate General, Toronto.

No. 44 (May 11, 1979) Diplomatic appointments: T. J. Bacon as High Commissioner in Zambia; Fred B. B. as Ambassador to Thailand and concurrently Ambassador to Lao People's Democratic Republic; G. Blouin as Ambassador to the Netherlands; E. Bobinski as Ambassador to the Philippines; C. Charland as Ambassador to Mexico and Guatemala; Marc Faguy as High Commissioner in Ghana; J. Grenon as Ambassador to Peru, with concurrent accreditation to Bolivia; J. G. Hadwen as High Commissioner to India, with concurrent accreditation to Nepal; D. S. McPhail as Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the United Nations in Geneva, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament; W. H. Montgomery as Ambassador to Indonesia; S. Nutt, Consul General in New York, concurrently accredited as Commissioner in Bermuda; R. D. Sisk as Ambassador to Costa Rica; J. S. Stanford as Ambassador to Israel, with concurrent accreditation to Cyprus.

No. 45 (May 11, 1979) Canada studies new Soviet citizenship legislation.

No. 46 (May 16, 1979) Secretary of State for External Affairs comments on new Soviet citizenship law.

No. 47 (May 18, 1979) James R. Midwinter appointed Inspector General of Foreign Operations.

No. 48 (May 21-22, 1979) Ministerial meeting, Paris, May 21 and 22, of International Energy Agency.

Statements and Speeches, published by the External Information Programs Division:

No. 79/5 Current Issues in Canadian Foreign Policy. A statement to the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, Ottawa, March 8, 1979, by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Don Jamieson.

No. 79/6 The Role of Government in Promoting and Protecting the Interest of the Canadian Business Community in the Changing World Economic Environment. Notes for remarks by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Don Jamieson, to the Canadian Council of the International Chamber of Commerce, Montreal, May 5, 1979.

No. 79/7 NATO After Thirty Years. A statement issued by the Prime Minister, the Right Honourable Pierre Elliott Trudeau, on April 4, 1979, to mark the thirtieth anniversary of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

No. 79/8 UNCTAD V: The Second Asian Meeting. The opening statement at the fifth session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Manila, May 9, 1979, by the deputy head and leader of the Canadian delegation, L. A. H. Smith.

Treaty Information

Bilateral

Argentina

Commercial Air Transport Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Argentine Republic

Buenos Aires, May 8, 1979

In force provisionally May 8, 1979

France

Agreement on Mutual Assistance between Canada and France for the Prevention, Investigation and Suppression, by the Customs Administrations of both Countries, of Customs Offences

Paris, January 9, 1979

In force, May 1, 1979

Japan

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of Japan constituting an Agreement concerning Textile Restraints

Ottawa, May 15, 1979

In force May 15, 1979

Senegal

Foreign Investment Insurance Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Republic of Senegal

Dakar, January 19, 1979

In force January 19, 1979

United Nations

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the United Nations amending the Agreement concerning Third Party Claims arising out of Acts committed by Members of the Canadian Contingency with UNICYP signed March 25, 1970

New York, March 30, 1979

In force March 30, 1979

With effect from September 1976

United States

Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America on East Coast Fishery Resources

Washington, March 29, 1979

Treaty between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America to Submit to Binding Dispute Settlement the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area

Washington, March 29, 1979

Special Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America to Submit to a Chamber of the International Court of Justice the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area

Washington, March 29, 1979

Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America to a Court of Arbitration the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area

Washington, March 29, 1979

Protocol amending the Convention between Canada and the United States of America for the Preservation of the Halibut Fishery of the Northern Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea signed at Ottawa, March 2, 1953

Washington, March 29, 1979

Exchange of Notes constituting an Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America concerning amendment of the Convention between Canada and the United States of America for the Preservation of the Halibut Fishery of the Northern Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea signed at Ottawa, March 2, 1953

Washington, March 29, 1979

In force March 29, 1979

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America to supersede the Agreement of July 6, 1970, as amended by an exchange of Notes of August 11, 1970, concerning the Operation of Pilotage Services on the Great Lakes (with a Memorandum of Arrangements)

Ottawa, August 24, 1978 and March 29, 1979

In force March 29, 1979

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America providing for the Construction, Operation and Maintenance of a Loran-C Transmitting Station at Port Hardy, Vancouver Island, B.C.

Ottawa, March 19 and 29, 1979

In force March 29, 1979

Upper Volta

General Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Republic of Upper Volta concerning Development Co-operation

Ouagadougou, November 8, 1977

In force April 6, 1979

Multilateral

Convention on the International Maritime Satellite Organization (INMARSAT)

Done at London, September 3, 1976

Signed by Canada, May 14, 1979

Protocols for the Fifth Extension of the International Wheat Trade and Food Aid Conventions constituting the International Wheat Agreement, 1971

Done at Washington, April 25, 1979

Signed by Canada May 15, 1979

SUBSCRIPTION ORDER FORM

International Perspectives

Published bimonthly, subscription rates Canada, \$4.00 a year; other countries \$5.00 a year.

Name

Address

Country **Postal/Zip Code**

**Please make your remittance, in Canadian Funds, payable to
The Receiver General of Canada and mail to:**

**Printing and Publishing,
Supply & Services Canada,
Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, K1A 0S9**



If undelivered,
return cover only to:
Canadian Government Printing Office,
Ottawa, K1A 0S7, Canada

En cas de non-livraison,
retourner cette couverture seulement au:
Imprimerie du gouvernement canadien
Ottawa, K1A 0S7, Canada



ISSN 0381-4874

September/October, November/December 1979

International Perspectives

A journal of opinion on world affairs

CAI
EA
- 156

Appraising Carter's foreign policy

International trade environment

Industrial policy in Canada

Islam and the crescent of crisis

The agony of Nicaragua

Epilogue

In his preface to the first issue of *International Perspectives* in 1972, my predecessor of the day, the Honourable Mitchell Sharp, wrote: "The journal is an experiment . . . with risks".

International Perspectives has in fact been that and much more. It has provided a forum for the expression of a great variety of individual viewpoints. It has stimulated informed debate on Canada's foreign policy and public interest in international affairs.

Today, the Department of External Affairs says farewell to *International Perspectives*. After eight years of publication, first under Murray Goldblatt, E. R. Bellemare and Pierre Ducharme, then under Alex Inglis and Louis Balthazar, we relinquish the journal in anticipation of a private sector venture.

To the readers as well as to the editors and contributors to *International Perspectives*, thank you for your past support. We look with confidence to new ventures.

FLORA MACDONALD
Secretary of State for External Affairs

International Perspectives

Contents

September, October, November, December 1979

Half-past Carter/ <i>Charles R. Foster and Anne L. Vorce</i>	3
World Economy	
International trade environment/ <i>Robert C. Clark</i>	7
National interests and the international system/ <i>Roy A. Matthews</i>	12
Challenging the Economic Council/ <i>Jeffrey S. Steeves</i>	15
Islam and the crescent of crisis/ <i>Georges Vigny</i>	20
South of the border	
The agony of Nicaragua/ <i>James Guy</i>	25
Andean group at the ten year mark/ <i>Gordon Mace</i>	30
Letter to the Editor	29
Reference Section	34

International Perspectives is issued bimonthly in English and French by the Department of External Affairs, Ottawa. Any material in this publication may be reproduced. Mention of *International Perspectives* as the source would be appreciated.

Published by authority of the
Secretary of State for External Affairs.

Authorized as third-class mail,
Post Office Department, Ottawa.

Subscription rates: Canada, \$4.00 a year,
single copies \$1.00; other countries
\$5.00 a year, single copies \$1.25.

Remittances, payable to the Receiver
General of Canada, should be sent to:
Canadian Government Printing Office
Ottawa, Ontario, K1A 0S9.

Editors:

Alex I. Inglis
Louis Balthazar

International Perspectives is a journal of opinion on Canada's role in the world and on current international questions. Its purpose is to stimulate discussion and interest in international affairs. It is not intended to reflect Canadian Government policy or perceptions. Indeed, the editors often seek to include material that expresses different or contrary views. The Department of External Affairs accepts no responsibility for the views expressed except where it is clearly stated that an article by a departmental officer is a statement of Government policy. All other articles contain a specific disclaimer of departmental responsibility for their contents.

Letters of comment on issues discussed in *International Perspectives* are welcome and will be considered for publication. Please address your correspondence to: International Perspectives, Department of External Affairs, L. B. Pearson Bldg., 125 Sussex Drive, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, K1A 0G1.

"Half-Past Carter"

The Carter Report Card

by Charles R. Foster and Anne L. Vorce

Even though the Carter Administration has passed its mid-term point, its foreign policy remains elusive to observers at home and abroad. Despite a number of major well-publicized foreign policy initiatives, the Carter stance on foreign policy is seen as fuzzy and erratic by friend and foe alike. Doubt and uncertainty about the Administration's leadership in foreign affairs are reflected domestically in its low ratings in public opinion polls. Confused by its lack of clear direction in international matters, allies question the reliability of its commitments to security, to human rights and to the management of the dollar in terms of the world economy. The Carter foreign policy is viewed as a series of disjointed improvisations in response to immediate domestic or international pressures.

The substance of the Carter foreign policy, however, is more impressive than its general image suggests. The above description of the Carter Administration is not unique. It is similar to Zbigniew Brzezinski's assessment of the Nixon foreign policy after its mid-term point. At that time Mr. Brzezinski prepared a report card to rate the Nixon performance; it seems appropriate now to use Mr. Brzezinski's method to evaluate this administration's foreign policy.

For a serious assessment of the Carter Administration's foreign policy, its substance must be separated from its style, although they are interrelated. The popular view is that the Administration has conducted its foreign policy in an amateurish and *ad hoc* manner, but actually the over-all approach has been a mixture of rather sophisticated global activism and naive messianic zeal. The theoretical underpinnings are based on earlier Brzezinski writings and speeches. Acting within Brzezinski's "architectural" structure, which is built upon the theory of trilateralism, the Carter Administration has attempted to localize conflicts through multilateral negotiations in a number of areas to prevent military conflict. The Carter Administration has attempted to regain for the U.S. its role of world leader in both a moral and a power sense.

In the early days of the Carter Administration, the rhetoric flowed freely as the Administration at-

tempted to present its overly ambitious plans for reshaping the world order. When this agenda did not correspond exactly — or even roughly — to certain developments, the Carter Administration was unable to explain the compromises it had to make in its programs as essential for the protection of U.S. vital interests. In many cases, the Administration's rhetoric was contrary to what was obviously taking place. Its media style raised false expectations. Coming to power on a platform of morality, Carter rose largely on the basis of his messianic rhetoric in the grand tradition of American liberal diplomacy. As a result, Carter's actions have generally been described in light of his moral stance. This is especially true of his position on human rights, which was based on standards, largely for domestic political reasons, that could never be realistically applied. Although his human rights stand proved effective in certain cases, it also alienated some allies. In dealing with certain countries he was forced to compromise on the issue to protect other, more vital, U.S. interests. His failure to apply such standards in Iran, Korea, Nicaragua and China — at least publicly — made his high-sounding rhetoric seem suspicious. He has never properly explained the complex nature of negotiations involving American interests. By defending authoritarian regimes, he has diminished the positive impact of his rhetoric.

Another problem of the Carter Administration is the division within the Administration itself. The most publicized differences have been those between Vance and Brzezinski, who have often given speeches expressing opposing views on the same topic on the same day. Also, debates within the NSC, particularly over linkage, have resulted in the departure of several key members, including Samuel Huntington.

Dr. Foster is Executive Secretary of the Committee on Atlantic Studies in Washington, D.C. He is also associated with the U.S. Office of Education.

Ms. Vorce is a graduate student at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and works at the Library of Congress. The views expressed in this article are those of the authors.

Recently, the resignation of nearly a quarter of the staff has been attributed to "mid-term blues". These internal conflicts, combined with the absence of a mediator other than the President, who seems to be more involved in the detailed technical aspects of events, have led to inconsistent policies, such as the stance concerning the Soviets. Another factor contributing to the public's confusion over U.S. foreign policy is its many spokesmen. In the initial days of the Administration, open discussion was encouraged and publicly welcomed as a needed relief from the secret diplomacy of the Kissinger years. The Vance-Brzezinski debates were encouraged and Andrew Young was given free rein. Carter has continued this approach by using troubleshooters such as George Ball and Robert Strauss. As a result, the Carter Administration has frequently lacked a unified voice on foreign policy.

In spite of its unfortunate style, the Carter Administration has had a number of notable foreign-policy achievements. Building upon the efforts of previous administrations, it has made successful policy decisions involving China, the Panama Canal and, apparently, SALT II. The Camp David agreement between Egypt and Israel was a much-needed breakthrough, but it requires expansion. Carter has, in general, succeeded in re-establishing friendly relations with traditional allies and lesser developed countries that had been relatively ignored during the Nixon-Kissinger years. It is misleading to see Carter as having had an easier role to play in foreign affairs than his predecessor because the U.S. is not involved in any military conflict. The Carter emphasis has been mainly on economic and political activity, rather than on military effort. Because of the Soviet arms buildup, however, the Carter Administration appears to be modifying its policy of avoiding military responses.

Africa

The successes and most glaring failures of the Carter foreign policy can be discerned in its approach to Africa, which has assumed a surprisingly significant position in its foreign policy. In contrast to the neglect of African affairs by the preceding administration, Carter has acknowledged African affairs as a top priority. In spite of a pronounced tendency at first to analyze African problems in terms of the American

civil rights experience, the Carter Administration has approached African affairs more broadly, namely in terms of "African solutions to African problems". Within this framework, the U.S. has sought to co-sponsor negotiations with Western European countries to settle regional conflicts among African nations, such as in Rhodesia, Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Zaire.

China

Despite a slow start, partly to avoid antagonizing the Soviet Union, the Carter Administration has moved carefully, yet rapidly, to normalize relations with China. The timing of the announcement came as a surprise, but the Administration had carefully made behind-the-scenes preparations that were built upon the groundwork laid by preceding administrations. The Administration has limited the playing of the question of "China Card" to the normalization announcement and a joint communiqué with Deng Xiaoping co-

demning Asian "hegemony".

Europe

In contrast to the Kissinger era, the Carter Administration has actively sought political and economic partnerships with various European nations for the solution of global and regional concerns. Reflecting Brzezinski's initial trilateral "architectural" approach to foreign affairs, the Administration has acknow-

The Carter Report Card

GEOGRAPHIC	Comment	Grade
1. Africa	<i>initially appealing approach undermined by failure to resolve some intractable problems</i>	B
2. China	<i>normalization followed by appropriately cautious optimism</i>	A—
3. Europe	<i>generally healthy climate, though much tension from particular issues</i>	B+
4. Japan	<i>continuing trade problems, despite efforts</i>	B—
5. Latin America	<i>business as usual: rhetoric without substance</i>	D+
6. Middle East	<i>still fluid: success, but also failures</i>	I
7. South and East Asia	<i>neglect; mixed on human rights</i>	B—
8. Soviet Union	<i>ambiguous, until recently</i>	B—
TOPICAL		
1. Arms Control	<i>mixed record on arms sales, non-proliferation; good on SALT</i>	B
2. Defence	<i>unclear approach</i>	B—
3. Foreign Aid	<i>neglect</i>	C+
4. Human Rights	<i>mixed: positive thrust, notable failures</i>	B
5. Trade and Economic Policies	<i>good on trade, mixed on monetary policies</i>	B+
OVERALL	<i>Style and consistency poor, substance impressive</i>	B

edged Europe as a cornerstone of its foreign policy. The U.S. and Europe are joining in political discussions on a number of areas, most notably on Africa, and on global economic problems. The Carter Administration has also pursued human rights objectives in Eastern Europe, with some success. However, Carter Administration policies have irritated European friends. Until late 1978 the U.S. allowed the dollar to deteriorate to a point alarming to its allies. Carter finally undertook massive rescue efforts in November, but it seems likely that management of the dollar, as well as the management of the U.S. economy in general, will continue to be a source of tension between the U.S. and Europe. The Administration has also angered several countries, most notably France and Germany, by its approach to the energy problem. Overall, the relationship between the U.S. and Europe appears to be healthy, but there is a danger of increasing tension as the energy problems continue and the U.S. economy worsens.

Japan

Although Carter has repeatedly declared that Japan is the cornerstone of his Asian policy and has made important security concessions to the Japanese in order to demonstrate his commitment, tension exists between the two countries because of the trade issue. The Administration has thus far been successful in insulating the security arrangements from the trade conflict. Continued strained relations, however, over the increasingly important trade issues may affect other areas. The Administration is devoting a great deal of effort to solving the trade problems and has achieved several agreements recently, but they may be limited by the complexity of the situation in both countries. Domestic factors are significant in both Japan and the U.S. The Administration must inform the public that the trade negotiations can only progress slowly and, at the same time, it must demonstrate a strong interest in securing agreements.

Latin America

Latin America provides the most striking illustration of the divergence between rhetoric and substance. The Carter Administration began its Latin American policy efforts with a flurry of activity directed toward improving relations dramatically with the long-neglected Latin American countries. The high priority that was initially accorded to Latin America was indicated by the unprecedented number of Carter speeches on Latin America, the widespread travel throughout Latin America by the Carter entourage, and numerous other symbolic gestures. Yet by 1978 it was clear that Carter's Latin American policy had clear limitations. The Administration's human rights policy became eroded in light of his support of the Somoza regime. Although Carter initially felt that his

human rights philosophy could have its greatest impact on Latin America because of the widespread existence there of authoritarian regimes and the absence of vital U.S. interests, the Administration discovered that it did, indeed, have important interests there. The Administration did create a distance between itself and the repressive Pinochet regime in Chile, but has mishandled the carrot and stick approach in aid to Brazil, Argentina, El Salvador and Guatemala. As a result, these countries have become alienated without much having been accomplished in the human rights area. The Administration's early initiatives in Cuba appeared to be appropriate until it was confronted with Cuban adventurism elsewhere. Despite more laudable intentions than its predecessors, the Carter Administration has not fared well in its relationship with Mexico, which has assumed increasing importance. Apart from the legacy of bad relations that any administration would have to overcome, the Carter Administration has created its own problems. The mishandling of the oil deal, the embarrassing comments made by Carter during his recent trip to Mexico, and the failure to settle the alien problem have hurt relations. Finally, the Carter Administration must be congratulated on its Panama Canal efforts. The Panama treaty was initially defined as a priority issue, and the Administration followed through.

Middle East

Although the Carter Administration has had an ambitious, relatively sensitive and, to an extent, innovative approach to Middle Eastern affairs resulting in several important accomplishments, U.S. interests there have been seriously undermined by recent unforeseen events. However different the Carter Administration may have been from its predecessor in its more even-handed approach to Arab-Israeli issues, its strategy continued to rest ultimately on the two "pillars" of Iran and Saudi Arabia. The significance of the collapse of Iran and the cooling of the Saudi friendship as a result of the Camp David settlement cannot be underestimated. It seems that the foundations for protecting the oil supply through regional security arrangements have been weakened. The U.S. apparently intends to change its approach from a relatively passive one to a more active "Carter Doctrine for the Middle East" with the Middle Eastern visit of Defence Secretary Harold Brown last winter, the training of Saudi military by the U.S., the dispatch of an aircraft carrier to the Arabian Sea in February in response to the Yemen conflict, and the possible separation of the U.S. Middle Eastern Command from the European Command. Thus, the Administration recently has recognized that a different strategy is necessary to protect American interests in the Middle East.

South and East Asia

Highly sensitive to previous U.S. involvement in South-east Asia, the Carter Administration initially sought to de-emphasize the U.S. presence there. In fulfillment of his campaign pledge, Carter immediately began to withdraw troops from South Korea until the Japanese indicated their displeasure. Also, ASEAN indicated to the Administration that it needed the commitment of U.S. presence in Asia. As a result, the Carter Administration found itself faced with responsibilities in Asia that Carter had strongly criticized during the presidential campaign. This inconsistency, although primarily due to the realities of power, damaged the Carter image. In addition, the lack of forceful human rights criticism of the Asian countries, including allies, hurt the Administration's credibility. Apart from the military assurances, the Carter Administration had paid little attention to South and East Asia.

Soviet Union

The Carter Administration's policy towards the Soviet Union has generally been unfortunate, despite the recent SALT II agreement. The Administration started with a misperception of the Soviet world role and, as a result, misread Soviet intentions. Beginning with a false sense of strength and superiority vis-a-vis the Soviet Union as a result of the legacy of *détente*, the Administration virtually ignored it except to make periodic human rights pronouncements and to settle the major issues through the comprehensive SALT negotiations. Yet problems in Soviet-American relations have occurred apart from the SALT negotiations, in various African, Middle Eastern and Asian areas. Because the Carter Administration's world order policy for matters other than strategic ones was based on a doctrine of trilateralism, the SALT issue was seen as a goal in itself without immediate relevance to other events. The Soviet image held by the Carter Administration and conveyed to the American public – and to the Soviet Union – indicated the confusion in attitudes towards the Soviets within the Administration. On one hand, the Soviet Union was considered the major partner in building a strategic world order through the SALT agreements. On the other hand, it was seen as a perpetrator of gross human rights violations. There is no doubt that the accusations of human rights violations have had some influence on the recent increase in numbers allowed to emigrate. However, the over-all effect of this dual policy has been to give an impression of inconsistency. The Carter Administration has recovered in part from this shaky beginning; and Carter's tough Annapolis speech in June, 1978, can be seen as a watershed.

Arms Control

The Carter Administration has a mixed record on arms control. Its greatest success is the SALT II

agreement, which offers sufficient advantage to certain American interests. The Administration jeopardized the negotiations at first by sending Vance to Moscow immediately with major new proposals, which the Russians refused. It recovered rapidly, however, from this mistake and has since proceeded more cautiously. The Administration has expressed lofty sentiments regarding non-proliferation, but the results of its initiatives in this area have been poor. The Germans and Brazilians, in particular, have been greatly alienated by the Administration's approach. The Carter Administration has also had a mixed record on arms sales. In contrast to previous administrations, they linked arms sales to the purchasing country's stand on human rights. To an extent they achieved some positive results, but their inconsistency in carrying out this policy was unfortunate.

Defence

The Carter Administration has generally sought to exercise U.S. leadership through political and economic initiatives rather than through military threat. It has maintained traditional global military commitments, but created some confusion because it lacked a clear definition of vital interests. In response to what was perceived to be the "lesson of Vietnam," the Administration drew back from global military involvement at first and then began to restructure its defence commitments in terms of more limited objectives. However, it has become clear that the continued existence of certain vital strategic interests limits any radical changes in defence policy. The failure to consider the strategic implications of the total withdrawal from Korea and the zig-zag decision on the deployment of neutron bombs in Europe have contributed to an image of confusion.

Foreign Aid

The Carter Administration has proclaimed extremely high standards for its foreign-aid program, but has not lived up to them. Despite its declared intent to establish a foreign-aid program that would further American moral interests, the Administration has yet to come up with concrete criteria and objectives for foreign aid. Continuing traditional U.S. policy, the Carter Administration has not changed the proportion of aid to the poorer nations as opposed to that given to a few developed ones. It has made little effort to send foreign-aid programs to Congress and the public.

Human Rights

President Carter must be given credit for the influence he has had on the worldwide interest in human rights, merely by publicizing the issue. It is difficult to assess the precise impact of the Carter rhetoric, but it is clear that the level of awareness of the issue of human rights has increased. The Administration has undoubtedly had a positive influence on

emigration from the Soviet Union and the release of political prisoners.

The Administration has, however, limited the impact of its efforts by its hyperbole and its failure to establish adequate criteria for implementing its own human rights policy. Its initial verbal activism without sufficient consideration of the effect on other important U.S. priorities hurt the Carter image. The Administration did not recognize that there are a number of other vital U.S. interests as well as human rights. Rather, it spoke of human rights issues as though they were the overriding interest in U.S. foreign policy.

Trade and Economic Relations

In contrast to the preceding administration, Carter has pursued a consistent and generally successful free-trade policy. The Administration has achieved favorable terms for the U.S. with the GATT agreement and has improved its global economic relations. The two major problem areas are Europe and Japan. The apparent lack of attention to the declining dollar has angered some European allies. They relate this failure to the weak domestic energy policy and the resulting increase in oil imports which wrought havoc

with U.S. balance of payments. Although the Administration is attempting to solve the Japanese trade problem, it is limited by institutional and domestic forces in both countries. Overall, the Carter Administration has made substantial progress on both these issues.

The Balance Sheet

Why is the Carter report card so uneven? Given global complexities, the Carter Administration has performed well on most issues. Its inconsistency is, in part, a result of the management of inevitable contradictions in any foreign policy. When it has faltered, however, the Carter Administration has too often been a prisoner of its own rhetoric.

Why is the Administration's foreign policy so little understood? Without a clear crisis, and without clear domestic mandates on any issues, it is difficult for any administration to define its foreign policy. But the Carter style has unnecessarily obfuscated the substance of its foreign policy. As Brzezinski cogently argued in 1971, there was no Nixon doctrine. Similarly, today, there is no Carter doctrine, and the President's chief task ought to be a lucid explanation of his goals and strategies.

International trade environment in the post-MTN period

by Robert G. Clark

The Tokyo Round may have been the last and most ambitious multilateral trade and tariff negotiations (MTN) to be conducted on a comprehensive and global basis. The initialling of the results also marks the first time that any major GATT trade negotiation has been concluded during a protracted period of slow growth in the world economy. At the four economic Summits held from 1975 through 1978, leaders sought to give impetus to an early and satisfactory conclusion of the GATT negotiations then in progress. At the Tokyo Summit leaders drew attention to the MTN achievement, and pledged commitment to the "early and faithful implementation" of the MTN agreements. Now, attention can be focused still more closely on the fundamental medium-term structural issues which will condition the international trading environment in the post-MTN period,

and on the major trade-policy issues which flow from them.

Slow growth

The advanced industrial economies are having to adjust to sharp increases in the cost of energy, persistent inflationary pressures and reduced growth rates. In

Mr. Clark is a foreign service officer in the Department of External Affairs, currently with the Department's Commercial and Economic Policy Division. Since he joined the Department in 1972, his responsibilities have focused on Canada-U.S. affairs, and more recently on trade policy development. He has served in Washington, D.C. The views expressed here are those of Mr. Clark.

these circumstances industrial economies are having to cope with slow productivity growth, fundamental demographic shifts, significant changes in demand and supply trends, technological changes, the effects of aging capital stock and the emergence of competition in some sectors from a number of developing countries. These structural phenomena (which have been exacerbated by cyclical overcapacity in some sectors) have been reflected in lagging domestic investment, unsatisfactory rates of unemployment and, externally, in large international-payments disequilibria and attendant periods of disorderly exchange market conditions. Domestically, these developments have led to pressures for increased government intervention, aimed particularly at stimulating investment and export earnings and protecting threatened industries from import competition.

While there has been a moderate economic recovery since the 1974-75 recession, current prospects are for little appreciable rate of increase in world trade or production for 1979 over 1978, and in particular little change is projected for real GNP growth in the industrial countries as a group (which averaged about 3.5 per cent in 1978). Looking further ahead, whether one accepts the "slow-growth" scenario or a more optimistic estimate, it seems generally agreed that the world will not soon return to the sustained growth rates characteristic of the pre-1973 quarter century. Among the many factors cited for this, is that tariffs have now been reduced in the West to the point where further reductions beyond those agreed in the MTN would be unlikely to lead to a significant expansion in international trade.

Thus, while constituting a signal success in present economic circumstances — a world-wide reduction in tariffs of about one-third, agreement on a series of significant non-tariff codes, and strengthened procedures for surveillance, consultation and dispute settlement — the MTN achievement is unfinished. It will be important to carry out the implementation of the MTN results through a) bringing domestic legislation and regulatory practices into conformity with the newly negotiated codes where necessary, and b) giving force to the codes through their effective administration in GATT. This will entail an enhanced management and administrative capacity for GATT. It will also likely require the development of a trade-policy role for the organization, possibly evolving from the existing Consultative Group of 18, which might be given a mandate to ensure that the spirit and intent of the MTN codes are fulfilled and trade-policy issues are addressed in a timely and coherent manner. Without determined follow-through, the MTN results might not be rigorously applied, increasing the risk of escalating trade-restrictive measures which the last six years of MTN negotiations have helped to avoid.

While the MTN result that has emerged is better than could reasonably have been expected under the circumstances, it can neither substitute nor lessen the need for fundamental adjustments in the world economy to the underlying structural changes which are now taking place. Moreover, given the degree of structural problems perceived and the lack of public support for freer trade, pressure to maintain protective mechanisms may rise in proportion as the pace of adjustment threatens to exceed domestic tolerance. Protectionism and adjustment thus confront trade policy makers with a basic two-edged issue which must be faced squarely if the MTN results are not to be endangered by the implementation of more sophisticated beggar-thy-neighbour policies. To reinforce their endorsement of the MTN results and any impetus given to their implementation, leaders at the Tokyo Summit made public their concern to manage the medium-term issues of adjustment and protectionism.

Protectionism

Protective measures, both ongoing and temporary, are provided for in GATT and are not regarded *per se* as necessarily unwise or undesirable. Judicious application of temporary and reasonable protective instruments can be a legitimate response to the injurious effects of imports whose disruptive impact overwhelms the absorptive capacity of the receiving economy at the time. Legitimate protective measures can be used to buy time for a domestic industry to adjust to foreign competition by becoming more competitive or to "adjust out" of an industry in a manner which minimizes hardship on the workforce. As sanctioned by GATT, they also protect producers from unfair injurious import competition arising from such measures as dumping, government subsidization or predatory pricing practices. However, especially in periods of slow growth, the danger is that protective measures will be used only as means of deferring adjustment and safeguarding employment — as palliatives treating immediate symptoms rather than as remedial actions aimed at underlying causes.

While often politically more attractive in the short term, protective action which does little more than prop up weak industries usually creates vested interests in continued protection, often attracts new investment to the least dynamic sectors of the economy, and thus contributes to inflexibilities in the economy which lock in labour and capital to the least dynamic uses. In the long run, this will involve loss of higher-income, higher-productivity jobs in those sectors with the most growth potential. Moreover, the real danger that protectionism would spread through example and retaliation cannot be underestimated in a sustained period of slow growth.

It is against this background that the OECD Trade Pledge (to avoid trade-restrictive measures for



Within weeks of becoming prime minister of Canada, Joe Clark was off to Tokyo for the fifth in the series of economic summit meetings that began at Rambouillet, France, in 1975. He is pictured here with Margaret Thatcher, Giscard d'Estaing and Jimmy Carter.

balance of payments purposes) was renewed at the OECD Ministerial Council Meeting in June. Artificially depressed demand in both the developed and developing economies through restricted market access would aggravate existing structural difficulties and result in a major impediment to any hope of a sustained world economic recovery. Equally, an undisciplined proliferation of export subsidies and investment incentives would lead to exaggerated distortions in capital and trade flows in relation to market signals.

Adjustment

The phenomenon of structural change and adjustment is not new. The post-war revival of Europe and the emergence in the 1960s of Japan and Italy were accompanied by pressures to accommodate new technologies and new patterns of consumption and trade flows. The western industrialized system has, by and large, been receptive to and has benefited from this dynamic change, acting from the premise that liberalized flows of trade and investment and the law of comparative advantage work to the benefit of the international community. What is new in current circumstances is the confluence of slow growth, serious structural problems and the rapid, export-led emer-

gence of the upper-income developing countries as highly competitive producers particularly in standard-technology, labour-intensive industries.

The trade liberalization embodied in the MTN result will, if anything, accelerate the need for adjustment to structural change. At the same time, increased competition in domestic and third markets will mean that conditions are least favourable for positive adjustment policies in domestic decision-making. The time would seem ripe, therefore, for a concerted approach to the phenomenon of structural adjustment which will lend some element of predictability and market confidence with respect to legitimate "positive" adjustment, and at the same time, minimize the possibility that the adjustment process will become transformed into a negative-sum exercise whereby all governments would manoeuvre to shift the burden of adjustment to their trading partners. It is against this background that the OECD has undertaken an intensive examination into the difficulties encountered in shifting to more positive adjustment policies, including a clarification of some of the general issues raised, to assist policy-makers in their consideration of adjustment problems.

The OECD study recognizes that adjustment policies can be directed towards economic ends

(encouraging the most efficient allocation of capital and labour) and non-economic ends (encouraging social goals through regional development and farm policies, income redistribution programs, etc., or mitigating the impact of severe economic dislocation). Adjustment policies are also viewed as integral to the achievement of sustained non-inflationary growth. Hence the OECD study points in the direction of choosing adjustment policies aimed at accomplishing the various socio-economic goals of governments with minimum distortion to the marketplace and by means that are compatible with economic efficiency.

It may be argued that the central challenge for policy-makers in the post-MTN environment will be to create an international climate of confidence — based on the reasonable expectation of mutual discipline — respecting structural adjustment. Otherwise, governments around the world, caught up in an escalating competition involving actions which retard adjustment, will find themselves running faster to stay in the same place relative to their trading partners, with each resistance to adjustment doing further harm to the cause of genuinely improving domestic economies. Thus, it was in this light that the Tokyo Summit leaders drew attention to the need to improve the long-term productive efficiency and flexibility of their economies.

Interdependence

A central feature of the trading environment during the 1980s will be the evolutionary integration of a growing number of developing countries into the international economic system. The extent to which Eastern European centrally-planned economies may share in this integration, and the impact they may have, is uncertain. Equally uncertain is whether the Chinese growth targets are obtainable, and if so, what will be the implications for the West of a billion people in that country becoming moderately more wealthy by the year 2000. Nevertheless, the principal issue posed by the emergence of the so-called "newly industrializing countries" is: what conditions should govern their entry as full participants into the world economic system? For it is no longer debated whether the prospects for accelerated growth in developing economies are a welcome development from the point of view of the industrialized economies. There is a clear marriage of interest in favour of a mutual expansion of trade based on comparative advantage. The middle-income developing countries provide markets for the specialized, technologically innovative products and "know-how" services of the developed economies, while providing consumer goods at lower cost. Investment capital from industrialized countries is used to finance development plans in LDC's — including the development of raw materials and energy — and in turn, frees up export earnings for the purchase of imported goods sourced from devel-

oped countries. In periods of weakened investment demand in the developed countries, the developing countries have also provided a welcome countercyclical outlet for investment. Growth in the developing world, for example, ameliorated the 1974-75 recession in the developed countries.

However, particularly in the wake of the 1974-75 recession, market penetration by low-cost imports in sensitive sectors of developed-country economies has brought pressures for relief for the threatened industries and a growing, sometimes exaggerated, concern generally about the implications of import competition from developing countries. Conversely, the developing countries perceive the existing international system as biased against them in terms of trade, access to private capital markets and control over resource development, and accordingly, they have called for fuller and more effective participation in all decision-making concerning the international economy. Most particularly, during the Tokyo Round tariff negotiations, the developing countries pressed for special and differential treatment in the form of deeper-than-Most-Favoured-Nation formula cuts; faster or slower staging of tariff reductions, shallower MFN tariff reductions for items covered by the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) to minimize the erosion of their GSP preference; binding of preferential concessions and margins, and various improvements in the GSP. In the negotiations of non-tariff codes as well, developing countries sought the incorporation into the codes of special and differential provisions. While the MTN negotiations with a number of LDC's continue, they have already registered their dissatisfaction with the MTN results and the conduct of the negotiations most recently at the UNCTAD V meeting in Manila in May.

While it is true that progress in meeting a number of the preoccupations of developing countries fell short of LDC expectations, the MTN negotiations provided developing countries with specific gains, in addition to the benefits accruing to them on an MFN basis from the concessions exchanged in the negotiations. These gains include a firmer legal basis for the GSP and for preferential trade arrangements among developing countries, the advance implementation of non-reciprocal tariff concessions on a range of tropical products, and provisions for special and differential treatment in the various non-tariff codes. The code provisions are particularly noteworthy, both in themselves and in the sense that they represent a departure from the Most-Favoured-Nation principle of GATT in order to respond to the interests of developing countries.

Whatever the perceptions of the MTN outcome and its likely impact on trade, one issue which will be significant in influencing the evolution of trade relations between developed and developing countries in the post-MTN period is the need for the mo-

advanced developing countries to assume greater obligations and to take measures of liberalization commensurate with their state of economic development. At issue here are the implications for both the developed and developing countries of not reaching agreement on the difficult question of "graduation", and of prolonging a trading system wherein the benefits of special and differential treatment accrue to those developing countries which increasingly need it least.

As the most advanced of the developing countries continue to gain in economic strength, and as others join their ranks, the impact from their having derived disproportionate preferential benefits will increase for developed and developing countries alike. With respect to the latter, the advanced developing countries will likely attract investment away from lesser developed countries, will dominate intra-LDC trade, and, to the extent that developing countries maintain their solidarity in the North-South dialogue, may well have a dampening effect on the future willingness of the developed countries to accede to the demands of the LDC's as a group. As regards the developed countries, and especially their need to adjust constructively to the emergence of the newly industrializing countries, this will be more difficult politically if domestic interests perceive themselves as having to adjust not only to a change in comparative advantage, but to import competition which unfairly benefits from unwarranted preferential treatment.

As part of an attempt to encourage business confidence, and as a signal to both the lesser- and most-developed of the developing countries that "differentiation" is an issue with far-reaching implications, the international community will want to examine appropriate means of ensuring that all countries assume international trade obligations commensurate with their state of economic development.

Japan's role

During discussions on structural adjustment and the alignment of macro-economic policies at the Tokyo Summit, the role of the Japanese economy came under implicit scrutiny. Japan's global trade surplus, exceeding \$25 billion, has resulted in strong pressures from both the EC and the U.S. for an increased contribution from Japan towards the achievement of greater bilateral and international equilibrium. The emphasis has been on securing more effective Japanese stimulation of domestic demand, together with greater liberalization of the Japanese market. While the Japanese growth rate has fallen short of their undertaking at the Bonn Summit, the main concern of Japan's major trading partners, including Canada, has been market access, without which increased domestic demand in Japan loses its relevance. The Japanese in turn point to: steps they have already taken to meet others' concerns; the domestic political

constraints upon the degree of flexibility they can be expected to show; the tradition of hard work and sophisticated marketing to which they credit their success; and (implicitly) the present and future vulnerability of their resource-dependent economy to external forces beyond their control. Although Canada places a high priority on obtaining market access in Japan for a higher proportion of processed and manufactured exports, its over-all trade surplus with Japan places it in a different position from the other Summit participants.

The Tokyo Summit was neither the time nor place to single out one Summit participant for attention or to press bilateral matters. It offered an opportunity, on the other hand, to stress the need for avoiding basic structural imbalances in the economic system, to welcome any contributions Summit countries might make to that end, and to reflect concern for the international system as a whole if it must sustain for much longer the maladjustments to which it is currently subject. It was also an occasion to recall that unilateral action by a Summit participant to restrict another's imports would be unfortunate politically as well as economically for both parties, and would likely entail adverse consequences for third parties through trade diversion.

Canadian interests

Given the nature of the Canadian economy, our position relative to the "Big Three" trading entities, and the emergence of newly industrializing countries with a growing capacity to compete with us domestically as well as in third markets, Canadian interests are served by an open international trading environment characterized by effective multilateral disciplines and non-discriminatory trade rules which work. This affords the best means of advancing Canada's basic trade interests, namely: the expansion of export opportunities for Canadian high-technology goods and processed industrial materials; the promotion of long-term and stable primary export markets on an internationally competitive basis; and the development of a competitive domestic economy with scope for an appropriate mix of access to and protection from imports to reflect Canada's particular circumstances.

Consistent with the above trade interests, there would be advantage for us in a post-MTN international trade environment which included the following major elements:

- (a) implementation of the MTN results through bringing national legislation and practices where necessary into conformity with the various GATT non-tariff codes;
- (b) strengthening of the GATT institutional framework to ensure that the letter and intent of the codes are fulfilled, and that major trade-policy issues are addressed in a timely and coherent manner;

- (c) a common political conviction that with the MTN negotiations concluded, protectionism must be resisted in both developed and developing countries in the universal interest of continued economic recovery;
- (d) endorsement of a positive approach to structural adjustment, in both developed and developing countries, so that socio-economic goals of governments are achieved with minimum disruption to the efficient reallocation of resources both domestically and internationally;
- (e) the gradual assumption by the more advanced developing countries of obligations and measures of liberalization commensurate with their state of economic development; and,
- (f) more generally, engagement of the developing countries on a broad range of trade-policy issues subsequent to the MTN and UNCTAD V, involving a coherent approach to the contributions to be made in discussions in GATT, the OECD and UNCTAD.

Industrial policy in Canada

Reconciling national interests to the international system

by Roy A. Matthews

In the last few years, there has been growing insistence in Canadian political debate on the need to evolve what is referred to as an "industrial strategy". Less widely known in this country is the fact that national industrial strategies or policies are also coming to represent an important topic of discussion in world councils, such as the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, where such arrangements are viewed with some concern.

It seems fitting that attention should be focused on the matter of governmental support to Canada's manufacturing sector during 1979, for this year marks the 100th anniversary of the introduction of the famous National Policy by Sir John A. Macdonald. Since 1979 is also the 40th anniversary of the start of the Second World War, whose origins can be traced at least in part to the failure of the international economic system in the 1930s — and most notably to the stifling of trade through excessive import protectionism — it appears a particularly appropriate year for examination of an ever-crucial question: the relationship between the search for industrial expansion

at home and the requirements of economic exchange and efficient international division of labour in the global context.

Manufacturing

Macdonald's National Policy was not, of course, by any means entirely an exercise in industrial development. Nonetheless, although that ingenious political construct involved many elements outside the realm of what we would now call industrial policy — it included measures promoting railway building, settlement of the western prairie, and large-scale immigration — probably its most important effect was the foundation it helped to lay for the establishment of a broadly-based manufacturing sector in Canada. One may usefully consider the role of the National Policy in the evolution of the Canadian economy and policy over the past hundred years, because it had an underlying purpose — or set of purposes — that can be seen as very relevant, still, to the sorts of concerns motivating our search for industrial strategies today.

The goals that were to be served by the National Policy — and in particular by the system of import tariffs that formed a part of its overall design — are the eternal objectives of any nation: wealth, strength and unity. Creating a complex of manufacturing in-

Mr. Matthews is an Ottawa economist. The views expressed here are the personal views of the author.

industries would make Canadians rich by drawing workers out of traditional activities like agriculture and fishing into modern spheres of endeavour where a more dynamic and innovative atmosphere prevailed. It would make Canada strong — that is, ensure its independence as a nation — by providing the basis for employing a lot of people, both native-born and immigrant, who would be gathered in great cities where the elements of a forceful cultural identity could be forged. It would unite the country by encouraging the interregional exchange of central-Canadian finished goods for eastern and western primary produce, an integrative symbiosis from which all would benefit.

There has been no change in the goals, obviously. What is more to the point, in the present context, is whether the requirements of contemporary conditions call for a similar effort by government to guide and foster industrial development, pursued not only through conventional import protection but through additional mechanisms capable of distorting international trade, investment, and other exchanges.

Today's goals

Given that the labour force of any developed country is, by definition, almost entirely employed in the modernized sectors of the economy, there is no longer any significant scope for enhancing efficiency and thus national wealth by attracting workers into manufacturing industry. Instead, efficiency is generally held to be adversely affected by any attempt to protect or otherwise sustain secondary industrial enterprises that cannot compete in world markets on their own. The argument most often heard nowadays in favour of special policy measures favouring industrial employment as a means of maximizing wealth — or, at least, as stimulating the potential for greater wealth creation in the future — is rather different. It suggests that the rewards of economic endeavour are especially large in the case of high-technology industries, so that governments will be well advised in effect to channel resources saved by the present generation into technological development that may pay off for the next. Thus the industrial policies of this day and age stress aid for research and development, tax incentives for high-technology innovations, and comparable devices.

The importance attached to technological competence is also a prime focus of the modern-day search for national strength and independence. Whereas in earlier times it seemed necessary to increase the number of Canadians — perhaps, in the ultimate extreme, to provide sheer manpower for an army — today the essence of nationhood appears to be a capacity for noteworthy technological achievement. Ours is a civilization based on scientific and technical excellence; *ergo*, any self-respecting nation must have its own cadres of brainy people able to contribute to the wonders of nuclear physics or electronic microcircuitry.

Disentangling the mystique of such notions from the real significance of technological capability for nation states and their peoples is one of the great challenges currently facing political economy. The problem is expressed very largely in terms of the role of highly sophisticated industrial technology in the growth of so-called multinational firms, which are seen as potent instruments for the dissemination of cultural influences and the perpetuation of unsymmetrical interdependencies between “metropolitan” countries (where multinationals have their headquarters) and “peripheral” ones (where branches and subsidiaries are located). This perception of affairs causes governments in countries like Canada to introduce machinery for the screening of foreign investments and motivates many people to advocate the establishment of state corporations in key industries to keep them under domestic control.

The continuing goal of national unity, as it presents itself in contemporary Canadian affairs, still has implications strongly reminiscent of those justifying the National Policy. However, the basis of the original position — namely, that Ontario and Quebec would constitute the nation's industrial heartland and the east and west its sources of primary goods — no longer seems to be workable. On one hand, Quebec is falling behind as a manufacturing centre for all except the more labour-intensive, standard technology products; on the other, western provinces are seeking to develop their own manufacturing capacity, at least as it concerns further processing of raw materials for export and possibly with respect to other items of various kinds. These conflicting trends explain the emergence of provincially sponsored efforts at industrial policy-building, which the federal government is desperately trying to accommodate in some sort of grand strategy of its own.

International aspect

Should these national goals, and the industrial-policy devices engineered to achieve them, be accepted as legitimate by the international community? In regard to the goals themselves there can be little quarrel. Although, in an interdependent world, there may be a *prima facie* implication that human welfare at the national level is indivisible from peace, progress, and prosperity among all nations, it is obvious that individual countries do often gain or lose, relative to some international average, from the outcome of economic events as determined by market forces. Because the citizen inevitably looks to his national government — and, in federal countries, also to his regional one — for the management of so many aspects of affairs influencing the milieu in which he lives, it is clear that such governments must always attempt to further those interests perceived as benefiting the electorate as a whole. Pursuit of national goals, therefore, is an intrinsic part of the nation-state system, which for

all its faults is as yet the only effective scheme we have found for organizing society at a level of any complexity.

The question to which students of this subject have to address themselves, however, is how far the particular interests of the nation can be pushed before there is damage to the fragile but substantive international order of which all states are now integral components, with the effect that in the end the individual nation itself is likely to suffer more loss than gain. At a time of rising protectionist sentiment, uncomfortably like the "beggar-my-neighbour" attitudes that helped to precipitate the Great Depression in the 1930s, there is little need to stress this danger. At the same time, though, it is also worth asking whether too great an insistence on global laissez-faire might not, under certain circumstances, undermine a relevant national interest to the ultimate detriment of international well-being. (For example, might a refusal by the Canadian government to sustain import-vulnerable industries in Quebec contribute to a collapse of employment in that province so serious that confederation would be fatally undermined, causing upheavals in the economy of this part of the world that would be felt by all our trading partners for a considerable time to come?)

Criteria

A number of criteria suggest themselves for gauging the legitimacy and validity of the devices put in place as elements of an industrial policy. One is the importance to the nation — as judged by an impartial observer rather than a politician or any other citizen of the country concerned — of readily identifiable goals evidently fundamental to its people's long-term welfare. Another is the extent to which the effects of the policies in question involve damage to interna-

tional interests that can be seen as measurable — even in the broadest sense — and substantial, instead of merely entailing an internal transfer of benefits and costs within the national economy. A third is the length of time the policies may be expected to remain in force and their consequences to be felt, not only at home but abroad. (To these three principal criteria might be added some sort of categorization of nations, the fragility of their economies or even of their political and social structures, and so on — which is really an elaboration of the first criterion.)

The implication of such notions must be, of course, that a type of surveillance or "referee" mechanism could come to exist, situated outside national jurisdictions, to rule on the acceptability of measures introduced by nations in the name of industrial policy. That is the proposition that lies behind deliberation of the issue among delegates from member governments in the OECD. It is likewise the underlying theme of an assessment of national industrial arrangements being fostered this year by the influential Trilateral Commission, which brings together luminaries from North America, Western Europe, and Japan to consider major foreign policy questions affecting their countries and the world.

Whether, in fact, it will ever prove feasible to allow supra-national institutions to have so substantial a role in the affairs of individual nations remains to be seen. But, given Canada's large stake in the effective operation of the international politico-economic system, the matter is surely of highest importance to Canadians. One might hope that the current popular attention being devoted to the pursuit of renewed viability for Canadian industry could, therefore, take account of such larger concerns, which up to now have been subject to virtually no public discussion at all.

The transfer of technology is sometimes conceived as nothing less dramatic than the secret delivery by an inventor to his associate of a "magic black box." Those who see it this way may have in mind William Stevenson's description, in *A Man Called Intrepid*, of the delivery by the British government to the United States Office of Scientific Research and Development of the cavity magnetron which generated short-wave-length electronic beams and made possible the centimetric radar that was small enough to fit into destroyers and aircraft. In fact, the transfer of technology is far more prosaic. Simply put, it is the process of the transfer of knowledge, and of how to use it, by people to people. And the knowledge transferred is itself the product of innovative thought and effort by people.

Extract from "The Transfer of Technology: the need for pragmatism" by E. Hugh Roach, Public Affairs Adviser, Alcan Aluminum Limited, Montreal, published by the Canadian Institute of International Affairs as Volume XXXVII No. 5 of its Behind the Headlines series.

Challenging the Economic Council's view of the new world order

by Jeffrey S. Steeves

If the 1960s represented a period of growing awareness within Third World nations of the complexities of development programs and directions promoted by the West, the 1970s have marked the growth of cynicism and disillusionment with those same policies. During the 1970s, Third World countries have become increasingly frustrated in their attempts to "develop" and have begun to perceive their condition of "underdevelopment" as emerging from the current structuring of the international economy. The collective efforts of OPEC countries in 1973 to determine a common price structure for oil stimulated the political leadership within the Third World to speak in unison on economic issues which clearly work to the advantage of the rich, developed North while systematically weakening the poor, underdeveloped South. Efforts by the Group of 77 to secure changes in the conditions of trade, monetary reform, agreements on commodity prices and on the transfer of technology have proved to be difficult, despite a whole array of international conferences established to work towards a more equitable international economic system. Meanwhile, the gap between the developed and the underdeveloped countries continues to widen. Of far greater significance, there is even less appreciation of the deteriorating condition of poor people — the near-landless, landless, under-employed and unemployed — who constitute the majority of the population in Third World countries.

Canada and the other industrialized countries of the North face a changing international environment, one in which a new policy framework must be developed to meet new international conditions. As one study has suggested, "We are entering an era in international relations during which political conflicts are widely perceived to be centred in economic relations."

Despite statements of intent and concern expressed intermittently by our political leaders, the Canadian response to North-South issues has been tempered by domestic concerns. Two major preoccupations — a persistently poor economic performance with high unemployment, inflation and a slow growth in productivity and the national unity question — have distracted concerted attention from the need for

a fundamental reorientation of assumptions and aspirations. Two important effects of our preoccupations can be perceived, both of which bear directly on the policy process at the federal level. Firstly, public awareness of and debate on the difficult choices which Canada will have to face over the next several decades have been inadequate. In part, this represents a failure of political leadership to alert Canadians to the important and continuing changes in our external environment and their potential impact on the country. Secondly, since the priorities of politicians and senior public servants lie elsewhere, little hard analysis of complex North-South issues has been undertaken or thought given to the alternative courses of action available, much less to the formulation of an appropriate policy to guide our relations with underdeveloped countries. As a result, the Canadian position is one of "suspended animation".

Last year, however, one institution at the periphery of the policy process in Ottawa, the Economic Council of Canada, released a major study entitled, *For A Common Future: A Study of Canada's Relations with Developing Countries*. The prestige of the Economic Council and its ability to draw upon both official and academic expertise raises the expectation that finally we will have a basis for informed debate and thereby an awakening of political and public concern.

A critical precondition to the development of a broad policy framework for Canada is the requirement for a sound and careful analysis of current reality and the identification of future trends which will be important to our relation with Third World countries. Unfortunately such an analysis has not been presented in *For A Common Future*. The authors of the Council's report have been captured by assumptions and attitudes which may have been relevant to an earlier period but which are clearly outdated now. In part, the explanation can be traced to the dom-

Professor Steeves teaches political science at the University of Saskatchewan. The views expressed here are those of the author.

inance of economists. The report lacks a political perspective. It seldom refers to events within underdeveloped countries and exhibits little appreciation of what is politically tenable in Canada. Of a much more critical nature is the lack of sensitivity to political realities, which is reflected in a naive and dangerous tendency to define our external environment in a way that supports the preferences of the authors of the report. Canadians are offered a portrait of the economic, social and political conditions within Third World countries that is reassuring, one that serves our interests and aspirations. If Canadian policy is premised on this analysis and the recommendations which flow from it, our actions will be misplaced.

Perspective

Not unexpectedly, a fundamental weakness underlying the arguments advanced in the report appears in the introductory remarks. The Economic Council suggests that the most appropriate theoretical perspective on development rests with the neoclassical growth approach. This approach assumes "... that accumulation of capital and increased trade provide countries with the wherewithal to develop". In other words, Third World countries can develop successfully along the path suggested in the early 1960s by Walt W. Rostow in his famous (some would suggest infamous) study, *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto* (1960).

What arguments are advanced for this particular perspective? The authors suggest first that development economists cannot agree on the nature of the development process. This is hardly surprising given the differences that underlie the theoretical divisions within economics. Secondly, conditions vary between countries both in the nature of development objectives and in key economic, social and political variables that affect the process of development. To say the least, this is stating the obvious. Thirdly, generalizations are not helpful — surely the Economic Council could not be expected to devote the time and resources necessary to complete a thorough study of individual Third World countries. The Council is quite correct in claiming that individual country studies are beyond its resources. However, ignoring the findings of the research which has been undertaken cannot be accepted so easily. For these reasons, the Council has been driven to adopt a simpler approach — "we have assumed that any developing nation that looks to this country for assistance wishes to receive Canadian capital and technology and to obtain access to Canadian markets for its products" — without spelling out clearly the inadequacies of this approach or the premises upon which it is based. The simpler approach, moreover, fails to address the persistent and compelling failure of Third World countries to break out of a condition of "underdevelopment". As the Chairman of the Development As-

sistance Committee of the OECD noted in his 1977 Report:

In spite of the tremendous economic progress of the last twenty years, the promise of effective development is dimmed by the fact that very little progress has been made by the poorest peoples and nations. Also, almost everywhere impressive rates of economic growth have not been matched by growth in employment or by improvement in the relative distribution of income — as the speeches of Robert McNamara and others have pointed out. Instead, the tendency has been for increased unemployment and polarization of incomes, as development has failed to provide enough opportunities for productive employment.

Despite portraying the social divisions which have arisen as a result of attenuated growth and despite recognizing that political elites have been influenced by the premises of "dependency theory", the Economic Council is content to reaffirm the liberal economic model. It is the political dimension of "growth without development", that is, the potentially explosive results of social differentiation between rich and poor, between the modern urban and the traditional rural areas, between the landed and the landless within underdeveloped countries that has led political elites to demand major reforms in the structure of the international economy.

The Economic Council bases its optimistic assessment of the future on two major assumptions. First, the social stratification evident in underdeveloped countries is temporary. Secondly, where selected countries — namely, Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and Korea — which have industrialized are today, the majority of Third World countries will be in twenty or thirty years' time.

No evidence is presented for the first assumption; the second assumption is quite simply an expression of hope. Moreover, the authors are incredibly naive in assuming that political consciousness and action on the part of the underprivileged majority within underdeveloped countries can be overcome by pointing to models that portray some improvement in per capita income by the year 2000. The Council acknowledges that the concessions it is prepared to advocate will only benefit the more advanced Third World countries. Yet, even here, liberalization of trade, opening the Canadian economy to their products, "... is likely to be conditional upon a market improvement in such factors as ... (Canada's) ... overall employment level. Until that occurs, we cannot in conscience advocate anything more than a hold-the-line-policy". For the Third World as a whole, the Economic Council is willing to let international market forces make the necessary adjustments:

... the best policy in the area of trade is to let the forces of competition operate freely, in accord with the international distribution of comparative ad-

vantages. Thus we believe that, as a rule, it is preferable to avoid balancing-off development concerns against the operation of market forces. In view of the great poverty of a number of Third World countries, however, we feel that a minor qualification of the rule might be warranted.

The very mechanism that is under challenge by the Group of 77 represents salvation to the Economic Council of Canada. Thus, although the report claims to deal with our relations with developing countries, rather it focuses on a narrow concern with the competitive challenge of exports from more advanced developing countries.

Aid program

From the Council's perspective, the economic fate of the remainder of the Third World must continue to rest with the aid program rather than with any fundamental change in our economic relationship. The Economic Council, not surprisingly, affirms the beneficial effects of aid, and argues in favour of the Canadian government's policy of maintaining a commitment not to let our aid volume fall below .5 per cent of GNP. In addition, it supports the general direction of bilateral aid both in relation to greater concentration on a smaller number of recipient countries and the continuation of aid-tying.

A number of basic elements that affect the Canadian aid program are either ignored or hastily reviewed. In the 1970s, aid donors, international institutions and academic researchers, concerned with the tendency for development efforts to benefit the wealthier strata within underdeveloped countries, have argued that greater attention should be given to the social impact of aid-sponsored projects. This means not simply a shift away from urban to rural development but as well a concern to see that less privileged strata within rural society gain access to participation in development.

In the past, efforts to promote cash-crop agriculture among small farmers have concentrated on the progressive farmer and left the bulk of the farming community outside the distribution of benefits. The new approach requires greater effort by aid and government officials to understand the structure of rural society and to be able to take account of the social divisions in project design and selection. Other important changes have occurred within aid circles. A "basic human needs" strategy, for example, has been advocated by the Development Assistance Committee and the World Bank. This strategy represents an attempt to provide the basics of food, shelter, health, education and other social services to the poorest 40 per cent of the population. In addition, since the Least Less Developed Countries, the poorest 25 on the basis of per capita income figures, depend heavily on aid to support government efforts, it is conceded that a greater effort must be made to increase the

aid contributions to this group of countries. Canada, in the *Strategy for International Development Co-operation 1975-80*, accepted the reorientation in aid towards a concern for the distributional effects of aid efforts:

Assistance will be concentrated in those countries which are at the lower end of the development scale, as measured by a variety of economic and other social indicators, and which are most severely affected by current world economic conditions. Priority will be given to meeting the basic needs of their populations. Canada will give the highest priority to development projects and programs aimed at improving the living and working conditions of the least privileged sections of the population in recipient countries and at enabling these people to achieve a reasonable degree of self-reliance.

A recognition of the significance of the social impact of projects and the acceptance of a basic human-needs strategy requires critical reforms within the aid programs of donor countries. Bilateral aid, for example, must focus on integrated rural development projects rather than on large-scale infrastructure projects which utilize Canadian goods and services as a result of the demand for high levels of Western technology. Aid must become increasingly untied to allow local project costs to be funded through aid dollars. Projects which serve the rural poor may be dispersed over a wide number of Third World countries which will require less emphasis towards concentrating Canadian aid on a limited number of program countries. In order to facilitate the selection of projects to meet the new criteria, a stronger emphasis will have to be placed on developing a larger and better qualified CIDA field establishment.

Both the reorientation in attitudes towards aid efforts and the requisite changes which must be introduced to respond effectively have escaped the attention of the Economic Council. In the section of the report devoted to aid, the only reference to the social impact of aid and the relevance of the social structure of Third World countries to development occurs with the rather bland statement that this is a complex area about which not much is known. The Council then presents an overview of the Canadian aid program that is directly counter to the demands of the new approach.

To the authors of the report, one of the central problems that has hampered the administration of our aid program has been the inability of CIDA to spend the funds allocated by Parliament. This "disbursement problem", which affects the bilateral component most severely, can be traced to several major factors. In the Council's assessment, aid-tying contributes to disbursement difficulties because Canadian products may not be sufficiently competitive or the economy of the underdeveloped country may not be

capable of absorbing Canadian technology. Secondly, the best method of committing large sums of money may be inappropriate. Program aid, which involves general balance of payments support and funding over a wide range of government expenditures, is not as simple to apply or administer as the alternative mechanism, project aid, which involves financial support for a very specific development effort such as road construction. Since project aid becomes the dominant method of disbursement, the problems associated with recipient countries' ability to suggest good projects coupled with the inability of Canadian aid personnel to identify and evaluate projects quickly tends to slow down the selection process. As a result, the time required and the limited range of relevant projects contributes to our failure to spend the allocated funds.

Although the authors pinpoint the basic elements of the disbursement problem, they do not come to terms with two fundamental points. Firstly, since the poorest underdeveloped countries require project aid, given Canada's concern to focus on these recipients, one would expect a series of recommendations as to how our aid administrators can overcome the difficulties of project selection. Secondly, and more importantly, if the social effect of development efforts is to be taken seriously in assessing projects for Canadian assistance then the difficulties in spending will be a less significant consideration. The assumption that the volume of our aid is the relevant indicator of the quality of the Canadian aid program will have to be abandoned.

The effects of this approach can be seen in the reforms suggested by the Council. The report suggests we should work to expand the number of program countries relative to those which receive project assistance and we should concentrate our assistance on a manageable number of program countries so that our aid efforts can be administered more efficiently. This revised strategy assumes that the efficient administration of aid has become pre-eminent. The provision of useful assistance, defined in relation to narrowing the social differentiation which has appeared in underdeveloped countries and addressing the basic needs of the poor majority, is neglected. Despite a disclaimer to the contrary, the priorities of the Economic Council have displaced the priorities defined in the *Strategy for International Development Co-operation, 1975-1980*.

Having argued for a concentration of our aid on a select number of countries, the Economic Council studiously avoids defining criteria which could be used to guide Canadian policy-makers. Rather, the authors engage in an unsuccessful attempt to identify what might have been the key criteria used by policy-makers some time ago:

From the point of view of eligibility ... (how Canadian authorities choose the recipient countries)

... it appears that a developing country will probably receive a favourable decision if it is either a Commonwealth member or a francophone country, if it has a large population, and if its income per capita is low. On the other hand, the value of Canadian exports to that country and the amount of aid it receives from other donors do not seem to have any influence on the eligibility decision. Note, however, that these results are for the years preceding the publication of the Canadian government's *Strategy for International Development Co-operation* in 1975. We do not know what influence these factors have had on the eligibility decision after that year.

Although the Council has recognized the adverse effects of aid-tying on our ability to spend aid allocations and the far greater need for aid finance to support local costs in development projects, the authors are very hesitant to advocate untying. This must be deferred until a time when the effects on the Canadian economy will be negligible.

With this decision, the Economic Council of Canada has come full circle. Major changes in the tariff structure, which impedes access to the Canadian market by underdeveloped countries, fundamental reforms in the Canadian aid program to meet the Canadian government's new aid priorities, untying of procurement to meet the needs of recipient countries and an increase in the volume of our aid disbursements must await a revitalization of the Canadian economy. The authors use phrases which suggest action and reform but which on inspection merely justify the continuation of policies defined in and only relevant to an earlier period. A selection from the concluding comments on Canadian aid serves to illustrate the point that the Council is not prepared to come to terms with its own recommendations:

All of our policy recommendations except the last, are in the nature of improvements in either the developmental quality of Canadian aid or the effectiveness with which it is administered. But the implementation of these measures will take time. In the interim, it would be unreasonable to plan for the immediate continuation of the same growth in aid volume that Canada has achieved in the past. This conclusion is reinforced by the current state of the Canadian economy and the future requirement to accommodate the fiscal needs of a large-scale domestic adjustment and redeployment program.

Domestic adjustment

The central thrust of the report is found in the domestic adjustment and redeployment program designed to alter Canadian employment and production in industrial sectors most seriously threatened by the competitive challenge of the advanced developing countries — Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Korea. Six major manufacturing sectors were iden-

tified as being under challenge: textiles, clothing, wood products, electrical apparatus, leather goods and footwear, toys and sporting goods. The Council estimates that 250,000 workers in Canada in 1971 were employed in the affected industries, which represented 15 per cent of all manufacturing jobs or 3 per cent of Canada's total employment. Most crucial in political terms, by far the largest concentration of the key affected industries is in Ontario and Quebec. Ruling out the possibility that workers in Central Canada could adopt the "Maritime" solution for seeking employment, that is, to move further west to seek new occupations in expanding industrial and resource development in Western Canada, the Economic Council suggests there are only two alternative courses of action worth consideration:

The practical question is . . . whether efforts to maintain . . . (the regional political balance) . . . should take the form of an increasingly difficult, and perhaps ultimately hopeless, attempt to save jobs by import protection or . . . that of determined strategy to revitalize the vulnerable regions — and replace the present noncompetitive activities — through programs of industrial adjustment and redeployment.

The Economic Council decided to opt for the latter response. A major concern, however, is that the industrial adjustment and redeployment plan, which requires federal planning and a national consensus to create and support a \$4 billion fund for "regional renaissance", must be tied closely to a timetable for liberalization of trade. In addition, this package approach requires an advance agreement on a date for, "... the reduction of import barriers in the vulnerable sectors" The "release point" that the Council envisages would occur in approximately 15 years and it would be premised on "... a lower national rate of unemployment . . . indicative of a condition of overall economic buoyancy and employment growth". This sets out not only the time when the program of trade liberalization would begin, but also the earliest date that the Council is prepared to advocate any untying of bilateral aid. There are several general comments which should be made. Firstly, the Economic Council assumes that the political will exists in Canada, at the federal, regional and provincial levels, to support such an expensive and elaborate strategy. Let us take just one example of what is required in terms of political commitment. The Council suggests that one possible structure to implement the strategy "... might be a development corporation — at least for the Central Quebec/Eastern Ontario region — that could implement an integrated design developed through federal-provincial co-operation." Given the presence of a Parti Quebecois government in Quebec and the more general sensitivity of Quebecers to federal intrusion in Quebec's affairs, the evolution of a political will for joint action between Ottawa and Quebec is hardly

likely. Secondly, it is conceded by the authors of the Report that the advanced developing countries will be the primary beneficiaries of the strategy. In the interim and beyond, the majority of underdeveloped countries will not receive the tariff reductions so essential to their ability to overcome "underdevelopment". Thirdly, since the poorest underdeveloped countries depend so heavily on aid, the possibility of our bilateral program becoming untied, and therefore more relevant to their needs, will be delayed for a further fifteen years at least until the magical release point is achieved. Fourthly, the continuation over the short term of protectionist policies by Canada in the face of increasingly vociferous demands by Third World countries for meaningful reforms will not assist the promotion of Canadian exports beyond our traditional markets. Finally, but of no less significance, the Council assumes away the problems of "underdevelopment" which Canada itself faces. There is no consideration of the extent to which key decisions on the future of our vulnerable industries are centered in Head Offices located outside Canada.

Conclusion

For A Common Future portrays the economic position of Third World countries from a simplistic perspective. The Economic Council's analysis is based on a false belief in the relevance of the liberal economic model of development. The authors have failed to appreciate that the political demands in the movement for a new international economic order derive from the persistence of a condition of underdevelopment in the majority of Third World countries. Although the shift in emphasis in aid theory towards a concern for the social impact of development projects and the basic-needs strategy represents a more appropriate basis for assistance, fundamental reforms in trade, monetary and investment patterns and the transfer of technology are required. The Economic Council, given its initial assumptions, never reaches the stage of identifying and assessing the central issues facing Canada. How can we account for the inadequacies of *For A Common Future*?

Three factors can be isolated in attempting to explain its shortcomings. The first is the overwhelming dependence by the Economic Council on economists schooled in and committed to liberal economic theory. Policy advice, such as that advanced by the Council, must be broadened to include more wide-ranging perspectives. This requires not only a broader outlook on the part of economists, but also the involvement of other disciplines which share an interest in the study of underdevelopment. Beyond this obvious criticism is the failure of the report to seek and assimilate the criticisms and recommendations of aid recipients.

Secondly, it is apparent that the authors have concerned themselves to a large degree with antic-

ipating the preferences of government officials rather than with carefully examining recent events and offering critical analysis in an effort to come to terms with international political realities.

Following upon this point is the absence of a sense of history evident in the report. The authors seem incapable of envisioning the long-term national interest — a fundamental prerequisite to providing a solution to the problems of underdevelopment and

world stability. Although the consequences of accepting such a proposition appear enormous, a new world order may demand a reduction in our standard of living and in our economic growth. Instead of confronting this possibility, the Economic Council has ignored it entirely. In turn, the Council has sacrificed its credibility as an organization established to consider and recommend appropriate strategies for policy-makers.

Islam and the “crescent of crisis” —exploding the myth of homogeneity

by Georges Vigny

When, in connection with the Middle East, we speak of a “crescent of crisis”, do we mean that these countries, whose geographical distribution suggests the shape of a crescent, are a breeding ground for crisis?

Or do we mean, on the contrary, that these countries are the victims of crisis?

Or are both of these interpretations correct?

Could it be that we are mistaking the effect for the cause? More precisely, are these “sensitive” countries merely reacting more violently to external factors, namely world events, just as the weak parts of a structure are more liable to collapse under pressure?

This expression, which American specialists — and non-specialists — employ with a certain affectedness, as their own wonderfully incisive invention, is rather inappropriate and clumsy. How many of those who use it attach to it the same meaning and apply it in the same context? The expression makes a gross generalization, leads to misunderstanding and is, besides, sterile in that having become a sort of “buzzword”, it seems to cast a negative light on all the events that take place in the area in question.

Moreover, the term is, at best, a plagiarism: what in the forties, in the excitement over the burgeoning Arab identity, was called the “fertile crescent”, in reference to Hashemite federal projects, seems to

have provided a semantic basis for this ill-advised expression, which owes its popularity to that of its predecessor.

The expression, representative of a certain kind of political thinking, perpetuates through its first word, “crescent”, a serious error: the crescent is the symbol of Islam, and in the expression “crescent of crisis” it has the immediate effect of homogenizing the fundamental differences which exist not only between the countries that compose it, but also within the Islamic religion itself.

Dangers

Our sole purpose in attacking this popular expression is to warn against the dangers of what is termed the “buzzword pattern”, which, by giving rise to the assumption that one has understood the situation, results in serious distortions of the truth, both intentionally and unintentionally. When such a process provides the framework or basis of political thinking within a government, it generally leads to political decisions which are based on an erroneous though accepted view of reality.

In the case of the “crescent of crisis” and the homogenization mentioned above, we are led to believe that the area described contains similar, if not identical, entities. A common denominator is held up in support of this claim: Islam and everything it represents as a dynamic and a static force. And to the extent that this subject has been studied within a single country, extrapolation does the rest, resulting in a dangerous and arbitrary generalization. The

Mr Vigny is Editor-in-Chief of the monthly magazine Informag and former Associate Editor of Le Devoir. The views expressed in this article are those of the author.

most blatant example is no doubt Iran, where the Peacock Throne occupied by the Pahlavis has been swept away by the liberating tide of Islam. More and more one is led to believe that what was true for Iran is also true for other countries, starting with Turkey. Trapped in this seemingly logical reasoning, one begins to speculate on the cloudy future of Saudi Arabia and, at the other end of the crescent, on that of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and so on, so that the effects of the "buzzword" are now combined with those of political generalization.

This is an absurd exercise which takes into account neither the true nature of Islam nor its internal differences. After minimizing this potential force for decades we are now trying to compensate by committing a second historical error. We were first guilty of default; now we are guilty of excess.

The truth is that Islam is not a monolithic religion, and that each of its sects has a cultural heritage distinctly different from the others — not to mention the fact that each ethnic and national entity endows its moral values with a specific set of aspirations and taboos.

To speak of Islam as an over-all common denominator is like speaking of Christianity as a monolithic whole. This would mean that the Huguenots and Catholics should never have been opposed for the simple reason that they belonged to the same religion.

Caught in a geopolitical situation where the search for national identity requires the rejection of Western objectives imposed by force or established through now-disgraced dictators, the masses are releasing a potential repressed for decades and, as is the case in Iran, are still in a state of general confusion. Through an understandable process of identification, they see the overthrown dictator as a Western presence, and by replacing a monarchy with a republic they believe they are rejecting Western-type government. In what way is a republic a less Western type of government, and in what way are parliamentary structures less Western than the overthrown empire and the government of one man? The opposite would no doubt be more true; otherwise history should be rewritten: the Sublime Porte and its government structure were Western inventions, the Ottoman Empire was a scheme of the Infidel, the caliphate following Mu'awiya was a heresy, and the history of Islam was a long succession of heresies until the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Ayatollah Rouallah Khomeini.

In other words, what we should examine in the expression "Islamic Republic" is not the concept of "republic" but that of "Islamic". Thus, when we Westerners assume that every monarchy, such as the Wahhabite in Saudi Arabia, is necessarily threatened by the religious force released in Iran, we are like wide-eyed spectators watching an illusionist.

Islam has always been governed by men who

hold in their hands both secular political power and the religious moral authority suggested by their title, "commander of believers". Thus, if developments in Iran constitute a threat to pro-Western regimes, it is not with regard to their political structure. A regime is endangered insofar as it follows the Western example and sacrifices its Islamic character to its ambitions and objectives. In this respect, a republic is threatened just as much as a monarchy, especially since nothing resembles a monarchy more than an authoritarian "republic" ruled with an iron hand and without opposition by a faction which is usually military.

Although today, by a coincidence — such as the one that provided the basis for the homogenization implied in the term "crescent of crisis" — the objectives are confused and Arab is considered the equivalent of Islam, it is important that a distinction be made not only between the categories of Islam, but also between what is Arab and what is not Arab in the context of the internal diversity of the Arab world.

Thus it would be just as reasonable to argue that Iraq and Syria have strengthened their ties in defence against a threat resulting from the traumatic experience of Iran as it would be to place this rapprochement in the context of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. For even though Egypt, because of its pro-American policy and its decision to recognize Israel, seems to provide an ideal target, the Kurdish problem in Iraq and the resulting Sunnite-Shiite rivalry, and the minority Alid government in Syria, which is primarily Sunnite, make these two countries ideal breeding grounds for an Islamic crisis.

It should also be pointed out that the 40-odd countries that take part in Islamic assemblies are more concerned with the problem of Islamic holy places in Jerusalem than with the threat that President Sadat represents to so-called Arab "solidarity", and that Saudi Arabia owes its position as leader not so much to its wealth as to its status as guardian of the holy places at Mecca and Medina, and for this reason claims the right to defend the mosques of Al-Aqsa and Omar in Jerusalem.

Roughly speaking, the question is: which country wishes to remain faithful to Dar al-Islam and which country has given its allegiance to Dar al-Harb?

Sects and identities

Two errors mark our perception of the Islamic religion. First of all, we generally confuse Arab and Moslem, since we discovered one at the same time as we discovered the other. The confusion is all the more understandable since the Arabs themselves have propagated the belief that the only Moslems are Arabs. Secondly, our mental picture of Islam is that of a vague, indistinct whole which contains a reality. What we forget is that the reality has no internal unity.



AP Photo

The Ayatollah Khomeini is silent and alone aboard a chartered plane that flew him back to Iran from France on February 1 to end fourteen years of exile.

The first error corrects itself when we realize that Indonesia and Pakistan alone account for more Moslems than all the Arab countries combined, or that some of the most devoutly religious Islamic communities are to be found among black African countries. It is not very flattering to Western Europeans, but some of the racist terms they employ are based on this misunderstanding. To state, therefore, that Arabs are Moslems, is to state a fact that serves as a basis for Arab nationalism itself, but to say a Moslem is of necessity an Arab is absurd.

At this point we encounter the weakness of the Islamic religion, which, integrating with amazing ease different cultures, languages and traditions, often envelops them superficially, adapting itself to local rituals and celebration, of which the Iranian Nowrouz is a good example.

Since Arabic is the language of the revealed book, one can understand how the Arab speaker should be considered a Moslem. But is the language of the revelation meant to be understood, or is it merely a ritual to be memorized? In other words, is this language a means of communication between non-Arab Moslems? It is interesting to note in this regard that Mustafa Kemal, wanting to secularize Turkey, instituted a Latin alphabet.

The point we are trying to make is that by calling themselves "Islamic", Moslems no doubt reinforce the Westerner's second error regarding Islam, but

also give rise to a second question: what kind of Islam? For although religion serves as a major unifying force in relations with the outside world, the world of the Infidel, or Dar al-Harb, the differences that divide it and the irresistible currents that run through it make it, in the longer term, a divisive element which surfaces at the political level.

True, in order for someone to call himself a Moslem he need only profess that there is no God but Allah and that Mohammed is his Prophet (La ilaha illa Allah Mouhammad Rassoul Illah); accept the Kelem Allah, or Koran, as the undisputable word of God revealed to Mohammed by the angel Gabriel; recite the five daily prayers and participate in the special congregational prayer on Friday; fast a Ramadan; perform the pilgrimage to Mecca and give alms; celebrate the feasts of Islam (the Mawled, the Id as-Saghir and the Id al-Kabir, and the Achoura) and fight, when necessary, a holy war, or "Jihad". But here the differences begin.

For example, the teachings and works of Mohammed as witnessed by his first disciples were collected as a supplement to the Koran. These "hadith", which constitute the "Sunna", were rejected by the Shiites but accepted by the Sunnites, who acquired their name from these writings.

Since this is not a course on Islam, I will limit myself to mentioning the four major schools of thought: the Maliki, Hanbali, Shafi and Hanafi.

As for the origin of the Shiite sedition (the word "shi'a" means "sedition") let us recall that after the death of Mohammed, Ali, the Prophet's son-in-law, cousin and heir, had the caliphate taken away from him by Mu'awiya, the prefect of Damascus. The partisans of Ali, a martyr, went on to form three main dissenting branches, and agreed that the first three caliphs who had succeeded Mohammed, namely Abu Bakr, Omar and Uthman, were usurpers, since the quality of "imam" could only be found in the family of Ali. They moreover considered Ali equal to Mohammed in holiness. Lastly, they rejected the Sunna as a supplement to the Koran.

Although one should be wary of extreme generalizations, it should be noted that "Shiism" is a sort of poor cousin within Islam. In strictly political terms this means that in a given Arab society, the middle class is of the Sunnite faith, while the poor masses are Shiite.

This is the case, for example, in the Moslem society of Lebanon, although in a predominantly Shiite society the situation would obviously be different. I would also point out that this insurmountable religious difference is also rooted in ethnic differences and that in the case of Iran — which, though not an Arab society, does provide us with an example of Shiism which is typical in its Iranian form and zealous practice — it dramatizes the problem of Kurdish and Turkoman minorities.

As for the *Ismailians*, they are an esoteric sect with their own interpretation of the Koran. They believe that the principles of the soul and universal reason are accessible only to prophets and imams. This transmigration is supposed to climax with the coming of the Mahdi, or Messiah, an incarnation to be hoped for by the faithful and feared by their oppressor. The Ismailians limit to seven the number of legitimate imams, inheritors of the Prophet's authority. The seventh, Ismail, however, died at the end of the eighth century without being able to transmit his divine quality. His followers therefore refused to believe in his death and insisted that he had merely disappeared, and formed this sect (whose leader, the Aga Khan, is known to the world for an entirely different reason) which claims that Ismail will return as the Mahdi.

The *Druzes*, who are concentrated in Lebanon, Syria and Israel, form a branch of Ismailism.

Another dissident sect, smaller but with a zealous following, is that of the *Kharijites*, who are often compared to the Quakers. They are especially concentrated in Oman, Muscat, Djerba, Zanzibar and Tripolitania.

There are also other sects, such as the Najarite, the Mutazilite, the Jabrite, and so forth.

This division of Islam into sects goes hand in hand with the influence of the monastic orders, of whose structure we know little, but whose power is undeniable. Today we hear most often about the "Akhuân al-Muslimin", or Moslem Brothers of Egypt, yet these "Khuans" (literally "brothers") are spread throughout the Islamic territory, and their order, the *Sufi*, has undertaken to call all believers to the truth.

In North Africa it is *Maraboutism* (the Marabout is a descendant of the shérif and is considered to belong to the family of the Prophet) which has pros-



AP Photo

Once back in Iran the silence is over for Khomeini. He is pictured here engulfed by supporters on arrival at Tehran's Mehrabad airport from Paris.

pered and assumed the leading role. The head of the brotherhood expects, and receives, total submission from his faithful, being considered divine.

There are, moreover, five basic religious orders: the Qadiriyyah, the Khelwatiyyah, Shadhiliyyah, Naqshbandiyyah and Suhrawardiyyah, and their branches are numerous.

Lastly, it was not surprising that the proliferation of sects and dissident groups should lead to the appearance of reform movements advocating a return to the sources of tradition and, in particular, the re-establishment of theocratic authority. At the head of these reform movements was the Wahhabi sect, to which belongs the royal family of Saudi Arabia, whose founder, Mohamed Ibn Sa'ud, embraced this doctrine. The common factor in these reform movements is perhaps the encouragement they gave to national emancipation — what we could call today national "liberation".

Driving force

The purpose of this brief glance at Islam is to establish by disproving the homogeneity of the phenomenon — namely the religion, its practice, and the values it represents — that Islam, both in the Arab and non-Arab world, serves as the seed of nationalism and, once this nationalism has been awakened, becomes its driving force.

Although the doctrinal controversies and "seditious" interpretations within Islam are insurmountable, religion is nevertheless a unifying element in the face of Western intrusion. It should also be noted that according to Islam, Marxist-Leninist ideology is also a pernicious Western invention and, more than that, the product of what today is still referred to as "international Jewry". This paradox may be found in yet another context: the designation "Zionist-imperialist" supposedly applies to Israel and the United States, yet some Islamic countries are allied to the Soviet Union, whose ideology is an "invention of the Jews" for the purpose of world domination. What is even more noteworthy is the fact that atheist Marxist-Leninist ideology is, according to Islam, a form of influence to be fought even more vigorously than the infidel and materialistic, but nevertheless monotheistic, capitalist forces. Infidel does not mean unbelieving, which explains Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's statement that the area should be rid of atheists, namely the Soviets; for Arabs, Jews and Americans — especially Jimmy Carter — have a common belief, if not a common religion.

In order to combat the intrusive and degrading influence of the West, whose exactions have been accompanied by a weakening of religious practice in Dar al-Islam, one must return to the unchanging values and principles of the Koran, which is not only a religious book, but also the inviolable sum of all social rules. It was this that led the Moslem Brothers

in Egypt to state well before the proclamation of an Islamic republic by the Ayatollah Khomeini, that "the Koran is our constitution".

In other words, and contrary to the claims of some, the anti-Western movement and the repudiation of its values is due to a return to Islamic sources, that is, an attempt to revive the dream of Arab greatness through conservative religious zeal.

In the final analysis, this means two things: that this nationalism will inevitably come into conflict with another nationalism, also inspired by Islam but grounded in a different, if not opposite, tradition; and that two anti-Western Islamic movements will not necessarily converge, but may, at a future date, find themselves radically opposed and attempting to renew ties with the West, whose influence would have been curtailed in the preceding period.

Thus one may turn to Mustafa Kemal for an example and conclude that, after 60 years, this "absurd theology", which should be eradicated, is more alive than ever, and if Sunnite Turkey is threatened by instability, it is certainly not because of a disease contracted from the virus that attacked Shiite Iran. Turkey has been carrying the painful seeds of an identity crisis for 60 years.

The bloody conflicts in Afghanistan, which is now a Marxist country, are an indication of the fact that this ideology comes into conflict with religious authorities and principles, and that, from one ethnic group to another, the rejection of this imported prototype begins with heightened religious feeling.

On the other hand, to return to our previous argument, the threat is not to a particular kind of regime, but is inversely proportional to the intensity of Islamic practice. This clearly explains — and here it is the surprise of the "observers" which is surprising — why, after Egypt and Israel had made peace, it was Saudi Arabia that took over the leadership of the states hostile to this "betrayal" of Arab Islam. The very concept of moderation when one speaks of Islamic regimes is a pitifully self-centred one, and it leads to a chain of errors. For although a given country may, in a given matter, adopt the American point of view, this so-called moderation affects only a superficial detail, and has little bearing on that regime's philosophy. Thus, the more "moderate" of two régimes is not necessarily the one that refuses to increase the price of its oil while proclaiming its religious leadership, but perhaps the one that increases the price while proclaiming its indifference to religious faith. A Wahhabite reformist is a nationalist in the full sense of the word, since his nationalism is based on Islam, whereas a supposedly extreme nationalist socialist is in a precarious position and no doubt sees socialism as a rapid means of attaining his ends.

In these circumstances, if the crescent is a symbol of anything, it is the symbol of the crescent moon of Islam.

The agony of Nicaragua

by James Guy

Revolution is very much a catchword in Latin America, although few of the republics have actually experienced one. In an area of the world where political violence is one of the only means of accelerating progress towards modernity, frequent *golpes de estado* (coups) are often erroneously considered as revolutionary. In most cases these *golpes* and *cuartelazos* (barracks revolts) merely shift power from one elite to another without affecting the daily lives of the peasants and urban dwellers. However, Nicaragua's painful 1979 upheaval has all the indications of a real revolution: the political, social and economic fabric of Nicaraguan society appears to have been irrevocably altered. Out of this revolutionary holocaust, which rendered all "Nicas" equally superfluous, emerged a Nicaragua that will never be the same again. Indeed the violent and chaotic events that led to the exile of Anastasio ("Tachito") Somoza Debrayle and members of his family in July have traumatized this nation far beyond any other experience in its history and will continue to do so for many years to come.

The immediate human costs are enormous, with approximately 15,000 people killed, 600,000 forced to flee their homes, the destruction of villages, towns, and cities, and the termination and ruin of many businesses. In spite of the victory of the Sandinistas, political nihilism is rampant in this largest of Central American republics. People have witnessed and experienced the mass execution of infants, children, peasants and soldiers, the brutal torture of political prisoners, arbitrary murder, detentions and the denial of civil liberties. All of these atrocities have left an indelible mark on the collective psyche of a nation that has moved from a ruthless personalistic authoritarianism to an amorphous totalitarianism. It may be some time before any positive attributes of this transition can be isolated and analyzed. But what is certain is that Nicaragua has not developed the institutions and traditions of democratic rule since it achieved independence as a separate state in 1838. Until recently the only detectable characteristic of 'political stability' in the Nicaraguan political system was the mere fact that one family had been able to maintain control for more than four decades. The

important question now is what institutions, if any, will emerge to fill the political vacuum left by the demise of the Somoza family.

The Dynasty

United States Marines intermittently occupied Nicaragua for about 19 years between 1912 and 1933 in order to "restore order" and "protect American lives and property". Six years before the final departure of the Marines the U.S. created the National Guard and approached a jovial pro-American Liberal, Anastasio "Tacho" Somoza Garcia to take charge. One of "Tacho's" first acts in consolidating his command of the guard would prove to sow the seeds of destruction for himself and for his son "Tachito" some 45 years later. On February 21, 1934, he ordered the execution of the charismatic Augusto Cesar Sandino who led peasant troops against the Marines during the second occupation. More than 20 years later, on September 21, 1956, a young Nicaraguan poet and follower of Sandino, Rigoberto Lopez Perez, assassinated Somoza Sr. during his fourth bid for re-election as president. After another 20-odd years the Marxist guerrilla movement which formed the major ground swell of opposition to "Tachito" Somoza also took its inspiration from Sandino and rallied around the Sandinist Front of National Liberation (FSLN) which had been formed in 1962.

The decade after the death of "Tacho" saw his two sons, Luis and Anastasio, run Nicaragua. Luis had been president of the Congress and constitutionally designated to fill the presidency at the time of his father's death. He had received his formal education at the Universities of California, Louisiana State and Maryland; his democratic reformism irritated his younger brother, Anastasio, a graduate of West Point, by nature a tough-minded authoritarian, who feared the ramifications of Luis' liberal politics. As com-

Dr. Guy is an Associate Professor of Political Science and a founder of the Centre for International Studies at the College of Cape Breton. He teaches courses on Latin American Politics and Canadian Foreign Policy. The views expressed here are those of Dr. Guy.



AP Photo

Ousted from power in Nicaragua, Anastasio Somoza holds a press conference in July at his Miami Beach residence. His son Julio Somoza (standing) listens in.

mander of the National Guard, Anastasio had the power to prevent his brother from continuing to implement his policies of democratization and modernization. Thus as a compromise between the two, from 1963 to 1967 two puppet presidents succeeded one another as "moderate liberal reformers" and administrators of the policies and programs of Luis Somoza. Dr. Rene Schick Gutierrez was elected president in 1963 and his vice-president, Lorenzo Guerrero, succeeded Schick upon his death in 1966. Luis died unexpectedly of a heart attack in 1967 and "Tachito" — after a thoroughly rigged election — ascended to the presidency. Commenting on his electoral victory, two *Los Angeles Times* columnists prophetically referred to "Tachito" Somoza as "the worst of the dynasty".

Somoza's tendency to use police brutality and military power to quell opposition to his government did not win him much popularity. This, coupled with his exploitation for personal profit of the 1972 earthquake that struck Managua by selling international relief supplies and land to the dispossessed, did little to endear him to the people.

National Guard

The five-star-general *cum* president began to encounter violent opposition to his government and his

dictatorial ways quite early in the 1970s. The powerful 12,000-man Nicaraguan National Guard (a combination army and national police force) was at the heart of the crisis. Commanded by both "Tachito" and his half-brother Colonel José Somoza, the Guardsmen were one of the most modern, best-trained military forces in all of Latin America. On a *per capita* basis the numbers of Nicaraguan recruits the U.S. trained in the Canal Zone and at Rio Hato were greater than those of any other military or police force in the Western Hemisphere.

Reports of human rights violations by the Guardsmen emerged almost from the first day "Tachito" took office. Any declared opposition to the regime was threatened by the National Guard. The conclusions of the OAS Inter-American Commission on Human Rights were definitive about the commission's findings on the use of torture and execution by the Guardsmen. Notwithstanding the toned-down nature of its resolution, the United Nations General Assembly condemned human rights violations in Nicaragua in December 1978, even though the U.S. abstained on the resolution. The Nicaraguan Permanent Commission on Human Rights constantly reported the disappearance of people. Many of the most obvious violations of human rights were conveyed by the

Nicaraguan Red Cross which often witnessed these atrocities. The Washington office on Latin America which had been monitoring human rights violations in its publication *Update: Latin America* wrote that "almost every single human rights violation reported from Nicaragua has been attributed to the National Guard".

Historically the Somozas had been quite successful in governing Nicaragua by operating under three facades: they claimed to be the allies of competitive organized labour; they pretended to be progressive and liberal; and they projected the image of themselves as statesmen who were devoted to the socio-economic independence of Nicaragua.

In actual fact, peasant and urban labour had progressed only marginally since the Somozas came to power in the early 1930s. Like most groups that tried to organize under the tight scrutiny of the regime, they acquired no political anchorage in the system. The ubiquitous presence of the Somozas in the businesses of Nicaragua made labour an important asset to the family. It has been estimated that over one-sixth of the Nicaraguan economy was directly controlled by family businesses; the national jet airline, shipping companies, two seaports, construction and cement companies, import franchises and important agricultural-export concerns. The awesome economic power of the Somozas went beyond the borders of Nicaragua with large holdings in the United States and Europe. But domestically, all roads led to a Somoza enterprise. It is not surprising then that the political system worked to discourage organized activities which may have threatened the regime, thus fostering ignorance and defencelessness.

When the Alliance for Progress was transferring funds to Latin American nations that took on the trappings of democracy, the Somozas paid lip service to peasant needs. However, the monies never funded peasant initiatives because the family blocked allocations and redirected them to their own interests. So in 1964 a non-governmental organization, the Institute for Human Promotion (IMPRHU) was started to raise the consciousness of the peasants by educational programs and occupational incentives. But the Somozas sabotaged its activities whenever they could and set up legal road blocks in its operations. In 1975 the Somozas, with the assistance of the United States, established the Institute of Peasant Welfare (INVIerno) to improve the lot of the rural poor. Many of the work projects undertaken by INVIerno were strategically placed in areas of major guerrilla activity and were designed to neutralize and dismantle guerrilla influence. The organization, however, proved ineffective.

Opposition

Nicaragua's urban labour force is barely distinguishable by advantage when compared with its rural

cousin. Ideologically, labour has tended to be internally fragmented by extreme right- and left-wing factionalism. The Somozas constantly monitored the 30,000-member workers' movement in order to detect any dangerous cohesions in its organization. But disunity was built into the organizations that comprised



AP Photo

Sandinista guerillas raise their weapons in a victory salute on the Leon highway outside Managua after the fall of General Somoza.

the movement. For example, the Marxist Independent General Confederation of Labour (CGTI) with its 12,000 members could not come to terms with the government-patronized General Confederation of Labour (CGT) whose 10,000 members openly supported the Somozas. Thus a monolithic opposition against the Somozas from this sector of the economy was impossible.

The position of the Church was also relatively weak as an opposing force. Historically the Church tended to take a permissive stance on all governmental activities. The Church came to accept the Somozas and the Liberals as defenders of the status quo. Monsenor Alejandro Gonzalez y Robleto was not respected by Nicaraguans as a result of his open support of the Somozas. Since the early 1970s, however, the Church has manifested a reversal of its crucially conservative image. A newer and more progressive clergy challenged the government on a number of issues. It refused to endorse Somoza's "*continualismo*"; his determination to remain in power even though his constitutionally designated term of office had expired. The new Archbishop of Managua, Monsenor Miguel Orlando Bravo, openly denounced the regime in a number of pastoral letters and by boycotting official ceremonies. By 1979 the Church was committed to the overthrow of the president.

Effective opposition to Somoza first materialized in 1974 when the Democratic Union of Liberation (UDEL) was formed. Initially UDEL included all opposition parties and labour unions but was gradually joined by business, the Church and many other groups which reflected an almost universal cross-section of Nicaraguan society. Somoza's grip on Nicaragua was not seriously threatened, however, until after the assassination of the outspoken publisher of *La Prensa*, Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, in January 1978. Chamorro was a prominent political leader who only three months before his death had received the Columbia University Cabot Award for his journalistic contributions to the promotion of Inter-American co-operation. His assassination was the result of his declared intentions to "end the Somoza dictatorship and establish a regime in which pluralism would fit". The demise of Chamorro gave the Sandinistas the incentive they needed to speed up their militant activities and to galvanize all opposition groups against Somoza and the National Guard. They began by organizing a two-week general strike which virtually paralyzed Nicaragua and generated increasing support from the business communities. This activity gave the Sandinistas international visibility and focused world attention on the growing vulnerability of the Somoza regime.

One of the most successful "actions" undertaken by the Sandinistas resulted from President Carter's congratulation of the Somoza regime for its "improvement of local human rights." The guerrillas attacked

and occupied the National Legislative Palace in the centre of Managua, holding over a thousand bureaucrats and legislators hostage. Among the hostages were Somoza's cousin, Luis Pallais Debrayle, who was the deputy speaker of the Chamber of Deputies, and the president's nephew, José Somoza Abrego, the son of the former acting commander of the National Guard. Somoza conceded to a list of demands which further demonstrated the eroding strength of his government. This, in turn triggered a longer general strike and uprisings in most Nicaraguan towns and cities which ultimately forced Somoza to flee for his life.

Revolution

Interesting similarities can be isolated in the Cuban and Nicaraguan revolutions. First, in both cases the guerrilla forces remained small in number, defeating a formidable military dictatorship protected by a large contingency of combat-ready troops well armed by the United States. Even the military strategies developed during the two revolutions reveal striking resemblances. The basic strategy of the rebels was to harass isolated army positions, withdrawing immediately and then preparing ambushes for the pursuing troops. During this period the guerrillas established friendly relations with the peasants and urban dwellers to acquire food and supplies and to make certain that the location of the guerrillas would not be divulged to the enemy troops. As with the case of Batista, the brutality of Somoza and the National Guard led to increased alienation of previously neutral citizens.

There are important differences as well. In the Nicaraguan insurrection the emphasis of the struggle was on urban terrorism, the guerrillas in the countryside playing only a secondary role. Castro, on the other hand, saw the priorities in the opposite order with the urban resistance supporting the rural guerrillas through financing, recruitment and supply. Secondly, the Nicaraguan revolution ensued in the absence of a charismatic leader; while in the case of Cuba the personal magnetism of Fidel resulted in the people's following him.

International effects

What is significant about the Nicaraguan revolution from an international perspective is the example to other nations of yet another successful guerrilla strategy as an efficacious way to achieve political change and modernization. In Latin America this is perhaps a result of the intransigent position taken by the United States *vis à vis* reformist governments of the leftist variety. In all cases where left-wing governments have emerged in Latin America by democratic — Guatemala, 1954, Chile 1970 — or nondemocratic means — Cuba, 1959 — the U.S. has intervened in the internal affairs of the country and attempted to overthrow the government. While President Carter

has publicly committed the United States to non-intervention in Nicaragua, his Administration has also adopted a wait-and-see position on the question of "normal relations" with the Sandinista junta. Certainly it is not in the interests of the U.S. to have another Cuba in the Western Hemisphere. Thus external intervention will continue to be within the realm of possibility, as either a multilateral effort led by the U.S. in the Organization of the American States or as a simple unilateral action.

Increasingly Latin American nations are showing their support for the new Sandinista government headed by Sergio Ramirez Mercado. The five members of the Andean Pact were particularly supportive during the insurrectionary stage of the revolution. One of its members, Venezuela, openly denounced Somoza and demonstrated its determination to help bring an end to the government. Venezuela also signed a Defence Pact with Costa Rica on September 15, 1978, to defend the sovereignty of Costa Rica and actually sent an arsenal of planes that were stationed near San José for a short time in order to dissuade Somoza from taking any military action against its neighbour.

A supportive OAS will be important to the fledgling Nicaraguan government in order for it to survive. It will also have to demonstrate its credibility to the other members of the Central American Common Market (CACM), the Central American Monetary Union (CAMU) and the Organization of Central American States (ODECA).

It is also expected that the foreign policy positions of the new Nicaraguan government will call for an end to dependence on the United States. This means that Nicaragua will seek to diversify its external relations by developing ties with nations like Cuba and the Soviet Union. It may also mean that Nicara-

gua will turn to Canada should the U.S. develop trade difficulties with the new government over the question of nationalizing U.S. business interests. Canada recognized the government in July 1979 and is in a good position to help in the reconstruction of Nicaragua. Canada can provide Nicaragua with many of its present needs in the area of non-durable consumer goods, durable consumer goods, raw materials for industry and construction materials.

Development and technical assistance would immediately benefit some capital projects that were under way before the revolution, such as expansion of the water-supply system in Managua, reconstruction of Managua's Las Mercedes International Airport and the geothermal-energy development project at Momotombo.

Prior to the Revolution, between 1975 and 1977, Canada's trade with Nicaragua more than doubled. Imports grew from \$6,061 millions in 1975 to \$14,436 millions in 1977 and consisted mainly of bananas, cotton, fish and coffee. Exports increased from \$4,045 millions in 1975 to \$9,178 millions in 1977, most of which was newsprint, telecommunications equipment, cereals and motor vehicles. If a socialist Nicaragua is here to stay, Canada may discover that the trade benefits with this country are as abundant as with Cuba.

The Nicaraguan Revolution shows that a small nation can break out of its past and establish a new order. But this battered nation has many fundamental economic problems to solve; inflation now in excess of 25 per cent, food shortages, no growth expected from a Gross Domestic Product of \$2.1 billion, and dependence on a primary-product monoculture subject to the vicissitudes of the world market. No *caudillo* or *junta* — socialist or capitalist — can solve these problems in the short term; perhaps not even the long term.

Letter to the Editor

Epstein erred . . .

Dear Sir,

Mr William Epstein's interesting article in the March/April edition of *International Perspectives* about Canada's Disarmament Initiatives at the 33rd Session of the UN General Assembly contains one serious error of fact. He gives the voting figures for the Mexican resolution on SALT (33/910) and says that the 10 abstentions included the U.S., U.S.S.R., U.K. and France. This is quite untrue. The only abstainers were the East European group of countries (less Romania) and Malawi.

Terry Empson
British High Commission
Ottawa

The Andean group at the ten year mark

by Gordon Mace

In 1966, in response to a call sent out by Presidents Eduardo Frei of Chile and Carlos Lleras Restrepo of Colombia, the heads of state and government of the Andean countries — with the exception of Bolivia — met in Bogota to discuss problems connected with regional integration in Latin America. Three years after what came to be called the Little Summit of the Five Nations, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru signed the Cartagena Agreement, which set in motion the process of Andean sub-regional integration. Venezuela did not join the group until 1973.

On May 26, 1979, exactly ten years after the signing of the Cartagena Agreement, the heads of state of the member countries — except Chile, which withdrew from the Agreement in 1976 — met again in Cartagena to take stock and, in particular, to affirm the desire of each of the participating countries to speed up the integration process. It is, therefore, an appropriate time to look at the results of the first decade of integration in the Andean region, and at the same time to consider the future of the integration plan.

Bogota to Cartagena

The Bogota Declaration, signed on August 16, 1966, provided for the setting up of a Joint Commission whose purpose was to create a general framework for a sub-regional integration agreement in which the Andean countries were to take part. The countries concerned were not forming a clique at Bogota and withdrawing from the Latin American Free Trade Association. They were merely criticizing the LAFTA scheme of things, which they felt was geared too much to liberalization of trade and thus brought dispropor-

tionate benefits to the three largest countries of the region — Brazil, Mexico and Argentina. They proposed for themselves a separate system which would ensure them more rapid economic progress, so that they could in time participate in LAFTA on an equal footing with the three major countries.

In the Joint Commission discussions, which went on from 1967 to the signing of the Cartagena Agreement, there were two main schools of thought. The first, championed by Chile and Colombia, put priority on the use of mechanisms for liberalization of trade. This was an entirely logical position for these two countries since, being the most developed countries in the region, they would derive greatest benefit from liberalization of trade. The other countries, however, especially Peru, opposed this concept and championed an integration process geared to mechanisms designed to promote the economic development of each country so that gradually a balance could be established between the countries in the region. As often happens in such circumstances, negotiations resulted in a compromise satisfactory to all parties. The Constitutive Treaty, a faithful copy of the final compromise, was seen, however, to give a slight edge to the free trade aspect, since liberalization would be achieved automatically but member countries would have to decide on the schedule for implementation of the mechanism relating specifically to economic development.

Institutions

The Andean Group's first four years were very fruitful from the point of view both of the setting up of central institutions and of the general development of the integration process. At the beginning, observers made very positive statements about the promising future of the Andean Group. This optimism seemed justified at the time, although it was based only on analyses of the economic aspects of the integration process. The future of the Andean Group, in fact, seemed more assured than that of any previous integration experiments attempted in the Third World. The most astute observers noted that the reality of the Andean Group went far beyond that of the Cartagena Agreement. The integration process would

Dr. Mace studied at the Institut universitaire des hautes études internationales in Geneva. The Andean Group is the subject of his thesis, to be published shortly. Dr. Mace has done research and conducted interviews in Mexico City and the Andean countries. He is, at present, professor of political science at Laval University. This article reflects the author's personal opinions.

be based in fact on four pillars which, although of unequal strength, still constituted the four foundation stones of regional integration. These four pillars are: in the economic sphere, the Cartagena Agreement; in the cultural sphere, the Andres Bello Agreement; and in the social sphere, the Hipolito Unanue and Simon Rodriguez agreements.

In the field of economics, the Cartagena Agreement provided for the setting up of a Commission which would be the key organ in the community institutional structure. Made up of one principal representative from each member country, the Commission is responsible for formulating the main economic policies, and is chiefly responsible for supervising proper implementation of the Agreement. Its decisions require a two-thirds majority or, for important questions, unanimity. It is the Commission that assigns work projects to the Junta and, in the absence of a community court of justice, it acts as the organ for monitoring the legal aspects of the Cartagena Agreement and ensures that the member countries respect the obligations they have undertaken within the framework of the Agreement. The growing difficulties experienced by the Commission in carrying out the latter function have demonstrated to the members the importance of setting up a community court of justice as soon as possible. For various reasons the Commission has so far been unable to come to a decision to do so, but a recent work program of the Junta indicates that they will decide in favour of setting up the necessary mechanism by the end of 1979.

The Cartagena Agreement provided for the founding of a technical body, the Junta, which would be composed of three members to whom the Constitutive Treaty guaranteed total independence of action. The technical body also plays an important administrative and executive role, since besides performing all the functions of a permanent secretariat, the Junta conducts studies requested by the Commission and supervises implementation of the Agreement as well as of the Commission's decisions. The Andean Development Corporation was founded by a separate treaty, and it too constitutes an important community organization in the economic sphere. Subject to international law, the ADC is the first exclusively Latin American international financial organization. It began operation in 1970 with the primary object of facilitating the economic and social development of the member countries. Its activities in this sphere are carried out through technical and financial assistance; priority is given to industrial development.

The other organs of the Cartagena Agreement — the Economic and Social Advisory Committee, the Consultative Committee and the various councils — are advisory bodies, as their names indicate. It must be said that for various reasons they have to date been unable to play the full role expected of them.

Finally, other community institutions have also

been set up for cultural and social activities. The Andres Bello Agreement, signed by the representatives of all the Andean countries at the beginning of 1970, governs community relations in the fields of education, science and culture. Article 34 of the Agreement stipulates that all regional educational, scientific and cultural activities will be co-ordinated by a number of permanent community agencies. The most important of these is the Conference of Ministers of Education, which plays a role similar to that of the Commission of the Cartagena Agreement. This "Council of Ministers" is backed by a co-ordination office, a committee of national directors of planning and a number of joint commissions. In the health and labour sectors, the Hipolito Unanue and Simon Rodriguez agreements provide for community structures, similar to that of the Andres Bello Agreement, for everything relating to co-ordination of regional activities in these spheres.

Chief mechanisms

Although the priorities of the region have forced the Andean countries to devote most of their efforts to economic activities, the member countries have still considered it necessary, from the beginning of the integration process, to take an interest in educational and cultural matters. The leaders of these countries soon learned that education and culture could perform an important role in establishing regional solidarity and at the same time play a significant part in the transformation of economic structures. That is why, despite the shortage of funds available to them for this purpose, the governments of the member countries did not hesitate to carry out programs in each of these fields. An effort at harmonizing school systems has been made, which has made possible the establishment of a system of diplomas valid in all member countries, and has promoted the use of common textbooks in various subjects at the primary level. An International Integration Institute and an Andean Entrepreneurs' School have also been founded. It should be noted, further, that there is already close co-operation between the various cultural institutes and that the member countries have implemented a training and research program in social communications. Lastly, a Commission of Higher Education has been set up for the entire region and, following the signing of the University Compromise of Trujillo in 1974, an Andean Association of Universities has also been established. Naturally these steps are only a beginning, but to realize their full importance we have to remember that the Andean countries have never really been associated in the past and that animosity still persists in the region as a result of the scars of border conflicts. Much remains to be done on the cultural level, but the efforts already made deserve high praise in a venture so complex that the results

are hard to quantify, and whose impact will only be felt in the long term.

The governments of the Andean countries have also resolved to co-ordinate their efforts in the fields of labour and health. Although their activity in these sectors has been on a smaller scale, they have agreed to give special attention to problems of co-ordinating labour and social security policies, to measures designed to facilitate manpower mobility and to occupational training systems. These intentions, first set forth in the Quito Declaration, have been followed through in the Lima Program of Action adopted in 1975 by the Third Conference of Labour Ministers. In the field of community health, the Hipolito Unanue Agreement has already given rise to interesting developments such as the formulation of health legislation applicable to all of the Andean region and the adoption of a common policy on pharmaceutical products. Close co-operation has also been developed in the field of assistance to disaster areas, and the member countries have agreed to exchange information and to co-operate closely in the repression of use and, more especially, traffic of narcotics.

Although the above measures are being carried out, it is natural that the member countries have considered it necessary to devote most of their integration efforts to the economic sphere. In this area, the basic community model, as defined in 1969, reflected quite faithfully the approach of the Economic Commission for Latin America. The thinking of the ECLA, strongly influenced by economist Raul Prebisch, stressed the necessity for Latin America to concentrate its efforts on industrial development through substitution of imports and a gradual increase in exports of finished and semi-finished products. In keeping with this line of economic thought, the leaders of the Andean countries devised a community model of economic development which was termed in Lima "rationalization of capitalism", in that the play of the free market was to go hand in hand with intervention by the State as chief agent in the assignment of resources.

This model was put into action by the adoption of a number of basic mechanisms. The first of these is the regional trade liberalization program, to be applied automatically and according to schedules set by the Constitutive Treaty. It covers about 6,000 products grouped under various headings and due to be liberated according to the appropriate schedule for each of the categories. In this regard liberalization of trade is surely the most successful mechanism of the Andean Group to date. In 1976, Colombia, Chile and Peru had already achieved five annual ten-per-cent tariff reductions. This made possible an increase in regional trade from \$143 million in 1969 to \$817 million in 1974. Of course, the total of regional sales is still low, but the action is interesting and promising in that it has made possible a diversification of regional

trade. This has made more room for manufacture products and non-traditional export goods, a significant change if we look at the total trade of the Andean countries with non-member countries, 95 per cent of which is still in primary commodities and traditional exports.

A second important mechanism of the Cartagena Agreement is the adoption of a common external tariff. In the beginning, it was planned that this common tariff would not be applied before 1980, because of the enormous difficulties in harmonizing the tariff structures of the various member countries. That is why the Commission, through its Decision 30, decided on the adoption of a minimum common external tariff which was applied by Colombia, Chile and Peru in 1970. This exercise was to serve as a dry run for future application of the real common external tariff. It had limited success, however, although the measure did not impose any real constraints on the member countries. Application of the common external tariff was postponed several years by the Lima Protocol of 1976 because some participating countries objected to the proposed tariff structure and level. The Commission resumed discussion on this subject a few months ago and it is possible that it will soon make a statement on the matter.

No doubt the most important mechanism of the Cartagena Agreement, and certainly the most original, is industrial programming. This is the instrument by which the Andean countries plan jointly the industrial development of the region. The seven major sectors reserved for industrial programming are primary metallurgy and non-metallic minerals, chemistry and petrochemistry, timber, pulp and paper, metal-working, the electrical and electronic industry and lastly the food industry. Two major types of programs are implemented in each of these sectors. Industrial rationalization programs are aimed, as their name suggests, at rationalizing the production of existing industries in these sectors. Somewhat neglected in the beginning, these programs have been growing in importance in the last few years, as evidenced recently by the setting up of a department of industrial rationalization in the Junta. Sectoral programming, for its part, deals with future production, and its main objective is to lay the foundations for an industrial specialization in which all the member countries will be able to participate equally.

By no means all the objectives of industrial programming have been reached. Only three sectoral programs had been approved at the time of writing, for example. This delay cannot really be blamed on the member countries themselves, but appears to be due rather to the novelty and complexity of a mechanism that has never been tried before in any other regional integration scheme. It is certainly too early to speak of failure in this area.

Another original mechanism has to do with the

preferential treatment given the relatively less-developed countries, that is, Bolivia and Ecuador. Because its scope is so extensive, this mechanism involves the Andean Group in an integration process entirely different from any before it. The preferential treatment affects most elements of the Cartagena Agreement, and to date it seems to have been implemented successfully by the member countries. The recent Decision 119, which instituted a special program of support to Bolivia, is a good example of the vitality of this measure. However, implementation of preferential treatment has not been a complete success in all fields: the Bolivian representatives on the Commission have noted negligence on the part of certain participating countries in isolated sectors such as regional trade and sectoral programming.

The last major mechanism is the harmonization of economic and social policies. Important steps have been taken in this area, in particular in the fields of industrial property and development, tariff nomenclature and export financing, agricultural product marketing, physical infrastructure and communications. The best known measure in this field of policy harmonization must be the adoption of a regional code of foreign investment and technology transfer. This action aroused comment and criticism which has only been quieted with the gradual dilution of the principal measures of the code. It is evident, however, that the mechanism of economic and social policy harmonization has not been a priority during the first years of existence of the Andean Group. This is to be expected at first, but it is certain that if progress is to be made in this area in future, an effort will have to be made to produce greater homogeneity of social and economic structures in each of the member countries.

Difficult years

The first four years of the Andean Group's activity saw spectacular progress in the movement towards integration. It is quite usual for such a plan to move full speed ahead in the setting-up stage. The founding of community institutions and the rapid adoption of certain important measures helped to create a climate of optimism and unbounded confidence in the future of the Andean Group. This attitude also prevailed among the Andean technocrats, that is, all the regional officials and national negotiators who were involved, closely or remotely, in the integration process and who shared a common willingness to ensure the success of the venture. Lastly, the fairly strong similarity between the political intentions of the governments of Bolivia (until 1972), Chile and Peru also explains the success of this initial stage of the Andean Group.

Beginning in early 1974, however, the situation became more complicated. In fact, it can be said that the integration process came to a standstill from 1974 to 1976. The first reason for this situation was a technical one involving Venezuela's entry into the Andean

Group. This entry, which the Government of Caracas had been obliged to delay under the pressure of the powerful Fedecamaras, had forced the Junta, in 1972, to devote a significant proportion of its time to studying and adapting existing regional programs. The new membership involved the reworking of several of the Cartagena Agreement mechanisms, and this prevented the Junta from concentrating on analysis of the proposals it was expected to make before the 1975 deadlines, in particular concerning the common external tariff and industrial programming.

The second reason was the serious deterioration of the international economy, beginning in 1973. The Andean countries, particularly those who were oil importers, were hard hit by the crisis. But they were not alone; all the underdeveloped countries were suffering from the situation — petroleum derivatives represent a large proportion of these countries' imports. Most of the Andean countries became more cautious in view of the economic situation and they hesitated to continue supporting integration mechanisms that might make the region less attractive to foreign investors who had, it was said, become more selective in their investments because of the scarcity of capital. However, the most important factor in the crisis came from within the Andean region itself. The Andean Group's image had deteriorated badly since the early seventies. At that time, three countries made up what could be called the driving force behind the integration process. These three — Bolivia under the Torres government, Chile under President Allende and Velasco's Peru — had, in varying degrees, come to adopt strongly nationalistic economic policies and had thus wanted to shape the regional economic model in line with their concerns. Thus it was the delegations of these countries on the Commission, and chiefly the delegation from Peru, that insisted on and obtained a decision in favour of control of foreign investments and transfers of technology.

The situation soon changed, however, with the coming to power of General Banzer's reactionary government in Bolivia at the end of 1971. Later, in September 1973, came General Pinochet's *coup d'état* in Chile. Thus, at the beginning of 1974, there were only two nationalist governments remaining in the Andean Group, those of Venezuela and Peru, while the latter was becoming increasingly entangled in an extremely difficult economic situation.

In 1972, the new Bolivian government had begun to call for a softening of some of the provisions of the Cartagena Agreement. Bolivia said, with justification, that it had not benefited as much as its partners from the first sectoral program relating to the metal-working industry. It also demanded profound changes to the foreign investment code, which was in opposition to an economic policy the new government was then trying out and which was subsequently adopted through that government's acceptance of the Musgrave

report. The new Chilean government, for its part, had taken pains at the beginning to make known its enthusiasm for the regional integration process. However, as 1974 wore on and more especially in 1975, it became clear that Chile's new economic development model was fundamentally incompatible with the regional model as defined in 1970.

The passing of the deadline, at the end of 1975, for adoption of the common external tariff and the entire industrial program served as a pretext for Chile, supported by Colombia, to challenge the entire community economic model followed to that point. The situation, which had begun to grow worse in mid-1974, now became critical for the future of integration. Chile, inspired by the "Chicago Boys", demanded no less than the abolition of the foreign investment code, an average common tariff protection not exceeding 10 to 20 percent in general, and the elimination of the State's role as an agent of economic development.

Although some countries, in particular Bolivia and Colombia, wanted to see a softening of the Constitutive Treaty, none of the member countries could share Chile's extreme position. All were prepared to make certain concessions so that Chile could remain in the Andean Group and thus make more flexible the elements of the regional model that, from the outside, appeared too nationalistic. After several months of intensive but fruitless negotiation, the Five resolved in to put pressure on Chile by signing the Additional Protocol of Lima, which had been provided for by Commission Decision 100. The reaffirmation of the intentions of the Five in the Bocaya Declaration of August 1976 did not succeed in shaking the Chilean government's firm stand. There was no choice but to draw the appropriate inferences, and it was decided that Chile would withdraw from the Cartagena Agreement. Thus, more than technical difficulties, and more than the effects of the difficult international economic

situation, the change in the economic development models of some member countries was the real reason for the grinding to a halt of the Andean integration process and for the profound changes in the regional economic development model.

The future

The Additional Protocol of Lima, reinforced by later Commission decisions, resulted in severe dilution of the regional economic program as it had been defined and implemented at the beginning of the seventies. The Andean Group is no longer what it was. The loss of one of its member countries has damaged its prestige and the new regional economic model it has adopted no longer seems to be a fitting instrument for the pursuit of independent development.

Consequently, it is difficult to share the optimism expressed by one of the members of the Junta in an interview last fall. The truth is that the Andean Group has been unable to avoid the difficulties that have affected and sometimes destroyed integration experiments elsewhere in the Third World.

It is too early, however, to make a final assessment, for the game is far from over. An integration process is not a one-decade experience — witness the unfinished European Economic Community. If we compare the Andean experience to other integration attempts in the Third World, we find the Andean Group's results definitely superior.

Any regional integration process constitutes an open and changing system. Consequently, it is possible that, under the impetus of certain governments such as that of Venezuela and the new Ecuadorean government, the Andean Group will return to an economic development model geared much more than at present to a truly independent type of development. However, such a change in the situation is not foreseeable in the short term.

Reference Section

Canadian Foreign Relations

I. Recent Books

Actes du Colloque sur les relations du Canada et du Québec avec les Communautés européennes, Québec, 19-21 octobre 1978. Organisé par le Centre québécois de relations internationales (Québec) et L'Institut européen des Hautes Études internationales (Nice). Québec: Centre québécois de relations internationales, Université de Laval, 1979. 154 p. (Choix, 10.)

Antonides, Harry

Multinationals and the peaceable kingdom. Toronto/Vancouver: Clarke, Irwin, 1978. 248 p.

Biggs, Margaret and Bernard Wood

Trade in the 1980s: Canada, GATT and the Third World. Ottawa: North-South Institute, 1979. 5 p. (Discussion paper). Publié aussi en français

Consultative Committee on the Implications of Telecommunications for Canadian Sovereignty. *Telecommunication and Canada.* Ottawa: Department of Communications 1979. 98 p.

Canada's trade performance 1960-1977. Volume I: General developments. Ottawa: Economic Intelligence Group Policy Analysis Branch, Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce, 1978. 177 p. Publié aussi en français.

Diuvaldo, R. J. and S. J. Scheinberg

A study of Canadian-American defence policy, 1945-75: northern issues and strategic resources. Ottawa: Department of National Defence, Operational Research and Analysis Establishment, 1979.
115 p. (ORAE extra-mural paper, no. 6).

Dobson, Wendy

Exports to developing countries: an opportunity for Canada. Montreal: C. D. Howe Research Institute, 1979.
23 p. (HRI observations, 20).

Feldman, Elliott and Neil Neville

The future of North America, the United States, and Quebec nationalism. Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy: Cambridge, Mass.: Centre for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1979.
378 p.

Thent, Jocelyn Maynard

Canadian government participation in international science and technology. Ottawa: Science Council of Canada, 1979.
136 p. (Background Study, no. 44).

Hoberman, Steven

U.S. ownership of firms in Canada. C. D. Howe Research Institute, National Planning Association, 1979.
96 p. (Canada-U.S. prospects series).

Griffiths, Franklyn

A northern foreign policy. Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1979.
90 p. (Wellesley papers, 7).

Iannigan, J. B. and C. H. McMillan

The participation of Canadian firms in East-West trade: a statistical profile. Ottawa: Institute of Soviet and East European Studies, Carleton University, 1979.
60 p.

Jacobson, C. G.

Soviet strategic interests and Canada's northern sovereignty. Ottawa: Department of National Defence, Operational Research and Analysis Establishment, 1978.
102 p. (ORAE extra-mural paper, no. 4).

LePan, Douglas

Bright glass of memory. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1979.
245 p.

MacLeod, J. C.

Canada's international role in forestry. Ottawa: Canadian Forestry Service, Fisheries and Environment Canada, 1978.
43 p. (Canadian Forestry Service Information Report DPC-X, 6). Publié aussi en français.

Marchak, M. Patricia

In whose interests? an essay on multinational corporations in a Canadian context. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1979.
317 p.

Schlegel, John P.

The deceptive ash: bilingualism and Canadian policy in Africa: 1957-1971. Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1978.
463 p.

Science Council of Canada

From the bottom up: involvement of Canadian NGO's in food and rural development in the Third World. Prepared in co-operation with the Canadian Council for International Co-operation, 1979.
153 p.

Skidmore, Darrel R.

Canadian-American relations. Toronto: Wiley Publishers of Canada, 1979.
96 p. (Canada, origins and options).

Swainson, Neil A.

Conflict over the Columbia: the Canadian background to an historic treaty. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1979.
476 p.

Switucha, N. M.

COMECON's mineral development potential and its implications for Canada. Prepared for the Mineral Policy Sector, Department of Energy, Mines and Resources. Ottawa, 1978.
112 p. (Mineral Bulletin MR183).

II. Recent Articles

Adelman, Howard

"C.B.C. and the embassy issue." In *Middle East focus* vol. 2 no. 3 September 1979 pp. 3-5.

Bilodeau, R. J.

"Can Canada compete: an economic alternative for Canada." Speech delivered to the Canadian Organization for the Simplification of Trade Procedures, Ottawa — May 14, 1979. In *Vital speeches* 45:592-594 July 15, 1979.

Doxey, Margaret

"Human rights and Canadian foreign policy." In *Behind the headlines* vol. 37 no. 4 pp. 1-20.

Doyle, Kevin

"Free trade: the disappearing border." In *Maclean's* July 23, 1979 pp. 18-21.

Enders, Thomas O.

"The United States and Canada: comparisons and interrelations." Remarks at Stanford University, May 3, 1979. In *Department of State bulletin* vol. 79 no. 2027 June 1979 pp. 1-6.

Grenon, Jean-Yves

"L'accord-cadre entre le Canada et les Communautés européennes: une première juridique." In *Canadian year-book of international law/Annuaire canadien de droit international* vol. 16, 1978 pp. 304-314.

Hurtig, Mel

"Canada on a platter." In *Canadian business* vol. 52 no. 7 July 1979 pp. 36-39.

Jacomy-Millette, Annemarie

"Le rôle des provinces dans les relations internationales." In *Etudes internationales* 10:285-320 juin 1979.

Kirton, John

"Les contraintes du milieu et la gestion de la politique étrangère canadienne de 1976 à 1978." In *Etudes internationales* 10:321-349 juin 1979.

Macdonald, R. D. S.

"Inshore fishing interests on the Atlantic Coast: their response to extended jurisdiction by Canada." In *Marine policy* 3:171-189 July 1979.

MacGregor, Roy

"The honorable Flora." In *Maclean's* vol. 92 no. 36 September 3, 1979, pp. 17-21.

Ogelsby, J. C. M.

"A Trudeau decade: Canadian-Latin American relations 1968-1978." In *Journal of interamerican studies and world affairs* 21:187-207 May 1979.

Page, Don

"Unlocking Canada's diplomatic record." In *International journal* 34:251-280 spring 1979.

Sarna, A. J.

"The Canada-U.S. free trade option." In *Journal of world trade law* 13:303-310 July/August 1979.

Schroeder, Richard C.

"Canada looks south." In *Americas* vol. 31 no. 5 May 1979 pp. 50-56.

Schlegel, John P.

"Ottawa's Achilles heel: formulating policies in Southern Africa." In *Round table* no. 274:142-53 April 1979.

Scrivener, Robert C.

"International markets or die." In *Business quarterly* 44:72-75 summer 1979.

Shields, R. A.

"Canada, the Foreign Office and the Caribbean market, 1884-1895." In *Dalhousie review* 58:703-722 winter 1978-79.

Trudeau, Pierre Elliott

"Double allégeance du Canada: Francophonie et Commonwealth." In *Politique internationale* no. 2 1978/79 pp. 33-42.

Tynan, Thomas M.

"Canadian-American relations in the Arctic: the effect of environmental influence upon territorial claims." In *Review of politics* 41:402-427 July 1979.

Walker, John R.

"The chance in China." In *Report* vol. 2 no. 8 July/August 1979 pp. 26-27.

Waller, Harold M.

"A Jerusalem embassy?" in *Middle East focus* vol. 2 no. 3 September 1979 pp. 11-16.

Wright, Gerald

"Land of rigorous standards." In *Report* vol. 2 no. 9 September 1979 pp. 24-7.

Publications of the Department of External Affairs

The following are lists of the most recent publications of the Departmental Press Office and of the Information Service Division dealing with international affairs and Canadian foreign policy.

Press Releases, issued by the Departmental Press Office
Ottawa:

No. 49 (June 11, 1979) OECD Ministerial Council Meeting
Paris, June 13-14, 1979.

No. 50 (June 21, 1979) Ten Mayors to visit Europe, June 22-30.

No. 51 (June 28, 1979) Montreal's National Theatre for Children (Les Pissenlits) a success in U.S.S.R. and Switzerland.

No. 52 (June 28, 1979) Agreement between Canada and the EEC on mutual fisheries relations.

No. 53 (July 17, 1979) Canada-China student placement program.

No. 54 (July 6, 1979) Situation in Ghana.

No. 55 (July 6, 1979) Situation in Nicaragua.

No. 56 (July 18, 1979) The Canadian delegation at the resumed eighth Session of the Law of the Sea Conference.

No. 57 (July 24, 1979) Recognition of the Government of Nicaragua.

No. 58 (July 26, 1979) Canada-United States talks on transboundary air quality.

No. 59 (July 27, 1979) Diplomatic Appointments: L. M. Berry as High Commissioner in Singapore; W. Jenkins as Ambassador to Saudi Arabia; R. S. MacLean as Ambassador to Brazil; P. M. Roberts as Ambassador to Romania; A. R. Wright as High Commissioner in Bangladesh.

No. 60 (July 27, 1979) Termination of tariff preferences accorded South Africa.

No. 61 (August 3, 1979) Secretary of State for External Affairs to attend the National Ballet's debut season at Covent Garden.

Statements and Speeches, published by the External Information Programs Division:

No. 79/9 Relations with developing countries in an interdependent world. A speech by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Flor MacDonald, at the OECD Ministerial Council meeting, Paris, June 13 and 14, 1979.

No. 79/10 **Human Rights Violations and Refugees.** A speech by the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Allan Gotlieb, to the Canadian Human Rights Foundation, June 11, 1979.

No. 79/11 **Canadian Diplomacy in the 1980s: Leadership and Service.** A public lecture by the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Allan Gotlieb, under the joint sponsorship of the Centre for International Studies, University of Toronto, and the Canadian Institute for International Affairs, Toronto, February 15, 1979.

Treaty Information

Bilateral

Cameroon

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United Republic of Cameroon constituting an Agreement relating to Canadian investments in the United Republic of Cameroon insured by the Government of Canada through its agent, the Export Development Corporation

Yaounde, June 8, 1979

In force June 8, 1979

European Economic Community

Agreement on Fisheries between the Government of Canada and the European Economic Community

Brussels, June 8, 1979

Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters between the Government of Canada and the European Economic Community concerning their Agreement on Fisheries

Brussels, June 28, 1979

Spain

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of Spain constituting an Agreement by which Canada will become a participating Member State to the Agreement on the Participation Enhancement Project (PEP) and the Protocol of Execution signed at Madrid, January 23, 1979

Madrid, May 10 and June 6, 1979

In force June 6, 1979

United States

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America constituting an Agreement with respect to Article I of the Convention between Canada and the United States of America to regulate the level of the Lake of the Woods, signed at Washington on February 24, 1925

Ottawa, February 21, and June 19, 1979

In force June 19, 1979

Multilateral

Protocols for the Fifth Extension of the International Wheat Trade and Food Aid Conventions constituting the International Wheat Agreement, 1971

Done at Washington, April 25, 1979

Signed by Canada May 15, 1979

Canada's Instrument of Ratification deposited
June 15, 1979

Entered into force June 23, 1979 with respect to all provisions other than Articles 3 to 9 inclusive and Article 21, on July 1, 1979 with respect to Articles 3 to 9 inclusive, and Article 21 of the Convention

Final Acts of the World Administrative Radio Conference on the Aeronautical Mobile (R) Service, Geneva, 1978

Done at Geneva, March 5, 1978

Canada's Instrument of Approval deposited
July 10, 1979

Convention on Inter-American Institute for Co-operation on Agriculture

Signed at Washington, March 6, 1979

Canada's Instrument of Ratification deposited
July 11, 1979

Geneva (1979) Protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

Done at Geneva, July 11, 1979

Index 1979

Afghanistan

Implications of the Afghan *coup*, Mar./Apr., p. 12, Van Praagh

Asia

China: catching up with the world, Mar./Apr., p. 16, Reford & Reford
Japan, China and the U.S., Mar./Apr., p. 23, Quo
Sino-American normalization, Mar./Apr., p. 19, Vigny

China *see* Asia

Development

Federal-provincial co-operation in, May/Jun./Jul./Aug., p. 25, Svoboda

Disarmament (*see also* SALT)

Canada's disarmament initiatives, Mar./Apr., p. 3, Epstein
Test ban negotiations, Jan./Feb., p. 29, Kapur

Eastern Europe

Hungarian minority in Romania, Jan./Feb., p. 24, Pilisi;
May/Jun./Jul./Aug., p. 30 (letter), Taranu
Yugoslav ambivalence towards *détente*, Jan./Feb., p. 19, Friedman

Economy *see* World Economy

Energy

An international problem, Mar./Apr., p. 31, Lantzke

Europe *see* Eastern Europe and Western Europe

External Affairs (*see also* Development)

A central agency? May/Jun./Jul./Aug., p. 8, Dobell
Lament for Third Option, Mar./Apr., p. 35 (letter), Lyon
Ottawa views Third World, Jan./Feb., p. 11, Lyon, Byers & Leyton-Brown
Towards a foreign policy for the 1980s, May/Jun./Jul./Aug., p. 3, Roche

Federal-Provincial relations *see* Development

France

Future of Canada-France relations, Jan./Feb., p. 16, Bishop

Goldmann, Nahum *see* Middle East

Human Rights *see* Western Europe

Hungary *see* Eastern Europe

Lebanon *see* Middle East

Middle East

Goldmann, Nahum, *The Jewish Paradox*, Jan./Feb., p. 1 (review), Freifeld
Islam and the crescent of crisis, Sep./Oct./Nov./Dec., p. 30, Vigny
Peacekeeping in Lebanon, Jan./Feb., p. 3, Wiseman

Japan *see* Asia

Nicaragua

The agony of Nicaragua, Sep./Oct./Nov./Dec., p. 25, Gu

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Canada, NATO and the neutron bomb, Mar./Apr., p. 1, Macdonald

Romania *see* Eastern Europe

South America

Andean group at ten-year mark, Sep./Oct./Nov./Dec., p. 30, Mace

Strategic Arms Limitation (SALT) (*see also* Disarmament)

SALT resolution vote correction, Sep./Oct./Nov./Dec., p. 29 (letter), Empson

Trade *see* World Economy

United States foreign policy (*see also* Asia)

Carter and human rights, May/Jun./Jul./Aug., p. 2, Balthazar
Carter report card, Sep./Oct./Nov./Dec., p. 3, Foster Vorce

United Nations

Canada on the Security Council, May/Jun./Jul./Aug., p. 12, Barton
Recap of thirty-third Assembly, May/Jun./Jul./Aug., p. 17, Tanguay

Western Europe

Western Europe's "guest" workers, May/Jun./Jul./Aug., p. 28, Land

World Economy

Canada at the Tokyo Round, Mar./Apr., p. 27, Winham
Challenging the Economic Council, Sep./Oct./Nov./Dec., p. 15, Steeves
Future of growth in advanced societies, Jan./Feb., p. 1, Wright
International trade environment post MTN, Sep./Oct./Nov./Dec., p. 7, Clark
National interests and international system, Sep./Oct./Nov./Dec., p. 12, Matthews

Yugoslavia *see* Eastern Europe



Canada
Post
Postage paid

Postes
Canada
Port payé

Third **Troisième**
class **classe**
K1A 0S7
OTTAWA

If undelivered,

return cover only to:

Canadian Government Printing Office,
Ottawa, K1A 0S7, Canada

En cas de non-livraison,

retourner cette couverture seulement au:

Imprimerie du gouvernement canadien
Ottawa, K1A 0S7, Canada



External Affairs
Canada

Affaires extérieures
Canada

ISSN 0381-4874

BINDING SECT. OCT 22 1961

